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ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis investigates three exemplars of uxorial substantive privileges in the criminal law: 
the marital coercion doctrine, the intraspousal conspiracy exemption, and the uxorial post-
offence accessorial immunity. Their history, choreography and variations are comparatively 
investigated across the common law jurisdictions including the impact of statutory 
interventions. The principal argument is that the judicial and legislative treatment of these 
uxorial privileges has been inconsistent or erratic so that they are not the products of any 
systematic, modern development in the criminal law. This thesis proposes that there is no 
justification for their continued retention in common law legal systems. Archival, 
Parliamentary, and other sources have been used to identify the factors impinging upon the 
creation of specific statutory uxorial privileges. The diaspora of these laws throughout the 
other common law jurisdictions is investigated. The discussion is illustrated by examination 
of the particular issues raised by polygamy, customary law concubinage as well as by gender-
reassignment. This thesis examines whether both gender-specific and marriage-specific 
criteria are valid constituents within the parameters of substantive criminal law. It traces the 
genesis of these special defences within the criminal law available exclusively to women, 
from the time of King Ine of the West Saxons c712, to examine the current status of such laws 
throughout common law jurisdictions. The investigation explores factors shaping the creation 
of a statutory defence of marital coercion by the British Parliament in 1925 and outlines the 
challenges generated by that law and its extraordinary resilience. This thesis demonstrates the 
failure of the criminal law to provide an overarching construct to implement emergent gender 
equality. 
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STATEMENT AS TO PRIOR PUBLICATIONS 
 
 
 
 
Except as stated below, the text of this thesis has not been published in any form prior to its 
submission for examination. The following references are to prior publications by the author. 
 
(a) Footnote: Chapter  2 fn 266 refers to David Clark and Gerard McCoy ‘The Most 
Fundamental Legal Right: Habeas Corpus in the Commonwealth’ (2000) Clarendon 
Press, Oxford pp 97 – 102. 
 
(b) Footnote: Chapter 3 fn 155 refers to an Editorial Note in HKSAR v Au Yuen Mei 
[2000] 1 HKC 411, 412. 
 
Except for materials quoted, where quotations are indicated by the use of quotation marks and 
are attributed in footnotes, this thesis is entirely my own work.  
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UXORIAL PRIVILEGES IN SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This work aims to investigate existing uxorial privileges in substantive criminal law in 
common law jurisdictions. Three exemplars are focused upon: the marital coercion doctrine, 
the intraspousal conspiracy exemption, and the post-offence accessorial immunity. The thesis 
is whether these special rules of the substantive criminal law relating only to married women, 
are validly products of a systematic development of the law?  
 
The three privileges identified have existed in English common law for a millennium or so, 
before uneven intervention by statute, in relation to each, in the twentieth century. 
Investigation of historical legislative and policy sources has been necessary as most materials 
are not synthesised in secondary material in an effective way. The ascertainment of the 
original laws, their choreography and present status, has also required intensive research of 
primary court documents, because of the inadequacy or non-existence of relevant secondary 
works. The diaspora of those progenitive and durable common laws and their statutory 
successors-in-title are investigated. The quest is how and why these ancient laws have 
continued, in modern force, in providing to only wives both a gender-specific and status-
specific defence to criminal conduct. The scope of this work involves an analysis of positive 
law and related policy. What is not investigated, other than in an incidental way, is adjectival 
and procedural law, including the rules of evidence. Philosophical rationales are also outwith 
the scope of this work. The methodology invoked has been for the contemporary documents, 
text, caselaw, or legislative debate, to speak to identify the dynamic that contemporaneously 
influenced the turning points in the relevant laws, so as to be able to investigate whether those 
laws have been systematically developed or merely progressed or otherwise. 
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Chapter One provides a broad historical overview of uxorial substantive privileges in the 
criminal law from the law of King Ine (c712) of the West Saxons, until the decision of 
Darling J in R v Peel1. In that case, a jury was directed as a matter of law to acquit the 
daughter of a prominent baronet as she was entitled to succeed in employing the defence of 
marital coercion – a defence for centuries hitherto reserved to the crabbed lower classes. In a 
second ruling, it was also held that under English common law an intraspousal only criminal 
conspiracy was non-justiciable.  
 
Chapter Two investigates the outcry that followed the triumph of Mrs Peel, the reaction of the 
media and proponents of female emancipation, culminating in the abrogation of the common 
law doctrine but the creation of a statutory defence, which is still the law of England and 
Wales: s47 Criminal Justice Act 1925 [UK]. It was in 1945 domestically adopted in Northern 
Ireland. Scotland had never countenanced it. 
 
Chapter Three investigates the 80 years of judicial and legislative responses to that defence; it 
having been successfully exported to many other common law jurisdictions, where it has 
played over the years to mixed reviews. 
 
Chapter Four turns to the second ruling of Darling J and investigates the history and rationale 
of the intraspousal conspiracy exemption up until 1957, the year in which the Privy Council 
affirmed the existence of such an uxorial privilege, albeit in relation to a potentially 
polygamous marriage2. 
 
Chapter Five investigates how for the next 50 years, courts and legislatures reacted to the 
decision in Mawji v The Queen and its implications for married women and customary law 
concubines, under the substantive criminal law. 
 
                                              
1
 The Times, 15 March 1922. 
2
 Mawji v The Queen [1957] AC 126 (PC). 
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Chapter Six considers the ancient privilege of a wife to be exempt from being an accessory 
after the fact to her husband’s crime and investigates the unfolding history, rationales, and 
legislative reactions, in common law jurisdictions. 
 
Chapter Seven identifies the conclusions and engages the issue of whether these uxorial 
substantive defences to the criminal law are unconstitutional as being violative of the right of 
equality and draws the conclusions from the earlier chapters. 
 
 
AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW  
 
“The married woman’s capacity to commit crimes is almost normal.”3 The adverb in that 
striking sentence alludes to but does not identify the special position of married4 women5 
under the substantive criminal law. The formal fact that a woman is married may provide the 
essential component in possible exemptions from the criminal law unavailable to any other 
class of person.6 Three such facets of uxorial privilege under the common law are 
                                              
3
 Sir William Holdsworth, ‘A History of English Law’ (1942) 5 ed (reprinted 1991)  Sweet and Maxwell London, 
vol III p530. cf Roland M Perkins, ‘The Doctrine of Coercion’, (1934), 19 Iowa Law Review 507: “Speaking, 
not in terms of human traits, but in the language of the criminal law, a woman has the same capacity to commit 
crime as is possessed by a man. And the criminal capacity of a married woman is the same as that of a feme 
sole.” As early as R v Fenner (1680) 1 Siderfin 410 a married woman “sans sa baron” was indicted; in R v Crofts 
(1795) 2 Str 1121 the court affirmed a conviction of a feme covert for selling gin, adding that although such a 
woman could not lawfully take the benefit of a contract because of her coverture, she could be convicted: 
“Besides there would be a plain way to evade the Act, if feme coverts could not be convicted”. 
4
 In Holmes v DPP [1946] AC 588, 600 Viscount Simon said “we have left behind us the age when the wife’s 
subjection to her husband was regarded by the law as the basis of the marital relation.”   
5
 D Mendes Da Costa ‘Criminal Law’ in R H Graveson and F R Crane (eds), ‘A Century of Family Law 1857-
1957’ (1957) Sweet & Maxwell, London, p165, “There appears to be no single underlying principle which, by 
itself, accounts for the special position of husband and wife in the criminal law. At least three concepts play an 
important part: the doctrine of conjugal unity, the doctrine of conjugal subjection and the duty, love and 
tenderness recognised by the law as being owed by a wife to her husband.”; Carol Smart, ‘Women, Crime and 
Criminology: A Feminist Critique’ (1978)  Routledge & Kegan Paul, London at p6: “There are very few sex-
specific offences in the English legal system as the law is, in principle, held to be equally applicable to all, 
regardless of sex, race, class and other distinctions.” 
6
 William F Walsh, ‘Outlines of the History of English and American Law’, (1916) New York University Press, 
reprinted Fred B Rothman & Co Littleton, Colorado (1995) at p469: “A married woman could not be guilty of 
larceny from her husband; and, except in the case of the worst crimes, such as murder and treason, it was 
presumed that she acted under coercion by her husband if she committed the offense in his presence and at his 
direction, though this presumption could be rebutted. Otherwise marriage did not affect her responsibility for 
crimes committed by her.” This last sentence will be seen to be unsupportable.  
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comparatively examined in this work: the defence of marital coercion,7 the intraspousal 
conspiracy exemption8 and uxorial accessorial exemption from criminal liability9. Each is 
separately considered (and where applicable its statutory successor). The thesis to be tested is: 
whether that there has been any sufficient coherent development for exempting wives10 as a 
particular class of womanhood from the criminal law. The complications induced by 
                                              
7
 Considered at length infra chp 3. There is no rule of criminal law preventing husband and wife from becoming 
accomplices in a given crime, whether as joint principals or as principal and accessory to each other.   
8
 Considered at length infra chps 4 and 5. The first jurisdiction to actually decide that an intraspousal conspiracy 
was not possible at common law was the Supreme Court of New Zealand in a trial ruling of Johnston J in R v 
Howard, The Lyttelton Times, Friday 9 April 1886 p6 col 1, closely followed with the same conclusion by the 
Supreme Court of California in People v Miller (1889) 22 P 934; Delaware in State v Clark (1891) 33 A 310 
reached the same conclusion. The first decision of a Federal Court in point was Dawson v United States (1926) 10 
F2d, 106 which equally affirmed it. The first decision in any jurisdiction denying that the common law rule 
pertained was that of the Supreme Court of Colorado in Dalton v People (1920) 189 P 37. In an earlier decision 
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had in an obiter statement also denied the rule in Smith v State (1904) 81 
SW 936. The first Federal decision repudiating the common law conspiracy exemption was Johnson v United 
States (1946) 157 F 2d 209. 
9
 Considered at length infra chp 6. William Pinder Eversley, ‘The Law of the Domestic Relations’ (1896) 2 ed, 
Stevens & Haynes, London, p174: “Where a wife receives stolen property, it is necessary to show that she took 
an active part in the receipt, and that if she only intended to conceal her husband’s guilt, and to screen him from 
the consequences, it is different; so if she harbours her husband or endeavours to conceal that which may lead to 
his apprehension, she ought to be acquitted”; Edward Jenks (ed), ‘Stephens Commentaries on the Laws of 
England’ (1922) 17 ed, vol 4, Butterworth & Co, London at p35: “But so strict is the law, where a felony has 
been actually committed, that even the merest relations of the offender are not suffered to aid or to receive him.  
And therefore if the parent assists his child, or the child the parent, if the brother receives the brother, the master 
the servant, or the servant the master, or if the husband receives the wife – in every case they become accessory 
after the fact. But the wife receiving or concealing her husband is presumed to act under his coercion; and she is 
not bound in law, neither ought she, to discover her Lord. She is therefore not liable as an accessory after the 
fact.” 
10
 The legal nature of the institution of marriage is to be found in the common law. Sir W Holdsworth, ‘A 
History of English Law’, 3ed (1942) vol 1, p622; author ‘Latey on Divorce’, (1952) 14 ed, p1-2 observing that 
“[t]he temporal courts had no doctrine of marriage”. As to the husband’s legal duty to support his wife and hers 
to serve him, see Joseph Warren, ‘Husband’s Right to Wife’s Services’, (1925) 38 Harvard LR 421-446 and 622-
650 and Paul Sayre, ‘A Reconsideration of Husband’s Duty to Support and Wife’s Duty to Render Services’, 
(1943) 29 Virginia LR 858-875. R v Watson and Watson [1959] Crim LR 785. Husband and wife were jointly 
charged with manslaughter of their three year old child who died three days after sustaining serious injury from 
scalding. This proposition was supported by R v Forsyth, unreported 25 July 1899 Chester Summer Assizes 
itself following R v Squire unreported 1799 Stafford Lent Assizes, Lawrence J and R v Saunders (1836) 7 Car & 
P 277. The authorities had held that the wife was under no duty to provide in R v Squire an apprentice with food 
and in R v Saunders her illegitimate child with food, as the wife was in each case the servant of her husband and 
was under no duty to find food for the child herself and could only be made criminally liable if it was shown that 
she had omitted to give the child food, which the husband had provided. In R v Saunders the statute 4 & 5 Will 4 
c76, s71 provided that a mother was bound to maintain her bastard child so long as she shall be unmarried or a 
widow which the Court had interpreted as being confirmation that her duty ceased when she had married. Thus, 
in R v Shepherd (1862) 9 Cox CC 123 it was held that no duty to act is owed by a parent to an 18 year old who 
was in childbirth. The view in P M Bromley Family Law, (1957) Butterworths & Co (Publishers) Ltd, London 
p148 was that “the wife is no longer the weaker partner subservient to the stronger but that both spouses are the 
joint, co-equal heads of the family”. Further s42 National Assistance Act 1948 [UK] provided that for the 
purposes of that Act “a woman shall be liable to maintain…her children”.  
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polygamy, customary law concubinage and their special interface with the criminal law in 
relation to the three identified exemplars are also investigated.  
 
Between spouses the adjectival laws of evidence generate special rights and the substantive 
criminal law provides in some jurisdictions for privileges for married women not available to 
any other person. The exceptional nature of these privileges is attributable to the interaction of 
the doctrine of conjugal unity, the social interest in marital harmony and the inferred 
dominance11 of the husband over the wife. Judges recognised and endorsed the unequal 
positions occupied by the individual parties to a marriage and the hierarchical structure of the 
marital entity itself, a recognition by the judiciary that marriage was the dominant social 
institution in the lives of married women and that the husband had been assigned the leading 
role in controlling the conduct of his spouse.12 A biblical imprimatur13 for the commanding 
role of the husband, expounded by legal and other writers, was based on the extrapolated 
notion that upon marriage husband and wife were in law but one flesh. In the husband merged 
the social and property interests of both. His guardianship14 role infiltrated all aspects of that 
                                              
11
 Her legal personality was sublimated by that of her husband to such an extent that a wife was not presumed to 
have the right to custody of their children and she was not liable in criminal law for their neglect it being the 
legal obligation of the husband alone to provide for their welfare. This notion persisted throughout much of the 
19th century, however, in R v Bubb (1850) 4 Cox CC 455, where it was held by Williams J in an indictment 
against a caregiver, a sister-in-law of the father of the child, who systematically starved the child, that she was 
under a common law duty to provide necessaries of life. This general privilege of the wife, the result of being 
under the thraldom of the husband and therefore having no independent responsibility or even the means to 
provide the necessaries, was only and finally repudiated in England in 1959 in R v Watson and Watson [1959] 
Crim LR 785, 786 (Assizes). Modern social welfare legislation provides no excuse for any omission by a wife or 
mother. Modern criminal law now makes both spouses criminally responsible for the welfare of any child in 
their custody: R v Lunt [2004] 1 NZLR 498, 506 (CA).  
12
 R v Saunders (1836) 7 Car & P 277, 173 ER 122, 123 “[T]he wife is only the servant of the husband.” This 
understanding of the law was extended in some jurisdictions into a collateral rule of evidence which presumed 
that any admissions made by a wife against her own interests, in the presence of her husband, were inadmissible. 
This was an adjunct to the privilege against spouse-incrimination, a common law rule, as it amounted on the 
logic of the conjugal identity, to self-incrimination. It was held therefore, that a wife’s silence in the presence of 
her husband could not be used as admissible evidence against her. An effect of the presumption of coercion was 
that it was doubtful whether a confession by a wife in the presence of her husband should be received as 
voluntary: R v Laugher (1846) 2 C & K 225, 226-227 per Pollock LCB where a confession to a constable 
induced by her husband “could not be received as a free and unbiased confession”, noted in WF Craies and H D 
Roome (eds), ‘Archbold’s Pleading, Evidence and Practice’ (1910) 24 ed, Sweet and Maxwell, p19. 
13
 Nancy F Cott, ‘Public Vows – A History of Marriage and the Nation’, (2000) Harvard University Press at p11: 
“The legal oneness of husband and wife derived from common law but it matched the Christian doctrine that 
“the twain shall be one flesh”, having exclusive rights to each others’ bodies.”  
14
 The husband was the fountainhead of the family so that his wife was defined by where he lived. Wellington v 
Whitchurch (1863) 32 LJMC 189, 192 “a man’s home is where his wife lives.” per Cockburn CJ; to the same 
effect it was submitted arguendo in R v Norwood (1867) LR 2 QB 457, 459. 
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union which permitted the assumption that he was able at will to exercise control of his wife’s 
will. The fundamental objective of the various privileges excluding married women from 
certain aspects of the criminal law, promoted the preservation of marital harmony, itself a 
significant societal value. From the wide central principle of intraspousal peace the special 
rules of evidence applicable to spouses naturally followed as intramarital confidences, if 
spilled under compelled testimony, might well undermine the greater objective of marital 
stability. Yet the defence of marital coercion only permitted the wife to succeed by 
establishing that the husband had so dominated and compelled her as to be instrumental in 
causing her to commit an offence in his presence. That is, a wife escaped the criminal law by 
proving, in essence, that her husband had broken the law as well as his guardianship 
obligation in relation to her; which ought to be potentially destructive of that very marital 
relationship. A wife could only save herself by implicating her husband, thereby destroying 
what the law otherwise had elevated into a special relationship deserving of privileges 
unavailable to any other duality.  
 
The absolute defence of marital coercion as an uxorial privilege has existed in the criminal 
law for more than a thousand years.15 It was almost a full general defence; at common law it 
was subject to only a few certain but definite exceptions16 (treason and murder) while other 
exceptions including manslaughter and robbery were themselves the subject of problematic 
and conflicting decisions, as to their very existence as exceptions. This remarkable common 
law defence, which selectively yet presumptively positioned an entire class of femalehood 
beyond the ordinary reach of the criminal law, was abrogated as the stammering but direct 
result of its sensational and successful invocation and the consequential acquittal in 192217 of 
the daughter of a baronet. As a result of that acquittal, the Lord Chancellor established a 
Committee under the chairmanship of Avory J, to report on the state of that law and to 
recommend any necessary changes to it. This work examines that critical decision in R v Peel, 
                                              
15
 Wayne Morrison (ed), ‘Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England’ [28] stating that the defence was 
“at least a thousand years old in this kingdom”. Francis Sayre, ‘Mens Rea’, (1932) Harvard Law Review 974, 
1004 identified the growing particularisation of the general mens rea with respect to specific defences, stating 
“After the twelfth century new general defences began to take shape such as insanity, infancy, compulsion or the 
like, based upon the lack of a guilty mind and thus negativing moral blameworthiness”.   
16
 Considered infra chp 3. 
17
 Considered at length infra chp 2. R v Peel (1922) The Times, 8 March 1922 reporting the trial before Darling J 
at the Central Criminal Court. 
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the work of the Avory Committee, and the subsequent three years of tumultuous political and 
judicial machinations which finally led to the passage of s47 Criminal Justice Act 1925 [UK], 
which created the rare, non-egalitarian, excusatory defence of marital coercion. By the statute 
it applies to every offence at law, save for the two exceptions of murder and treason. Since its 
inception, there have been only about 10 occasions on which this defence has been invoked in 
England and Wales (it never having been part of Scottish law) and but one example of its 
deployment, since its belated entry into force in Northern Ireland in 1945, is known.  The 
caselaw is examined for its revelations.  
 
The 1925 Act declaring the demise of the common law defence, the origins of which were 
traceable to the laws of King Ine18 of the West Saxons in 712 AD, simultaneously created a 
new statutory defence, again of almost general applicability and again only available to 
married women. There had been sustained criticism of the marital coercion doctrine by law 
reform bodies19 and even by the judges themselves throughout the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries, but to no avail. This defence still is in force in England has been substantially 
replicated in other common law jurisdictions which continue to adopt it; although Arkansas in 
185520, Canada in 189221, and New Zealand22 in 1893 were pioneers23 in rejecting it. The 
                                              
18
 H Adams,  H C Lodge,  J L Laughlin and E Young, Essays in Anglo-Saxon Law’ (1905) Little Brown & Co, 
Boston at p175: “Ine, 57: “If a ceorl steal a chattel and bear it to his dwelling, and it be intertiated therein, then 
shall he be guilty for his part without his wife; for she must obey her lord. If she dare to declare by oath that she 
tasted not of the stolen property, let her take her third party” ”; 1 Edmund H Bennett ‘Leading Cases in Criminal 
Law’, (1869) 2 ed 86; noted F Sayre, ‘Mens Rea’, (1932) 45 Harvard Law Review 974, 1012. 
19
 WR Cornish, ‘Crime and Law in Nineteenth Century Britain,’ (1978) Dublin pp 66-71. Beginning in 1830 a 
series of Commissions were appointed to report on the state of the English criminal law.  
20
 Considered at length infra chp 3. 
21
 s13 Criminal Code 1892 [Can]. Don Stuart, ‘Canadian Criminal Law - A Treatise’ (1982) Carswell Co Ltd, 
Canada, notes at p384 that the first Criminal Code in Canada abrogated the defence which was an “arbitrary and 
socially dated notion that a wife could rely on the defence of duress merely on account of the marital bond. Our 
abolition as early as 1892 was in terms more forthright than the later abolishing statutory provision in England, 
which still presents difficulties”. 
22
 s24 Criminal Code Act 1893 [NZ]. In R v Annie Brown (1896) 15 NZLR 18, 34 Williams J stated that if the 
defence of marital coercion was based solely upon a legal fiction, the abolition of the fiction would put an end to 
the entire defence. The Privy Council impatiently dismissed a further appeal, Brown v Attorney-General for New 
Zealand [1898] AC 234 (PC). 
23
 The presumption (but not the defence) has now been abolished in all Australian jurisdictions: s32 Criminal 
Code Act 1899 [Qld]; s32 Criminal Code Act 1902 [WA]; s407 Crimes Act 1900 [NSW]; s12 Criminal Law 
Consolidation Amendment Act 1940 [Sth Aust]. In D Brown, D Farrier, D Neal and D Weisbrot, ‘Criminal Laws, 
Materials and Commentary on Criminal Law and Process in New South Wales’ (1996) vol 2, The Federation 
Press, at p778; “The Northern Territory was the last jurisdiction in Australia to abolish the presumption, in 
1983”. This statement is incorrect the last jurisdiction was the Australian Capital Territory where it was only 
abrogated in 1999 after R v Batt unreported, Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, SCC 18 of 1999, 
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defence was bodily copied by other common law jurisdictions, including the then British 
dependencies and colonies of Hong Kong and Gibraltar. The Australian States and Territories 
all received the defence at common law. All have now eventually provided for the abrogation 
of the presumption, with the Australian Capital Territory legislature hastily enacting such 
legislation in 1999 after a Supreme Court Judge had ruled that that jurisdiction still remained 
the law. The states of South Australia and Victoria still retain the defence by statute. The 
uneven position of the American states is also considered in detail.24 
 
The doctrine that only a woman who, as a result of her husband’s coercion, engages in any 
but the most serious criminal conduct, is absolved of criminal responsibility, is unique to the 
generic law of compulsion and duress,25 in that the common law defence, because of the 
rebuttable presumption of coercion, could be maintained without any demonstration of actual 
or threatened physical violence. The doctrine is of ancient derivation and was based on an 
understanding of the legal and practical power of the husband to impose his will on his wife 
and of the resulting need therefore to protect her from criminal liability, when she lacked 
independent26 criminal intent. It is also implicit in the doctrine that the close ties of emotion 
rendered the wife vulnerable and susceptible to coercion. The fact of the defence also exposes 
the accepted reality that a wife was to unquestioningly comply with any judgment made for 
her by her spouse. The defence necessarily reinforced his thraldom over her. The mere 
                                                                                                                                             
1 March 1999, Higgins J confirmed its existence. The Australian Capital Territory legislated urgently, responded 
and passed an amendment abrogating the presumption. The debate on the amendment via the Crimes Amendment 
Bill (No 2) 1999 [ACT] was supported by all parties in the legislature. Mr. J Stanhope MLA, ‘Legislative 
Assembly of the Australian Capital Territory’ (1999) week 12 Hansard (25 November) p3694 described the 
presumption as an “archaic and extremely sexist notion”. Enacted as s407 Crimes Act 1990 [ACT] (notified in 
ACT Gazette No 50: 15 December 1999). 
24
 Infra chp 3. 
25
 Robin S O’Regan, ‘Essays on the Australian Criminal Codes’, (1979) The Law Book Company Ltd, Sydney 
at p126-136 discusses the position in relation to marital coercion under the Codes of Queensland and Western 
Australia as it stood at that time. “As Sir Samuel Griffith observed in a note appended to this section of his draft 
of the Queensland Code, the scope of the common law defence of marital coercion which the section replaced 
was obscure.”  
26
 In R v Cohen (1868) 11 Cox CC 99, 100 (CCCR), the Recorder directed a jury that if they thought the woman 
was acting independently of her husband and not under his control they could find her guilty. Anon, ‘Husband 
and Wife in the Criminal Law’ (1927) 91 JP 662, 663 has a significant statement that “the common law 
development was such that: it was thus sometimes shown what was not coercion, but never positively what 
was”. Noted Kenneth C Sears and Henry Y Weihofen, ‘May’s Law of Crimes’, (1938) 4 ed, Little Brown & Co, 
Boston at p40. Paul H Robinson, ‘Criminal Law Defenses Criminal Practice Series’, (1984) vol 2, St Paul, 
Minn. West Publishing Co, at p371 §177(h). The presumption had as its aim a determination of whether the 
actions of the wife were “independently accountable”.  
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existence of the marriage did not raise the defence, as it only applied to exculpate where the 
husband was present at the time his wife committed an offence. So the defence sprang from 
marriage but the operative feature was the physical proximity of the husband to the wife, on 
the basis that within a sufficiently near diameter of influence, possibly reinforced by actual 
physical assault, the wife was incapable of exercising free will.27 If the husband could exert 
his immediate influence and control over her then the defence was available.  
 
The matrimonial relationship still provides in some common law jurisdictions a complete 
defence, as much as any other general defence of the criminal law does in relation to an aspect 
of the substantive offence of conspiracy. The defence of marital coercion had a unique feature 
as it permitted complete exculpation without any evidence of a threat or actual violence being 
required as the defence operated on the presumption that marital coercion had existed unless 
and until it was displaced on all the evidence; normally by demonstrating that the wife had 
exercised independence and initiative in the offence.28  
 
Marriage itself, as an institution, was protected by the criminal law29 in different ways and it 
is also controlled by other aspects of the common law30. The defence of marital coercion was 
                                              
27
 Alan Wertheimer, ‘Coercion’ (1987) Princeton, New Jersey p148 examines deontological theory that it is 
unjust to punish a person not possessed of freedom of choice and utilitarian theory that punishment for 
involuntary conduct is inefficacious. Stanley Yeo ‘Coercing Wives into Crime’ (1992) 6 Australian Journal of 
Family Law 214, 217 argues that the threats to a wife (as much to a husband) could be of a psychological nature. 
Moral pressure can be the effect of economic or other threats. A threat of divorce which might go against a 
wife’s religious belief or a threat to prevent her from seeing her children are all realistic scenarios. See also J Ll J 
Edwards, ‘Compulsion, Coercion and Criminal Responsibility’ (1951) 14 Modern Law Review 297, 309 who 
gives similar examples as do Albert Lieck and ACL Morrison, ‘The Criminal Justice Act, 1925, with 
Explanatory Notes’ (1926) Stevens and Sons Ltd, Chancery Lane, London p90-91. 
28
 In The City Council v Van Roven (1832) 2 McCord 465 Nott J said “a husband is never to be presumed to act 
under the influence of the wife.” 
29
 J v S-T [1997] 1 FLR 402 at 438, per Ward LJ: “it seems to me that the status of married persons, the sanctity 
of the marriage union, and the institution of marriage itself are all objects of public policy requiring our 
protection.” In Whiston v Whiston [1995] 2 FLR 268, a bigamist was held by the Court of Appeal, to be 
disqualified from obtaining ancillary relief on the nullification of her bigamous marriage. Ward LJ said ibid at 
274, that to grant such relief would give “scant effect to the seriousness of bigamy”, a crime which “undermines 
our fundamental notions of monogamous marriage”. cf. Rampal v Rampal (No2) [2001] 2 FLR 1179 held that 
there is no absolute rule that a bigamist can never claim ancillary relief; and allowed such a claim to proceed. 
Thorpe LJ at p1188 stated that “the rule in Whiston v Whiston…does not preclude this court from having regard 
to the nature of the crime and all the surrounding circumstances”. Bigamy is punished because it represents a 
threat to public morality, because it compromises the institution of marriage, aside from its inherent duplicity. 
Section 206 punishes bigamy. In Hassen v Director of Public Prosecutions unreported, Queens Bench Division 
(Crown Office List), 30 July 1997 Hobhouse LJ, Moses J, CO/182/97 it was held that in a prosecution for 
bigamy, if the defendant alleges that the supposed prior marriage is invalid he need not make it an evidential 
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dependent on the torque of the union. It approbated the matrimonial institution by identifying 
its breaking point yet also sacrificed it to save the wife from her husband if necessary. 
  
The defence of coercion was allowed with far greater indulgence than the common defence of 
duress (interchangeably called compulsion). No threat of death or serious bodily harm needed 
be shown and the mere conduct of the wife in the presence of the husband itself raised a 
presumption of her coercion. However, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, 
various Legislatures often abandoned the presumption of marital coercion31 or went further 
and entirely abolished the defence as being outmoded and reinforcing of the stereotypical 
inferiority and inequality of women generally and wives in particular.32 The policy and 
imperatives that influenced the legislation in the different jurisdictions are analysed, including 
the position in relation to polygamy.33 Late in the twentieth century the constitutional validity 
of the defence fell for consideration. Despite regular calls for statutory alteration in England 
                                                                                                                                             
issue as the burden remains on the prosecution to establish its validity: R v Kay (1887) 16 Cox CC 292, 293-294 
per Huddleston B. 
30
 In Lowe v Peers (1768) 4 Burr 2225 a contract which attempted to prevent a person from marrying at all, or 
considerably restricted that opportunity, was held invalid at common law. Any contract that imperilled an 
existing marriage was unlawful: see Fender v St John Mildmay [1938] AC 1, 33 (noted in Andrew Borrowdale 
(ed), ‘Criminal Law in New Zealand’ (2000) 4 ed, Butterworths, p100). Lord Russell of Killowen said “it is in 
the interest of the State that, if possible, the marriage tie should remain stable and be maintained.” He 
sardonically noted at p35 that the institution of marriage was “steadily assuming the characteristics of a contract 
for a tenancy at will.” See Raphael Powell, ‘Marriage Brocage Agreements’, [1953] Current Legal Problems 
254 for a comparative and historical inquiry of contracts in which one party agrees to cause a marriage between 
the other party to the contract, with another person as in Herman v Charlesworth [1905] 2 KB 123, 130 where 
‘The Matrimonial Post and Fashionable Marriage Advertiser’, had contracted with the plaintiff to introduce 
several potential matrimony candidates in return for an advance payment. It has been persuasively argued that 
the public policy insured in Herman v Charlesworth is outdated: see John Dwyer, ‘Immoral Contracts’ (1977) 
93 LQR 386, 393. Chuang Yue Chien Eugene v Ho Yau Kwong Kevin [2002] 4 HKC 245, 261 G per Ma J. A 
court will not enforce any condition in a will which would operate as a restraint upon the devisee’s freedom to 
marry: Bellairs v Bellairs (1874) LR 18 Eq 510, 513; Re Fentem (deceased) Cockerton v Fentem [1950] 2 All 
ER 1073, 1076C. 
31
 Nigel Walker, ‘An Analysis of the Penal System in Theory, Law and Practice: Crime and Punishment in 
Britain’ (1968) University Press, Edinburgh at p298 notes “Women who co-operate with men in the commission 
of offences are frequently regarded as unwilling accomplices (often this is the case, but sometimes they are the 
instigators)”. This assumption, he asserts, is even reflected by statute referring to s47 Criminal Justice Act 1925 
[UK] noting that it originated as a legal fiction for the protection of women “but it is significant that it was 
perpetuated and not abolished.” 
32
 A wife’s weakness did not suddenly appear on her wedding day. By the turn of the twentieth century many 
courts were becoming impatient with claims of marital coercion. Recent advances in the status of women had 
included the abolition of the husband’s right to imprison or chastise his wife and granted enfranchisement and 
separate property rights. 
33
 In R v Caroubi (1912) 7 Cr App R 149 the Court of Criminal Appeal appeared to accept a concession that the 
presumption of marital coercion would apply to a potentially polygamous conjunction. In R v Khan (Junaid), The 
Times, June 10 1986 (CA) a second and polygamous marriage was not regarded as a valid marriage for the 
purposes of spousal non-compellability. 
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and other common law countries the defence remains virtually intact in a significant number 
of common law countries, other than Canada and New Zealand, which were the first nations 
to repudiate the entire doctrine of marital coercion. The defence has, however, undergone a 
renaissance in 1977 in the State of Victoria where it has been modernised and extended.  The 
defence still is in force in Alabama and North Carolina34 and some other American states.  
Even Federal judges there remain unsure whether the marital coercion presumption continues 
to exist.35 
 
Under the criminal law a married woman is generally as amenable to the offence provisions 
of law as any other man or single woman. Single women, femes sole, have always had 
identical legal responsibility for their crimes as men, but this equality disappeared on 
marriage only to revive immediately upon widowhood.36 A wife is fully responsible for 
crimes she has committed alone and voluntarily, or for crimes which she has procured or 
incited her husband to commit. She can commit a crime jointly with her husband.37 She can 
incite her husband to commit a crime.38 She can aid and abet her husband to commit a 
crime.39 She could not at common law, however, conspire with her husband alone nor could 
                                              
34
 State v Owen (1999) unreported, Supreme Court of North Carolina No COA 98-413, 15 June 1999, per 
Timmons- Goodson J at [z] “As we conclude that the presumption of spousal coercion remains a valid 
affirmative defense” Lewis and Walker JJ concurring. 
35
 United States v Harris (1971) 328 F Supp 973 per Daugherty DJ. 
36
 Montague Lush, ‘A Century of Legal Reform, Twelve Lectures on the Changes in the Law of England during 
the Nineteenth Century, Delivered at the Request of The Council of Legal Education in the Old Hall, Lincoln’s 
Inn, during Michaelmas Term 1900 and Hilary Term 1901’, reprinted (1972) South Hackensack, New Jersey, 
Rothman Reprints Inc. at p351. Married women were not entitled to enter contracts on their own behalf but there 
was an exception: “if a man were convicted of a crime and were civilly dead, his wife could acquire and hold 
property in contract and sue and be sued as a feme sole. This was an invention created by necessity rather than 
by enlightenment, and on the husband regaining his freedom the wife apparently lost hers”. 
37
 Somerville’s Case (1584) 1 And 104; J M Beattie, ‘Crime and the Courts in England 1660-1800’, (1986), 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, p238: “The rule that a married woman could not be held responsible for illegal acts 
done in the company of her husband (unless he could be shown to be blameless) may also have discouraged 
some prosecutions. But under-reporting is not likely to explain differences in the types of offences men and 
women were charged with, particularly because serious capital crimes made up a much smaller proportion of 
women’s prosecuted offences than men’s.” In footnote 71 the author refers to the presumption of marital 
coercion and notes that married women were often indicted with their husbands “the more common experience, 
of which many examples could be cited in this period, was for a wife to be discharged after her husband was 
found guilty on the grounds that she must have acted under his direction”. 
38
 P R Glazebrook (ed) Sir Matthew Hale 1 ‘Historia Placitorum Coronae’, [‘Pleas of the Crown] 1736, 
Professional Books Ltd, London (1971) pXXX, Cap VII, 45S. R v Annie Brown (1896) 15 NZLR 18, 32 per 
Prendergast CJ. 
39
 Mok Wei Tak v The Queen [1990] 2 AC 333 (PC). In Browning v Floyd [1946] 1 KB 597 (DC) a railway 
regulation provided that an unused half ticket could not be transferred to another person. A wife transferred such 
a ticket to her husband who used it. He was charged with an offence and his wife with aiding and abetting him in 
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she be an accessory after the fact to his felony, as in that situation her marital duty was to 
harbour the husband40 including obstructing his apprehension. Although scattered among the 
substantive law were a number of other disparate uxorial privileges,41 exempting wives from 
criminal responsibility, as a class, they have almost all perished by statute or by judicial 
decision.  
 
 
INTRAMARITAL CONSPIRACY EXEMPTION 
 
The second substantive exemption to be examined is the common law position which held 
that two spouses alone could not conspire together, on the basis of their supposed conjugal 
unity.42 This conclusion was assumed to be English law43 but no decision since 1365 had 
                                                                                                                                             
it. The justices acquitted on the basis that husband and wife must be treated as one person. This is the very 
decision which prompted the article by Glanville L Williams, ‘The Legal Unity of Husband and Wife’ (1947) 10 
MLR 16 fn 2. Lord Goddard CJ allowed a prosecution appeal on the basis that the regulation precluded a spouse 
relying on a ticket issued to the other.  
40
 Coke 3 Institutes 108; 1 Hale PC 47; 1 Hawk PC 4; People v Dunn 53 Hun (NY) 381. 
41
 Frederick Pollock and Frederic Maitland, ‘The History of English Law’,(1895)  vol 2, (reprinted 1996)  2 ed, 
vol 1, The Law Book Exchange Ltd, Union, New Jersey, p482. A married woman could never be outlawed as 
she was never in law; or attained: Lee Kei-Yick v The Queen [1978] HKLR 510 (CA) (Briggs CJ, Leonard & 
Zimmern JJ) “as forfeiture was a necessary consequence on attainder for felony and a married woman could 
have nothing to forfeit”.   
42
 In Wenman v Ash (1853) 13 CB 836 Maule J declined to carry the common law doctrine of unity to its logical 
conclusion holding the publication of a defamatory statement to the plaintiff’s wife was an actionable publication. 
“In the eye of the law, no doubt, man and wife are for many purposes one: but that is a strong figurative 
expression, and cannot be so dealt with as that all the consequences must follow which would result from its being 
literally true. For many purposes, they are essentially distinct and different persons” Phillips v Barnett (1876) 1 
QBD 440: “It is a well established maxim of the law that husband and wife are one person. For many purposes 
this is a mere figure of speech; for other purposes it must be understood in its literal sense.” In Re March, Mander 
v Harris (1883) 24 Ch D 222 Chitty J said: “It appears to me that the [Married Womens Property Act 1882] 
makes such alterations in the relation of husband and wife that it severs the unity of person, and divides that 
compound person which the law formerly recognised to such an extent as to render it wrong for the Court to apply 
the old principle which was founded on unity of person”. De Montmorency, ‘The Changing Status of a Married 
Woman’, (1897) 13 LQR 187, 192 says of the doctrine of the legal identity of husband and wife: “The English 
Judges were too reasonable to be logical, if they could possibly help it.” 
43
 In Director of Public Prosecutions v Blady [1912] 2 KB 89 Lush J dissented stating: “The foundation of the 
rule which prevented a wife from giving evidence against her husband was the fact that they were one person in 
the eye of the law. No doubt that rule was applied in every case except where it was necessary either for the safety 
of the wife or for her wellbeing to relax it.” The judge emphasised that the rule operated “in strange ways both in 
the criminal and in the civil law”. In particular he observed: “Husband and wife being one person could not be 
indicted or convicted of conspiracy one with the other. A wife could not be convicted of being an accessory after 
the fact when her husband had committed a felony; but the rule was relaxed in the converse case, and a husband 
could be convicted of being an accessory after the fact in the case of his wife’s felony.” Both New Zealand and 
Canadian Courts had by a majority concluded that the intraspousal doctrine was well-founded or alternatively was 
so well embedded in the common law that it could only be extirpated by a purpose-built repeal by specific 
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actually reached that position. However, the Privy Council on appeal from Tanganyika in 
Mawji v The Queen44 had to starkly consider the issue in relation to whether the exemption 
applied to a polygamous marriage. Earlier, the New Zealand Court of Appeal45 by a majority 
and the Supreme Court of Canada46 also by majority had affirmed the existence of the 
intraspousal conspiracy exemption. This work examines that case law and the subsequent 
enactment of s2(2)(a) Criminal Law Act 1977 [UK]47 which now specifically provides for the 
exemption in relation to every criminal offence. This legislation has also been adopted in 
other common law jurisdictions and the implications of this exemption are considered in an 
investigation whether the exemption can be rationally justified on any persuasive criminal law 
basis. 
  
 
ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT EXEMPTION 
 
The third exemplar is the common law defence available only to married women that they 
were exempt from criminal liability for any accessoryship role after the fact of a felony 
committed by their spouse. This common law offence has now been modified by s1(1) 
Criminal Law Act 1967 [UK] by the introduction of a new offence of assisting offenders, 
                                                                                                                                             
legislation. The American Courts repeatedly upheld the existence of the doctrine until the matter came to the 
United States Supreme Court in US v Dege (1960) 364 US. Just after the critical decision in Dege, Lord Denning 
MR was able to state that the unity rule “has now been swept away in nearly all branches of the law.” Gray v 
Formosa [1963] P 259, 267 (CA). 
44
 Mawji v The Queen [1957] AC 126 (PC). 
45
 R v McKechie [1926] NZLR 1 (CA). Until s67 Crimes Act 1961 [NZ] the common law fiction of conjugal unity 
persisted. In R v Howard and Howard unreported, Supreme Court, Christchurch, 9 April 1886, Johnston J, it was 
held that the common law rule was in force.  This decision predated the Criminal Code Act 1893. In R v Annie 
Brown (1896) 15 NZLR 18, 32 (CA) Prendergast CJ stated obiter “A husband and wife together with others have 
been considered indictable together, though a husband and wife, being one in the eye of the law, cannot be 
indicted for conspiracy without alleging that others were in the conspiracy.”   
46
 Kowbel v The Queen [1954] 4 DLR 337 (SCC). 
47
 Section 2(2)(a) Criminal Law Act 1977 [UK] provides: “A person shall not…be guilty of conspiracy to commit 
any offence…if the only other person or persons with whom he agrees are…(a) his spouse” This provision was 
considered by the English Court of Appeal in R v Chrastny (No.1) [1992] 1 All ER 189, 192a (CA), Glidewell LJ 
stating “It will be seen that the section restates the previous position at common law”At 192b-c he added: “A 
wife, knowing that her husband is involved with others in a particular conspiracy, agrees with her husband that 
she will join the conspiracy and play her part she is thereby agreeing with all those whom she knows are the other 
parties to the conspiracy.” The Appeal Committee of the House of Lords (Lord Keith of Kinkel, Lord Templeman 
and Lord Lowry) refused leave to appeal: [1992] 1 All ER 189, 192g. It follows that where a husband and wife 
are charged with conspiring with another, the jury should be directed to acquit the spouses unless they are 
satisfied that there was another party to the conspiracy: R v Lovick [1993] Crim LR 890 (CA).  
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which allows anyone to rely upon the specific defences of lawful authority or reasonable 
excuse. The specific former spousal exemption has been intentionally abrogated, leaving it 
clear that marital status reliance does not fall within the new statutory exceptions.  
 
The comparative position in common law jurisdictions is investigated to identify the rationale 
for this exception to the criminal law. Some jurisdictions have now significantly widened this 
exemption so that it applies to both spouses, or even to a schedule of identified family 
members, and irrespective of whether the spouse who committed the principal offence, did so 
with others. In certain common law jurisdictions, a wife (and sometimes a husband) has 
complete immunity for the offence of being an accessory after the fact to her husband’s crime. 
Sometimes the liberality of the law laterally extends to protect her also where her husband’s 
accomplices were involved.   
 
While the dominance of the husband over his wife may have strengthened the unity doctrine, 
as that dominance was seen to result in but one will between them, it more specifically 
created a legal consequence, the presumed inability of a wife to be able to commit criminal 
conduct in the presence of her husband. The feme covert48 concept was a civil law regime, 
derived from the property and inheritance law of marriage49 in which a woman was excused if 
she committed an offence in the presence of any man.50 This legal concept was a function of 
the notional dominance by the husband and was an ameliorative manifestation of the power 
imbalance between the spouses. One result of this was that few females and fewer wives51 
                                              
48
 TE ‘The Lawes Resolution of Women’s Rights’ (1632) John More, reprinted (2005) Lawbook Exchange Ltd, 
New Jersey. “When a small brooke or little river incorporateth with…the Thames, the poor rivulet looseth her 
name…A woman, as soon as she is married, is called covert;…she hath lost her streame.” 
49
 Blackstone, ‘Commentaries’, Vol 1:442. 
50
 Wayne Morrison (ed), ‘Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England’, vol 4, [29] “And it appears that, 
among the northern nations on the continent, this privilege extended to any woman transgressing in concert with 
a man, and to any servant that committed a joint offence with a freeman; the male or freeman only was punished, 
the female or slave dismissed: ‘proculdubio quod alterum libertas, alterum necessitas impelleret’.” [Because 
doubtless one did it of his own free will, the other of necessity.] 
51
 G Godfrey Phillips, ‘Kenny’s Outlines of Criminal Law’ (1933) 14 ed, Cambridge University Press, p74, fn 4, 
states: “Hence under Charles II and James II, though (just as now) few women were tried, I find them form about 
two-sevenths – sometimes even a majority – of those sentenced to death at each Old Bailey sessions.” Women 
however were rarely tried but because of the severity of the criminal law which provided for many capital 
offences at the time, when convicted because of their ineligibility for benefit of clergy until 1692, formed a 
disproportionately high percentage of the numbers of people sentenced to death. In a study of the indictments 
between 1663 and 1802 in Surrey and Sussex reveals that 80% of those charged with felonies were men. “A 
strikingly lower level of criminality of women is clearly apparent.”: JM Beattie, ‘The Criminality of Women in 
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were ever charged with criminal offences as their circumstances simply did not provide them 
with the freedom of opportunity for autonomous action.  
 
 
INTRASPOUSAL EXEMPTIONS 
 
The list of common law intraspousal exemptions from the criminal law was substantial. At 
common law spouses52 could not: conspire alone together,53 commit intraspousal theft,54 
commit intraspousal rape,55 or commit intraspousal criminal libel.56 Some spousal privileges 
                                                                                                                                             
Eighteenth-Century England’ (1975) 8 The Journal of Social History 80. This is consistent with the position in 
Canada between 1712 – 1759 in which it was concluded that at a time when women accounted for 49% of the 
total population of Canada they were the accused in only 19.7% of total indictments: André Lachance, ‘Women 
and Crime in Canada in the Early Eighteenth Century, 1712 – 1759’, p158 in Louis A. Knafla (ed), ‘Crime and 
Criminal Justice in Europe and Canada’ (1985) Wilfrid Laurier University Press Ontario. Noting at p167 that 
the legal status of a Canadian woman under the French regime, was that of a minor. 
52
 A pre-marriage conspiracy by an eventual husband and wife did not protect them, R v Robinson (1746) 1 Leach 
37. In R v Leonard [1922] NZLR 721 (CA) on a charge of sexual intercourse with a female mental defective, the 
words “Every person” did not exclude the woman’s husband. 
53
 William F Walsh, ‘A History of Anglo-American Law’ (1932) 2 ed, reprinted (1993) ibid p390: “A married 
woman’s disability to make contracts in her own behalf was due entirely to her incapacity to hold property, not 
to any personal incapacity growing out of the theoretical unity of husband and wife.” At common law, a husband 
and wife could not contract with each other. For this reason a man could not grant anything to his wife, or enter 
into covenant with her (Co.Litt.112), except with the intervention of a trustee, for the grant would be to suppose 
her separate existence; and to covenant with her would only be to covenant with himself. (Co.Litt.30) noted P F 
P Higgins ‘The Law of Partnership in Australia and New Zealand’, 2ed, Law Book Co (1970) p32-33. In 
Millineri v Millineri (1908) 8 SR (NSW) 471 spouses entered into a formal business partnership, after the 
Married Women’s Property Act 1893 [NSW]. In Balfour v Balfour [1919] 2 KB 571, 575 (CA) Atkin LJ stated 
at 579 “Agreements such as these are outside the realm of contracts altogether.” “The consideration that really 
obtains for them is that natural love and affection which counts for so little in these cold Courts.” Followed in 
Cohen v Cohen (1929) 42 CLR 91, 96 (HCA) per Dixon J. and Jones v Padavatton [1969] 1 WLR 328, 332B 
(CA) (mother and daughter same principles apply); Magill v Magill [2006] HCA 51, November 2006, para 53 
(intraspousal deception as to paternity not justiciable).     
54
 I Hale PC 513; I Hawk PC c 33 s19. “Husband and wife cannot, while living together, steal one another’s 
property…This immunity from punishment for theft by the wife of her husband’s goods was one of the few 
practical consequences of the theory behind the declaration in the marriage ceremony: ‘with all my worldly 
goods I thee endow.’”: Anon, ‘Husband and Wife in the Criminal Law’, (1927) 91 JP 662, 663; R v Kenny 
(1877) 2 QBD 307; R v Creamer [1919] 1 KB 564.  
55
 Marriage after rape is no defence to the earlier rape: see R v McKay (1876) 2 NZ Jur (NS) 71. In State v Smith 
(1981) 426 A 2d 38 the Supreme Court of New Jersey repudiated the implied consent theory. If a wife can 
exercise a legal right to separate from her husband and eventually terminate the marriage ‘contract’, may she not 
also revoke a ‘term’ of that contract, namely consent to intercourse? Just as a husband has no right to imprison 
his wife because of her marriage vow to him, he has no right to force sexual relations upon her against her will.”  
R v R [1992] 1 AC 599 (HL) the House of Lords concluded that the spousal immunity did not represent the law 
of England. The husband, undeterred, referred the matter to the European Court of Human Rights in SW v UK 
(1995) 21 EHRR 363; CR v UK [1996] 1 FLR 434 where the Court said “the abandonment of the unacceptable 
idea of a husband being immune against prosecution for rape of his wife was in conformity not only with a 
civilised concept of marriage but also, and above all, with the fundamental objective of the Convention, the very 
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were one-sided. A feme covert could not enter into a contract at all, so it seemed natural that 
she could hardly agree with her husband to commit a crime.  
 
Only wives were incapable of being convicted as an accessory after the fact of the felony of 
their husbands.  Nor equally could they be guilty of any offence of omission by breaching a 
duty owed to family members to provide necessaries, as this duty fell exclusively on the 
husband. But the most striking advantage under the law was the separate defence of marital 
coercion57 which presumed that every wife58 was coerced by her husband into committing a 
crime if her husband was present during its commission by her.  
 
Marriage has modified the general rules of the criminal law in its adjectival, procedural and 
substantive aspects. It has substantially implicated the rules of evidence, so that issues of 
competence and compellability arise where a spouse is to adduce evidence for or against the 
                                                                                                                                             
essence of which is respect for human dignity and human freedom.” Patricia Easteal (ed), ‘Balancing the Scales, 
Rape, Law Reform and Australian Culture’, (1998) The Federation Press, Sydney, at p14observes that the first 
legislation in a common law jurisdiction removing the marital rape immunity was in South Australia in 1975 and 
“was subject to considerable public and parliamentary opposition and succeeded in achieving only a partial 
removal of the exemption.” Mark Henaghan and Bill Atkin (eds) ‘Family Law Policy in New Zealand’ (2002) 2 
ed, Wellington, LexisNexis, Butterworths at p20-21 note that the former law really provided that “the intercourse 
that takes place between husband and wife after marriage is not by virtue of any special consent on her part, but 
is mere submission to an obligation imposed upon her by law.” 
56
 R v Lord Mayor of London (1886) 16 QBD 72, 77; R v Barter (1922) JP 176 it was held that in law an 
indictment against a husband does not lie for publishing a criminal libel concerning his wife. The Recorder of 
London at the Central Criminal Court, Sir Ernest Wild KC, stated “The law would protect a wife if physical 
injuries were inflicted upon her by her husband but apparently did not protect her from what was much more 
serious – cowardly attacks in postcards [by her husband]”. But in Watt v Longsdon [1930] 1 KB 130, 139 (CA) 
the doctrine of marital unity held inapplicable where a defamation of one spouse was published to the other; a 
case concerning the alleged “matrimonial delinquencies of the other party to the marriage.” Followed by 
Macnaghten J in Ralston v Ralston [1930] 2 KB 238 in a civil action for libel by a wife against her husband.  
Itself followed by McCardie J in Gottliffe v Edelston [1930] 2 KB 378. In R v Reinke (1972) 7 CCC (2d) 410 it 
was held that an indictment charging a wife with defamatory libel against her husband was not possible between 
spouses. In Sesler v Montgomery (1889) 21 P 185  (Supreme Court of California) six judges held that words 
spoken by a husband to a wife, were incapable of being a publication for the purposes of slander; Heap v Green 
(1926) II Butterworths Fortnightly Notes 328 per Alpers J. 
57
 Charlotte L Mitra, ‘For She has no Right or Power to Refuse her Consent’, [1979] Crim LR 558, 559. And at 
p 561: “The criminal law likewise developed special rules to accommodate the wife’s status as a legal nonentity, 
of which the defence of coercion is a modified survival”. J Tudor Rees, ‘Reserved Judgment, Some Reflections 
and Recollections’, (1956) Frederick Muller Ltd, London at p197-198 refers to a case before him in which it was 
humourously argued where a husband and wife dispute was involved, that they were one entity for the purposes 
of s47 Criminal Justice Act 1925.  
58
 Joseph Chitty, ‘A Practice Treatise on the Criminal Law’, (1826) 2 ed, vol 1, Samuel Brooke, Pater-Noster 
Row, London, p265: “The only relation which excuses the harbouring a felon is that of a wife to her husband, 
because she is considered as subject to his controul, as well as bound to him by affection. But no other ties, 
however near, will excuse…” 
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other spouse, or even for or against a co-accused of the other spouse. Other disparate 
privileges under the criminal law continue to exist such as the privilege against spouse-
incrimination59 and the inability of the prosecution in a criminal case to comment on the fact 
that a husband has failed to call his wife to give evidence for him60 and the inability to 
comment that the evidence of a wife exculpating her husband needed corroboration61 and 
                                              
59
 Self-incrimination may extend to the incrimination of a spouse: R v All Saints Worcester (1817) 6 M & S 194; 
105 ER 1215; and Lamb v Munster (1882) 10 QBD 110, 112-113 per Stephen J: “When the subject is fully 
examined, it will I think be found that the privilege extends to protect a man from answering any question which 
“would in the opinion of the judge have a tendency to expose the witness, or wife or husband of the witness, to 
any criminal charge”; Sir James Fitzjames Stephen ‘A Digest of the Criminal Law (Crimes and Punishments)’ 
(1887) 4 ed Macmillan and Co, London at p23, Art 30.  New Zealand Law Commission, Evidence Report 55 – 
Volume 1 Reform of the Law, August (1999) Wellington at p78. Spouse-incrimination privilege is recognised in 
Hong Kong: Salt & Light Development Inc. v Sjtu Sunway Software Industry Ltd [2006] 2 HKC 440, 453 I. The 
Queensland Court of Appeal has held that the common law recognises self-incrimination and spouse-
incrimination: Callanan v B (2004) 151 A Crim R 287, 293 per Jerrard JA “The marriage relationship and a 
wife’s position in it has accordingly resulted for at least a thousand years of our written legal history in special 
protections being available to a wife, including a principle that a wife cannot be compelled to incriminate her 
husband”, adopting the arguments of David Lusty, ‘Is there a Common Law Privilege against Spouse 
Incrimination?’, (2004) 27 University of New South Wales Law Journal 1. This decision was reluctantly 
followed in S v Boulton (2005) 155 A Crim R 152, 158 by Kiefel J. In Stoten v Sage (2005) 154 A Crim R 523, 
Dowsett J held that at common law a witness may decline to answer a question asked in non-judicial 
proceedings upon the ground that it may inculpate the witness’ spouse. In Hawkins v Sturt [1992] 3 NZLR 602 
spouse could not be compelled to disclose communications made to her by him for the purpose of his trial, 
distinguished by Courtney J in Director Serious Fraud Office v Mamfredos [2007] NZAR 26 on the basis that 
the privilege against spousal-incrimination could not be invoked, to defeat the special investigative powers under 
the Serious Fraud Office Act 1990 [NZ], which applied before the other spouse had been charged with an 
offence. The refusal of a wife to attend a compulsory interview under that Act therefore did not amount to a 
lawful excuse or justification for non-compliance with a statutory notice requiring the wife to so participate.  
60
 An explanation by a prosecutor that as a matter of law he was prohibited from calling the wife of an accused 
was held not to constitute a prohibited comment: R v Wildman (1981) 60 CCC 2d 289 (Ont: CA); in Hui Po v 
The Queen [1966] HKLR 635 (FC) prosecuting counsel told the jury that they may find it significant that the 
accused husband had failed to call evidence from an obvious quarter, namely his wife and family. It was held 
that this clearly infringed the mandatory provision of s55(b) Criminal Procedure Ordinance which stated that 
the failure of any person charged with an offence, or of his wife or husband as the case may be, of the person so 
charged, to give evidence shall not be made the subject of any comment by the prosecution. 
61
 R v Stewart-Smith (1960) 128 CCC 362 (Alb: CA) held that the theory of conjugal unity, should no longer 
apply, so as to prevent one spouse from corroborating the other in criminal matters. Johnson JA said: “If there is a 
rule that spouses cannot corroborate each other's evidence, it must find its origin in the disqualification of the 
spouses to give evidence, for or against each other…” There were several reasons for this disqualification. The 
oldest “a piece of semi-mediaeval metaphysics” was the legal fiction that the husband and wife were one and were 
presumed to have “but one will”. It could be argued “their interests are absolutely the same, and therefore they 
can gain no more credit when they attest for each other than when any man attests for himself…If a rule for the 
exclusion of such testimony can now be found, it must rest on the old theory of the unity of the spouses.” The old 
doctrines still show “astonishing vitality”. R v Neal & Taylor (1835) 7 Car & P 168 was often taken as authority 
for the fact that a wife’s evidence could not corroborate her husband, but criticised in R v Payne (1913) 8 Cr App 
R 171. See also R v Willis [1916] 1 KB 933, 936. In Canada different provinces had taken different views. In R v 
Galsky (1936) 67 CCC 1018 (Man: CA) held that a wife’s evidence may corroborate her accomplice husband. 
The opposite result was reached in R v Munevich (1942) 78 CCC (BC: CA). R v Stewart-Smith (1960) 128 CCC 
362 “Being thus unhampered by authority, and the status of a wife being completely changed, she being 
emancipated in law and in fact from the authority of her husband, it would be illogical to apply the concept of the 
unity of spouses at this time” heeding the admonition of Lord Atkin in United Australia Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd 
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should be treated with automatic suspicion.62 In addition, many of the rules of evidence as to 
admissibility,63 competence and compellability64 were designed to specifically cater for 
exemption by spouses from the general rules. 
  
In some jurisdictions, a husband was presumed to have sole possession of any items found in 
premises jointly occupied by the spouses.65 In others, a husband was liable for financial 
                                                                                                                                             
[1941] AC 1, 29 (PC): “When these ghosts of the past stand in the path of justice clanking their mediaeval chains 
the proper course for the judge is to pass through them undeterred.” This issue is alive in most jurisdictions as 
treason, sedition and perjury usually have a mandatory requirement. 
62
 R v Turnbull (1976) 63 Cr App R 132 a jury should be warned “that they should not necessarily regard the fact 
that the witness is the defendant’s wife as derogating from the worth of her evidence when the nature and 
content of the defence is such that anyone would expect her to be called as a witness in any event.”; R v Cheung 
Ping Kei [1985] HKLR 57 (CA) husband relying on the defence of alibi called his wife as a witness to that issue. 
The prosecutor impermissibly told the jury that a wife, because of the nature of the relationship, would under 
any circumstances do all she possibly and humanly could do to extricate him from any difficulty that he might 
find himself in. 
63
 R v Smith (1826) 1 Moody CC 289 “on an indictment against several accused the wife of any one of them is 
inadmissible as a witness”, per Littledale J. The wife of one of several accused where is an incompetent witness 
for any of his associates, when all of them are on trial: R v Denslow and Newbury (1847) 2 Cox CC 230 per 
Williams J (after consulting Cresswell J). ANE Amissah, ‘Criminal Procedure in Ghana’, (1982) Sedco 
Publishing Ltd, Accra at p200: “Under the old [Criminal Procedure] Code (Cap 10) there was discrimination 
between the spouse married under the Marriage Ordinance and his or her counterpart married according to 
custom or Mohammedan law over the question of privilege from giving evidence in the criminal case against the 
other spouse. Both types of spouses were competent witnesses for the prosecution. But this spouse, married 
under the Ordinance, was not compellable while “one married to another person otherwise than by a Christian 
marriage” was compellable”. 
64
 Lord Hardwicke in Barker v Dixie (1736) Cas temp Hard 264 gave the single rationale for the rule that spouses 
were incompetent witnesses against one another that: “The reason why the law will not suffer a wife to be a 
witness for or against her husband is, to preserve the peace of families” See Comyns, Digest Justices (1740) 
reprinted (1882) 4 ed, A Strahan, T.2. at p593: “The only natural relation, however, which the law regards as 
destroying competency, is that of husband and wife; for no other tie, however intimate, can render testimony 
inadmissible”. Neither husband nor wife were allowed to testify against the other because this would entail the 
anomaly on one legal personality effectively testifying against himself: Richard O Lempert, ‘A Right to Every 
Woman’s Evidence’, (1981) 66 Iowa Law Review 725, 726. A wife was unable to testify on behalf of her husband 
on the societal assumption her interests automatically mirrored his. Both the privilege and the incompetency 
doctrine were intended to promote marital unity: “In trials of any sort [husband and wife] are not allowed to be 
evidence for, or against, each other: partly because it is impossible their testimony should be indifferent; but 
principally because of the union of person”. Jeremy Bentham, ‘Rationale of Judicial Evidence’ vol 5, 344 (1827): 
“The reason likely to have been the original one, is the grimgribber, nonsensical reason,…Baron and Feme are 
one person in law…This quibble is the foundation of all reasoning.” There is some authority to suggest that the 
early privilege expressly prevented wives from testifying against their husband and only later became a gender-
neutral prohibition: People v Hamacher (1989) 438 NW 2d 43, 55 Boyle J dissenting. The privilege does not 
prevent the admission into evidence of communications intercepted prior to the marriage even if the parties to the 
communication are married by the time of the trial: R v Andrew (1986) 26 CCC (3d) 111 (BCSC). Requiring a 
‘common law’ spouse to testify against the accused does not infringe the equality rights of the testifying spouse as 
guaranteed by s15 of the Charter: R v Duvivier (1990) 60 CCC (3d) 353, affd 64 CCC (3d) 20. To a similar effect 
see R v Thompson (1994) 90 CCC (3d) 519 (Alta:CA). c.f R v Lologa [2007] 3 NZLR 844, 847.  
65
 In early English law, R v Boober, Boober and Boober  (1850) 4 Cox CC 272 Talfourd J had said that a wife 
cannot in law be said to have any possession separate from her husband; followed in Canada so a wife was 
entitled in criminal cases to a common law presumption in her favour that articles found in premises occupied by 
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penalties and fines imposed on his wife.66 In some jurisdictions, criminal offences specifically 
provide for aggravated penalties when a crime is committed by a man against a woman,67 
without the converse scenario being equally so treated. In some common law jurisdictions 
there remain some offences, defined in other than gender-neutral physiological terms,68 for 
example rape, but there is no obstacle in substantive criminal law terms for a woman to 
commit the offence of rape.69 The offence of infanticide70 only applies to women yet it 
                                                                                                                                             
her husband and herself were in his sole possession: see R v Hang (1931) 55 CCC 65; R v Gun Ying (1930) 53 
CCC 378; R v Tanchuk (1936) 63 CCC 193 and R v Klyne (1958) 120 CCC 318; Lee Kei-Yick v The Queen 
[1978] HKLR 510, 513 (CA) strongly repudiated the existence of this presumption “it appears to me to grant a 
husband a pre-eminence over his wife in the home which is perhaps not generally recognised in these 
enlightened days”.  
66
 In State v Harvey (1824) 3 New Hampshire 65 it was held that a husband and wife were jointly liable to 
prosecution for a forcible entry and detainer but that the fine should be imposed on the husband only. H Adams,  
H CLodge, J L Laughlin and E Young ‘Essays in Anglo-Saxon Law’ (1905), Little, Brown & Co, Boston p178: 
“Fines incurred by the wife were probably paid by the husband, as her active guardian, from her property. But, if 
this property did not suffice, not the husband but the wife’s kindred, were liable for the rest.” Early American 
law provided not only did the presumption excuse the wife but it also where successful made the husband liable. 
Charles Almy Jr and Horace W Fuller, ‘The Law of Married Women in Massachusetts’, (1878), George B Reed, 
Boston at p61 states that if a wife commits a crime in the presence of her husband, she is presumed to have acted 
under his coercion and will not be liable for it – but he will: Commonwealth v Burk (1858) 11 Gray 437; 
Commonwealth v Gannon (1867) 97 Mass 547; State v Boyle (1885) 13 RI 537. This development was an 
extension of the duty the husband had as head of the household, so that he became liable for his omission to 
control his wife. This early view persisted until Commonwealth v Hill (1887) 145 Mass 308 which repudiated it 
on the basis that the husband’s omission to perform a duty of this nature was not itself criminal but may be 
evidence of disproving the independence of his wife’s actions. James Schouler, ‘A Treatise on the Law of the 
Domestic Relations; Embracing Husband and Wife, Parent and Child, Guardian and Ward, Infancy and Master 
and Servant’, 1874, 2 ed Little, Brown and Company at p101 “it would be cruel and unjust to punish one person 
for the crime of another, or even to compel the two to bear the penalty together”. At p104 noting the presumption 
“is something to be easily rebutted, in the latest cases”. At common law, women’s status as independent actors 
degenerated so that they were not responsible for either their husband’s wrongs or their own – their husbands 
were. 
67
 Section 214 Crimes Act 1969 [Cook Islands] (aggravated penalty for assault on a woman). This offence is a 
clone of s194(b) Crimes Act 1961 [NZ]. The prosecution must prove that the male defendant knew that the 
assaulted person was a female: Chandler v The Queen unreported, High Court Napier AP 4/93 10 February 
1993, Greig J. Section 188(2)(b) Criminal Code [NT] also provides for this offence. In Harris v Republic [1969-
1982] Nauru LR 51 a husband was charged with offensive behaviour directed to his wife, contrary to s5 Police 
Offences Ordinance 1967 [Nauru]. His unsuccessful defence was he could not be charged since the person 
offended was his wife. The Supreme Court of Nauru ruled that their matrimony supplied no authority or excuse. 
In R v Abraham (1974) 30 CCC (2d) 332, (Qué: CA) a husband unsuccessfully argued on appeal against a 
conviction for common assault on his wife that by virtue of the marital relationship she must have consented to 
such an assault. 
68
 For example, rape is still defined in many jurisdictions by the penetration of a vagina by a penis. 
69
 A woman may incite rape: R v Baltimore (1768) 4 Burr 2179, 98 ER 136; People v Haywood (1955) 280 P2d 
180, or may abet it; R v Ram and Ram (1893) 17 Cox CC 609 and a woman may commit rape by forcing a male 
under duress, as her innocent agent, to penetrate a female: R v Scrubby unreported, Supreme Court of Northern 
Territory, SCC 20315731, 1 March 2005, Angel J in which a wife forced her husband, by threatening him with 
both a spear and a knife, to have sex with a 13-year-old girl.  The wife pleaded guilty and the husband was not 
charged as by the duress he was an innocent or non-responsible agent making it a case of rape by proxy: Schultz 
v Pettit (1980) 25 SASR 427, 438. A husband has been held capable of being a principal in the second degree to 
a rape of his wife if he assisted another person to commit a rape upon her: see Lord Castlehaven’s Case (1631) 3 
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substantively operates as a defence for females (not wives) to reduce what would otherwise be 
the crime of murder.71  
 
Apart from feme covert status, women as contrasted with wives, had the special avenue of 
pregnancy for escape from the capital sentence necessarily imposed upon conviction of a 
felony. And in relation to that exemption the common law also provided for married women 
to have an adjudicative role in the criminal justice system, namely when a jury of matrons72 
was constituted to determine whether another woman convicted of a capital offence was or 
was not quick with child. A jury of matrons would establish whether a woman was pregnant – 
“one of the few official duties women performed in the criminal justice system.”73 This 
                                                                                                                                             
St Tr 402; Sir W O Russell, ‘A Treatise on Crimes and Misdemeanours’, (1896) 6 ed, vol 3 at p224: “A husband 
cannot be guilty of a rape upon his wife, on account of the matrimonial consent which she has given, and which 
she cannot retract; but he may be guilty as a principal, by assisting another person to commit a rape upon his 
wife; for though in marriage the wife has given up her body to her husband, she is not by him to be prostituted to 
another.” Bohanon v State (1955) 289 P2d 200. In R v A [2003] 1 NZLR 1, Tipping, Glazebrook and Williams JJ 
held that under s128 Crimes Act a woman could violate a male by unlawful sexual connection, in this case the 
imposed envelopment of the penis by her genitalia. 
70
 Carol Smart, ‘Women, Crime and Criminology: A Feminist Critique’ (1978) Routledge & Kegan Paul, London 
at p6 “There are very few sex-specific offences in the English legal system as the law is, in principle, held to be 
equally applicable to all, regardless of sex, race, class and other distinctions. One exception to this is infanticide 
which is an offence that only women can commit”. Although a male could be an accessory or a secondary party 
as a principal. This defence has a convoluted history. By an Act of Parliament 21 Jac I c.27 in 1623 legislation 
was passed to punish “lewd women that have been delivered of bastard children” by making the mothers’ 
concealment of their death operate as a rebuttable presumption of murder. The severity of this legislation was 
even noted by Blackstone: ‘Commentaries on the Laws of England’ (1775) vol 4 p198. The Infanticide Act 1922 
and the Infanticide Act 1938 [UK] introduced the current regime where what would otherwise be a murder 
conviction is reduced where a woman causes the death of her own child under 12 months old and “at the time of 
the act or omission, the balance of her mind was disturbed by reason of her not having fully recovered from the 
effect of giving birth or by reason of the effect of lactation consequent upon the birth of the child”. In R v K A 
Smith [1983] Crim LR 739, McCowan J held that if the child survived there could be a conviction for attempted 
infanticide, followed in HKSAR v Ip Shui Kwan [2003] I HKC 36. In R v P [1991] 2 NZLR 116 (CA) the 
expression in s178(1) “any child of hers” was held to include not only the killing of her natural children but to all 
children who could in fact in law and commonsense be said to be hers.   
71
 In addition women had the special statutory defence of infanticide: so that parturition too was a further basis 
for differential treatment of women. In R v Gordon, unreported, CA 276/04, 16 December 2004, the New 
Zealand Court of Appeal considered that infanticide operated as something of a hybrid between an offence and a 
defence as it can be advanced by the defence to reduce the offence of murder or it could be charged as an offence 
in its own right.   
72
 Sir Frederick Pollock and Frederic William Maitland, ‘The History of English Law’ (1996), reprinted 2 ed, vol 
1, The Law Book Exchange Ltd, Union, New Jersey at p484: “we never find women as jurors except when, as 
not unfrequently happened, some expectant heir alleged that there was a plot to supplant him by the production 
of a supposititious child, in which case a jury of matrons was employed. [Bracton, f.69; Not Book, pl.198]” 
73
 N E H Hull ‘Female Felons Women and Serious Crime in Colonial Massachusetts’ (1987) University of 
Illinois Press, Urbana, p23. James Oldham, ‘On Pleading the Belly’ (1985) 6 Criminal Justice History p30 “In 
England the jury of matrons died a natural death of obsolescence”. However, this is quite incorrect as such juries 
were empanelled in 1913 and 1917. The jury of matrons was only abolished by the Sentence of Death (Expectant 
Mothers) Act 1931 [UK] which required the jury which had convicted her, on the evidence on the part of the 
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decision-making role in the criminal law was exclusively reserved for married women74 who 
were empanelled to decide whether a woman sentenced to death was pregnant or not, so if 
enceinte she would be respited from execution.  
                                                                                                                                             
prosecution or the defence, to determine not whether she was quick with child, as before, but whether she was 
‘pregnant’. In ‘A Jury of Matrons’ (1879) 67 LT 212 the verdict in R v Webster is reported where a jury of 
matrons “retired with the prisoner to a private apartment, there to ascertain the fact to be inquired of.” The 
forewoman of the jury informed Denman J that in answer to the question ‘Do you find that the prisoner is with 
child – quick child – or not?’ answered ‘Not’. The author notes ‘that the intended new Criminal Code, whilst it 
does away with a jury of matrons, and substitutes an examination by one or more registered medical 
practitioners, still adheres to the exploded doctrine about the woman being with a quick child”. Section 531 of 
the Criminal Code would have abolished the jury of matrons and replaced it with the expert evidence of “one or 
more registered medical practitioners”: House of Commons Sessional Papers (1878-79) vol 2 title 7 part 43. In R 
v Edmunds, The Times 18 January 1872 p5 the trial before Martin B involved a jury of matrons, a matter of 
“romantic ghastliness”. Upon the verdict of guilty of murder being returned the prisoner made the unexpected 
announcement that she was pregnant “and in obedience to the injunction the Under-Sheriffs, with swords, 
cocked hats, and frills, sallied into the body of the court and galleries in quest of matrons. After about 20 
minutes, a dozen well-to-do and respectably dressed women – who could have supposed that a dozen such were 
to be found in such a place? – were captured, and directed to enter the jury-box”. This incident in that trial is 
detailed by Ernest Bowen-Rowlands, ‘Seventy-Two Years At The Bar’ (1924) Macmillian and Co Ltd, London, 
p123-1234. The jury found that the prisoner was not enceinte. The author argued that a jury of matrons is more 
than an anachronism but was a scandal which should be “supplanted by a proper scientific investigation by 
competent medical men, will, like trial by battle or conviction for witchcraft, be consigned to the limbo of 
historical curiosities”. The president of the Obstetrical Society of London described the proceedings in R v 
Webster in which a jury of matrons was involved as a “solemn farce of asking the opinion of a jury of matrons, 
whose decision on such a question is of about the same value as it would be on a point of disputed legal 
procedure”. In R v Williams (1913) The Times 12 December 1913 p4 Ridley J had a jury of matrons empanelled, 
who returned a verdict that the prisoner was pregnant. Casenote on R v Williams (1914) 6 Criminal Justice 
History 280-281. In R v Stevens, The Times 19 July 1917 p3 Lawrence J ordered a jury of matrons which 
returned a verdict that the prisoner was pregnant. In JEB v Alabama ex rel TB (1994) 511 US 127, 132 the 
American history of the jury of matrons was reviewed. 
74
 A jury of matrons was a jury de circumstantibus: Sir Harry B Poland, The Times 4 April 1923 p6. The jury 
consisted of twelve married women and if there was an insufficiency of such women then the sheriff of the court 
was entitled to pray a tales, by capturing from the neighborhood enough matrons to make up the quorum. The 
special oath taken by such married women is recorded in the report of R v Wycherley (1838) 3 Car & P 202, 
being based upon R v Baynton (1702) 14 Howell’s State Trials 634, namely “to diligently, inquire, search and try 
[the prisoner] at the bar, whether she be quick with child or not and thereof a true verdict give according of the 
best of your skill and knowledge.” In R v Hunt (1847) 2 Cox CC 261, 262, the jury of matrons found that the 
prisoner was not enceinte but the Surgeon of Newgate Prison, reached a different conclusion just prior to the 
date set for execution: 26 Central Criminal Court Session Papers p682 and p1088, where upon she was 
reprieved and after a few months gave birth. Sir Harry Poland, The Times, 4 April 1923, p6 strongly protested at 
the continuance of the institution of the jury of matrons, which held the power of life and death yet had no 
medical qualifications other than their combined experiences of pregnancy. He supported s531 Criminal Code 
1879, which had been prepared by the Royal Commissioners, which would provide that henceforth “one or more 
registered medical practitioners” would make the decision. He specifically stated that this reform, which he had 
earlier urged in a letter published in The Times 8 February 1923 p 11, as well as the reform of the law relating to 
marital coercion, should be dealt with together in one Bill. His suggestion did not come to fruition until the 
enactment of the Sentence of Death (Expectant Mothers) Act 1931 [UK]. In civil law a jury de ventre inspiciendo 
[to inspect the belly] could be empanelled to determine whether a woman was pregnant, in cases of 
supposititious hiers. A late example is In re Blakemore (1845) 14 LJ Ch 336 per Knight Bruce VC. Such a jury 
was finally abrogated in Victoria only by s73 Juries Act 1967 [Vic]. Daniel Defoe, ‘The Fortunes and 
Misfortunes of the Famous Moll Flanders’ (1722) Penguin Library, London, “my mother  pleaded her belly, and 
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The apotheosis of the marital coercion defence was in the mid-nineteenth century, which 
coincided with the publication of a leading English criminal law text in 1867 which still found 
it apposite to record that publicly selling or buying a wife was an indictable offence75 and 
enclosing a model indictment. This poignantly provides a contemporary insight as to the 
status of some married women in England at that time. 
 
 
ORIGINS OF THE MARITAL COERCION DOCTRINE 
 
There is no complete consensus76 as to the origin of the various uxorial privileges, but as was 
noted in a joint judgment of Dixon CJ, Williams Webb and Fullagar JJ: 
 
To say that the common law rule is based upon the conception of the unity of husband and 
wife is probably to invert the order of historical development. One may suppose that the 
conception of the unity of husband and wife is but an ex post facto explanation and not a 
source of the state of early English law upon the subject. What Bracton actually said in 
reference to “vir et uxor” was “qui sunt quasi unica persona, quia caro una et sanguinis unus”: 
Bracton, ‘De Legibus’ fo.429b (Woodbines’ ed, vol4, p335).77 
 
                                                                                                                                             
being found quick with child, she was respited” Page 260, “I pleaded my belly, but I am no more quick with 
child than the judge that tried me.” 
75
 J B Maule, ‘Burn’s Justice Of The Peace’ (1867) 30 ed, H Sweet; Maxwell & Son, and Stevens & Sons, 
London, p1235. The draft indictment for the offence is set out at p240-241. R v Delaval (1763) 3 Burr 1438, 
conspiracy to remove an 18 year old female apprentice and to place her in the hands of Sir Francis Delaval for 
the purpose of prostitution. The text notes “many prosecutions against husbands for selling, and others for 
buying, have been sustained, and imprisonment for six months inflicted (R v Padley, 27 July 1818)”. The fact 
that women were the property of their husbands is demonstrated by the practice of wife sale presumably a 
method of providing for divorce where it was otherwise unavailable or too costly: C Kenny, ‘Wife Selling in 
England’ (1920) 45 LQR 496; Thomas Hardy, ‘The Mayor of Casterbridge’ (1886) reprinted (1975) Macmillan 
and Co, London p32-36 identifies the practice. 
76
 No single theory provides a coherent explanation for uxorial privileges. Sir W O Russell, ‘A Treatise on 
Crimes and Misdemeanours’ (1896) 6 ed, vol 1 at p145. Stating that a feme covert “is so much favoured in 
respect of that power and authority which her husband has over her” that she is not liable for committing most 
crimes if she is subject to her husband’s coercion. Smith and Hogan, ‘Criminal Law’ (1965) Butterworths, 
London, at p135: “Various theoretical justifications were advanced for the rule – the identity of husband and 
wife, the wife’s subjection to her husband and her duty to obey him – but the practical reason for its application 
to felonies was that it saved a woman from the death penalty when her husband was able, but she was not, able 
to plead benefit of clergy. This reason disappeared in 1692 when the benefit of clergy was extended to women, 
yet the rule continued and its scope increased.”   
77
 Tooth & Co Ltd v Tillyer (1956) 95 CLR 605, 615; The origin of the defence of coercion is generally 
explained by the former state of subjugation of the wife and her duty to obey her husband: R v Robins (1982) 66 
CCC (2d) 550, 561 (Qué: CA). 
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Any attempt however to identify a source involves an uncertain path into the miasma of 
Anglo-Saxon legal history, yet most commentators accept that the laws of King Ine,78 AD 
791, of the West-Saxons in England, provided much of the DNA for the modern legal 
position. Those laws were substantially re-enacted by King Canute,79 who promulgated laws, 
undated,80 and showing “no marked originality” but having the inestimable advantage of 
being comprehensive of earlier laws.  
 
Blackstone81 noted that the Northern nations82 of Europe had extended a privilege not 
dissimilar to marital coercion to any woman83 transgressing in the company of a man. Sir 
James Fitzjames Stephen84 equally accepted that the Germanic races which populated early 
England had imported this legal rule which was applicable to all women. The Norman 
conquest85 brought the overlay of the law of feme covert,86 and over time it is probable that 
                                              
78
 Glanville Williams ‘Criminal Law: The General Part’ (1961) 2 ed, Stevens & Sons Ltd, London, accepted that 
the presumption of coercion originated in the wife’s subjection to the husband and that laws of King Ine, ibid 
p762, AD 712, provided for the defence. Notwithstanding, 1 Hale PC 45-6. The presumption applied whether or 
not a wife was “a marionette, moved at will by the husband”: Smith v Myers (1898) 74 NW 277,278 
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the original privilege contracted to favour of wives only, partly as a compensation for their 
disability of coverture87 which recognised their very substantial legal helplessness. A husband 
additionally had the right to control his wife through physical chastisement and it is probable 
that such an ability to enforce obedience and compliance in a wife was a facet of the defence88 
which presumed she acted pursuant to his command in criminal acts where he was sufficiently 
proximate to be able to effect physical compulsion over her. The savagery of the criminal 
law89 too may in itself have produced a sympathetic environment for the defence to thrive. It 
followed that the custom of the law was to look exclusively at the husband as the head of the 
household and to treat him as being vicariously liable for all damages flowing from acts 
committed by the wife.90 A wife was not economically independent91 of her husband, nor did 
she have legal personality,92 upon her marriage her separateness93 became merged in him94 
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who was by law able to determine her legal and factual volition.95  The common law defence 
of marital coercion would make married women the object of special solicitude in recognition 
of their putative lack of free will and independent thought and action.96   
 
The theories of conjugal unity, uxorial subjection97 and the correlative rights and duties 
between spouses to each other all gelled to produce a power imbalance overwhelmingly in 
favour of the husband.98 This outcome was itself conceived as being no less than the 
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fulfillment of a biblical imperative. The religious99 influence in the status and implications of 
marriage were to become decisive upon the creation of the benefit of clergy100 which excused 
criminal offences for only those males who had a semblance of literacy. By contrast, only 
wives were excused by the marital coercion doctrine; no other class of person was so 
privileged.101 The general assumption of the absence of a free choice in a wife, in the presence 
of her husband, prevailed as a matter of substance and reality as well as by a presumption in 
the criminal law.102 Among the suggested theories for the development of the defence the 
prevailing social conditions of spouses seems the most plausible particularly “when the 
exceptional cruelty with which the ancient law treated the servile classes is remembered”.103 
In addition it has been argued that as crimes were capable of being atoned by the payment of 
money, wergild, those early offences were seen as torts for the purposes of punishment; it 
followed that when the state began to monopolise the function of prosecution for the more 
serious offences, the reason for the rule ceased to exist as virtually no offence remained 
expiable or compoundable by a payment.104  
 
The origin and evolution of the defence had indubitably both secular and religious 
beginnings, involving a response to the limitations on the right of women to claim benefit of 
clergy. Thereafter, because of the harshness105 of the law and uncertainty as to the scope of 
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the defence, English criminal law developed inconsistently and hesitantly in relation to 
married women, comforted by the convenience of the mollifying effect of the presumption of 
coercion.  
 
In ancient Roman times, women were under the wing of their husband.106 Wihtred, a late 
seventh century English King, issued a law stating that “if a husband, without his wife’s 
knowledge, makes offerings to devils, he shall forfeit all his goods”, but only if the wife 
participated were her goods forfeited.107 King Ine provided that “if a husband steals a beast 
and carries it into his house, and it is seized therein, he shall forfeit his share [of the household 
property]”;108 but not the wife, unless she had eaten any of the meat.109 With these 
injunctions, the common law tradition developed, incorporating and intermingling the legal 
traditions of the Romans and the Normans with the canon law of the Catholic Church and the 
Anglo-Saxon traditions.  Married women were under the cover and protection, and therefore 
influence, of their husbands.110 The married woman had no proprietorial interests separate 
from her husband, all her personal and real property immediately belonged to him upon 
marriage. The wife was ‘civilly dead’.111 Social norms converged with Biblical imperative: 
“Your desire shall be for your husband, and he shall rule you.”112 A husband had the limited 
satisfaction of knowing that although a man who killed his wife was guilty of murder; a wife 
who killed her husband was guilty of the enhanced crime of petit treason and could be 
punished by being drawn and burnt alive.113 
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During the Anglo-Saxon period in England, AD 580-1066, women had greater control over 
their destinies than under the Norman regime which succeeded it. Their capacity for self-
determination was generally comparable with that of men.114 The legal system brought to 
England the inherited notion of wergild, which was the monetary value of a person’s life, 
which in turn depended upon one’s rank in society. Women had the same wergild as men of 
their own rank. In fact pregnant women were further protected and valued by the assessment 
that they were measured as being entitled to not only their own but in addition also half of the 
unborn child’s wergild.115 The autonomy of Anglo-Saxon women included the specific right 
to enter into only voluntary unions of marriage; despite the considerable authority of father’s 
over both sons and daughters.116 Under the legal system Anglo-Saxon women were held 
accountable for their own crimes and were not accountable for those committed by their 
husbands.117 Under the Norman118 influence the status of women as independent actors 
degenerated to the point that they were no longer even responsible for their own wrongs.119 
Narrower attitudes were chronicled. There was a powerful decline in the influence of women. 
Women now generally had little choice in their selection of a husband.120 The limitations 
placed on their education were seen as consonant with their intellectual capabilities. The 
teachings of the Christian church stressed the inferiority and subordination of women and this 
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undoubtedly had an effect on how women were perceived in society and by the courts.121 
Occupations were regulated by male-controlled guilds. The preference for male land 
ownership became mandated by the establishment of primogeniture, so that a daughter could 
only inherit land in the absence of a brother. As land ownership became essentially a male 
prerogative the other legal incidents of landholding followed, so that a married woman could 
no longer make a valid will without her husband’s consent.122 The general waning of feminine 
power meant exclusion from the legal system so that a woman became either the 
responsibility of her father or her husband, having no choice to exercise as to whom she 
would be married. Even the dissolution of marriage upon widowhood became a financial 
enterprise, as she thereupon automatically became a ward of the King, who for profit could 
arrange and direct another marriage for her.123 A married woman was unable on her own to 
initiate litigation or defend it. She regained this right if she was widowed but it ceased upon 
any remarriage.   
 
The Anglo-Saxon legal system appears to have been much more benevolent to women than 
the succeeding Norman laws, customs and feudalism124, yet wives were accountable for their 
own crimes and never for those committed by their husbands.125 The ability of women in the 
Saxon era to dispose of land also gave them a capacity for self-determination comparable to 
that enjoyed by men. By the eleventh century, the laws of Canute stated; “let no one compel 
either woman or maiden to [marry a man] whom herself dislikes”.126 
                                              
121
 Lina Eckenstein, in Christine Fell (ed) ‘Women in Anglo-Saxon England’ (1984) Blackwell, p11 n3 notes that 
no woman living during Anglo-Norman time had ever been honoured by being raised to sainthood. As church 
law became increasingly influenced by Cannon Law with its view that women were not made in God’s image, 
with the natural result of her subjection to man, the lesser serving the greater: Angela M Lucas, ‘Women in the 
Middle Ages – Religion, Marriage and Letters’, (1983) Harvester Press, Sussex, p6 n21.  
122
 Jennifer C Ward, ‘English Noblewomen in the Later Middle Ages’, (1932) Longman, London, p9. Land was 
intrinsically valuable and conferred power, a woman who was incapable of controlling land during her lifetime 
was also prohibited from controlling it upon her death. 
123
 Therefore Magna Carta provided that: “No widow shall be compelled to marry so long as she prefers to live 
without a husband, provided she gives security that she will not marry without [her overlord’s] consent”: 17 John 
§ 8 (1215). 
124
 Christine Fell, ‘Women in Anglo-Saxon England’, (1984) Blackwell, p13: “The evidence which has survived 
from Anglo-Saxon England indicates that women were then more nearly the equal companions of their husbands 
and brothers than at any other period before the modern age.” 
125
 Christine G Clark, ‘Women’s Rights in Early England’, (1995) Brigham Young University Law Review 207, 
213. 
126
 Ibid 215 quoting Laws of Cnut cl 73. “One final interesting aspect of the Anglo-Saxon legal system is the fact 
that Anglo-Saxon women were held accountable for their own crimes and not those committed by their 
   
 30 
 
The political structure of the Anglo-Saxon regime meant each person counted and therefore 
had to contribute to the defence of the community. But the Normans brought with them a 
culture steeped in chivalry127 which denied women their own rights. They were to be coddled 
and protected from the criminal law when conduct also involved their husband. Self-
determination and autonomous decision-making in the presence of the husband was presumed 
to be unthinkable. In the thirteenth century, because of various local urban customs, “the 
complete merging of personality being obviously out of harmony with bourgeois habits”128 
women’s property was sometimes outside the husband’s control129, an era which definitely 
rejected the principle of community property between husband and wife, which otherwise 
prevailed throughout a considerable part of the continent.130 This was not so much because of 
the fiction that husband and wife were one; but rather the fact that the husband was head of 
the family.  
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Brooke131 in 1568 referred to Anonymous132 where a woman was charged with stealing two 
shillings worth of bread. Her defence was that she did it by the command of her husband. The 
report continues [in translation] “And the Justices for pity’s sake would not hold her by her 
confession but took an inquest. By which it was found that she did it by the coercion of her 
husband and against her will. Therefore she went quit. And it was said that if she acted by the 
command of her husband, it would be no felony”. Bacon,133 Dalton134 and Noy135 the 
Attorney-General, all wrote to similar effect. 
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Hale,136 and Blackstone137 all accepted that the wife was incapable of conspiring alone with 
her husband, nor could she be an accessory after the fact to his crime. While there was some 
doubt as to whether the only exceptions to the marital coercion doctrine extended to murder 
and treason,138 there was no doubt that marital coercion was presumed in the great majority of 
serious criminal cases. In Anonymous139 at the Cambridge Assizes of 1664 it was propounded 
by all the judges that if a husband and wife commit a burglary, both of them breaking into a 
house, entering and stealing goods, that the wife committed no offence.  
 
For the wife, being together with the husband in the act, the law supposeth the wife doth it by 
the coercion of the husband. And so it is in all larcenies. But as to murder; if the husband and 
wife both join in it, they are both equally guilty. 
 
 
BENEFIT OF CLERGY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF UXORIAL PRIVILEGES 
 
Marital coercion is a form of private140 civil141 subjection with an obscure history. Sir James 
Stephen stated142 that it developed as a response to the singular injustice in which, where 
                                              
136
 Hale 1 ‘Pleas of the Crown’, 45: “If she (the wife) commit larceny by the coercion of the husband, she is not 
guilty (27 Ass. 40), and, according to some, if it be by the command of her husband, which seems to be law if 
the husband be present, but not if her husband be absent at the time and place of the felony committed. But this 
command or coercion of the husband doth not excuse in case of treason nor of murder, or in regard of the 
heinousness of those crimes.” Sir W O Russell, ‘A Treatise on Crimes and Misdemeanours’ (1896) 6 ed, vol 1 at 
p146(l) in an extended footnote notes that there was no actual decision excepting treason from the presumption.  
137
 Blackstone 4 Commentaries 29: “By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very 
being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and 
consolidated into that of the husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs everything; and is 
therefore called in our law-french a feme-covert, foemina viro co-operta; is said to be covert-baron, or under the 
protection and influence of her husband, her baron, or under the condition during her marriage is called her 
coverture. Upon this principle, of an union of person in husband and wife, depend almost all the legal rights, 
duties, and disabilities, that either of them acquire by the marriage.” 
138
 Edward Jenks (ed) ‘Stephens Commentaries on the Laws of England’ (1922) 17 ed, vol 4, Butterworth & Co, 
London p29: “The rule, moreover, was never applicable to such offences as murder, manslaughter and the like; 
these being of too deep a dye to be thus excused. In treason, also, no plea of coverture can excuse the wife, no 
presumption of her husband’s coercion extenuate her guilt; as well because of the odiousness and dangerous 
consequence of the crime of treason itself, as because the husband, having broken through the most sacred tie of 
social community by rebellion against the State, has no right to that obedience from his wife, which he himself, 
as a subject, has forgotten to pay”. 
139
 (1664) Kelyng 31.   
140
 Compare the defence of superior orders in a military context: R v Smith (1899) 17 Cape of Good Hope 
Reports 561. 
141
 (1736) 1 Hale PC 44 where the defence is referred to as an “indulgence of the law”. 
142
 Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, ‘A History of the Criminal Law in England’ (1883) Macmillan and Co, London, 
vol 2 p105.  
   
 33 
spouses committed an offence together, the husband (often the far less deserving of the two) 
would become the beneficiary of the doctrine of benefit of clergy by the semblance of 
repeating a verse in the bible, whereas the wife would be sentenced to death. To 
counterbalance this comparative injustice the doctrine of marital coercion was a response 
which would allow a significant number of married women to be exempt from the criminal 
law thus placing a significant number of wives, in practical terms, in the same place as their 
husbands.143 Marital coercion became the approximate working equivalent of benefit of 
clergy. While in some cases the outcome would be that both spouses would not suffer the 
punishment of the law, marital coercion existed at least some 500 years before benefit of 
clergy, which only arose out of the disputes between church and state in the thirteenth 
century. The reason advanced by Stephen is contradicted by Hale144 who refers to: 
 
‘the modern practice and in favorem vitae is fittest to be followed; and the rather, because 
otherwise for the same felony the husband may be saved by the benefit of his clergy, and the 
wife hanged, where the case is within clergy; tho I confess this reason is but of small value’. 
 
This life-saving privilege arose from the struggle as to the jurisdiction to try clerics accused of 
crime. The church claimed sole adjudicative power over its own and for them only to answer 
in ecclesiastical tribunals145 and not before courts of law. Churchmen claimed exemption from 
all secular jurisdictions. King Henry II reigned for 35 years but it was a reign “of bipartite 
legal systems; one set of laws governed the state and another set of laws governed the 
Church”.146 It eventuated that any male who could mumble the small quantity of Latin 
necessary to repeat a standard verse from the Bible, was able to escape conviction in the 
courts of justice by ‘pleading his clergy’ – which was a bar to curial jurisdiction over him.147 
This outwitted the criminal law. But as no woman could be a cleric, from the twelfth century 
until statute finally intervened in 1692 and stretched the fiction to now allow females to claim 
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the benefit of clergy,148 all women were haplessly exposed to the full rigour of the law. Their 
husbands and other males were set free – all in a time when society knew, understood and 
expected that he was able to control and command his wife.149 The privilege: 
 
developed into one of the most incongruous fictions in British legal history for it had become 
available to any person who could read, even if he had never had the remotest connection with 
the Church. It was, in fact, an absolute charter for the literate, whereby they might totally 
evade any effective punishment if they were convicted of a felony.150 
 
It was in essence an exception from capital punishment in which the secular courts yielded to 
the ecclesiastical courts, where the punishments were comparatively insignificant. By a 
merciful fiction in favour of maledom, the clerical privilege was purged of its ecclesiastical 
character and ultimately of its scholarly connotation as well; its residuum was essentially as 
Hobart terms it “a kind of statute pardon”151 for a limited group of offences.  
 
It was decided that petty treason [murder of a husband] was an offence for which benefit of 
clergy would never be available…the British criminal code continued to be unscientifically 
divided into clergyable and non-clergyable offences.152 
 
By the sixteenth century, Parliament stated that certain offences were enacted as being 
expressly “without benefit of clergy”.153 In the reign of William and Mary, the advantages of 
the privilege were extended to women154, while in the succeeding reign the reading-text was 
abolished for all. Only in 1827, was the benefit of clergy privilege swept away by the British 
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Parliament155, although it continued to exist in its Colonies156 and in American law157 until 
1850. (Until 1826 in England, treason and all felonies, except larceny and mayhem, were 
punishable by death).158 The general tendency of newer statutory laws until the abolition of 
benefit of clergy in 1827, had been to restrict the privilege as to crimes and to extend it 
indefinitely as to persons.159 Over time the optimum practice was for male prisoners of 
whatever status to plead not guilty, providing to them two separate opportunities to avoid 
capital punishment, as if found guilty, the claim to clergy was a total immunity.160 
 
For the privilege of clergy; as if a clerk be ordered in court before a lay judge to answer to an 
action for a personal trespass, and especially in a case criminal and mortal plead that he is a 
clerk, the judge hath no further conusance of the cause, for the church is so enfranchised, that 
no lay judge can have jurisdiction over a clerk, though the clerk will acknowledge him for his 
judge; and in such a case he is without delay to be delivered to his ordinary.161 
 
Benefit of clergy “was to have a pervasive and benign, if counter-productive effect on the 
development of criminal law for the next few centuries”.162 It has been unconvincingly 
argued163 by Sir James Fitzjames Stephen that the origin of the marital coercion doctrine was 
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a response to the inequality of the benefit of clergy doctrine, which did not apply to women, 
on the basis that no woman could become a cleric in the church.164 However, this conclusion 
is irreconcilable with the fact that the marital coercion doctrine existed in its own right from at 
least 712 whereas the benefit of clergy doctrine did not exist and ultimately coalesce until 
some centuries later. The marital coercion position was a response to the inferior social and 
legal status of women whereas the benefit of clergy doctrine in its original formulation was 
mandated by ecclesiastical law and practice. Judges in deciding the contours of the common 
law had over time crafted the marital coercion doctrine so that it would apply only to where it 
was necessary to avoid executing a woman, as felonies were almost without exception, capital 
offences.165 A complex interaction among social, legal and psychological forces shaped the 
status of wives during the life of the marital coercion doctrine. It literally applied the legal 
unity of husband and wife by the obliteration of the wife’s separate personality. It is quite 
improbable that the anomalies of the benefit of clergy doctrine can explain the marital 
coercion defence. The two doctrines finally, yet partially, overlapped in 1692 but only until 
the abolition of the former in 1827, to provide a further level of protection for all women (not 
just wives); but benefit of clergy was principally a means of mitigation of punishment which 
permitted an alternative lesser sanction to be imposed. The marital coercion defence, by 
contrast, resulted in a complete acquittal. The coexistence of the benefit of clergy provision 
reduced the importance to wives of the marital coercion doctrine, although the non-clergyable 
exceptions were distinctly wider than the exceptions to the common law defence. The list of 
crimes which Parliament had placed outside the benefit of clergy was considerable by the 
time of the demise of the privilege in 1827.    
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By the turn of the nineteenth century English criminal law had reached a degree of 
unparalleled asperity166 as there were in excess of 200 offences carrying capital punishment, 
without benefit of clergy. If the doctrine of marital coercion was a function of the 
unavailability of the benefit of clergy, upon the extension of that benefit to women in 1692, it 
may be surmised that the earlier doctrine would diminish in its virility, whereas it had 
continued with renewed vigour. But the benefit of clergy never applied to misdemeanors167 so 
it could be inferred that with the significantly reduced sentences for misdemeanors, that the 
husband would suffer yet the wife, by virtue of the unrebutted presumption, would be free. It 
also avoided the “strange and monstrous consequences of a joint conviction”.168 
 
From its inception, the presumption of coercion was never established as being conclusive, 
but by the seventeenth century it had been slowly transformed into an irrebuttable principle of 
law169. The mere fact of wifehood had become a complete defence for conduct committed in 
the presence of her husband. The wife could simply invoke that status as a total answer to the 
allegation of criminality, as long as the husband had been present. This approach was 
completely at odds with the developing theory of the law that combinative crime, such as 
exemplified by conspiracy, or joint enterprise, had a more pernicious effect than crime 
committed by an individual. The very justification in doctrine for criminalising concerted 
criminal effort was being undone where the joint action was between husband and wife, or by 
a wife where her husband was within a close distance. Once the presumption had become a 
legal, rather than a factual one, it was a passport to joint crime being indemnified from 
successful prosecution. The resilience of the marital coercion doctrine is explained by how the 
judges adapted it. While the very fact of the women’s marriage was the making of a 
conclusive defence170, by the early nineteenth century it was finally decided that it was now 
only a rebuttable presumption of fact. This position in turn became further weakened as courts 
responded to the unjust outcomes of acquittal by concluding that the quantum of evidence 
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required to tip the presumption was in effect less and less over time. The presumption 
diminished in terms of practical importance because judges began to robustly direct juries, 
that evidence of apparent independent action by a wife was inconsistent with the presumption 
and the defence. There was at common law no statement as to the standard of proof required 
to tilt the presumption, other than the orthodox requirement that the prosecution overall be 
proved beyond reasonable doubt. There was no rule that the presumption meant that the 
prosecution had to displace it on any narrated standard. The judges crafted the doctrine in 
order to achieve the flexibility of dictating a just result in the individual case.   
 
The courts slowly modified the presumption so by the mid-nineteenth century it had returned 
to its original place as only a rebuttable presumption of fact and not a conclusive presumption 
of law, or even a rebuttable presumption of law.171 This alteration was significant as it now 
required courts and lawyers to focus on how the presumption could be tipped. It became the 
approach that the prosecution needed to demonstrate that the wife had to some appreciable 
extent acted as an independent agent. To identify ostensibly independent acts, suffered from 
the logical fallacy: those acts themselves may have been the product of unwitnessed anterior 
coercion. An apparently free act performed in advance of the offence, narrowly defined in 
terms of its elements, may actually have been the product of coercive behaviour. With the 
presumption in place, those apparently free acts must be themselves presumed to be coerced. 
Therefore, it was on analysis a circular approach. The prosecution in reality could only beat 
the presumption if the innate features of the crime showed not that the wife took an 
independent part, but that she was the dominant participant in a joint crime. In a situation 
where she alone was charged, the fact her husband had been present and had not been 
charged, could look to all as though he had been responsible for her act and she was his 
proxy.  
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By 1867, the leading textbook in English criminal law172 stated that the law was now settled 
so if a crime be committed in the presence of her husband then, as a generality subject to 
limited exceptions, the law presumed she acted under his immediate coercion. But the 
presumption was one of fact not law, as it was rebuttable173 by evidence that the wife was 
principally instrumental in the commission of the felony by acting voluntarily. But even the 
exceptions which did not enable a wife to plead marital coercion were not themselves entirely 
certain.174 In relation to misdemeanours there was some uneven175 authority that they were 
outside the protection of the presumption.176 The reason urged for restricting the defence to 
felonies was that in misdemeanours which involved “the government of the house” the wife 
would take a principal share in that governance. Prior to R v Cruse177 in 1838 there appears to 
be no authority in the decided cases justifying the general exclusion of misdemeanours from 
the operation of the presumption. Even after R v Cruse courts continued to apply the doctrine, 
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for example to the misdemeanour of an assault occasioning actual bodily harm.178 If the 
reason for the exemption of the most heinous crimes of treason and murder from the 
exemption was their intrinsic seriousness and nature, then the lesser crimes ought to activate 
the defence, as otherwise only a very wide middle band of offences was covered. But it was 
inconsistently argued that certain misdemeanours were outside the doctrine which turned on 
the predilections of wives, namely offences “touching the domestic economy or government 
of the house, in which the wife has the principal share”179 such as keeping a common gaming 
house180 and keeping a common bawdy house.181 It was stated “according to the prevailing 
opinion, it seems that the wife may be found guilty with the husband in all 
misdemeanours.”182  
 
The presumption of marital coercion was easily rebuttable183 especially where the husband 
was physically incapable184 of exercising actual dominion over his wife at the time she 
committed the offence. The presumption was startling as it inverted the normal assumption 
underlying the inquiry of the criminal law into the responsibility of an individual for conduct. 
The initial assumption is that the accused is a fit subject for legal sanction because he or she 
had made an informed decision to commit a crime. It is only at that point evidence of either 
cognitive or volitional incapacity permits a lack of culpable blameworthiness to be 
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excusatory. For a married185 woman the law started from the assumption that she was so 
malleable that a crime physically committed by her was attributed not to her own exercise at 
will, but to the influence exerted upon her by her husband’s will.186 The cultural and political 
assumptions187 underlying the doctrine were traceable to the laws of King Ine.188 
 
Wives were believed to possess an immature or uninformed moral sense, so a miscreant wife 
was one who displayed any tendency toward autonomous action. In the era of the nineteenth 
century it was still permissible for a husband to lock up his wife and to cause a recalcitrant 
one to conform to his authority through physical punishment. Therefore independent action by 
a wife was perceived as a management failure by her husband.  This explained why he was 
found to be vicariously liable for her acts and financial penalties. The marital coercion 
doctrine could be used to inflict detriment on the husband for a crime his wife had committed, 
on the basis that he had irresponsibly failed to exercise proper control of her.189 The theory of 
criminal responsibility is based on the consequences of free choices, yet the effect of the 
marital coercion doctrine was to confirm that a wife was subjugated to her husband. It was 
hierarchical civil subjection, a reflection not only of the subordinate legal position occupied, 
but also of an obdurate belief in her intellectual, motivational and moral deficiencies. But 
quite inconsistently these assumptions ought to have, but did not, also applied to unmarried190 
women. The wife’s weaknesses began with her wedding day: the status was itself the 
determinative debilitating fact, from which her reordered legal consequences now flowed. 
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INCREASING JUDICIAL INTOLERANCE OF THE DEFENCE 
 
The case law shows that by the beginning of the nineteenth century the tolerance for the entire 
doctrine was wearing very thin. The irritation of judges may have had the effect that 
prosecutors did not bring cases where there was an apparently strong defence.  Courts became 
impatient with claims of marital coercion, which increasingly were separated from the 
realities of daily life in which women were begrudgingly becoming more independent. In 
1837, Charles Dickens in Oliver Twist191 memorably fixed a contemporary stare at the marital 
coercion defence.  
 
The courts, however, consistently reaffirmed that the defence articulated an ostensibly benign 
explanation for the hierarchical distribution of power within marriage.  The justification was 
to locate the source of the wife’s subjugation to her husband’s will in her submissive and 
confiding nature, coupled with the devoted affection she held for her husband. Judges 
contented themselves with the notion that it was natural, indeed noble, for wives to submit to 
the wills of their husbands. The inevitable effect of this defence to criminal conduct is to 
attribute irresponsibility to every woman who qualifies for the status of wife, irregardless to 
individual circumstances. The surging public policy propping up the defence trumped all 
considerations on inequality and emancipation. The defence was perceived as ‘fair’, 
chivalrous and not unreasonable. It was seen as affirmative discrimination necessary to deal 
with the grim realities of connubial life amongst the lower classes.   
 
By the first three decades of the nineteenth century, the common law general defence of 
duress was so under-developed to be almost theoretical only; the common law knew but two 
or three examples of its deployment. The practical content of the general defence of duress 
was that of its overworked partial sub-set – marital coercion, which became the single focus 
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to interest of contemporary legal commentators. Marital coercion was “the particular area 
which had received most formal judicial attention”.192 Soon193 it was openly acknowledged 
that a wife or feme covert was so much favoured by the law in respect of that power and 
authority which her husband had over her. She only lost the presumption if “it can clearly 
appear that the wife was not drawn to it by the husband, but that she was the principal actor 
and incitor of it.” 
 
The law demanded the complete complicity194 of the wife with the wishes and desires of the 
husband. Femininity was prized and derived from an optimum model of passivity: meekness, 
helplessness and innocence; the perfect recipe for successful coercion. Increased access to 
education and economic and technological changes slowly prompted women into the work 
place. Upon marriage a wife’s personal property195 became absolutely vested in her husband. 
Her income was his and unless from an aristocratic family,196 her land became his. Because of 
the economic dominion of the husband her options for independent thought and action were 
limited. Seen this way the marital coercion doctrine was a realistic and rational response by 
the criminal law to the predicament of women who were directed by their husbands to effect 
an unlawful act. The law presumed them guiltless of the dilemma. The disparate justifications 
for the doctrine included an assertion of the inferior intellect of women.  This was a handy 
conclusion as the dominance of the husband was by linear logic a sensible and humane 
solution. It conveniently followed that the wife would act in accordance with the stipulations 
of the husband, as she was vulnerable when unaided in important decision-making. Biological 
justifications were also advanced for her frailty, including the debilitating effect of 
menstruation on the nervous system of the human female. But this could never, even if true, 
explain the quite separate and equal treatment of all other women, on identical terms as men, 
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under the criminal law. (An entire theory of comparable medicine had been responsible for 
the earlier twentieth century statutory defence of infanticide which was created to explain 
away why lactating mothers would occasionally kill their newborn children.) The 
iconography of the Victorian female was a woman come to terms within the limited ability of 
her mind with the demands of childhood. Because the mind of a woman was considered 
incapable of safely processing the factual nuances and legal implications of her conduct, the 
law paternalistically provided a defence which positively encouraged her to comply with her 
husband’s superior intellect. The criminal law reinforced the teaching that in almost197 no 
circumstance should a wife question the judgment of her husband.   
 
The common law position remained quite uncertain whether the defence applied to 
misdemeanors. A textbook, in its eleventh edition, published 14 years before the Avory 
Report,198 could state that not all felonies were included “though it seems unsettled where the 
line is drawn”199 and “in cases of misdemeanor, the prevailing opinion seems to have been 
that the wife is responsible for her acts”.200 The presumption never applied in non-
indictable201 offences in England, but it did in Australia and other common law jurisdictions. 
Now s47 Criminal Justice Act 1925 [UK] which creates the statutory defence of marital 
coercion applies to all offences, summary202 and indictable without distinction. Another 
exception, ill-defined as to its outer reaches, reappeared in the early nineteenth century in 
which a wife was not entitled to claim the defence in relation to offences concerning “the 
government of the house,” as a wife was inconsistently held to have a principal share in its 
governance. It was said such offences “as may generally be presumed to be managed by the 
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intrigue of her sex” were outside the defence.203 The bottom line was that by her running a 
bawdy house or engaging in prostitution, even with the husband nearby, was too far beyond 
the pale. Such wives were too brazen and contaminated by cashflow to be within the 
contemplation of the law’s magnanimity. Such women had irretrievably departed from the set 
course – they constituted a prohibited sub-sub-class.  Upon this theory the use of the house, 
otherwise a matrimonial sanctuary for criminal offences such as keeping a brothel,204 was 
violative of the sanctity enshrined by the defence.205  
 
The imposing strength206 of the doctrine in the mid-nineteenth century is demonstrated by a 
decision of the Court for Crown Cases Reserved. In R v Samuel Smith and Sarah Smith207 the 
husband and wife had been convicted before Channell B and a jury of wounding one John 
Leach with intent to disfigure him and of another count of intending to do him grievous 
bodily harm. Mrs Smith did not personally inflict any violence upon Leach but she was 
present while her husband did so. Mrs Smith had written letters to Leach pretending that she 
had become a widow and beguiling him into a meeting with her at a secluded spot. Dressed as 
a widow she met Leach at a railway station where she induced him to go with her to a place 
where her husband, lying in wait, attacked Leach and inflicted the injuries on him. Pollock 
CB delivering the judgment of the Court found that the conviction of Sarah Smith had to be 
quashed because there was no evidence to rebut the presumption of her coercion.  
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Case law demonstrated that the defence applied to virtually208 every other offence, although 
there were occasionally expressions of judicial discontent that it applied to robbery, but 
Stephen J himself so applied it in R v Dykes et Uxor.209 It had long been established that it 
applied to burglary,210 forgery211 and arson.212 It applied to all crimes of violence213 short of 
murder.214   
 
“The anarchic state of the eighteenth century law of crimes”215 was such that law reform of it 
was as inevitable as it was pedestrian. The Criminal Law Commissioners issued eight reports 
between 1833 and 1845216 including a forlorn draft Bill217 which would have consolidated all 
criminal law into a single unified code, the Criminal Law Bill. This work met with very 
substantial resistance from judges218 who in reply to a request from the Lord Chancellor wrote 
detailed objections to the content and notion of a criminal code for England. In relation to 
marital coercion though, they were unanimous in representing their strong opposition to the 
perpetuation of the presumption. Wightman,219 Platt,220  and Williams221 JJ agreed with the 
Law Commissioners “as to the expedience of altering the law respecting the presumption of 
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married women”. Two of the judges (Erle and Talfourd JJ) however, made extensive 
observations on the proposal to abolish the presumption and on the existing law.  
 
Section 3 abolishes the presumption of coercion where a wife commits a crime in presence of 
her husband: but will she be allowed to prove that she was in fact coerced? – and if so, is she 
admissible as a witness against her husband? – and if so, will a less degree of coercion than 
that required for ordinary free against exempt her from responsibility? – and if she is not 
admitted to prove coercion, is there not a danger of wrong conviction? 222 
 
These concerns of Erle J were very apposite. At this juncture a defendant could not give 
evidence on her or his own behalf. How was a wife to establish marital coercion, without the 
benefit of the usual presumption, when she was required by law to stand mute in her defence? 
Additionally the introduction of a Criminal Code would leave the position unclear as to how 
the discarded presumption would impact on the very real possibility that a wife would be 
wrongly convicted and incapable of demonstrating that. It was also unclear how the abolition 
of the presumption would operate alongside the then very rare defence of common law 
duress. Talfourd J made very extensive commentary when, with original emphasis, he 
wrote:223 
 
 The third section enacts, that “the rule of law, whereby a married woman charged with the 
commission of any offence is presumed, in case her husband be (query, was?) present at the 
time (query, what time? According to the grammatical construction, the time when she is 
charged, but probably the time of the alleged offence is intended,) “to have acted under his 
coercion unless it appear that she did not so act, and all rules of law contrary to the provisions 
of this Act relating to incapacity, &c shall be repealed and cancelled. 
 
 The object of the section to annul the rule which, in certain cases, has raised a presumption of 
a wife’s coercion from her husband’s presence, is unquestionably good; but it is not necessary 
to mis-state the rule to be annulled by representing it as being more extensive and mischievous 
than it is. There is no such rule as that recited in this section. The rule respecting presumptive 
coercion certainly does not apply to cases of highest crimes of treason and murder; probably 
not to any crime of violence; certainly not to some misdemeanours, as keeping a brothel, 
keeping a gaming house, or assault; and, according to the greater current of authorities, not to 
any misdemeanour. It would be a simpler course to enact that no married woman shall 
hereafter be acquitted on the ground of coercion, unless the fact of such coercion shall appear 
in proof”.    
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It is self-evident that this judge was out of kilter in exclaiming that the presumption and the 
defence probably did not apply to any crime of violence. Further, his solution in his last 
sentence would aggravate the problem, for how would a wife show the coercion; how could it 
“appear in proof”? The English judges were convinced that the common law should be left to 
them to decide, mould and to articulate. Their role would diminish under a code and this may 
explain the pedantic objections taken by them.  
 
 
NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICAN CASE LAW AND LEGISLATION PERTAINING 
TO MARITAL COERCION 
 
As early as 1766 in colonial Massachusetts wives were successfully invoking marital coercion 
as a defence. It has been noted that:  
 
women were evidently apprised of the anomaly in the felony law. The survival of feme covert 
was not, however, an unmixed blessing: while it afforded women some relief in the criminal 
courts, it insured their subservience to their husbands on the civil side of the law.224 
 
The Seneca Falls Declaration of Sentiments,225 was the beginning of the organised women’s 
rights movement in America,226 the earliest, systematic, public articulation there of the quest 
for full legal equality.227 Texas in 1845 and Kansas in 1849 had written some degree of 
protection for married women’s property rights into their State Constitutions. Wyoming gave 
married women separate control over their earnings during marriage and equal custody of the 
children228 and granted women the right to vote in 1869.  The relevant common law of the 
American States was described in 1846:  
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A wife or feme coverte is so much favoured in respect of that power and authority which her 
husband has over her, that, in general, if a felony be committed by her in company with or in 
the presence229 of her husband, the presumption of the law is that she acted under his 
immediate coercion and she will be excused from punishment.230   
 
The first common law jurisdiction to legislatively abolish the presumption of marital coercion 
was the state of Arkansas231 in 1855, which henceforth required actual coercion to be proved 
as it would no longer be presumed. In Freel v The State232 English CJ set out that 1855 statute 
 
Married women, acting under the threats, commands or coercion of their husbands, shall not 
be found guilty of any crime or misdemeanor, if it appears from all the facts and 
circumstances of the case that violence, threats, commands or coercion, were used. 
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Around the same time, in 1858233 the Supreme Court of Massachusetts234 strongly doubted 
whether the emancipation of women in the modern understanding of society could justify the 
continuance of the marital coercion defence, but reluctantly acknowledged that it was a matter 
for the legislature to determine.  In 1869 a leading American criminal law text235 derided the 
presumption as one that “must be very weak” as it was not possible to accommodate a 
universal presumption of the criminal law that a husband had ordered his wife to commit a 
crime. The defence was incompatible with “the progress of civilisation and the extension of 
commerce, an artificial state of society has grown up, incompatible with that state of 
simplicity from which many rules of the common law have been derived”. Marital coercion as 
a defence was attributable to the fact that a feme covert had no legal status apart from her 
husband,236 which was no longer the true legal position. 
 
The earliest repudiation of the common law defence by a court237 anywhere is the decision of 
the Kansas Supreme Court in 1884.238 Spouses had been charged with murder and the 
evidence239 disclosed that Mrs Hendricks had carried out the fatal shooting. At trial she had 
unsuccessfully sought a trial instruction to the jury permitting her to rely upon marital 
coercion.  Valentine CJ stated: 
 
The laws of Kansas do not presume that a wife who unites with her husband in the 
commission of a crime, acts under his coercion. On the contrary, the laws of Kansas presume 
that all persons of mature age and sound mind act upon their own volition, and are responsible 
for their acts. 
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The court reasoned that the changed conditions of society and its institutions meant that the 
common law presumption had to be abrogated by judge-made law, although adding it “was 
probably right when first adopted for the state of society which then existed”. Once the reason 
for the presumption ceased to exist, the presumption itself also ceased to exist.240 The 
Supreme Court of Nebraska also exclaimed against the operation of the presumption in 
1898241 but courts in New Jersey242 and North Carolina243 continued to apply it.  
 
In 1891 in Alabama it was claimed that the law was now “eminently unsatisfactory, and the 
matter seems to call very urgently for that legislative interference by which alone it can now 
be adjusted on a rational basis”.244 The Supreme Court of Tennessee245 and the Court of 
Appeals of Kentucky246 in 1920 did not wait247 and reached the conclusion that the 
presumption could no longer compatibly exist with emergent notions of female equality. 
Although the reason for it was unclear it must have had as a foundation the peculiar 
relationship between spouses as at common law a husband had almost absolute control of his 
wife “she was in a condition of complete dependence”. But equity had modified the harshness 
of the common law and disregarded the fiction of marital unity where it had been necessary to 
protect uxorial rights. Kentucky had never accepted the right of a husband to chastise his wife 
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and had by legislation in 1894 materially altered the rights and liabilities of married women, 
so that all former common law rules now had to be individually appraised for their continuing 
compatibility with the ethos of society and the momentum of legislation. The one-person 
fiction of the common law could no longer be maintained as the touchstone of a married 
woman’s rights and capacity. But in State v Miller,248 an extraordinary decision, the wife, Mrs 
Miller, had her conviction quashed for conveying a revolver into a jail with intent that her 
husband might use it to facilitate escape from prison. Gantt J stated at 694: 
 
Marriage does not take from the wife her general capacity to commit crime, but, as it casts 
upon her the duty of obedience to and affection for her husband, the law indulges a 
presumption that, if she commits an offence in his presence, it is the result of his constraint or 
coercion and, in the absence of proof to the contrary, excuses her.249 
 
Women were, on the cusp of the twentieth century in some American states, on a plane of 
significant legal equality and were therefore unable to shelter under the supposed former 
dominion of a husband. The defence of marital coercion, depended on a profound disability 
acquired by virtue of marriage, but that fiction had now been destroyed by emancipation.250 
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THE FIRST CRIMINAL CODES IN THE DOMINIONS AND COLONIES AND THE 
MARRIED WOMENS’ PROPERTY ACTS 
 
While the American states were in flux, the Dominions were also reacting to and with the 
emerging newer status of women. In the late nineteenth century women in Canada, like in 
America,251 Australia, and New Zealand, frequently entered the trades out of necessity, 
becoming merchants, as their husbands had to leave homes and farms to secure employment 
or to fight wars.252 A robust independent class of women, so different from the Victorian 
ideals of womanhood, were shaping social conventions and manners. No longer were they the 
property of their husband, but still they monopolised the domestic private sphere, while the 
husband was responsible for all public activities and relationships outside the family. Married 
Women’s Property Acts253 were passed in almost every jurisdiction to ensure the stable 
transition of wealth and to secure financial independence and security.254 Once married 
women had (limited) rights of ownership and control, changes occurred to effect other 
recognitions of their legal personality, including their privileges under criminal law. The 
Married Women’s Property Act 1882 [UK], permitted from 1 January 1883, the wife, 
whenever married,255 capable to sue and be sued and have in her own name the same civil256 
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and criminal remedies257 for the protection and security of her separate property, as if she 
were a feme sole. For those purposes the feme covert now became a feme discovert. In 
America the courts in Kentucky258 and Tennessee259 had held that the Married Women’s 
Property Acts verified that a wife was no longer under control of her husband; but other 
states260 steadfastly saw property legislation designed in favour of a wife, as having no 
broader implications for the destruction of either the presumption or the defence. The pattern 
of responses by the courts generally tended to show contiguous State courts adopting the view 
of the neighbour.  But some courts firmly decided that the passage of legislation providing for 
married women to have separate interests in property and distinct legal personality, meant that 
the doctrine of marital coercion had expired as being radically incompatible with the modern 
legislation; others saw this legislation as only providing for marital property and not having 
the necessary implication of removing a long-standing criminal defence, by a side wind of 
matrimonial property reform.261 Commentators in England generally saw the legislation as 
creating equality under the criminal law but limited to only separate property interests.262 
 
English common law was encrusted with precedent and historical anomalies and therefore 
condensing it to a cohesive set of principles was problematic. In England there had been 
attempts to systematise the law while reforming it; the judges were doing just that in relation 
to the defence by constantly softening the presumption and by expecting proportionately 
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greater robustness from wives in evaluating the limits of their responsibility. The defence 
resisted irradiation in England as the necessary fundamental rethinking of the law required a 
mindset that freed itself from the inherited traditions of British common law.263 That 
transformation had been achieved in 1879 by the English Law Commissioners who prepared 
the model code for criminal law, which contained a provision which would abrogate the 
presumption against marital coercion. It was never enacted. At that time Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand had legal systems that were unreformed and right for experimentation. 
Political force was needed to bring such a code into effect and in 1892 Canada and in 1893 
New Zealand enacted (apart from the Indian Penal Code264), the first Criminal Codes in the 
British Empire. 
 
James Stephen, Under-Secretary of the Colonial Office identified the challenge265 of an infant 
colony and the adoption of its laws in these terms: 
 
 In the infancy of a colony the choice must be made between the adoption of an old and 
inapplicable code or of a new and immature code.  Both are evils, but in my mind it is much 
safer to begin with a vigorous effort to lay the foundations of law on a right and durable basis, 
than to build it on a basis which must be wrong and which can never possess any stability.266 
 
The draftsman of the Criminal Code 1892 [Can] was Burbidge J267who modelled the draft on 
Stephen’s ‘Digest of the Criminal Law’ and the Report of the English Criminal Code 
Commissioners 1879.268 The codification of criminal law was first mooted in the Canadian 
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Parliament269 on 12 May 1891 by Sir John Thompson. The next year270 he introduced a Bill to 
codify the criminal law, which engaged only limited debate before it received the Royal 
assent.271 The parliamentary consideration was a pallid affair. The second reading was on 12 
April 1892 and the Bill passed within two months, with Committee hearings in the interim.272 
The debates in Canada, as in New Zealand, were really a desultory discussion of technical 
detail with a minimum of serious criticism or comment and even then many of the comments 
were more social than legal. The Code was proclaimed in force on 1 July 1893, a few months 
earlier than the New Zealand Code. The topic of marital coercion was almost summarily dealt 
with in the legislative debates, even though there was a real paucity of case law on it in 
Canada.273 The Canadian proposal to abrogate the presumption of marital coercion was only 
challenged by a Member from Prince Edward Island, who questioned the need to alter the 
common law. In explanation, Sir John Thompson stated:274 
 
The presumption under the common law is in many cases a strained one. In many cases the 
wife commits an act of violence in spite of her husband, but under the common law it is 
presumed that she is acting under the compulsion of her husband if she does that in his 
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presence. We now leave that to be a matter of evidence, to be proved in the court, whether she 
acted upon the compulsion of her husband or in spite of her husband.  
 
This intervention represents the total discussion in the debates as to the shape of marital 
coercion in the proposed code. A similar discussion in relation to the exemption of a wife 
from being an accessory after the fact to the offence of her husband, prompted slightly more 
discussion.275 Sir John Thompson quixotically retorted that “The wife is not expected to give 
up her natural duty, which is to protect her husband; but that is not the duty of the husband to 
his wife”. An attempt to broaden the clause276 so that the husband too was protected, in the 
converse situation, was rebuffed. A number of reasons277 have been advanced as to why the 
public and parliamentarians appeared to show little interest in the prospective legislation.278 
 
William Swainson, the first Attorney General of New Zealand, in 1859 referred to the earlier 
legislative years of the fledgling New Zealand colony:  
 
Not being hampered by any complicated pre-existing system, nor impeded by the opposing 
influence of a powerful profession, the lawgivers of the Colony were enabled to effect 
amendments in the law which the British legislature has hardly yet succeeded in 
accomplishing.279 
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Despite that catechism one legislator, Mr Carleton in 1854, would say: “I would model New 
Zealand upon England. I would reproduce, to the extremist verge of possibility, the noble 
institutions of the Mother Country.”280 This wish to replicate English law for New Zealand 
was also seen in 1861 when a Commission was set up to consider the proposal to establish a 
Court of Appeal.281 Until the first New Zealand Code was enacted in 1893 the common law of 
England as to crimes was applicable subject to the provisions of local statutes dealing with 
crime and the provisions of English statutes applicable to New Zealand.282 English criminal 
law was, at this stage of its adoption overlaid with ponderous complexities, subtle distinctions 
and intricate technicalities. The pioneering pragmatists in the legislature had a free hand at 
reaching sensible solutions attuned to contemporary needs. Until the enactment of the Code 
there was little innovation in criminal law apart from a persistent path to more severe 
penalties. The prevailing ethos was that New Zealand should comfortably follow in the wake 
of English criminal law and should not embark itself on variants of substantive law and 
procedure not sanctioned there by experience or authority. In Elliott v Hamilton283 a judge 
was able to say in relation to applicable English legislation proscribing gambling in the 
colony that “it might no doubt be argued that it is little suited to the necessities or the temper 
of a colonial population like our own”.284 
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Only two New Zealand common law decisions raising the defence285 can be traced. But two 
significant reported decisions, relying upon the new 1893 statute occurred within a very short 
time after its enactment.286 The earlier common law case is R v McShane287 which resulted in 
the Court of Appeal (Prendergast CJ, Johnston, Gillies and Williams JJ), on a Crown Case 
Reserved, quashing the conviction of Sarah McShane who had been convicted in the Supreme 
Court of Invercargill at a trial presided over by Williams J. After the Grand Jury had returned 
with a true Bill against the defendants288 a petty jury was empanelled.289 In opening the 
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prosecution, the Crown Prosecutor290 stated that the female291 prisoner was indicted for 
receiving stolen property. Among the prosecution witnesses, was the accused’s daughter. In 
summing up to the jury, Williams J said: 
 
The law presumed that, where a female prisoner committed a theft, or received stolen property 
in the presence of her husband, she acted under his coercion. Their own experience might lead 
them to the opposite conclusion, namely, that when a man and his wife engaged in mischief, 
the woman was generally at the bottom of it; but that was not the law.292 
 
He added that what: “was meant by the requirement of the presence of her husband in this 
context was the husband’s being cognisant of the fact of her action in the matter. Anything 
done by the wife while her husband was asleep293 would not come under the legal definition 
of act done in his presence.” After a retirement of half an hour, the jury found both male 
prisoners and Mrs McShane guilty. Williams J remarked to the Crown Prosecutor “that her 
husband having been found guilty, it was doubtful whether the female prisoner could be 
convicted.” He therefore reserved the point for the Court of Appeal and granted Mrs McShane 
bail294 pending the decision of the Court of Appeal. In due course, no counsel appearing on 
either side, each of the four judges of the Court of Appeal delivered a judgment of one 
sentence in length. Prendergast CJ concluded that “there was no evidence of independent 
action of the wife sufficient to overcome the presumption”. Johnston J was of the opinion that 
as the husband was guilty, “the receiving by his wife was part of the same transaction, and 
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wife, and that she had received the property under his coercion, she would be entitled to acquittal – if she was his 
wife, and had received the property in his presence; otherwise – if this were not the case – she would not be 
entitled to acquittal.” As the marriage was not pleaded in the indictment, nor Sarah McShane captioned as the 
wife of the co-accused, it correctly fell for the prisoner to establish the fact of the marriage. It transpired however 
that a police officer gave evidence that the two accused with the same surname were in fact married to each 
other. 
292
 Williams J then directed the jury that if: “the female prisoner committed the theft in the presence of her 
husband, or received the stolen property from her husband or in his presence, they would have to acquit her, 
although morally, she would be guilty.” This approach was wrong in law as it was a rebuttable presumption of 
fact, not an irrebuttable presumption of law as the judge directed. 
293
 The Southland Times, 13 June 1876 p2. Their daughter had given hesitant evidence for the prosecution, that 
her father may have been asleep while her mother received the stolen watch from the other male accused. 
294
 Two sureties in the sum of £50 each.  Her husband and the other prisoner were sentenced to 12 month’s 
imprisonment with hard labour. 
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must be taken to have been done under his coercion”. Gillies J expressed disquiet295 about the 
state of the law of marital coercion while Williams J,296 who had been the trial judge, 
concurred in the result.  
 
In response to the stultification of the criminal code in England in 1879, the New Zealand 
government made a hesitant move to appoint Commissioners to prepare a draft Bill for 
presentation to the legislature. The Criminal Code Act 1893 [NZ] involved a 10 year gestation 
period until its eventual enactment. The Note to clause 22 Criminal Code Bill 1883 [NZ]297 
provided the initial justification for the provision in New Zealand law to discard the 
presumption and terminate the separate uxorial defence. The Note emphasised that “the 
application of this doctrine to particular cases has frequently led to the perpetration of grave 
crimes with impunity”.  
 
In the second session of the Eighth Parliament on 20 June 1883 the Hon Mr Whitaker moved 
the Second Reading of the Criminal Code Bill noting that when the Statutes Revision Bill had 
been enacted, one clause provided that a Criminal Code should be adopted for the colony on 
the lines of the Criminal Code framed for England. The only objection he perceived was that 
the equivalent English Bill had been before the Imperial Parliament for some years and had 
not yet been passed. He noted:298 
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 (1876) 3 NZCA 314, 317 “While the law upon the subject continues as it is, I think such evidence as was 
given in this case is insufficient to convict the wife”.   
296
 He had recorded in the Crown Case Reserved that he had directed the jury that Mrs McShane had to be 
acquitted “unless it were proved clearly that she acted independently”: New Zealand Archives Reference AAAR 
W3558 1876/188; The Evening Post 2 December 1876. 
297
 (called s22), New Zealand legislature, Index to Bills Thrown Out, 1883 [NZ] “Sec.22 (sec.24, 1880). 
Compulsion, This clause, altered from the provisions of the Bill of 1878, and adopted by the English 
Commissioners, is the subject of a special elaborate note (A) annexed to their report. The first part of it deals 
with the sort of compulsion in fact which the law deems sufficient to afford an excuse for that which otherwise 
would have been a punishable offence. The second paragraph contains an alteration of the common law, which 
presumes that a married woman committing an offence in the presence of her husband does so under 
compulsion, and is therefore irresponsible. Experience has proved that the application of this doctrine to 
particular cases has frequently led to the perpetration of grave crimes with impunity; and the English 
Commissioners have not hesitated to recommend that this presumption of the common law should be abolished. 
If the Legislature of the colony are prepared to adopt that recommendation, it seems to us desirable to insert in 
sub clause (2) the word “only” after “compulsion”. The identical note appeared in 1886: New Zealand 
Legislature, Index to Bills Thrown Out, 1886 [NZ] p11. 
298
 1883 44 NZPD 43. 
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It had been said that this Code should not be passed until the English one had come into 
operation; but to that he would answer that they might wait and wait for years, as they had 
already done, before that came to pass. 
 
He emphasised that the Government had already waited four years for the parallel enactment 
to happen there and it was not prudent to wait any longer.299 The Hon Mr Wilson following 
noted that the Bill contained 452 clauses and the members of the Legislative Council would 
only be doing their duty in a “perfunctory” way if they were not to consider it very carefully. 
He recalled that in New Zealand the Revision Commissioners had considered the English 
draft and one of the Commissioners had prefixed a statement to the Criminal Code Bill which 
read: 
 
 We are not prepared to undertake the responsibility of expressing a decisive opinion on the 
propriety of adopting at once the English Bill of 1880 with the necessary modification. We are 
still of opinion that it might be better to defer the enactment of the Code in the colony until 
the English Parliament has finally dealt with the subject.300 
 
Although the Bill was read a second time it foundered.301 In the first session of 1884, the 
Legislature threw out the Criminal Code Bill.302 The next year the First Reading of the 
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 1883 44 NZPD 44. He remarked that alterations “had been made to adapt the Code to our circumstances and 
wants”.   
300
 1883 44 NZPD 44. Women, especially married ones, were still of diminished legal status in civil law: Sir 
Robert Stout & William Alexander Sim, ‘The Practice of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeal of New 
Zealand’, (1902) 2 ed. Whitcombe and Tombs Limited, Christchurch: Rule 67 of the Code of Civil Procedure in 
the Supreme Court, being Second Schedule to the Supreme Court Act 1882 unhappily lumped together married 
women, infants, idiots and lunatics as the persons who could sue and defend civil actions by a guardian ad litem. 
See also F W Pennefather & J Brown ‘Code of Civil Procedure in New Zealand’ (1885) Edwards & Green, 
Wellington at p29. Table D in the same schedule provided for witnesses expenses and stated “female witnesses 
at the rate of two-thirds the allowance of male witnesses of corresponding rank”. The decision of In re Roche 
(1888) 7 NZLR 206 (SC) and (CA) held that a married woman was disqualified from holding a publican’s 
licence under the Licensing Act 1881 [NZ] and that the Married Women’s Property Act 1884 [NZ], had not by 
implication repealed the prohibition. In the Supreme Court, Williams J followed his earlier decision in Callendar 
v Allan (1888) 6 NZLR 436. Williams J at 210 found that s56 Licensing Act required the applicant for a 
publican’s licence to stipulate after the Christian and surname the “addition”, stating: “Now the term ‘addition’ 
in the case of a woman certainly includes a statement of whether she is spinster, wife, or widow, and for all legal 
purposes a woman is imperfectly described in the absence of such a statement”. Mrs Roche had neutrally applied 
as “Margaret Roche – Applicant”. 
301
 1883 45 NZPD 578. The Criminal Code Bill was before the Legislative Council on 14 August 1883. The Hon 
Mr J C Richmond at 579 referred to “The impossibility of passing the Bill this session through the other branch 
of the Legislature seemed to him to be a good ground for asking that it should not be pushed on”. The Bill was 
thrown out. New Zealand Legislature Index to Bills Thrown Out, 1883 No 8 Criminal Code. 
302
 No 3 of 1884. New Zealand Legislature Index to Bills Thrown Out, 1884  Clause 22 of the 1884 Criminal 
Code Bill provided: “22.(1)  Except as hereinafter provided, compulsion by threats of immediate death or 
grievous bodily harm from a person actually present at the commission of the offence, shall be an excuse for the 
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Criminal Code Bill was given on 11 June 1885.303 On 19 June 1885 Hon Mr P A Buckley rose 
in the Legislative Council in support of the Criminal Code Bill and referred to the Royal 
Commission in England in 1878 which had concluded that the reform of the criminal law 
“was a matter of the most urgent necessity”. He then referred to the proposed alteration of the 
law in relation to marital coercion:  
 
 There is a fiction of law which says that when a married woman is within sight of or under the 
supervision of her husband she cannot commit an offence; but, as we know, women often do 
commit offences in such circumstances without their husbands having any control over them. 
This Bill puts married women in the same position as men or single women in that respect. 
We have given women the same privileges in respect to their property as men have, and there 
can be no reason why they should not have the same liability as men in respect to being 
charged with offences, without being allowed to shelter themselves under their husbands 
against the law.304 
 
On 28 June 1893 the Criminal Code Bill was given its First Reading.305 On 4 July 1893306 the 
Hon Sir P A Buckley, as he now was, rose and in terms of exasperation referred to the 
desultory history of the proposed legislation. “It was introduced, I think, in the first instance 
by myself in 1883. It was then passed through the Committee of this Council. I again 
introduced it in 1884 and it remained in the Council. In 1886 it passed through the Council 
again and went to another place. In 1888 and again in 1891 it also went to the House of 
                                                                                                                                             
commission, by a person subject to such threats, and who believes such threats will be executed, and who is not 
a party to any association or conspiracy he being a party to which rendered him subject to compulsion, of any 
offence other than high treason, murder, piracy, offences deemed to be piracy, attempting to murder, assisting in 
rape, forcible abduction, robbery, causing grievous bodily harm, and arson. (2) No presumption shall be made 
that a married woman committing an offence does so under compulsion, only because she commits it in the 
presence of her husband”. 
303
 1885 51 NZPD 4. 
304
 1885 51 NZPD 57. The Criminal Code Bill of 1885 was thrown out. New Zealand Legislature Index to Bills 
Thrown Out, 1885, No 9 Criminal Code. It was identical to the 1884 Bill. In 1886 the Criminal Code Bill was 
again thrown out. New Zealand Legislature Index to Bills Thrown Out, 1886, No 71 Criminal Code (Hon Mr 
Tole).  It was identical, both in the terms of clause 22 and the accompanying explanation to that which had been 
thrown out in 1884 and 1885. In 1891 the Criminal Code Bill was again thrown out. New Zealand Legislature 
Bills Thrown Out Sessions I and II – 1891, No 7 Criminal Code (Hon Mr Buckley)]. Bill 59 of the same session 
Female Suffrage Bill 1991 (Hon Sir J Hall) was also thrown out. By the 1891 Bill clause 22 had been 
renumbered as clause 24 but was otherwise identical with the 1883 original version. Keith Sinclair, ‘A Destiny 
Apart New Zealand’s Search for National Identity’, Allen & Unwin in association with the Port Nicholson Press 
at p66: “In 1886 73.25 per cent of the population were literate, and another 4.7 per cent could read but not 
write”. “From 1873 to 1880, 6 per cent falling to 4 per cent of marriage partners in New Zealand signed the 
register with a mark”.  
305
 1893 79 NZPD 57. 
306
 1893 79 NZPD 180. 
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Representatives; but it met its fate in the general slaughter of the innocents, and we heard no 
more about it.” After indicating some of the general changes he continued:  
 
 The Bill has a further advantage – namely that of giving a husband or wife in criminal cases 
the right to be examined if they think fit to be so. It also provides that, in the case of an 
offence committed by a wife, there shall be no presumption of compulsion merely because it 
was committed in the presence of her husband.307  
 
In relation to the proposed provision providing that a wife would be exempt from being an 
accessory after the fact to the offence of her husband, the Hon Mr Scotland argued that no 
licence should be given to a wife to harbour her husband’s confederates in crime.308 On 4 July 
1893 the Bill was read a second time. It was given its third reading on 7 July 1893 and on the 
same day the Criminal Code Bill was given its First Reading in the House of Representatives. 
The Criminal Code Act309 received the Royal Assent on 6 October 1893,310 a year in which 
the New Zealand legislative was making extraordinary advances over its progenitor at 
Westminster. The franchise was extended to women and the criminal law was codified. With 
one stroke it abolished the distinction between treason, felony and misdemeanour and the 
attendant procedural differences that bedevilled English law.311 It also abrogated the 
presumption and defence of marital coercion;312 and introduced a statutory defence for a wife 
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 1893 79 NZPD 180. Keith Sinclair, ‘A Destiny Apart New Zealand’s Search for National Identity’ (1986) 
Allen & Unwin in association with the Port Nicholson Press at p66. “There was an imbalance of sexes. Society 
was strongly male-dominated.” At p68 “in the late nineteenth century 40 per cent of men never married”. 
308
 1893 79 NZPD 181: “I think, perhaps, in one or two cases, it leans a little too much on the side of mercy. In 
clause 75(2) the first part of the clause reads as follows: “No married woman whose husband has been a party of 
an offence shall become an accessory after the fact therto by receiving, comforting, or assisting her husband”. 
Surely that would be going far enough; but the Bill goes on to say “or by receiving, comforting, or assisting, in 
his presence and by his authority, any other person who has been a party to such offence, in order to enable her 
husband or such other person to escape”. Now, of course, a married woman would be doing a natural and almost 
praiseworthy thing in assisting her husband to escape. I think this offers too great a latitude – giving power 
actually to a married woman to assist in the escape of her husband and of her husband’s “pal” to use a slang 
term. For instance, in the case of a burglar, I think it is going a little too far.”  
309
 Act No. 56 of 1893. 
310
 Sir Samuel Griffith ‘Explanatory Letter to Attorney General Queensland with Draft Code,’ Queensland 
Parliamentary Papers (C.A. 89-1897) p7 noted that he had drawn “great assistance” from the Penal Code of Italy 
1888, adding “In 1893 the Parliament of New Zealand adopted the Draft Bill of 1880, with some minor 
alterations, which, however, did not meet the criticisms of Sir A Cockburn”.   
311
 I D Campbell, ‘Criminal Law’, p365 in J L Robson (ed), ‘New Zealand – The Development of its Laws and 
Constitution’, (1967) 2 ed Stevens & Sons, London states that “the proposal for codification had the enthusiastic 
approval of many influential lawyers”.   
312
 In R v Howard (1894) 13 NZLR 619 (CA) a jury had acquitted a married woman of the offence of keeping a 
bawdy-house in Hawera. At the rear of the property in which she lived with her husband and children, there was 
an out-house to which she would invite men, receive money from them and have connection with them. The 
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exempting her from being an accessory after the fact to the offence of her husband. It said 
nothing as to whether an intraspousal conspiracy could exist, the very point which would lead 
in 1926 to a majority decision of the Court of Appeal313 affirming the existence of that 
immunity.   
 
Almost three decades later, in the very first Bill before the Irish Dáil, Members of the Irish 
Parliament referred to the inequality of women and the debate centred on existing inequalities 
- some of which were “really insulting and offensive to women”.314 Mr Kevin O’Higgins for 
the Government stated that the intended statutory provision to confer on men and women 
equal political rights as citizens was not intended to alter the law, 
 
as to the guardianship of children, the existing law with reference to marital coercion and 
crime.  That is a matter in which women have a certain privilege. They are entitled to go into 
Court and say they committed a crime under duress of their husbands; husbands, 
unfortunately, are not entitled to go into Court and say they committed a crime under the 
duress of their wives. 
 
In Ireland,315 the metaphor of the convergence into one legal person of husband and wife 
existed at common law, in certain respects. Spouses could not commit conspiracy alone,316 
nor could the publication of a defamatory statement by one spouse to the other constitute 
                                                                                                                                             
offence was alleged to have been committed on 11 July 1894 contrary to s143 Criminal Code Act 1893. The jury 
returned a special verdict finding that she acted under the coercion of her husband, to whom the property 
belonged and who was generally at home. The prosecution appealed to the Court of Appeal on the basis that the 
decision of the jury was insensible as there was no evidence whatsoever that the husband had coerced the wife 
into leading a life of prostitution. On appeal, it was argued that the former common law presumption never 
applied to offences involving prostitution and that “there is a counter-presumption that the wife has just as much 
to do with the management as the husband”. In addition, the husband was not present during the acts of 
prostitution. The Court of Appeal dismissed the prosecution appeal. Prendergast CJ remarked that the finding of 
“coercion” must be taken as a finding of “compulsion” in terms of s24 Criminal Code Act 1893, as “whether the 
compulsion be that of her husband or of another matters not” as the new Code had abolished “whatever 
distinction there was at common law between the case of a married woman and a woman not married.” 
Denniston J also agreed that s24 “put an end altogether to the doctrine of excuse on the ground of coercion by a 
husband”. He decided that the jury must have been confusingly directed by the trial judge who appeared wrongly 
to assume “that the doctrine of coercion by a husband, as a part from compulsion as defined by the Code, 
remains”. Williams and Conolly JJ agreed with the dismissal of the appeal.  
313
 R v McKechie [1926] NZLR 1. 
314
 Dáil Éireann vol 1, 18 October 1922, Constitution of Saorstat Eireann Bill. Another Member of the Dáil 
Professor Magennis added that the law of marital coercion provided “very necessary protection” for a “great 
many women”. 
315
 The Law Reform Commission of Ireland, Report on the Law Relating to Dishonesty, LRC 43-1992, para 2.36.   
316
 F Graham Glover, ‘Conspiracy as Between Husband and Wife’, (1979) 9 Family Law 181, 182. 
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actionable defamation.317 The marital coercion defence existed but featured little in reported 
decisions of the nineteenth318 and twentieth319 centuries, although Lord Shandon, former 
Attorney General of Ireland has stated that the defence was frequently invoked in the 
twentieth century there.320 In nineteenth-century Australia the earliest decisions go back to 
1826.321 In South Africa322 the defence was recognised certainly in the Cape of Good Hope,323 
but in 1921 a Transvaal court determined that Roman-Dutch law did not recognise the 
presumption of marital coercion.324 One uxorial privilege remained there though; a wife had a 
customary defence in relation to harbouring her husband and screening him from justice.325 
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 C S Kenny ‘The History of the Law of England as to the Effects of Marriage on Property and on the Wife’s 
Legal Capacity’ (1897) Reeves and Turner, para 254; R v Harrison (1756) 1 Leach 47, 168 ER 126.   
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319
 R v Hallett (1911) 45 ILTR 84 involved a prosecution for public nuisance for obstruction of a navigable river. 
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 Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, vol 53, 28 February 1923, p174. 
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 R v Smithers and Smithers, Sydney Gazette 30 December 1826, Supreme Court of New South Wales.  
322
 R v Hendrik Adams & Leah Adams (1883) III Buch EDC 216 (Cases decided in the Eastern Districts’ Court 
of the Cape of Good Hope) Barry JP on review quashed the conviction of a wife in circumstances where 
husband and wife had been convicted of the theft of a sheep. Following R v Torpey (1871) 12 Cox CC 45 it was 
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stated “The question is, does this presumption exist here; and if positive proof be required that Leah was a free 
agent, is there such proof? The presumption of the English law has constantly been acted upon in our Courts 
here, and is consistent with the principles of the Roman-Dutch Law based upon the civil law”.   
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 R v John Feze and Sarah John (1883) III Buch EDC 336 [Cases decided in the Eastern Districts’ Court of the 
Cape of Good Hope] Buchanan J, referring to R v Hendrik Adams & Leah Adams (1883) III Buch EDC 216 
quashed a conviction where the spouses had been convicted of theft of sheep stating that the only evidence 
against the wife was that she was with her husband when he was arrested at which time some meat was found in 
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given to her by him.” 
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 R v Mtetwa (1921) TPD 227. 
325
 Charles Lansdown, William Hoal and Alfred Lansdown, (eds) ‘Gardiner and Landsdown: South African 
Criminal Law and Procedure’, (1957), 6 ed, vol 1, Juta & Co Ltd, Capetown, p109. Ibid p156. But South 
African law provides that physical and moral coercion may constitute duress: R v Mtetwa 1921 TPD 227. 
Wessels JP at p229 concluded that Roman-Dutch law did not provide for the common law presumption of 
marital coercion, although noting such a defence had been accepted in earlier South African cases; R v Adams 
(1883) 3 EDC 216; Bosch v R (1904) TS 55. Wessels JP accepted that where there has been actual coercion: 
“physically and morally coerced” the wife could rely upon those facts as a defence. 
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CONTROL BY THE HUSBAND OVER THE BODY OF HIS WIFE 
 
While Canada and New Zealand were deciding to abolish the entire marital coercion doctrine, 
at almost the same time English common law was still struggling with the notion whether a 
husband could control the corporal being of his wife, by detention or by physical assaults. The 
common law had always appeared to permit a husband to reinforce his dominion over his 
wife by physical chastisement326 and by physical restraint. This was justified as being: 
 
 For the happiness and the honour of both parties it [the law] places the wife under the 
guardianship of the husband and entitles him, for the sake of both, to protect her from the 
danger of unrestrained intercourse with the world, by enforcing cohabitation and a common 
residence.327 
 
It was not until 1891 in R v Jackson328 that it was finally settled that a husband was not 
entitled to imprison329 his wife or to inflict personal chastisement on her.330 Mr and Mrs 
Jackson married in 1887 but apart from a few days cohabitation she refused to live with her 
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 In R v Lister (1795) 1 Str 478 Lord Kenyon CJ said a husband had no right to beat his wife but only to 
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 [1891] 1 QB 671 (CA). In 1920 McCardie J in Butterworth v Butterworth & Englefield [1920] P 126, 133 
stated: “The diminution of his power of physical control or punishment was gradual and the decision of the 
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329
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 R v Jackson [1891] 1 QB 671. In Pal Singh v Amer Singh [1935] 16 KLR 73 Gamble AJ held that a civil 
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husband, defying a court judgment despite his successful suit for restitution of conjugal 
rights331 in 1889. In frustration the husband kidnapped the wife in public on 10 March 
1891.332 Her sisters immediately applied for a writ of habeas corpus to gain her release. Cave 
and Jeune JJ refused the application for the writ but an especially constituted Court of Appeal 
reversed that decision333 and Mrs Jackson was freed from her husband and returned to her 
family.334 This decision has correctly been seen as a benchmark in the evolution of the rights 
of married women under the law.335 However, even in the outcome R v Jackson did not give a 
wife total security of the person, because Lord Halsbury LC336 instanced an example of the 
right of a husband to still physically restrain his wife when she was found on the staircase 
about to join some person with whom she intended to elope. Lord Esher MR337 concurring 
stated that if a wife was about to do something which would be to the dishonour of her 
husband, as where he saw her in the act of going to her paramour, he might seize her and pull 
her back. Victorian considerations still provided to a husband the defence of cuckold.  
 
The alleged right of a husband to chastise his wife had been abolished in Alabama in 1871338 
yet it “continued to exist in many Western countries until the late nineteenth century”.339 But 
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with the resounding rejection in R v Jackson340 of the asserted right to chastise a wife, another 
prop underpinning the doctrine of coercion disappeared, as Blackstone341 had rationalised that 
the right of uxorial chastisement was granted to the husband to reinforce his dominion and 
decision-making. Her defence was therefore only a contingent response to the recognition of 
his failure to have secured her unquestioning compliance. 
 
 
TWENTIETH CENTURY ENGLISH CASELAW BEFORE R v PEEL 
 
The sensational and successful invocation of the marital coercion defence in R v Peel342 in 
1922 was not startling in its originality (unlike the resurrected defence of trial by battle),343 as 
it had featured in reported judgments both before the Court for Crown Cases Reserved and its 
successor the Court of Criminal Appeal on a number of occasions earlier in the twentieth 
century. In R v Baines344 the jury found that Mary Baines was guilty of a separate receiving 
from that of her husband. On appeal resort to the marital coercion doctrine was quickly 
dispatched by Lord Russell CJ presiding, who held that there was no evidence that Mrs 
Baines was acting under the influence of her husband as she had gone into a house and 
returned with the stolen silver lamp by herself. In such a state of the evidence the trial judge 
ought to have told the jury that the mere fact of the marital relation did not raise any 
presumption as to her husband’s control. The fact that the husband was in the 
“neighbourhood”345 did not generate any presumption of non-independent action by the 
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entrust him with this power of restraining her, by domestic chastisement…”. 
342
 Infra chp 2. 
343
 Ashford v Thornton (1818) 1 B & Ald 405. 
344
 (1900) 16 TLR 413 (CCCR). The mere fact then of marriage did not raise this presumption and if the husband 
was nearby when the crime was committed the real issue for the jury was whether the wife took an independent 
part.    
345
 Holmes J in Commonwealth v Flaherty (1886) 5 NE 258 in the Supreme Court of Massachusetts said that a 
husband need not be in the same room to fulfill the proximity requirement, so that he is considered at least 
constructively present, rather than absent, when he is near enough for the wife to act under his immediate 
influence and control. This approach of Oliver Wendell Holmes has subsequently been adopted by the South 
Australian Courts in relation to the doctrine. Goddard v Osborne  (1978) 18 SASR 481. It is unavailable when 
the legislation requires “actual presence”: R v Pickard [1959] Qd R 475, 470 per Stanley J; R v Joyce [1968] 
NZLR 1070, 1077, l33 (CA). 
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wife.346 The Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Court347 held that for the presumption to operate 
it was essential for the parties to be in law husband and wife and that it did not apply where a 
woman was living with a man as his wife, but not actually married to him. Isaacs CJ348 in R v 
Green349 pronounced in favour of the presumption that “is not one which rests on technical 
grounds, but is based on a knowledge and understanding of the relations that usually exist 
between husband and wife”.350 It was essential though that the crime had been committed in 
the presence of the husband so that “he could have seen her, and she him, at any time during 
the transaction, and therefore they were in the presence of one another” per Hamilton J351 in R 
v Caroubi.352 In every case it was held to be a question of fact to be determined whether the 
wife had acted independently of any presumed coercion by the husband.  
 
Around the time of R v Peel some common law jurisdictions in the American states and 
elsewhere had concluded that the marital unity doctrine had no contemporary validity353 and 
had therefore refused to apply the common law rules. Others found a residuum of support for 
the doctrine despite other legislation.354 The broader social policies of the time were 
fundamentally incompatible with the existence of marital privileges which differentiated 
between spouses on the basis of marriage. The disunity of the defence in promoting the 
interests of one half of the relationship over the other was to not enhance the status of 
marriage but to weaken its covalent bonds for the interests of a moiety. In 1901 a leading 
writer stated a hope or expectation that the doctrine would be finally imploded.  
 
                                              
346
 Applying Brown v Attorney General for New Zealand [1898] AC 234 (PC).  
347
 (1912) Cr App R 127 (CCA). 
348
 Later Lord Reading CJ. 
349
 (1913) 9 Cr App R 228, 231 (CCA). 
350
 The doctrine therefore reinforced unquestioning obedience to the judgment of the husband. 
351
 Later Lord Sumner. 
352
 (1912) 7 Cr App R 149, 152 (CCA). Glanville Williams, ‘The General Part’ (1953) Stevens & Sons Ltd, 
London,  p762-763 n.15 “Although the presumption could be rebutted, it was not rebutted by merely establishing 
the absence of coercion; the prosecution was required to affirmatively establish that the wife acted 
independently”. 
353
 The position in Tasmania was very robust as s20(2) Criminal Code 1924 [Tas] provided that “a married 
woman shall be in the same position as regards compulsion by her husband as if she were unmarried”. 
354
 In the next decade the tide turned: White v Proctor [1937] OR 647, 651 the Ontario Court of Appeal said “I 
question if the old fiction of law that husband and wife are in law one person has much place in modern 
jurisprudence.” In Broom v Morgan [1953] 1 QB 597, 611 Hodson LJ stated that public policy was the basis for 
the principle of unity.  But at p609 Denning LJ said that the theory “has no longer any place in our law.” 
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It is within the last half-century that married woman have been emancipated and set free from 
the restraints imposed upon them by the common law and placed in a position which they 
were long ago entitled to occupy – a position of independence and equality with their 
husbands.355 
 
To redress the inherent difficulties of prosecution, the courts began to accept less and less was 
needed from the prosecution to rebut the presumption, which was atrophying in practice. The 
emancipation of married women had been accompanied by a proportionate decrease in the 
quantum of evidence necessary to rebut the presumption. Where it was not possible in law for 
an accused wife to even be able to give evidence, the prosecution faced the singular reality 
that not only did they have to prove the offence but they had in doing that to also prove that 
the woman was a free agent throughout. The ease with which the presumption now became 
rebutted explained the willingness of the courts to be generous in its application, since the 
reality was that generally the result would be the same whether the presumption existed or 
not. It withered356 to the extent that it usually played no significant part in the criminal justice 
system as very slight evidence357 within the prosecution case would nullify it. But the trial of 
R v Peel358 became the catalyst for the law to be changed,359 not as may have been anticipated 
                                              
355
 Montague Lush, ‘A Century of Legal Reform, Twelve Lectures on the Changes in the Law of England During 
the Nineteenth Century, Delivered at the Request of The Council of Legal Education in the Old Hall, Lincoln’s 
Inn, During Michaelmas Term 1900 and Hilary Term 1901’, reprinted (1972) South Hackensack, New Jersey, 
Rothman Reprints Inc. at p378. David S Evans, ‘Criminal Law – Presumption of Coercion – Crimes Committed 
by Wife in Husband’s Presence’, (1956) 35 North Carolina Law Review 104, p112: “At the time of its creation 
the presumption was in keeping with the then prevailing domestic relations; today it has no sound basis. 
However, the doctrine should not be abrogated in its entirety. Even now there still may be a few women who, 
either because of a marriage vow to obey their husband or for other reasons, would follow their husband’s orders 
– even to the extreme of violating the law. These women should be entitled to prove coercion as a defense.” 
356
 Leo Kanowitz, ‘Women and the Law’, (1969) University of New Mexico, Albuquerque p89 n14 who 
discusses the presumption of coercion at p112: “based on the idea that husbands occupy a position of authority 
over their wives while wives dutifully obey their husbands, and although it may act as a form of discrimination 
in favour of married woman, it is founded upon the legal recognition of a woman’s inferior social status in 
society. However, like other legal anomalies, which are based on traditional paternalistic and chauvinistic 
attitudes towards women, this exception in the law is likely to be removed or fall into disuse as the position of 
women in society improves.” 
357
 Kenneth C Sears and Henry Y Weihofen, ‘May’s Law of Crimes’, (1938) 4 ed, Little Brown & Co, Boston at 
p40: “It is believed that there is nothing in our day to justify the continued existence of the presumption. 
Accordingly it has been frowned upon as a weak presumption; it has been regarded as inconsistent with the 
Married Women’s Property Acts; and it has been repudiated by a few legislatures. In spite of all of this the 
presumption in most States is still a part of the law”. 
358
 In the very year of that trial: Edward Jenks (ed), ‘Stephens Commentaries on the Laws of England’, (1922) 17 
ed, vol 4, Butterworth & Co, London at p29: “But the expediency of maintaining the rule has from time to time 
been questioned; and the presumption of coercion of the wife by the husband may be rebutted by evidence that 
she was acting voluntarily and not under his constraint, although he may have been present and have concurred 
in her acts”. William G Riddell and Arthur H Holmes, ‘The New Zealand Justices’ Manual’, (1922) 2 ed, WAG. 
Skinner, Government Printer, Wellington at p149: “A married woman who takes part with her husband in the 
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in conformity with the momentum by abrogating the marital coercion doctrine, but by giving 
it revivifying statutory force.  
 
                                                                                                                                             
commission of a crime is not now presumed to act under his coercion merely because she commits the offence in 
his presence, but coercion may be proved in other ways.” 
359
 United States v de Quilfeldt (1881) 5 F 276, the defence of marital coercion was the “relic of a belief in the 
ignorance and pusillanimity of women.”  The Law Commission, ‘Criminal Law: Report on Defences of General 
Application’, Law Com No.83 (1977) pp17-19 unsuccessfully urged the abrogation of the entire doctrine. Anon, 
‘Husband and Wife in the Criminal Law’ (1927) 91 JP 662, 663: “The old presumption, which rendered proof of 
coercion unnecessary was applied without any exact determination of what coercion was, and if an offence was 
committed in the husband’s presence, the onus was cast on the prosecution to show that the wife acted of her 
own volition.  It was thus sometimes shown what was not coercion, but never positively what was.” Peter 
Gillies, ‘Criminal Law’, (1997) 4 ed, LBC Information Services at p357 “There is, however, a paucity of 
authority on its meaning [coercion] at common law”. Donald Nicolson ‘What the Law Giveth, It Also Taketh 
Away: Female-Specific Defences to Criminal Liability’ p160 Donald Nicolson and Lois Bibbings (eds), 
‘Feminist Perspectives on Criminal Law’, (2000) Cavendish Publishing Ltd, London. “While it has existed since 
at least the eighth century, its rationale remains obscure, being variously explained in terms of the identity of 
husband and wives, the latter’s subjection to the former, wifely duties of obedience and the law’s ‘tenderness to 
the wife’.  
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2 
 
CREATION OF AN UXORIAL STATUTORY DEFENCE 
 
 
 
 
 
The common law defence of marital coercion, which had existed for over 1000 years became 
discredited in a sensational criminal trial in 1922 when the daughter of a baronet successfully 
deployed it as a result of a highly dubious judge-directed acquittal. This defence had hitherto 
been the exclusive province of the subjugated lower classes, yoked to economic and other 
disadvantages.  An immediate and sustained public reaction demanded the abrogation of this 
common law defence which was now seen as repugnant to the quest for female equality in all 
aspects of society.  Only a few years earlier the British Parliament had enacted initial 
legislation proscribing certain discriminatory conduct on the basis of gender. The continuance 
of his ancient criminal defence conflicted with the intensification of suffragette demands for 
full equality. This chapter choreographs responses by the government to the unabating press 
demands for the existing law to be removed.  Ironically it began by the Lord Chancellor 
appointing all all-male committee to consider the state of the law in light of the acquittal and 
to formulate necessary recommendations.  
 
 
ARISTOCRATS ON TRIAL – R v PEEL (1922) 
 
Captain Edmund Owen Ethelston Peel MC1 and his wife Violet Margaret Florence Peel2 were 
each arraigned on 7 March 1922 before Darling J at the Central Criminal Court, she on seven 
                                              
1
 The son of Major Hugh Edmund Ethelston Peel and Gwladys Freda Rowley-Conwy. Born 13 July 1893. 
Married 18 November 1919. Divorced 1927. Died 21 March 1935.   
2
 The daughter of Sir Robert William Buchanan Jardine of Castlemilk 2nd Bt and Ethel Mary Piercy. Sir Robert 
was the head of the firm Jardine Matheson, China merchants. He succeeded to the title of 2nd Baronet Jardine, of 
Castlemilk, co Dumfries [UK 1885] on 17 February 1905: see Charles Mosley (ed) ‘Burke’s Peerage, 
Baronetage & Knightage’ 107 ed Volume page 575 (Genealogy Books Ltd, 2000), Delaware. In 1927 Mr & Mrs 
Peel divorced [RIN: 4381 DIVORCE: 1927 404381]. Mrs Peel remarried John Drummond, the 15th Lord Strange 
on 8 February 1928. They had a daughter Jean Cherry Drummond b.17 December 1928 who inherited as the 16th 
Lady Strange.  Mrs Peel, now Lady Strange, herself died on 16 October 1975. Lord Strange died 13 April 1982.   
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counts of having forged an instrument, contrary to s7 Forgery Act 1913, and he on 14 such 
counts.3 The indictment alleged they had on 8 October 1921 in the village Post Office at Avon 
Dassett in Warwickshire by means of telegrams forged as to their timing, endeavoured to 
dishonestly obtain money from bookmakers. The prosecution alleged the couple had placed 
very large bets on a horse called Paragon which to their knowledge had already won the Duke 
of York Stakes4 before they purported to heavily gamble on its possible success. 
 
The trial of the spouses for fraud, he a decorated war hero and direct descendant of Mary 
Tudor, and she the daughter of Sir Robert and Lady Jardine of Castlemilk, was a sensation, 
widely reported throughout the United Kingdom. It exceeded all expectations though when 
the husband pleaded guilty upon arraignment.  But it was the legal ruling of Darling J in 
relation to Mrs Peel that has had the greater effect. It led to the demise of a common law 
criminal defence traceable to AD 791, and in 1925 to the creation of an anomalous statutory 
defence in parts of the United Kingdom, that still exists over 80 years later. The wife was 
acquitted on the directed verdict of the jury, because of the Judge’s ruling that she was 
entitled to succeed because of the unrebutted presumption of marital coercion in her favour; a 
defence hitherto the exclusive province of the crabbed lower classes. There was public uproar 
upon her acquittal, based as it was on a defence that seemed to sit very uneasily with the spirit 
of suffragettes, emancipation and equality, and a strong clamour for immediate statutory 
intervention to abrogate the entire defence followed. 
 
The prosecution case at trial was the elderly village Postmaster was assisted by an 
impressionable 16 year old girl who specialised in the transmission of telegrams. She was 
overawed by the chic style and swanky manner of the Peels. Captain Peel attempted to send 
45 telegrams placing bets to bookmakers in Dublin, London, Leeds and Newport while at the 
same time his wife was receiving a call in the Post Office, on the only telephone in the entire 
village. The call lasted 13 minutes 45 seconds, while the young assistant meekly waited to use 
it so as to transmit their telegrams. The Duke of York Stakes was officially due to run at 
2.50pm but it started late and did not finish until 3.03 p.m. The prosecution case at trial was 
                                              
3
 Captain Peel also faced a single count contrary to the Post Office (Protection) Act 1884 [UK]. 
4
 Paragon started at 100-8, was owned by Sir Ernst Paget and was ridden by Arthur Balding. The 5-4 favourite 
Abbots Trace was second at Kempton Park that day: The Daily Telegraph, 10 October 1921 p18. 
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that this deferment exactly explained why Mrs Peel was engaged on such an unusually long 
telephone call – because the person at the other end was informing her of the name of the 
winning horse. The allegation was that the time on the telegrams was then surreptitiously 
ante-dated to before the start of the official race time. The pair had expended £76 and their 
actual return was over £2,600 and would have been more, save several bookmakers refused to 
pay out, having become suspicious of their combined losses all attributable to bets placed at a 
minor rural outlet. The spouses were easily traced5 and Mrs Peel upon being interviewed by 
officials on behalf of the Postmaster General, informed them she had not been talking on the 
telephone about horseracing at all, but was conversing with a friend about the purchase of 
“Anglo-Ecuadorian” railway shares.   
 
Counsel for the prosecution6 and for the accused couple7 (including two knights)8 were the 
cream of the English criminal bar.9 Darling J10 was renowned for playing to the gallery with 
his bon mots and witticisms, with which this trial too was ultimately embellished. Every 
detail of the trial including Mrs Peel’s daily couture and millinery was reported in intricate 
detail.11 Noblemen, including the Duke of Sutherland,12 were present in the public gallery. 
North and South of the Scottish border the press embraced the trial with a fervour, describing 
it as being “of great public interest”13 and of “intense interest”.14 The jury empanelled to try 
                                              
5
 The telegrams were in the name of “Plumage” and “Fieldbury” which were the secret betting names of Mrs 
Peel with the bookmakers. 
6
 Sir Charles Gill KC, Mr Travers Humphreys and Mr Forster-Boulton. 
7
 Sir Henry Curtis-Bennett KC, Sir Richard Muir and Mr J A C Keeves. 
8
 Sidney Felstead, ‘Sir Richard Muir, A Memoir of a Public Prosecutor’, 1927, John Lane, The Bodley Head 
Limited, London, p368. “Lady Jardine, the mother of Mrs Peel, worked untiringly on behalf of her 
daughter”…the main object in the defence was Mrs Peel should be saved from prison and, although those 
responsible for it would have preferred to have got a clear acquittal from the jury, they could not afford to risk 
not undertaking what they considered the perfectly safe point of coercion.” 
9
 Mr J P Valetta held a watching brief for the Postmaster General. 
10
 His appointment to the Bench had been the subject of a lampoon that described Darling J as “the impudent 
little man in horse-hair, a microcosm of deceit and empty-headedness” for which a reporter for the Birmingham 
Daily Argus was found guilty of contempt in scandalising the court and only narrowly saved from imprisonment: 
R v Gray [1900] 2 QB 36 (DC). 
11
 The Times 8 March 1922 reported the arraignment the day before, recording that Captain Peel pleaded guilty 
to each offence “in low tones”. Mrs Peel pleaded not guilty “wearing a blue costume with furs and a broad-
brimmed red hat”. The Glasgow Herald, Tuesday 14 March 1922, on page 1, noted that upon arraignment, Mrs 
Peel had worn “a fashionable blue costume with large hat trimmed with cerise ribbon”. 
12
 The Pall Mall Gazette and Globe, City Special Edition, Monday 13 March 1922. 
13
 The Manchester Guardian, Monday 6 March 1922, p7, noting the trial would take place “this week”. 
14
 The Glasgow Herald, Tuesday 14 March 1922, p8. 
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Mrs Peel, would by a lingering irony, contain two women,15 this feature itself still such a 
novelty under English criminal law, that their selection was the banner headline on the front 
page of the evening London newspaper.16 The trial, quickly known as “The Society Turf 
Case”,17 involving an allegation of cheating18 that the sport of Kings19 was about to unplay. 
Three years later the British Parliament would because of the directed verdict, enact the first 
statutory defence of marital coercion, necessarily abrogating the common law defence which 
had existed for about 1,200 years.   
 
The divergent pleas by the spouses may have taken the prosecution by surprise as Sir Charles 
Gill KC then intimated that the prosecution sought the Judge’s view as to the course it should 
then take,20 as husband and wife were jointly charged with the first seven counts.21 Mrs Peel 
was facing felonies not misdemeanours, so the Court would not be troubled with the 
disputable position that the defence of marital coercion was unavailable for misdemeanours. 
Gill stated as an aside, that no charge of conspiracy had been proffered “because as the law 
stood a husband and wife could not conspire together to commit a criminal offence”,22 
                                              
15
 Female jurors (or their absence) still attract occasional judicial attention. In Kiwelesi v Republic [1969] EACA 
227 the Court of Appeal (de Lestang AP, Duffus AVP & Spry JA) quashed a conviction for murder that had 
been entered in the High Court of Tanzania (Georges CJ) because one of the Assessors was a woman. Spry JA 
stated: “So far as we are aware, this is the first time that a woman has sat as an Assessor at any trial in Tanzania 
or, indeed, in East Africa”. Without statutory authority female participation in decision-making invalidated the 
whole trial. More recently the Privy Council narrowly held 3:2 that a provision in Gibraltar very significantly 
restricting women from the general jury pool was unconstitutional: Rojas v Berllaque (Attorney General 
Intervening) [2004] 1 LRC 296 (PC) 
16
 Evening Standard, Late Night Special Edition, Monday 13 March 1922, p1, ‘Two Women on Jury – Turf 
Terms Explained – Mr Dow and £200’. In  R v Evans and Pritchard (1921) 15 Cr App R 111, 114 Lord Reading 
CJ had explained the operation of the recent Rule 3 Women Jurors (Criminal Court) Rules 1920 [UK]. 
17
 The Manchester Guardian, Wednesday, 15 March 1922, p14. 
18
 Cheating at cards had already produced an equivalent sensation, when one of the players and a witness at the 
trial was Prince Edward: Gordon-Cumming v Green, The Times 1 June 1891, Lord Coleridge CJ presiding over a 
special jury.  
19
 Mrs Peel’s father, Sir RWB Jardine, Bart, was a “member of the Jockey Club and a prominent owner of 
racehorses”: The Pall Mall Gazette and Globe, Final Night Edition, Tuesday 14 March 1922, p2. The same 
report noted that Captain Peel’s mother was “Mrs Hugh Peel, the well-known racehorse owner”. 
20
 The Times, 8 March 1922. Later, in mitigation, Sir Henry Curtis-Bennett KC said Capt Peel had pleaded guilty 
“on Counsel’s advice”: The Evening Standard, 14 March 1922, p8. 
21
 Contrary to s7 Forgery Act 1913 [UK]. 
22
 The Times, 8 March 1922. Could not conspire together “alone” was more correct. English law provides since 
1977 by statute that a husband and wife cannot conspire together alone. That position had been consistently 
assumed to be the case, but never actually decided. The first ever ruling in the common law to that effect being a 
decision of the Supreme Court of New Zealand in 1886, a ruling of Johnston J in R v Howard and Howard 
unreported, The Lyttelton Times, Friday 9 April 1886, New Zealand Supreme Court, Christchurch.  
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exclusively relying upon a statement from Hawkins,23 an eminent writer of the seventeenth 
century, for this proposition. Darling J rejoined “of course, it takes two persons to conspire, 
and being one person in law, the situation is that they cannot conspire”.24 Gill noted that a 
husband and wife being one person in law, being presumed to have but one will, was “a 
somewhat quaint presumption”. Darling J, never able to let an opportunity for a witty retort be 
bypassed, added,25 “[i]t is more likely to have been true in the time of Hawkins than it is 
today”. That jest would actually articulate the public response upon the conclusion of the trial.  
 
The prosecution then itself directly referred to the possible availability of the defence of 
marital coercion, a defence “that went back about 1,500 years”,26 and that the modern law 
existed in the law of King Ine27 and the West Saxons in England at least a thousand years ago. 
Darling J added, “[b]ut is it not notorious in the time of King Ina women were not nearly so 
independent as they are now?”,28 observing husbands formerly beat their wives and regularly 
                                              
23
 P R Glazebrook (ed) William Hawkins ‘Pleas of the Crown 1716-1721’ vol 1 ch 72 s8, Professional Books 
Limited, 1973, London p192 “no such Prosecution is maintainable against a Husband and Wife only, because they 
are esteemed but as one Person in Law, and are presumed to have but one Will”. In R v Peel 1922 The Times, 8 
March 1922, Sir Charles Gill KC in his opening of the prosecution advised Darling J there was no charge of 
conspiracy on the indictment because of the “quaint” rule enunciated in Hawkins. This was met with the rejoinder 
“Mr Justice Darling – It is more likely to have been true in the time of Hawkins than it is today (laughter).” In his 
ruling discharging Mrs Peel, Darling J erroneously stated that the “pre-arrangement”, between the husband and 
wife to defraud the bookmakers, was a “conspiracy”: The Times, 15 March 1922, p7. In R v Annie Brown (1896) 
15 NZLR 18, 27 a case where marital coercion was unsuccessfully relied upon, counsel for the prosecution 
conceded in argument that the common law rule precluding a conspiracy between husband and wife had not been 
“attempted to be dealt with by the Code” and that s21 of the Act “preserves it”. Section 21 Criminal Code Act 
1893 [NZ] preserved all common law defences, except in so far as altered by or inconsistent with it. (See now: 
s20(1) Crimes Act 1961 [NZ] considered in R v Hutchinson [2004] NZAR 303, 310 (CA) per Heath J.) 
Prendergast CJ at p32 noted that it did not follow that because a husband and wife in the eye of the law were still 
“for may purposes one person, and cannot ordinarily agree together” that it precluded them engaging in 
“combination or concert, express or implied”. While expressly acknowledging that a husband and wife alone 
“cannot be indicted for conspiracy” he narrowly delimited the exemption from uxorial criminality to the crime of 
conspiracy. Williams and Conolly JJ refrained from the line of reasoning. Dennison J at p36-37 was evidently 
hesitant about the special spousal exclusion from conspiracy. The Chief Justice fortified his assertion that joint 
spousal action was no bar to prosecution by stating that a wife would be liable as an accessory before the fact to 
her husband’s offence “by procuring or inciting him” to commit it. The criminal law instances a remarkable 
paucity of authority on uxorial incitement.  
24
 The Times, 8 March 1922. 
25
 To laughter from the public gallery: ibid. 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 This law of King Ina (Ine) (c688-94) is quoted in Frederick L Attenborough, ‘The Laws of the Earliest English 
Kings’ (1922) The University Press, Cambridge, p55-6 as “[i]f a husband steals a beast and carried it into his 
house, and it is seized therein, he shall forfeit his share [of the property of the household] – his wife only being 
exempt, since she must obey her lord.” 
28
 The Times, 8 March 1922. Percy H Winfield, ‘The Chief Sources of English Legal History’, 1925 Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge at p44: “A curious illustration of the need for a complete legal bibliography in 
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subjected them to violence, but asserting that that power imbalance no longer existed. Such a 
notion was as obsolete, the judge said, as the former right that a husband might beat his wife 
“so long as a man did not use a stick thicker than his thumb”.29   
 
The discussion from the bench then turned to the exceptions from the common law defence 
and the rationale for the excepted offences. Darling J argued that murder and treason were 
outside the defence, because those crimes were so heinous30 it being supposed a married 
woman would revolt against even her husband’s authority, than be guilty of them. The 
prosecution then submitted no issue could arise that the defence was unavailable in relation to 
an offence of forgery, as the very point had been previously decided.31 Darling J then 
informed the prosecution he certainly would not stop the case at that juncture and that the 
prosecution ought to call its evidence.32 “[T]he country formerly conceded to husbands 
control over their wives, which was no longer conceded. It conceded control over their 
persons and property, which had been to a large extent abolished.”33  
 
The prosecution called the Post Office employees and the bookmakers with whom the bets 
were laid.  Captain Peel had handed in 45 different telegraphic bets, but the telegrams were all 
                                                                                                                                             
general and of Anglo-Saxon law in particular was afforded by a trial at the Central Criminal Court, London, in 
1922, the presiding judge traced back to the laws of Ine (a West-Saxon king who seems to have reigned from AD 
688-725) one of the most stupid presumptions which still disfigures our criminal law – that any ordinary crime 
committed by a wife in the presence of her husband is done by his compulsion [R v Peel, The Times 8 and 15 
March 1922]. The Court, presumably owing to lack of information, does not appear to have made use of the best 
authority for these early English laws, nor even of the second-best authority.”   
29
 This revelation was also received with laughter from the public gallery. See, however, R v Jackson [1891] 1 
QB 671, (CA) per Lord Esher MR. “One proposition that has been referred to is that a husband has a right to 
beat his wife. I do not believe this ever was the law.”; Reva R Siegel, ‘The Rule of Love: Wife Beating as 
Prerogative and Privacy’, (1996) 105 Yale Law Journal 2117, 2148. 
30
 Samuel E Thorne (ed) ‘Bracton on the Laws and Customs of England’ ‘De Legibus et Consuetudinibus 
Angliae’, f.151b, Selden Society, 1977, vol II, p428, stating that the marital coercion doctrine was not applicable 
to “atrocioribus” [heinous crimes]. 
31
 R v Atkinson (1814) 1 ‘Russell on Crimes and Misdemeanours,’ 8 ed, pp96, 103. 
32
 The trial was adjourned until Monday, 13 March 1922. An application for bail pending sentence by Captain 
Peel was refused and Mrs Peel was granted bail in the sum of £1,000. 
33
 The Times, 8 March 1922. “The early 1920s were also notable in general legal history. The war had done 
much to put women on the map as responsible citizens and in November 1921 Miss Frances Kyle created a new 
precedent by being called to the Irish Bar. Six months later Miss Ivy Williams received her call to the English 
Bar”. M Ostrogorski, ‘The Rights of Women A Comparative Study in History and Legislation’, (1893) reprinted 
(1980) Porcupine Press Philadelphia at p141. Kristin Brandser, ‘Alice in Legal Wonderland: A Cross-
examination of Gender, Race and Empire in Victorian Law and Literature’, (2001) 24 Harvard Women’s Law 
Journal 221, 252 lists some of the milestones in England in the early twentieth century achieved by women in 
terms of progress towards equality, identifying the first admission by women as solicitors, barristers, members of 
parliament and cabinet ministers and the first appointment of a female judge.  
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in Mrs Peel’s handwriting.34 The defence cross-examined highlighting the fact that Mrs Peel35 
was in immediate proximity to her husband even when she was on the telephone, and that the 
spouses could still see each other throughout the duration of her call.36 At the conclusion of 
the prosecution case, on the third day of the trial it was submitted that Mrs Peel had no case to 
answer by invoking the presumption of marital coercion, which it was argued was unrebutted 
on all of the evidence. In particular, emphasis was placed on the fact that Mrs Peel had 
nothing to do with either the handing-in or the forging of the telegrams. The defence referred 
to a considerable number of authorities,37 tracing the law from the early nineteenth century 
and noting three decisions of the Court of Criminal Appeal38 in point, all delivered within the 
preceding eight years, substantiating the continued existence of the common law defence. 
Darling J himself additionally referred to the decision of Stephen J39 in R v Dykes et Uxor40 in 
which a wife was acquitted upon a special verdict of a jury, of highway robbery with 
violence, because there was some evidence to show she acted under the compulsion of her 
husband who was actively involved, and in fear of violence from him. 
 
Darling J stated that the marital coercion doctrine should not be extended “seeing how things 
have altered in the last few years in this country, where women are now serving on juries and 
                                              
34
 The Times, 14 March 1922. It also recorded Sir Robert and Lady Jardine were present in the public gallery. 
Captain Peel “was standing on the steps leading from the cells to the dock, out of sight of the public.” ‘Coercion 
– The Peel Case’ (1922) 86 JP 137 described the case as “of absorbing human interest”. 
35
 Douglas G Browne, ‘Sir Travers Humphreys – A Biography’, George C Harrap & Co Ltd, London, 1960, 
p197, relates that The Times, 14 March 1922 said Mrs Peel “was wearing a black costume with blue trimmings 
and furs and a black straw hat with blue quills crossed on one side.” It was subsequently reported that “feminine 
readers of the Times” who learnt that Mrs Peel was so attired, “may have regretted that the reporter was a man. 
What did he mean by trimmings?” 
36
 The Postmaster said in evidence when Capt Peel went to communicate with Mrs Peel in the telephone box 
“…he had one foot in and one foot out.”  The Evening Standard, 13 March 1922, p8.     
37
 PRO LOC2/584, ‘Authorities Cited by The Defence in R v Peel’; Halsbury’s Laws of England, vol 9, p244, 
para 519; ‘Russell on Crimes’, vol 1, pp93-94; R v Hughes (1813) 2 Lew CC 229; R v Sarah and John Morris 
(1814) Russ & Ry 270; Seagar v White (1884) 51 LT (NS) 261 (selling liquor contrary to licence: Stephen J); R 
v Archer (1826) 1 Mood CC 143; R v Connolly (1829) 2 Lew CC 229; R v Price (1837) 8 Car & P 19; R v Cruse 
(1836) 2 Mood CC 53; R v Smith (1858) 1 Dears & B 553; R v Boober, Boober & Boober (1850) 4 Cox CC 272; 
R v Torpey (1871) 12 Cox CC 45. 
38
 R v Caroubi (1912) 7 Cr App R 149; R v Court (1912) 7 Cr App R 127; R v Green (1913) 9 Cr App R 228. 
39
 Sir James Fitz-James Stephen, ‘Digest of Criminal Law’, (1894) 5ed 
40
 (1885) 15 Cox CC 771 (a very inadequate one page report); in a contemporary newspaper report of the trial, 
the wife aged 20, a hop-picker “put her hand into his [the victim of her husband’s robbery] left hand pocket, but 
finding nothing there the male prisoner again kicked the prosecutor and he became insensible”. Her husband, by 
contrast, took £5 4s. Stephen J is reported to have said after the special verdict of the jury, in which they found 
the wife acted under the compulsion of her husband (although herself taking nothing) that “the opinion of the 
jury would best be met in the case of the female by a verdict of not guilty against her – for it nearly was that.”: 
Kent Messenger, 30 October 1885 p3 under the heading ‘Capel-Robbing With Violence’.   
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becoming Members of Parliament.”41 The judge then emphasised that apart from the usual 
reasons42 given to substantiate the doctrine,43 there was also the historical fact that for a very 
long time women had been unable to obtain the benefit of clergy44 formerly available.  This 
disability arose because of both their general illiteracy and the critical fact that as a class 
women were in any event not clergyable;45 so the presumption of marital coercion was 
invented by the judges to ameliorate their comparatively wretched position. The presumption 
he added46 was also founded upon the fact that women were excluded from benefit of clergy 
“and would be executed for doing the very thing their husbands could do without being 
executed because they could read a few words or learn them by heart for the very purpose.”47   
 
 
THE RULING OF DARLING J 
 
The judge expressly stated there would have been a case to answer except for the fact the 
accused was a married woman.48 That legal status guaranteed the presumption of marital 
coercion which applied to exonerate her.  He particularly noted Seagar v White49 where 
Stephen J had held the defence of marital coercion was still available in English law,50 a 
                                              
41
 The Times, 14 March 1922. Curtis-Bennett KC added women were becoming Members of the Bar as well and 
Darling J replied “I don’t see what the Bar is to do, except marry them (laughter).” Counsel even exclaimed the 
possibility of women occupying judicial office one day had to follow. Douglas G Brown, ‘Sir Travers 
Humphreys A Biography’ (1960) George G Harrap & Co Ltd, London at p192 noted “The early 1920s were also 
notable in general legal history. The war had done much to put women on the map as responsible citizens…”  
42
 Power imbalance, economic duress, dominance, psychological dependency, biblical imperative. 
43
 Which he described as “a melancholy rule”; The Times, 14 March 1922. This exact expression had been used 
in relation to the defence of marital coercion by Stephen J in Seager v White (1884) 51 LT (NS) 261, 268 (DC); 
but in The Justice of the Peace report of the same case, Stephen J is recorded as saying of the contemporary view 
of the common law defence “It was a state of the law which now causes some astonishment”: Seager v White 
(1884) 48 JP 436,437 (DC). 
44
 Sir Frederick Pollock and Frederic William Maitland, ‘The History of English Law’, reprint 2 ed vol 1 (1996), 
‘The Law Book Exchange Ltd’, Union, New Jersey at p482 describe “benefit of clergy” as “one great exception” 
from the criminal law. 
45
 See chapter 1 infra. This class restriction on women was removed by Act of Parliament in 1692; 4 W & M c9. 
46
 Citing ‘Brook’s Abridgement’ p108 “Ratio videtur es que le ley extend que le feme ne osa contradire son 
Baron.” [The law is founded on the assumption a wife would never dare contradict her husband.]  
47
 The Times, 15 March 1922. 
48
 ‘Coercion – The Peel Case’ (1922) 86 JP 137, 138 stated that Darling J ‘has undoubtedly performed a public 
service in calling attention to the inapplicability of an ancient theory of law to the changed conditions of modern 
relationships’. 
49
 (1884) 51 LT (NS) 261. 
50
 Also citing R v Hughes (1813) 2 Lew CC 229 and R v Sarah & John Morris (1814) Russ & Ry 270. 
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position which that judge reaffirmed in 1885 at Maidstone Assizes in R v Dykes et Uxor.51 
Hamilton J52 delivering the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Caroubi53 had 
also confirmed the current longevity of the common law presumption and defence. In that 
latter case the same argument had been unsuccessfully advanced, namely because there was 
evidence of prearrangement between the spouses that demonstrated the wife was acting 
independently and without coercion. However, Hamilton J had noted the illogicality of this 
argument, as evidence of prearrangement might itself be the very product of the earlier 
coercion of the wife.54 Darling J noted Mrs Peel was never alone in the Post Office while 
doing anything at all “which could contribute to this conspiracy”,55 and her husband was there 
all the time. He had handed in the telegrams and it was he who kept them back until the 
proper moment. She had left the Post Office before he handed in the telegrams. The judge 
concluded he was unable to see that Mrs Peel did any individual act which was absolutely 
independent of the presumed coercion of her husband. He concluded there was no evidence56 
to rebut the common law presumption of marital coercion57 and she was acquitted.58   
 
                                              
51
 (1885) 15 Cox CC 771. This decision had been referred to by the judge rather than by any of the counsel, see 
‘Authorities Cited By The Defence In R v Peel’: PRO LCO2/584, recorded as R v Dikes (sic) & Wife.  
52
 Noted as “the present Lord Summer”, The Times, 15 March 1922. 
53
 (1912) 7 Cr App R 149 (CCA). The husband had also been convicted: R v Caroubi (Hadji Ben Ahmed)(1912) 
7 Cr App R 153. 
54
 In State v Houston (1888) 29 SC 108 the South Carolina Supreme Court had ruled that the mere fact that a 
wife appears the more active participant in the crime is not logically conclusive proof of her guilt as that greater 
activity may itself have been the very product of antecedent actual coercion. The error of this reasoning, as with 
that in R v Caroubi, is to find that because there are possible competing inferences at the end of the prosecution 
case, there is no case to answer: R v Galbraith [1981] 1 WLR 1039 (CA); Haw Tua Tau v Public Prosecutor 
[1982] AC 136,151 (PC); R v Fulcher [1995] 2 Cr App R 251 (CA). The presumption must be fact-specific in its 
application and could not be elevated into an immutable rule of law. 
55
 This reference to a conspiracy is a clear mistake. No conspiracy was, or could have been, charged between the 
two spouses alone. The judge’s view was so over-benevolent as to amount to an error of law. Her 
communication to her husband had been a critical step in the commission of the offence by him; she was 
involved in a joint enterprise with him and her role was indispensable.  
56
 Darling J did not deal with the plain and obvious inference that Captain Peel antedated the telegrams after 
being told by his wife the result of the race, and without her contribution, including the remarkably lengthy 
telephone call, he could not have garnered the vital information.   
57
 Darling J directed the jury to return a verdict of not guilty. Upon being discharged, “Mrs Peel then quietly left 
the dock”: The Times, 15 March 1922. 
58
 Mrs Peel was “dressed in a dark costume over which were a brown coat and furs. Her hat was of black satin, 
trimmed with pink flowers. She also wore a necklace of pearls.” The Pall Mall Gazette and Globe, 14 March 
1922, p1. 
   
 82 
THE SENTENCING REMARKS RE CAPTAIN PEEL 
 
Captain Peel, then aged 26, was brought up and sentenced to 12 months’ imprisonment59 after 
his impressive war record had been the subject of evidence.60 The judge stated he did not 
believe Captain Peel had actually coerced his wife; but the law presumed he had and there had 
been no evidence to rebut it. Mrs Peel had not been coerced by him in the course of the 
scheme.61 Darling J said, as the shorthand notes62 of his remarks reveal: 
 
If I believed that you really had coerced your wife into taking part in these frauds with you, I 
would pass upon you a very heavy sentence, but notwithstanding what I look upon as a fiction 
of our law, I do not believe that you coerced her into doing anything which she did in the 
course of this scheme to defraud the bookmakers. You both profited by it, and I can see no 
evidence of it at all that she knew less about it than you did, or that she was a weak person 
who was compelled by you to do something which would have revolted her. I therefore take it 
that you were not guilty of that cruel and wicked act which the law would assume you to be 
guilty of. 
 
 
THE IMMEDIATE MEDIA REACTION TO THE ACQUITTAL OF MRS PEEL 
 
The press went into a frenzy. The Pall Mall Gazette and Globe63 and Evening Standard64 
flashed the acquittal before the morning newspapers could scoop the story. The next morning, 
the headlines65 were baying about the injustice of the situation. Had not the war hero been 
                                              
59
 In the Second Division, ie without hard labour. “The prisoner, who was evidently deeply affected by the 
shame of his position, was then removed from the dock”: The Times, 15 March 1922. 
60
 He had joined the 5th Dragoon Guards at Ypres in November 1914, he had been “in every action in which the 
1st Cavalry Brigade took part, including the three Battles of Ypres and the Battle of Loos and he was present on 
the Somme at Arras and Cambrai.” He had been awarded the Military Cross for most conspicuous gallantry, 
including the fact he had captured six German soldiers singlehandedly: The Times, 15 March 1922. (The only 
child of their marriage, Hugh William Jardine Ethelston Peel (born 7 October 1920, died 17 February 1945 from 
wounds received in action): thepeerage.com/p4305. The Peel family were direct descendants of Mary Tudor. 
Bankes LJ gave a character reference in mitigation and his letter stated he was willing to attend to give evidence.     
61
 The Evening Standard, 14 March 1922, p8. 
62
 Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, vol 49 p702, 21 March 1922, per Lord Askwith. 
63
 Final Night Edition, 14 March 1922. It also carried on the front page photographs of Captain and Mrs Peel, 
and of Darling J.   
64
 Tuesday, 14 March 1922, p1 (with photographs of Captain and Mrs Peel), p8, “Society Turf Drama Finale – 
Judge’s Burning Censure on Capt. Peel – “You Supposed To Be A Gentleman” – Does Not Believe He Coerced 
His Wife”.  
65
 The Scotsman, Wednesday, 15 March 1922, p10, under the heading ‘Back-Timed Betting Telegrams – Captain 
Peel Sent To Prison – Mrs Peel Discharged – Justice Darling And Doctrine Of Coercion’; The Manchester 
Guardian’, Wednesday 15 March 1922, p4: “End Of The Society Turf Case – ‘Coercion’ Plea Succeeds – Judge 
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gallant again?66 How could an aristocrat avail herself of such a defence? Why did the defence 
exist at all? What was the rationale and limits of the defence? The public agitation for law 
reform was strident and immediate. 
 
A biography67 of Sir Henry Curtis-Bennett KC, the senior knight for the Peels at trial, records 
the trial was closely followed by the “fashionable society and racing crowd”. 
  
Curtis had shown the absurdity of the law as it stood. And when the Press rumbled and 
thundered on the theme the next day, the judgment was also criticised as being an illustration 
of one law for the rich and another for the poor, since a month before, a labourer had been sent 
to prison with hard labour for a similar offence. The law, which Sir Charles Darling had called 
“a melancholy doctrine”, was now called “musty and antiquated, a fly-blown legal doctrine”.68 
 
The thundering editorial in The Times the day after the acquittal exclaimed:69 
 
[t]his legal protection of the married woman, a remnant not of chivalry, but of serfdom, has 
more than served its time, and to use the words of the Judge is “absolutely inappropriate to 
modern life”, in which women become Justices of the Peace, serve on juries, and are elected 
members of Parliament. 
 
The Times editorial of 15 March 1922 pungently reviewed the doctrine of marital coercion, 
noting it was “once utilitarian, now sometimes almost metaphysical”, and stated that it had to 
be removed by statute as it was irreconcilable with the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act 
                                                                                                                                             
On Out-Of-Date Law – The Mysteries Of Betting By Telegram”; The Daily Telegraph, Wednesday, 15 March 
1922, p12 “Betting Telegrams – Mrs Peel Acquitted – Judge’s Scathing Words – Sentence Of Mr Owen Peel”.  
66
 The Evening Standard, 14 March 1922, p8, records counsel stating Capt Peel had taken “…the proper and 
manly course.” 
67
 R Wild & D Curtis-Bennett, ‘King’s Counsel: The Life of Sir Henry Curtis-Bennett’, 1938, Macmillan 
Company, New York, p99.   
68
 Ibid p101. Adding incorrectly though “[t]he Peel case was the last, therefore, in which the doctrine was heard 
that a woman was inevitably under the influence of her husband.” It is a remarkable fact, attributable probably to 
the notoriety of the Peel acquittal, that other later instances of the common law defence have been wholly 
overlooked.  See fn 166-184 infra.  When the statutory defence was introduced by s47 Criminal Justice Act 1925 
[UK], the first known example of it being invoked in a superior court was much later: R v Pierce (1941) 5 
Journal of Criminal Law 124 (a decision not otherwise reported). 
69
 The Times, 15 March 1922. ‘Coercion – The Peel Case’ (1922) 86 JP 137, 139 compared Bourne v Keane 
[1919] AC 815 (HL), where the lawfulness of a Catholic will for the bequest of masses was upheld as the Roman 
Catholic Charities Act 1832 [UK] “changed fundamentally the entire situation, the whole outlook, and the 
underlying principle of the law in reference to the Roman Catholic religion.” The author said an analogy 
between the position of married women and Roman Catholics was now valid. 
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1919 [UK] the operation of which was a constant reminder “of things left undone in the 
levelling processes of democracy.” 
 
 
COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN LORD CHANCELLORS, ATTORNEY GENERAL 
AND DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS IN THE IMMEDIATE AFTERMATH 
OF THE DECISION IN R v PEEL 
 
There was an almost immediate reaction too by parliamentarians. Mr Leslie C Bowker,70 the 
Legal Secretary to the Law Officers of the Crown,71 wrote,72 on 16 March 1922,73 to Sir 
Claud Schuster74 enclosing a copy of a Parliamentary Question which Mr Raper MP intended 
to ask the Attorney General in the House of Commons on the next Wednesday75 “consequent 
on the remarks of Mr Justice Darling in the Peel case”. On the same day by Schuster to 
Bowker in reply which stated, “As regards Mr Raper’s question for Wednesday next…[i]t is 
obvious a very large question of policy is involved, upon which some discussion between the 
Lord Chancellor and the Attorney General may be desirable.”76 That Parliamentary Question 
is recorded in Hansard77 where Mr A B Raper asked the Attorney General whether the 
Government proposed to have the whole law of marital coercion repealed. Sir Ernest Pollock 
the Attorney General said on 22 March 1922, in the House of Commons that the Government 
intended to “set up a small but highly expert committee” to consider the whole issue.  
  
The “very large question of policy” referred to by Schuster still remains an anomalous issue 
in English law.  With an immediate challenge to the state of the law, one day after the 
acquittal of Mrs Peel, with implications that transcended the narrow law of marital coercion, 
                                              
70
 His brother was clerk to Sir Edward Marshall-Hall and Birkett J. See: A E Bowker, ‘Behind the Bar’, 1947, 
Staples Press Limited, London, p22. 
71
 Elected as Remembrancer of the City of London in 1933. 
72
 PRO/LC02/584: ‘Criminal Law: Report of the Committee on the Responsibility of the Wife for Crimes 
Committed Under the Coercion of the Husband’. 
73
 The day after the acquittal was reported in The Times. 
74
 KCB, CVO, KC, Law Officers Department, Royal Courts of Justice, London. Permanent Secretary to the Lord 
Chancellor 1915-1944 (b 1869 – d 1956). Later 1st Baron Schuster. 
75
 22 March 1922. 
76
 PRO ibid. 
77
 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, vol 152 p447, 22 March 1922. 
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Sir Claud must have considered the response to be ominous. As right hand man to the Lord 
Chancellor,78 he must have felt the Lord Chancellor, who had overall responsibility for law 
throughout the United Kingdom, was shortly going to be very much on the back foot. A very 
high profile criminal case had, in the eyes of the public, gone awry because a common law 
criminal defence fashioned at least a thousand years earlier, had produced a result that did not 
just perplex, but angered the public. The injustice created by the application of the ancient 
law, compounded by the overwhelming lack of moral merit in the factual matrix was seen to 
have sullied the law itself. But the dimension of the quest for rapid change in the law instantly 
grew. On 17 March, the next day, Sir Harry Brittain MP, filed a Parliamentary Question.79  
 
To ask Mr Attorney General, whether, the object of securing equality between the sexes, he 
can foreshadow an early alteration in the Law as to do away with the theory of the coercion of 
the wife by the husband, as illustrated by a recent decision in the High Court of Justice. 
 
Bowker immediately sent a copy of the question to Schuster, adding it involved “an 
amendment of the law of coercion between husband and wife.”80   
 
On 17 March 1922, The Times published a letter from the redoubtable Sir Harry Poland KC,81 
who stated no-one could doubt the law of marital coercion “ought to be amended”. He noted a 
Royal Commission82 in 1879 had recommended the abolition of the presumption and 
suggested that as “about 42 years have elapsed since their recommendation” the government 
should “forthwith bring in a Bill to carry it out”. He optimistically adding “the law where 
there is actual compulsion requires no alteration.” He opined that there was no doubt that such 
a Bill would “readily pass both Houses of Parliament without opposition”. How wrong he 
was. On the same day the solicitor of the General Post Office83 wrote to Schuster a long letter, 
                                              
78
 He served a remarkable 29 years as Permanent Secretary to the various Lord Chancellors (1915-1944). 
79
 PRO LCO2/584 Parliamentary Question for Oral Answer on 21 March 1922. 
80
 PRO LCO2/584. 
81
 Who had been the Senior Prosecuting Counsel at the Old Bailey for many years – see his biography: Ernest 
Bowen-Rowlands, ‘Seventy-Two Years at The Bar’, (1924), Macmillan and Co Ltd, London. 
82
 George Eyre & William Spottiswoode, ‘Law Relating to Indictable Offences’, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office 
1879 at p18. 
83
 Conduct of the prosecution of R v Peel had been in the hands of the solicitor to the Post Office as the forgeries 
had been of telegrams. Woods advocated that apart from abrogating the presumption that “[t]o secure 
consistency in principle, it would be desirable at the same time to alter the existing Common Law rule that 
husband and wife cannot conspire together without a third conspirator, which is based on an analogous legal 
fiction that they are supposed to have only one mind”: PRO LCO2/584. 
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sent at the request of the Secretary of the Post Office.84 A transcript of the judgment was 
enclosed as well as an analysis of it. The solicitor concluded the decision demonstrated “very 
strikingly the necessity for the reconsideration of the law” so as to bring it into accord with 
the conditions of modern life, in which “women take so large and prominent a part”. He 
recommended85 the presumption should be abrogated and instead there should be an onus of 
proof placed on the wife to establish that she had acted under coercion.   
 
 
PROSECUTION SOLICITORS COMMUNICATE WITH LORD CHANCELLOR 
 
On 17 March 1922 Mr R W Woods Esq CBE from the Solicitor’s Department, General Post 
Office, London, wrote “By Special Transfer” (an early form of courier) to Sir Claud on behalf 
of the Secretary of the Post Office enclosing a copy of the ruling of Darling J, a copy of the 
brief and trial exhibits, a list of the legal authorities upon which the defence relied and “an 
Extract from The Times of the 15th instant, which contains a reasonably full summary of the 
legal arguments”. Woods informed Sir Claud that Darling J held: 
 
that in view of the long line of uniformly consistent authorities, he was bound to hold that this 
defence prevailed, but he expressed the opinion that the doctrine is one which is no longer in 
harmony with modern conditions, inasmuch as the principles upon which it was based have 
long since ceased to exist. 
 
The Solicitor from the General Post Office, who had the particular interest that telegrams had 
been sent by the Post Office to effect the crimes, also advised Sir Claud: 
 
Moreover, in passing sentence on Captain Peel, the Judge stated that he did not believe that 
the prisoner had coerced his wife in doing anything that she had done in the course of the 
scheme to defraud the Bookmakers by which they both profited, and, for reasons which he 
stated, he found that the prisoner Owen Peel was not in fact guilty of the act of [coercion] 
which the law presumed him to be guilty. 
 
Woods continued: 
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 The Secretary expressly sought to have the Lord Chancellor consider “the desirability of initiating legislation 
which will prevent a similar miscarriage of Justice in the future”: PRO LCO2/584. 
85
 The letter was copied to the Attorney General. 
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That in the case of Mrs Peel the administration of justice was gravely impeded, if not 
defeated, by the artificial presumption of law, which in the particular case was at variance 
with the strong probabilities and in general can, at the present time, only be regarded as 
somewhat of an anachronism. 
 
He had made a bold plea for instant law reform, so that the criminal law would be in “accord 
with the conditions of modern Life, in which women take so large and prominent a part.” He 
commended that the proper legislative solution would be to abrogate the existing presumption 
of coercion and to place upon the wife the onus of proof that she in fact acted under the 
coercion of the husband. Woods did not recommend the entire removal of wifely status as a 
defence: he proposed a modified version. He urged the Lord Chancellor to consider “the 
desirability of initiating legislation, which will prevent a similar miscarriage of Justice in the 
future.” Woods made an additional valuable observation:  
 
To secure consistency in principle, it would be desirable at the same time to alter the existing 
Common Law rule that husband and wife cannot conspire together without a third conspirator, 
which rule is based on the analogous legal fiction that they are supposed to have only one 
mind. 
 
This point, however, was not pursued by the Government, even though a copy of his letter of 
17 March was also forwarded to the Attorney General. The terms of reference framed for the 
committee appointed to consider the issue of marital coercion provided no remit to consider 
any broader implications of the recently exposed position of married women under the 
general criminal law. 
 
In a letter published in The Times on 18 March 1922, Rooper & Whately, solicitors of 17 
Lincoln’s Inn-fields, desperately wrote on behalf of their clients, that although Captain Peel 
had pleaded guilty to ante-dating the telegrams, he did so without knowledge at that time of 
the name of the winning horse. In addition, in relation to Mrs Peel it was said, “By reason of 
the ruling of the Learned Judge, Mrs Peel was unable to go into the witness box as she desired 
to do, to deny on oath, that she had any knowledge of the winner or any complicity in any 
scheme to defraud such as the prosecution had put forward”. 
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Bowker, on 18 March 1922 wrote86 to Schuster, stating the Attorney General was postponing 
giving answers on this issue pending Viscount Birkenhead LC’s reply to Viscount Ullswater. 
He argued that as there were now four similar questions pending, from Mr Morgan Jones MP, 
Mr Raper MP, Mr Mills MP, and Sir Harry Brittain MP, it was prudent for the Attorney 
General to await the reply of Viscount Birkenhead LC87 to Lord Ullswater, before himself 
answering the outstanding questions in the Commons. 
 
Schuster had telephoned the Director of Public Prosecutions and on 18 March with reference 
to that conversation, Mr Guy Stephenson CB from that office wrote88 to Schuster stating the 
law of marital coercion “appears to be fully dealt with in the note to Article 31 in Stephen’s 
Digest of the Criminal Law”.89 His analysis of the ruling of Darling J concluded that “cogent 
evidence of independence on the part of the wife must be required and that there was no such 
evidence in this case”. He also noted the text in Stephen’s Digest took the view marital 
coercion seemed to be an available defence in relation to misdemeanours.90 This second 
observation meant that the effect of the ruling of Darling J was likely to be far more pervasive 
than originally thought; as it would now apply in all trials before magistrates, as neither of the 
two well-grounded common law exceptions of murder and treason were tried before them. 
The ruling had confirmed that the defence generally applied to felonies so it would be very 
impolitic to have to justify it, if it was not of general application in all courts within the 
criminal justice hierarchy. Stephenson’s letter, by double negative, also reasoned: 
 
I do not understand the effect of Darling’s ruling to be that the presumption of law that the 
woman who committed an offence of the nature with which Mrs Peel was charged is 
presumed to have acted under the coercion of her husband if her alleged offence was 
committed in the presence of her husband cannot be rebutted by evidence. 
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 PRO LCO2/584. 
87
 Schuster replied to the letter from Woods on 20 March 1922, stating that the Lord Chancellor would be 
replying to a question from Lord Ullswater and that Schuster would further correspond with him: PRO 
LCO2/584. 
88
 PRO LCO2/584.   
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 Reference was made to the (1894) 5 ed p395. 
90
 PRO LCO2/584 Schuster replied on 20 March, 1922 asking if Stephenson might be able to speak to the 
Director of Public Prosecutions for his views, prior to the Lord Chancellor having to answer the question from 
Lord Ullswater, the next day. 
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He concluded Darling J had found there was no evidence to rebut the presumption in Mrs 
Peel’s case otherwise the judge would have been required to leave the case, specifically 
referring to the “fourth line from the bottom of The Times report of his judgment”. 
Stephenson considered the ruling betrayed an apparent inconsistency, in view of an earlier 
passage in it to the effect that if the two had not been husband and wife, the judge would have 
allowed the case against the wife to go to the jury. But this apparent contradiction was 
eliminated because Stephenson tamely acknowledged that in order to rebut the presumption 
“cogent evidence of independence on the part of the wife must be required” and he conceded 
that there was no such evidence in this case.   
 
Stephenson then referred to a formal legal opinion which he had coincidentally obtained on 
17 March from Travers Humphreys91 in relation to another fraud prosecution. In that case it 
appeared that a wife (Mrs Celis), had given fraudulent references as to the honesty of her 
husband, in a “long-firm fraud”. Humphreys’ opinion included the following: 
 
On the charge against Mrs Celis of aiding and abetting her husband that is, of being a party to 
the obtaining of the goods, there is, in my view, ample evidence upon which a jury might find 
that the presumption of coercion by the husband is rebutted by the evidence that she acted 
apart from him and took an important and leading part in the transactions. I should be sorry to 
think that a wife, who, in a false name, and for purposes of fraud, gave untrue references for a 
firm consisting of her husband, is not amendable to the criminal law92 
 
Stephenson noted the indictment in R v Peel had charged a felony and ‘Stephen’s Digest of 
Criminal Law’ stated the defence of marital coercion “seems to apply to misdemeanours 
generally”.93 Schuster replied to Stephenson on Monday 20 March and entreated him to speak 
to Sir Archibald Bodkin, the Director of Public Prosecutions, on the subject as the next day 
the Lord Chancellor had to answer the parliamentary question from Viscount Ullswater in the 
House of Lords. 
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 One of the prosecution counsel in R v Peel. 
92
 PRO LC02/584. 
93
 Sir James Fitz James Stephen, ‘Digest of Criminal Law’, (1894) 5ed Art 23. 
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ANOTHER PARLIMAMENTARY QUESTION IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS 
 
Lord Askwith KCB also put down a Parliamentary Question for the Lord Chancellor: 
 
Whether the doctrine of coercion of a wife by her husband as exemplified in the case of R v 
Peel may not lead a judge to assume the guilt of a wife, without any finding of a jury or any 
evidence given by her on her behalf or any proof of crime by her, in order to explain the 
sentence he may be giving to a husband and to obviate the necessity of having to find that the 
husband has in fact coerced her with consequent heavier sentence; and that the doctrine, for 
that reason and in view (inter alia) of the report of the Royal Commissioners on the Criminal 
Code prepared in 1878 and 1879, requires consideration and revision? 
 
Within three days the acquittal of Mrs Peel had generated four questions in the House of 
Commons and two in the House of Lords. Schuster then wrote to both Lord Ullswater and 
Lord Askwith94 inviting them to each postpone their Question, until some other unspecified 
date. To Lord Ullswater he specially referred95 to the anticipated prolonged and highly 
contentious debate on the Irish Free State (Agreement) Bill 1922 which would precede his 
Question. He observed that it would not therefore be reached until a late stage96 in the 
evening. 
 
The Lord Chancellor would prefer to reply to your question, which raises issues of great 
gravity, at a time when the House is not already wearied with so important a debate as that 
which will precede it, and he asks me, therefore, to suggest that you should postpone the 
question until some date when it can be reached earlier in the evening.  
 
By a letter of the same date Schuster wrote to Lord Askwith, enclosing a copy of the letter to 
Lord Ullswater which had been written on the instructions of the Lord Chancellor, saying 
“Perhaps if [Lord Ullswater] sees fit to put off his question, you will be disposed to follow his 
example.” Lord Ullswater was not rebuffed by the invitation from Schuster to adjourn, so on 
Tuesday 21 March he handwrote a letter97 in reply to Schuster. However, his letter was only 
receipted by a stamped impression from the Lord Chancellor’s Department on 22 March – the 
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day after his question was to be asked in the House of Lords. Perhaps showing both a canny 
sense of timing and of political intuition he responded: 
 
I am very loth to postpone my question. In my experience postponement generally means 
disappearance.  There is no certainty that the question, if postponed today, would be reached 
at a more convenient hour tomorrow or Thursday or on any day to which it might be 
postponed.98  
 
That evening, Viscount Ullswater rose99 to ask the Lord Chancellor the Parliamentary 
Question of which he had given notice, his question was: 
 
Whether his attention has been called to the Judgment of Mr Justice Darling in the recent case 
of R v Peel, in which the learned judge held that the “melancholy doctrine” that a wife can be 
coerced by her husband into the commission of a crime is still the law of this land whenever 
husband and wife are jointly indicted of a crime, and that the doctrine is founded on the 
assumption that a wife will not dare to contradict her husband and whether he will introduce a 
Bill to abolish this doctrine, which appears to date from the reigns of King Canute and King 
Ina, and bring the law into close accord with the well-known facts of present day matrimonial 
life?100 
 
He noted the same general issue was to be raised in the House of Commons the next day, but 
emphasising as “the head of the law is in this House” he was particularly anxious to have a 
reply from the Lord Chancellor rather than await the response of some “subordinate officer in 
another place”. The history of the defence was recounted in terms referred to by Darling J in 
R v Peel, and conveniently set out in ‘Brook’s Abridgment’. It stated the reason for the law 
was founded on the assumption a woman would never dare to contradict her husband: an 
assumption which Lord Ullswater argued was no longer in accordance with reality. It 
followed “respect for the law” could not co-exist with such a law that was not itself in 
accordance with “our customs, with our habits of thought, and with the social relations of the 
time”.101 Lord Ullswater then cited a few sentences from Darling J’s ruling: 
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If it appears on the facts that the husband was present when the wife committed the crime, the 
presumption is that she was acting under the coercion of her husband, except in certain cases. 
It would not be so in murder or treason. In my judgment it is not a doctrine which should be 
extended seeing how things have altered in the last few years in this country. I should do 
nothing to extend the doctrine because I think it is absolutely inappropriate to modern life. 
 
The rationale for a rule of law which created a privilege for only certain women “in Saxon or 
Norman times” now lacked all validity as it now no longer represented a true picture. 
Although he accepted that “in many cases” a married woman may be able to prove that she 
was coerced by her husband into crime, that did not provide any necessity for the continuation 
of the general presumption of that coercion – which was itself an indictment of contemporary 
uxorial status. Where coercion was alleged a wife should be “entitled to prove it and to be 
acquitted; that is to say, on the facts she ought to get her acquittal.” The confined objective of 
his speech was to have the presumption removed as “it connotes an inferior and degrading 
status”102 which conflicted with the whole tendency of the current social milieu. It was 
inconsistent with the broad thrust of modern equalising legislation which had sought to 
elevate the status of women, to the position of equality by removing gender distinctions as a 
basis for differential treatment under the law. He therefore asked the Lord Chancellor whether 
the latter would introduce a Bill to abolish the presumption and the doctrine, noting that there 
already existed a drafted precedent to achieve this in the short Bill, prepared in 1879 as 
annexed to the Report of the Royal Commissioners on the Criminal Code.  
 
Lord Ullswater referred to the letter to The Times written by Sir Harry Poland KC a few days 
earlier,103 which had observed that as long ago as 43 years earlier such a recommendation had 
been made, but not acted upon. He felt convinced that public sentiment would be equally in 
favour now of that recommendation. Scottish law, he added with an allusion to Lady 
Macbeth,104 had never provided for the presumption of coercion and the comparatively 
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asinine state of English law on this subject was a “cause for mirth”.105 It only proved that the 
absurdity of the presumption, which Charles Dickens in 1837 memorably invoked against the 
hapless Mr Bumble in Oliver Twist,106 continued to disfigure the state of the law. Lord 
Ullswater also commented on the recent decision of the Committee of Privileges of the House 
of Lords in a Peerage case, Re Viscountess Rhondda’s Claim,107 to show that it had been 
argued there that a woman might even become Commander-in-Chief or become Lord 
Chancellor one day – so that the status of women was now recognised in virtually every 
forum as having been very significantly altered from how it had been regarded only some 
years earlier. He proposed that the 1879 Bill drafted by the Royal Commissioners (including 
Stephen J) be adopted, convinced that this course would be generally supported by women 
and in the opinion that it did not raise “controversial issues between the sexes”. 
    
It is a Bill which seems to be to be eminently suitable for a Coalition Government to bring 
in...I hope that in reply the Lord Chancellor will be able to say that he sees no objection to this 
alteration of the law, that it will be useful, and will bring the law up to date.  
 
Lord Askwith followed and stated the doctrine of coercion as exemplified by R v Peel needed 
urgent “consideration and revision.” His Lordship then recited from the shorthand note of the 
sentencing remarks of Darling J to illustrate Mrs Peel had not in fact been coerced it was 
simply that the law presumed she had been. He emphasised the facts of the case as recorded 
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by the judge amply demonstrated her reliance on this ancient presumption only demonstrated 
that the relevant law had ossified.   
 
I shall assume nothing as proved against you which, in my judgment, is not conclusively 
proved…If I believed that you really had coerced your wife into taking part in these frauds 
with you, I would pass upon you a very heavy sentence, but notwithstanding what I look upon 
as a fiction of our law, I do not believe that you coerced her into doing anything which she did 
in the course of this scheme to defraud the bookmakers. You both profited by it, and I can 
seen no evidence at all that she knew less about it than you did, or that she was a weak person 
who was compelled by you to do something which would have revolted her. I therefore take it 
that you were not guilty of that cruel and wicked act [of coercion] which the law would 
assume you to be guilty of.108 
 
Lord Askwith remonstrated that the assumptions made by the trial judge were unfair, as by 
acquitting her on the basis that there had been no case to answer, Mrs Peel was deprived of 
the opportunity of giving evidence to deny that she had any complicity in her husband’s 
fraud. He added he supported an inquiry as to whether the common law presumption should 
continue to remain part of English law. 
 
A former Lord Chancellor, Lord Buckmaster rose and stated that he was “utterly unable to 
agree”109 with the reformative arguments of Viscount Ullswater: 
 
It is my firm conviction that the bulk of women to-day act under the direction of their 
husbands, both those who declined to say they would obey at the altar, and those who did say 
they would obey. That is most assuredly true as you get down into the poor and poorer 
conditions of life. 
 
He added the presumption had not been introduced into the common law by people unaware 
of human nature: 
 
and men and women were much the same then as they are now. You have not changed women 
by enabling them to vote, and enabling them to sit in all sorts of places. They are still what 
they were before these different opportunities for showing their capacities were given to them. 
And men are just the same too. If a woman commits a crime in the presence of her husband, I 
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think it shows the immense sagacity of the Common Law when it says you shall assume she 
was doing it under his direction.110 
 
He stated that from what he had read of R v Peel “the woman had acted under the direction of 
her husband, and had she been acting alone she never would have done the things she did, and 
the fraud would never have been perpetrated.” His speech was truculent and reactionary.  
 
For the government Viscount Birkenhead LC stated Stephen’s ‘Digest of the Criminal Law’ 
“accurately summarised”111 the current law in relation to marital coercion.112 He emphasised 
the doctrine “is actually a limiting one” as it did not apply to high treason or murder. (This 
was a facile point as for most practical purposes the doctrine applied across the board to every 
act or omission proscribed by criminal law.) He acknowledged there were valid divergent 
views, as demonstrated by the irreconcilable positions of Viscount Ullswater and Lord 
Buckmaster. The very fact of the non-implementation of the Report of the Royal 
Commissioners on the Criminal Code in 1879 might equally have suggested that opinion then 
too was not altogether uniform on this subject. The Lord Chancellor then added:113  
 
But I do believe it to be the fact that in the lower orders of society – if I may use an expression 
to which I object – in the humbler ranks of society, it is, in my judgment, absolutely true that 
there is a very great degree of that kind of control which our ancestors had in their minds 
when they surrounded a woman with this protection.  Then the question arises – and it is a 
difficult one – Has the gradual conquest of various offices and positions by women altered 
that which is basic and fundamental?” 
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Lord Birkenhead concluded he was not prepared to definitely commit to any decision on this 
topic, in the absence of further reflection. He specifically stated that little authority should be 
attributed to the opinion of a single puisne judge as in R v Peel, who was making a ruling 
coloured by the particular facts of that case, as a much more complex issue was 
fundamentally at stake. He announced that: 
 
not only this matter but various other questions affecting the responsibilities of women require 
reconsideration in the light of the changes which have taken place; and I propose, after 
consultation with the Attorney-General, to set up a small but highly expert Committee which 
will express itself upon the question of principle, and make a Report to me on the whole 
subject. Without the Report of such a Committee, and giving further reflection to it, I am not 
prepared to recommend or carry out legislation.114 
 
On 22 March 1922 a letter to the editor was published in The Times, from Lady Frances 
Balfour,115 writing as President of the National Council of Women of Great Britain and 
Ireland. She protested116 at the outcome of the R v Peel case as it “brought vividly before the 
public one of the absurdities surviving in our law of married women.” She noted the 
amelioration brought about by the Married Women’s Property Act 1882 [UK] and the 
significant decision of the Court of Appeal in R v Jackson117 which had finally “negatived a 
claim that a husband had the right to imprison his wife”. Lady Balfour asserted that the 
extinction of the alleged common law right of a husband to imprison his wife meant that the 
common law presumption of marital coercion also should be similarly ended, as the two 
alleged common law rights stemmed from the same theory of the right and responsibility of a 
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husband to dominate and control his wife.  Such a notion was now utterly at odds with the 
emancipated status of modern British women. She added that the National Council of Women 
advocated the earliest possible demise of the marital coercion doctrine.  
 
At the same time the wife’s position as her husband’s property is still in practice, as for 
example, when she is not allowed to decide for herself, like other adults, whether or not she 
shall submit to a surgical operation. Her husband must first give his consent. We submit that 
these doctrines, which belong to an age of servitude and serfdom should be specifically 
annulled by legislation, so that marriage may become an equally responsible partnership, 
which is necessary to the building up of the highest kind of family life. 
 
 
PRESS REACTION TO LORD CHANCELLOR’S SPEECH 
 
The Times, on 22 March, approvingly referred to the fact Lord Ullswater had called for urgent 
revision of the law and that the Lord Chancellor had announced that a Committee would be 
appointed to consider the whole question of the status and responsibility of women under the 
law in the light of their changed standing. But despite that statement, the eventual terms of 
reference were significantly narrowed; only an attenuated reference was eventually bestowed. 
The Committee which was shortly to be established was only tasked118 “to consider the 
doctrines of the criminal law with reference to the wife’s responsibility for crimes committed 
by her in the presence of or under the coercion of her husband, and to report what changes, if 
any, are desirable in the criminal law upon the subject”.   
 
 
SELECTION AND FORMATION OF THE COMMITTEE 
 
On 4 April 1922 Schuster wrote119 to Avory J stating Lord Birkenhead had decided “after 
consultation with the Lord Chief Justice”120 to set up “a small expert Committee” and asked 
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Avory J whether he would accept the Chairmanship of it. In addition, Avory J121 was invited 
to make any observations he may have on the suggested terms of reference of the Committee. 
The next day Avory accepted the nomination and on 7 April he wrote to Schuster in reply 
stating he had no suggestion in that regard. Schuster then wrote to the Attorney General on 6 
April stating as the Lord Chancellor had announced in the House of Lords he proposed to 
establish a Committee to consider the law exemplified in R v Peel, both the Lord Chancellor 
and the Lord Chief Justice were of the opinion one of the Law Officers ought to be a member 
of the Committee. The Attorney General, Rt Hon Sir Ernest M Pollock KBE, KC, MP, replied 
by handwriting a response on Schuster’s letter; “Yes, I would wish myself personally to be a 
member of the Committee EMP 8/4/22.”122 On 7 April Schuster wrote to His Honour Judge 
Sir Alfred Tobin K.C. of the County Court inviting him to be a member and stating that the 
Attorney General would also be a member of the Committee. H D Roome123 of 5 Paper 
Buildings, Sir Archibald Bodkin, the Director of Public Prosecutions, Judge Tobin, Travers 
Humphreys and Sir Richard Muir both of 3 Temple Gardens124 and G J Talbot KC all 
accepted nomination to the Committee. On 13 April Schuster wrote to Avory revealing the 
appointment of “the ‘Coercion’ Committee”. The Warrant of Appointment by Lord 
Birkenhead is dated and signed by him on 1 April 1922, yet none of the members had even 
been approached until later in that month. There clearly had been some ante-dating of the 
Warrant by the Lord Chancellor. On 2 May the Lord Chancellor’s office circulated to “the 
press and the Law Papers”, the membership and terms of reference of the Committee.125 The 
Times of Wednesday 3 May 1922 reported a “Legal Committee of Inquiry” had been set up126 
to consider the doctrine of marital coercion. No time frame for the completion of the inquiry 
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was stated. The apparently127 open-ended time-horizon for the Committee to complete its 
work had the opposite effect, if one was intended at all. For the Committee produced its six 
page report within three effective weeks of being established, as its initial meeting occurred 
not before the last days of April and the Report was formally transmitted to the Lord 
Chancellor in the middle of May. The speed by which the Report was produced is highly 
indicative of a superficial investigation leading to its conclusions and its recommendations.    
 
On 6 May 1922 Bowker wrote128 to Schuster stating the Attorney General was required to 
answer a fifth parliamentary question in the Commons pertaining to the law of marital 
coercion. This question, from Sir James Greig MP required a written answer for Monday 8 
May: 
 
To ask the Prime Minister whether the committee recently appointed by the Lord Chancellor 
to inquire into the inequalities in the law as between men and women is confined to matters 
relating to the Criminal Law; and, if so, whether he will consider the advisability of extending 
the inquiry so as to comprise also matters relating to the Civil Law? 
 
The draft answer for a reply to be given by the Attorney General was, “The answer to the first 
part of the question is in the affirmative. It would not be advisable to extend the present 
inquiry as suggested, as an inquiry with so wide a scope would necessarily be prolonged”. No 
observations on the draft reply were made by the Lord Chancellor. The Question did not 
embarrass the Government as it dealt only with the separate position under civil law. No 
challenge was made to the tightly circumscribed terms of reference129 focusing on the 
criminal law.  
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THE AVORY COMMITTEE METHODOLGOY 
 
The Committee decided it needed to address three issues. These were:130 
 
(1) What law is the subject at the present time as administered in practice? 
(2) The effect of the existing law as exemplified in the Peel case. 
(3) What alteration, if any, is to be recommended? 
 
In relation to identifying the present state of the law the Committee hesitantly concluded the 
law “as applied in practice, appears to be” as they then described. The inapplicability of the 
defence to the crimes of murder and treason was accepted but the Committee also concluded 
that the defence applied “to all other felonies and to all misdemeanours.”131 It also concluded 
that the presumption was only a prima facie one,132 capable of being rebutted where the 
evidence showed where the wife had “done some independent act from which the inference 
can be drawn that she was acting voluntarily.”133 In those circumstances there was a case to 
answer and it became a matter of fact for the decision maker to decide whether the wife had 
acted voluntarily or under coercion. The presumption only applied when the criminal acts 
were committed in the presence of her husband so the presumption and the entire defence did 
not avail her where the husband was absent or even where “crimes were committed by his 
order or procurement” if he were not concurrently present with her at that time. The 
Committee did not examine the rationale for the requirement of the presence of the husband 
or whether he could be constructively present.   
 
The exceptional nature of the defence was acknowledged as there was no similar privilege 
from the criminal law for other persons in broadly parallel circumstances of possible 
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subordination, such as a husband, a child of the family or an apprentice employee. No linkage 
was made to the possible cognate defence of superior orders applicable to military personnel 
required to unquestioningly comply with orders from superior officers. The Committee did 
not refer to a single case decision or a single textbook or institutional writing in purporting to 
record its view of the present state of the law, which did not extend to more than three 
quarters of a page of the Report. In noting the defence was not a general one, but one that did 
generally apply to married women, the Committee acknowledged that coercion that did not 
constitute duress as defined by the criminal law, could still be “taken into account in awarding 
punishment”.   
 
 
MARITAL COERCION “AS EXEMPLIFIED IN R v PEEL” 
 
The six-member Committee then moved to consider the case of R v Peel. Two members of 
the Committee had been respectively counsel for the prosecution and for the defence in the 
trial.134 The Committee reported Mrs Peel had been betting on her own account using her own 
secret code name which she had registered with the bookmakers and she had used her own 
separate banking account for the transactions. Further, at the time Captain Peel was tendering 
the telegrams making the bets she “was telephoning to some person at the time when she 
might have ascertained the winner of this particular race, and was at the time in verbal 
communication with her husband.” On these facts the Committee recorded that Darling J held 
there was no evidence to rebut the presumption that she was acting under the coercion of her 
husband “as everything that she did was done in his presence and by pre-arrangement with 
him.”   
 
The directed verdict to the jury to acquit was subsequently to be seen in light of the remarks 
of the judge that Mrs Peel was not in fact acting under the coercion of her husband, but for her 
own personal pecuniary benefit.135 The Committee had gone as close as possible to saying 
                                              
134
 Travers Humphreys, one of the Prosecution Counsel, and Sir Richard Muir, one of the Defence Counsel.  
135
 An expression used in the Report, not found though in any of the reports of the trial itself. 
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Darling J had wrongly found Mrs Peel had no case to answer; without saying it.136 Their 
review resonated with an understanding the judge should never have withdrawn the case from 
the jury, as the facts showed significant concerted action between the spouses to place the bets 
in such a ‘timely’ manner. It was almost as though Darling J had had second thoughts about 
his ruling (in the knowledge of the press and public reaction to it) which he gave vent to in the 
sentencing remarks he made in relation to the husband.   
 
The methodology employed was a comparative exercise to understand the state of the law in 
Scotland, the Colonies and a few other jurisdictions with a common law background. (It is 
striking the Committee never considered the earlier decision in R v Torpey137 in 1871 and the 
significant commentaries on the state of the law that that decision had provoked by lawyers 
and Law Lords in Parliamentary Debates.) The Committee superficially considered the law 
from a number of other jurisdictions. It correctly noted Scottish law had never138 recognised 
the defence of marital coercion. (Their statement should be contrasted with that made by the 
Scottish Law Lord, Lord Colonsay to Lord Hatherly LC, related by the latter, in the 
Parliamentary Debates in the House of Lords in 1871. The Lord Chancellor there had 
specifically but incorrectly remarked that Scotland did recognise marital coercion, but not its 
associated presumption.) Scottish law recognised neither. 
 
Reference was made to the Penal Code of India which also contained no provision at all for 
the defence of marital coercion. That Code had been drafted by McCauley and Stephen J then 
a Legal Advisor to the British Government in India. Its form and content had influenced other 
British controlled jurisdictions. South African common law was quickly considered, again 
without any specific reference to either case law or text. The Committee concluded South 
Africa appeared to recognise coercion as a defence, while not recognising the presumption. 
                                              
136
 The Justice of The Peace, in reviewing the Avory Report, stated that the Committee left it “to be inferred that 
a miscarriage of justice resulted from the enforcement of the law as it stands”: (1923) JP 201. 
137
 (1871) 12 Cox CC 45. See infra fn 367-379. 
138
 Note the robust view of Scotland law that flatly rejected the notion of the coerced wife. In William 
Blackwood, ‘Principles of the Criminal Law of Scotland by Archibald Alison’, Edinburgh, 1832 at page 668: “1. 
A wife is not excusable in the commission of any crime by the influence or power of her husband, if she has 
taken any part in its commission along with him” At p669 it was later appositely remarked that the adoption of 
the Avory Report “would have the effect of assimilating the law of England and Scotland” on this point: ‘The 
Criminal Justice Bill and the Doctrine of Coercion’: (1923) 87 JP 201,202.   
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This broad generality was incorrect as different common law applied to different parts of 
South Africa and in those parts more heavily influenced by the English common law the 
defence and the presumption had been recognised and acted upon by the courts but by the 
time of the Committee’s report South Africa had completely eschewed the entire marital 
coercion doctrine.139 The colony of St. Lucia,140 with its French Civil Code background was 
then noted as having recognised the defence, but not the presumption, in its recent Criminal 
Code 1921.   
 
In relation to Australia, the Committee only referred to the Criminal Code 1901 [Qld] and the 
Crimes Consolidation Act 1915 [Vic], asserting those statutes were to the same effect as the 
common law of South Africa. This too was incorrect. An Australian commentator derided the 
incomplete and wholly erroneous view of the state of the law in that jurisdiction that the 
Committee had availed itself of.141  
 
The Committee then made the sweeping and aggravatingly erroneous statement that with the 
exception of the United States of America, no jurisdiction could be found in which the 
presumption of marital coercion still existed. Even this statement was too broad as a number 
of appellate courts in some of the American states had by that time ruled that the presumption 
and/or the defence no longer represented the common law there.142 A significant number of 
British Colonies, Protectorates and other common law jurisdictions at that time retained the 
                                              
139
 R v Mtetwa (1921) TPD 227, Wessells JP concluding that the common law position which had existed in 
certain parts of South Africa was inconsistent with Roman-Dutch law and should no longer be followed. 
140
 s144, Chapter Sixth ‘The Civil Code of St Lucia’ 1879, Harrison and Sons, St Martin’s Lane, London, 1879. 
“A husband owes protection to his wife; a wife obedience to her husband.” 
141
 J G Norris, Private Civil Subjection [1928] 2 Australian Law Journal 10. The Avory Report was described as 
“strange to a Victorian lawyer” as to its finding of Victorian law. The Report in relation to the Victorian statute 
was erroneous as that Act did not purport to be a complete codification of the criminal law. The writer noted that 
the presumption had frequently been recognised in Victorian Courts: R v Bailey et Uxor (1864) 1 WW&A’B(L) 
20: R v Bolton (1885) 11 VLR 776. At p12 s47 Criminal Justice Act 1925 was doubted as representing a 
desirable change in the law. The Avory Committee also did not note that s20 (2) Criminal Code Act 1924 [Tas] 
extirpated both the presumption and the defence; leaving married women in an identical position to all other 
persons sui juris. In Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia, Queensland and New South Wales the defence 
of marital coercion existed, although it was “not at all certain” to what extent precisely the presumption existed 
in each state.  
142
 Infra ch 3 which details the position across the various American states from Freel v State (1860) 21 Ark 212 
removing the presumption, to State v Owen unreported Supreme Court of North Carolina No COA 98-413, 15 
June 1999 upholding the existence of the presumption. 
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presumption as part of their common law143. Finally, reference was made to the Criminal 
Code Act 1893 [NZ] which introduced the general defence of “compulsion” to replace the 
earlier common law defence of marital coercion thereby conflating the position of married 
women with all other men and women. That legislation had specifically removed the 
presumption; and with the removal of the presumption the defence did not independently 
survive. In a single line the Criminal Code 1906 [Can] was noted as being to the same effect 
as the law in Queensland, South Africa and St Lucia, whereas in fact it had abrogated the 
entire doctrine. The Committee had seriously misdirected itself as to the state of the common 
law jurisdictions. The speed within which it reported left it no serious opportunity for any 
scholarly appreciation of the nuances within the jurisdictions they considered and especially 
those to which they did not even refer. 
 
The Committee particularly noted that for England and Wales, as early as 1878, in the Report 
of the Royal Commissioners appointed to consider the law relating to indictable offences had 
in their Draft Code recommended the abolition of the presumption as to coercion. (That was a 
reference to s23 of the Draft Code which, after providing that compulsion would be a general 
defence stated: “No presumption shall henceforth be made that a married woman committing 
an offence in the presence of her husband does so under compulsion.”) Apart from a 
tangential reference to Brown v Attorney General for New Zealand,144 reference was 
approvingly made to a Note in Stephen’s Digest of the Criminal Law145 which in part stated  
 
Surely as matters now stand and have stood for a great length of time, married women ought 
as regards the commission of crimes to be on exactly the same footing as other people”.  
 
                                              
143
 The Australian Capital Territory only abolished the presumption in 1999 after a decision of its Supreme Court 
that the presumption continued to form part of its law: R v Batt unreported, Supreme Court of Australian Capital 
Territory, SCC 18 of 1999, 1 March 1999, Higgins J;  Crimes Amendment Bill (No 2) 1999 [ACT] introducing 
now s407 Crimes Act 1990 [ACT]. 
144
 [1898] AC 234,237 (PC). The only decision other than R v Peel itself referred to by the Committee was 
Brown v Attorney General for New Zealand where Lord Halsbury said: “The mere fact that the parties are 
married never even formed a presumption of compulsion by the husband. Even as early as Bracton’s time, if the 
wife was voluntarily a party to the commission of a crime her coverture furnished no defence.” The bare fact of 
marriage never generated the presumption because it required the additional fact that the husband was present 
before the defence could operate.   
145
 5ed 1894, Note 1 to Article 31. 
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The Committee further adopted the same Note that the doctrine of coercion is, “…uncertain in 
its extent and irrational as far as it goes and appears to have originated in the anxiety of 
Judges to devise means by which the excessive severity of the old Criminal Law might be 
evaded”. 
 
 
THE AVORY COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATION 
 
The Committee then considered two alternative proposals for alteration of the criminal law: 
 
(1). To abolish any presumption of coercion when a crime is committed by a wife in the 
presence of her husband leaving the defence of coercion open to the wife and to be 
established in the ordinary way. 
 
(2). To abolish the whole doctrine of coercion by the husband as a defence for the wife, 
leaving her on the same footing as other people free to establish any defence of that 
kind of compulsion (i.e. the fear of immediate death or grievous bodily harm) which 
affords a defence to any person except in the case of certain specified crimes. 
 
In a short conclusory passage the Committee described the present law as “unsatisfactory” 
without condescending to particularity. It noted the “altered status of married women under 
the Married Women’s Property Act and The (sic) Sex Disqualification Removal (sic) Act” and 
unanimously recommended the second alternative proposal be adopted. The entire defence 
and apparatus of marital coercion as a defence in criminal law would be abolished, 
assimilating the position between wives and husbands and others, but leaving any wife, as 
much as any other person, free to establish any other defence including the common law 
defence of duress, or to urge the coercion in mitigation of sanction.146  
                                              
146
 In Olsen v The Queen unreported Northern Territory Court of Appeal, [2002] NTCCA 7, 14 June 2002, the 
significance of marital coercion was considered in a mitigation context, relying on Ewart v Fox [1954] VLR 699. 
In R v Pierce (1941) 5 J Cr L 124,126, although the wife’s defence failed, the sentence imposed on the wife was 
only one sixth of that of her husband in their joint enterprise. In R v Z [2005] 2 AC 467, 492 para [22] Lord 
Bingham acknowledged that where the defence of duress failed “it is always open to the judge to adjust his 
sentence to reflect his assessment of the defendant’s true culpability”.  
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A broad reforming perspective by the Committee was neither authorised nor expected as its 
jurisdiction was confined by the limiting nouns “coercion” and “presence” of the husband. No 
inquiry therefore could apparently be made into the other important facet of the ruling of 
Darling J in R v Peel, which confirmed that the intraspousal exemption from conspiracy, also 
existed under the common law. No synthesis of the special position of married women under 
the substantive criminal law was possible under such terms of reference. The significant issue 
as to whether a wife was incapable of being an accessory after the fact to the crime of her 
husband was never properly before the Committee, although in one flaccid paragraph147 the 
Committee did, without any arguments or reasoning, simply state that there was no need to 
alter the state of the law in relation to the position of a wife in relation to other modalities of 
criminal participation. No overarching consideration of the wider implications of 
recommending only the extirpation of both the presumption and the entire defence was ever 
given. The conclusion of the Avory Committee was a recommendation that sought to entirely 
eliminate the marital coercion defence, leaving the remaining corpus of the criminal law 
intact, in relation to uxorial privilege. The unrelenting media attention and the obvious 
disenchantment by parliamentarians in both Houses with R v Peel, provided the impetus for a 
quick-fix legislative solution to be recommended. The opportunity for a wider vision, which 
would have challenged the suggested rationale for the other uxorial privileges, was forsaken. 
The law therefore was not subjected to any close analytical scrutiny as such introspection 
would have sat uneasily with the very recent decision of the Privileges Committee of the 
House of Lords only two months earlier, which had reversed itself in the same matter by 
eventually refusing to grant Viscountess Rhondda’s Claim, notwithstanding the Sex 
Disqualification (Removal) Act 1919 [UK]. In that case Lord Birkenhead LC had been 
instrumental in fomenting the opposition to the Peeress. The inference is that the Lord 
Chancellor did not see that it was politically astute to have an all-embracing inquiry into the 
status of married women under the criminal law as it would necessarily throw up the whole 
issue of gender disparity and inequality. The Lord Chancellor, Lord Buckmaster, and even 
Lord Ullswater all accepted there still did exist in the lower stratified class system of England 
                                              
147
 Cmnd 1677 p6, “We do not recommend any alteration in the existing law under which a husband or wife are 
not liable to be indicted for conspiracy and a wife not liable to be indicted as an accessory after the fact to her 
husband’s felony and we report accordingly.” 
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significant evidence that husbands did control the decision-making of their wives who 
occasionally yielded to their commands under physical or psychological coercion. 
 
In the last paragraph no recommendation was made to change any other aspect of uxorial 
privilege. This last paragraph is particularly intriguing because the recommendation of 
maintaining the existing law in all other cognate respects was itself wholly outside the terms 
of reference. More importantly, there is no evidence whatsoever the Committee had 
considered the comparative law on these points in the other jurisdictions to which reference 
had been made in relation to marital coercion. No documents even exist in the Public Records 
Office that the implications in terms of wider principle of this recommendation, were ever 
addressed by the Committee. Nor did it purport to rationalise how this position it was 
advocating in relation to both the spousal exemption from conspiracy and the privilege of 
uxorial and accessorial liability in criminal law, could be maintained consistent with its 
primary recommendation to abolish both the defence (and presumption) of coercion. The final 
recommendation appears to be almost a gratuitous tack-on. In addition, the Committee would 
also have had to deal with the implications of the very recent decision on 16 May 1922 in R v 
Barter.148 There the Recorder of London, at the Central Criminal Court, Sir Ernest Wild KC, 
had remarked at the apparent schizophrenic nature of the law in relation to a married woman, 
“The law would protect a wife if physical injuries were inflicted upon her by her husband but 
apparently did not protect her from what was much more serious – cowardly attacks in 
postcards [by her husband]”, as intraspousal criminal libel was very reluctantly held to be 
immune from prosecution at common law – because of the fictional unity of the spouses. 
 
The doctrinal importance of the final recommendation in the last paragraph of the Report is 
that the historical and conceptual linkages between the marital coercion position and other 
examples of uxorial special status in the criminal law were never explored. The Report 
produced an ad hoc solution to quickly satiate the baying public and media. The price for the 
inattention to these ramifications means that over 80 years later English criminal law still 
                                              
148
 (1922) JP 176 where it was reconfirmed that in law, an indictment against a husband did not lie for publishing 
a criminal libel concerning his wife, on the basis of the doctrine of conjugal unity; following R v The Lord 
Mayor of London (1886) 16 Cox CC 81. A wife had been held not to be a separate person where a defamatory 
statement was made only in her hearing to a third person, so there was no sufficient publication: Sesler v 
Montgomery (1889) 21 P 185, 186 (California: SC).   
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provides that spouses are incapable of conspiring alone together and no coherent single 
treatment of the wider issues has been explored either by Parliament or even by the English 
Law Commission.  In other common law jurisdictions too the same piecemeal approach to the 
reform of the remaining uxorial privileges in criminal law, has meant that only partial 
inconsistent statutory solutions have been enacted. By contrast the Law Reform 
Commissioner of Victoria in 1975149 published a report exclusively devoted to the criminal 
liability of married persons, which led to the introduction of a hyper-modern statutory form of 
the marital coercion defence150, only available to wives, as well as other associated reforms. 
 
 
MR JUSTICE AVORY SENDS THE REPORT TO THE LORD CHANCELLOR 
 
On 18 May 1922151 Avory J handwrote directly to the Lord Chancellor enclosing a copy of 
the Report and adding, “I am glad to say it is unanimous”. The version of the Report, which 
carries the actual signatures of each member of the Committee,152 shows Avory had made 
certain initialled amendments to it. In particular he was insistent the ordinary defence of 
duress, which the Committee recommended should equally cater for married women as much 
as any other person, should only be available where there was a fear of “immediate” death or 
grievous bodily harm. The signed Report inserts the word “immediate” against the initials 
“HA”.153  The other amendments made by Avory are insignificant, save he altered the signed 
final version which carried the paragraph, “In none of these with the exception of the U.S.A. 
is there to be found any recognition of the presumption of coercion, as an excuse for crime 
committed by a wife in the presence of her husband”. He also deleted the phrase “as an 
excuse for” and substituting “in the case of”. But intriguingly, the formal published version154 
of the Report is different again to the formal signed version, as it reads, “In none of these, 
with the exception of the United States of America is there to be found any recognition of the 
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 Victorian Law Reform Commissioner, Report No 3 ‘Criminal Liability of Married Persons (Special Rules)’ 
June 1975, Melbourne. 
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 Introducing s336 Crimes Act 1958 [Vic] by s2 Crimes (Married Persons’ Liability) Act 1977 [Vic]. 
151
 PRO LCO2/584.  Remarkably though, the Report itself is undated. 
152
 PRO LCO29/10. 
153
 Horace Avory. 
154
 Cmnd 1677. 
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presumption of coercion, in the case of crime committed by a wife in the presence of her 
husband”.   
 
 
LORD CHANCELLOR COMMUNICATES WITH THE HOME SECRETARY 
 
On 22 May 1922 Schuster wrote to Avory J on behalf of the Lord Chancellor thanking him 
and the Committee for the “most valuable report”. Schuster sent an advance copy of it on 
23 May 1922 to Rt Hon Edward Shortt KC, MP155 asking for the latter to make observations 
in relation to “the course to be adopted to effect the amendments proposed”. By a letter of the 
same date, Schuster wrote to Lord Hewart CJ enclosing a copy of the Report, adding: 
 
The Lord Chancellor thinks it would be desirable to deal with the matter by legislation in the 
course of the present Session, but before any decision is reached on the matter he would be 
very glad if you would furnish him with your observations upon the Committee’s proposals. 
 
On 24 May Schuster wrote to The Controller HM Stationery Office asking for the estimated 
cost of printing and publishing the Report as it was the intention of the Lord Chancellor to lay 
it before both Houses of Parliament as a Command Paper.156 On 30 May the Secretary to the 
Lord Chancellor provided a copy to the Clerk of the Votes & Proceedings office, asking for it 
to be presented to the House of Commons by “Command of His Majesty”. On 31 May 1922 
HM Stationery Office replied that the cost of printing 875 copies of the Report would be 
£4.10.0,157 each copy of the report was priced at 2d, as eventually published.  The Times158 
prominently reported with approval159 the recommendation in the Report that not only should 
the presumption be abolished but so should the entire defence. On the same day160 it also 
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 The Home Secretary. 
156
 Published as Cmd 1677.   
157
 This was held up as an excellent example of official economy: The Times, 3 June 1922 p15. 
158
 The Times, 3 June 1922 p11 under the heading ‘Wife’s “Coercion” Plea – Abolition Recommended By 
Committee’, noting that the Committee accepted that marital coercion, once abolished as a defence, would still 
be significant evidence in mitigation of sentence. The newspaper reminded readers that it was the acquittal in R v 
Peel which had lead to the Report and it affirmed its earlier statement that “this legal protection of the married 
woman, a remnant not of chivalry, but of serfdom, has more than served its time.”   
159
 The Times, 3 June 1922 p11 “the Report is admirable for its conciseness and clearness of expression”. 
160
 The Times, 3 June 1922 p15 “Wife Coercion in Law”, emphasising the common law had over the centuries 
adjusted itself to social changes and had also “often been jostled and ousted by statute”.   
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published an editorial critically analysing the presumption as “absolutely inappropriate to 
modern life” and emphasising the presumption was incongruous with the virtually equal 
status of married women, which had been substantially secured by the passage of legislation 
enhancing the rights of married women to property and the equalising effect of the Sex 
Disqualification (Removal) Act 1919 [UK]. The continued dangling existence of the marital 
coercion presumption put English law out of step, not just with other English law, but also 
within the Empire. The adoption of the proposal in the Avory Committee would leave married 
women on the same footing as all other people, free therefore to establish any defence. The 
current law had fallen “out of correspondence with its environment”.161  
 
Edward Hall, on behalf of Lord Hewart LCJ wrote162 on 25 May to Schuster stating the Lord 
Chief Justice “entirely concurs in the proposals of Mr Justice Avory’s Committee.” Lord 
Hewart had nominated Avory J to the Lord Chancellor to be the Chairman of the Committee. 
Thereafter, no progress was made to have the recommendation passed into law. The Coalition 
Government, led by Lloyd George, did not survive the public humiliation caused by the 
Chanak Crisis, when Turkey invaded Smyrna. This lead to the Conservatives withdrawing 
support from the Coalition Government and the Ministry fell163 with the Prime Minister 
resigning in October 1922. The new Government meant a new Lord Chancellor and a new 
Attorney-General.164 
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 The Times, 3 June 1922 p15, an expression which the editor thought had a biological connotation. (1922) 
Justice of the Peace 137, 138 noted that Darling J had “undoubtedly performed a public service in calling 
attention to the inapplicability of an ancient theory of law to the changed conditions of modern relationships”. 
And at p139 “No-one is prepared to deny that there may still be numerous cases in which women are dominated 
by their husbands, but the point is that it is no longer reasonable to presume that such is the case”. 
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 PRO LCO2/584 Edward Hall, Royal Courts of Justice to Sir Claud Schuster. 
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 Kenneth O Moran, ‘Consensus and Disunity: The Lloyd George Coalition Government 1918-1922, Oxford 
University Press, USA, 1979, p111. The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland ended on 6 December 
1922 when the Anglo-Irish Treaty created the Irish Free State.   
164
 Viscount Cave LC succeeded Viscount Birkenhead LC. Sir Ernest Pollock was succeeded by Sir Douglas 
Hogg (who was Attorney General 24 October 1922 – 22 January 1924), in turn who became Lord Chancellor as 
Lord Hailsham in 1928. 
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THE CONTINUING SUCCESS OF COMMON LAW MARITAL COERCION AFTER R v PEEL  
 
Despite the glare of the actual verdict in R v Peel, a consequence of that decision was that as a 
ruling of the King’s Bench it bound all the lower courts to apply it. Those courts had no 
option because of stare decisis. The media took significant pleasure in reporting each 
available instance of the defence being employed and its success or otherwise. Small cases 
before a magistrate in suburban London now featured as individual reported stories, which 
appeared to have as their theme an opportunity to collect the remarks of the judicial officers, 
on the doctrinal merits of the presumption and the defence. Minor court proceedings that 
would otherwise never have elicited any general public interest now were reported, almost 
invariably under a headline that specifically incorporated reference to the law of marital 
coercion.   
 
In R v Cope,165 within a month after R v Peel, spouses were indicted, also at the Central 
Criminal Court, with fraudulent conversion. Judge Atherley-Jones KC directed the jury, upon 
a submission of no case to answer,166 to acquit the wife because the evidence showed the 
husband was “the dominating party” and the evidence pointed “rather to the male than to the 
female.” The jury returned as directed a formal verdict of Not Guilty; the husband was 
convicted after trial. The judge stated that:  
 
A married woman acting under the influence of her husband cannot be found guilty. I need not 
trouble about the logic of the law or its antiquity. It is some comfort to ladies of the jury to 
know that at any rate it is one of the privileges they still retain. 
 
Just over a fortnight later in R v Foster167 spouses were charged with theft of jewellery from 
their employer.  A detective, who gave evidence for the prosecution stated there was “no 
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 The Times, 11 April 1922, p1, under the heading ‘Another ‘Coercion’ Case – Accused Woman Discharged’. 
166
 This decision is wrong in law. Even if there was substantial evidence of coercion by the husband this was 
always a matter for the jury to decide. There was evidence by which the jury could have concluded that there 
was no lack of volitional conduct by the wife. The judge had proceeded almost as though the presumption was a 
presumption of law, rather than a presumption of fact. Further for a wife to act under the influence of her 
husband wholly fails to satisfy the demands of the defence which requires coercion not influence which can 
range from benign, neutral to malign.  To influence conduct is not to coerce it. In Kanhaya Lal v The National 
Bank of India (1913) 24 TLR 314 (PC), ‘coercion’ under s15 Indian Contract Act was considered.     
167
 The Times, 27 April 1922, p11, under the heading ‘Jewel Theft and ‘Coercion’’. 
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doubt” the wife had acted under her husband’s influence. The Stipendiary Magistrate168 
therefore acquitted the wife. A few months later in R v Jenkins169 spouses were charged with 
stealing and receiving a purse which had been inadvertently left on their stall by a customer. 
Mrs Jenkins uplifted the purse and handed it to her husband who put it in the fruit basket.  A 
Magistrate reluctantly acquitted the wife. In R v Horton170 a young wife was acquitted of 
complicity in fraud with her husband by utilising the defence. Upon her arrest, her husband 
had the foresight to state to the detective he had coerced his wife into committing the 
crime.171 With these periodic press reports of the presumption being employed with 
considerable success it was not long before the defence was employed in another serious case. 
In R v Birt172 at the Central Criminal Court before the Common Serjeant, Sir HF Dickens KC 
it was submitted on behalf of the two wives that they were entitled to be acquitted at the end 
of the prosecution case, because of the presumption. The Common Serjeant refused to find 
that there was no case to answer commenting that there was no presumption in law of 
coercion instead it was a matter of fact whether they had taken independent parts in the 
receiving of the jewels or whether they were under the control of their husbands. Mrs Birt173 
then gave evidence and the jury acquitted her on the direction of the judge who acknowledged 
that it appeared that she had acted under coercion. He added it was “an out-of-date and 
ridiculous principle.” 
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 Mr D’Eyncourt, Marylebone Police Court.   
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 The Times, 17 August, 1922, p5 under the heading ‘The Law Of ‘Coercion’’. Mr Forbes Lankester, 
Stipendiary Magistrate, West London Police Court, stated that he doubted that the presumption of marital 
coercion could apply, where the initial criminal act was performed by the wife herself, not in the presence of her 
husband, but he gave her the benefit of the doubt. The husband was convicted of receiving the stolen purse from 
the wife.    
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 The Times, 16 February 1925, p19 under the heading ‘The Law Of ‘Coercion’’. 
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 He said to the officer “It’s quite right. I admit it. My wife acted upon my instructions. She is not to blame.” 
Mr Hay Halkett, the Stipendiary Magistrate at Marylebone Police Court pointedly remarked that the husband 
seemed to have an intelligent idea of the law.   
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 The Times, 28 November 1922, p7 under the heading ‘Thieves’ Wives and Coercion Law – The Highgate 
Jewel Robbery’. Of the five accused, three men were charged with burglary of the house of Sir Arthur and Lady 
Crosfield, the other two accused who were charged with receiving the burgled jewellery were wives of the 
majority of the burglars.   
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 The other accused wife Mrs Clarke was found guilty by the jury. The judge imposed an extremely light 
sentence on her only ordering her to be bound over to keep the peace. The husband of Mrs Birt had been 
sentenced to seven years imprisonment as he was “a notorious criminal known to the Johannesburg police.”   
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In the next year in R v Cranston174 the spouses were charged with theft. The husband pleaded 
guilty and the wife was acquitted with the Court175 stating the presumption of marital 
coercion “was very wise and sensible, and was founded on the wisdom of centuries.” In R v 
Malcolm176 spouses were charged with obtaining money by false pretences. The husband had 
committed suicide since his arrest and Sir Richard Muir177 prosecuting said it was doubtful if 
the doctrine of “common purpose”178 applied to spouses, that spouses could not be charged 
with conspiring only with each other and as marital coercion “was still part of the English 
law”,179 the prosecution had decided to withdraw180 the proceedings against the wife, now a 
widow. Sir Vansittart Bowater, the Alderman, said181 “it was time this antiquated dogma 
about marital coercion was swept away now that women’s rights were equal to men’s in 
nearly every direction.” 
 
It is remarkable in every case reprinted in The Times since R v Peel where the defence was 
employed, the wife was acquitted. It may be supposed that, consistent with its editorial stance, 
The Times was delighting in the publication of these instances. It does also demonstrate that 
the defence was being far more frequently employed in London alone then has been hitherto 
demonstrated. On 3 June 1922,182 The Times greeted the recommendation of the Avory 
Committee that the “whole doctrine of coercion” was to be abrogated, with the editorial 
comment that the defence was not “a remnant of chivalry, but of serfdom, and has more than 
served its time.” 
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 The Times, 8 March 1923, p17 under the heading ‘Wife Coercion’.  
175
 Mr JA Simmons, Stipendiary Magistrate, Marylebone Police Court.  
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 The Times, 7 November 1923, p7. 
177
 Who had been one of the defence counsel in R v Peel the year before. 
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 ie. the doctrine of joint enterprise.   
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 The Times, 7 November 1923, p7 under the heading ‘Doctrine of Marital Coercion’. 
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 This decision may have been influenced more by gallantry than justice, in which case it showed the defence 
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A YEAR AFTER R v PEEL 
 
Almost a year after the ruling of Darling J, Sir Harry Poland KC, wrote to The Times183 
referring to the forceful but unrequited leading article that newspaper had published184 in the 
immediate aftermath of R v Peel.185 He lamented the fact that the strong recommendation of 
the Royal Commissioners186 on the draft Criminal Code in June 1879 that the presumption of 
marital coercion be abolished had been ignored as no remedial legislation had been enacted. 
His letter recollected that a private member’s Bill187 had been introduced by Viscountess 
Astor in the House of Commons would have achieved the same result, as had been proposed 
in 1879. But that Bill faltered amongst the competition for Government business in the House 
of Commons. He then declaimed the fact that the unanimous recommendation of the Avory 
Report to change “this absurd state of the law” had also not been implemented. Sir Harry 
continued to push for the necessary amendment to the law by another letter to The Times,188 
albeit principally written about a proposal to abolish the longstanding law providing for a jury 
of matrons in capital cases – curiously the one role women had as decision-makers under the 
criminal justice system, prior to their recent enfranchisement permitting them to sit as 
ordinary jurors.   
 
The presumption and its necessary implications were also repudiated by Lady Frances Balfour 
in a further letter to The Times. She resented the entire doctrine as it was founded on the 
unsubstantiated belief that women lived in subjugation of their husbands. She argued that this 
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law meant that women were “being treated as young children”.189 A year had passed, the 
Avory Committee had reported rapidly, yet nothing had happened on the legislative front. 
 
Poland’s second letter had also snorted at a “ludicrous case [which] occurred recently at the 
Old Bailey”190 in which a married woman pleaded guilty to an offence; but before sentence 
was imposed the Recorder learned from the mitigation advanced on her behalf that her 
husband had been present when she committed the offence. The judge thereupon 
recommended to her to withdraw her plea of guilty and plead not guilty, which she obligingly 
did. The Recorder then directed the jury that they must acquit her, as the law presumed that 
she acted under the coercion of her husband and there was no evidence to rebut the 
presumption “and so the astonished culprit went away rejoicing”. This vignette, which cast 
the administration of criminal justice in relation to the special position of married women into 
an even dimmer light, was employed by Poland to illustrate the urgency of the need for 
“forthwith” reform.191  
 
 
NEW LORD CHANCELLOR WRITES TO THE PARLIAMENTARY DRAFTSMAN 
 
On 9 February 1923, no doubt prompted by the letter from Poland to The Times the previous 
day, Schuster192 wrote to Mr W M Graham Harrison CB,193 of the Office of the Parliamentary 
Counsel, stating that the new Lord Chancellor, Viscount Cave LC, wished a clause “be added 
to the Criminal Justice Bill giving effect to the recommendations of Avory’s Committee”. A 
postscript to that letter stated “P.S. He wishes the clause to be in alternative form embodying 
both (1) and (2) on page 5”, being a reference to the two numbered alternative proposals of 
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that Committee, a copy of which was enclosed. On 13 February Graham Harrison replied to 
Schuster stating he had prepared a clause to give effect to both alternative recommendations 
and enclosed the draft as Clause 24 of the Criminal Justice Bill. He stated having drafted the 
clause he was not altogether satisfied with its concluding words and reformulated it to end 
“unless the coercion amounted to compulsion of such a kind as when applied otherwise than 
by a husband to a wife constitutes a good defence”.194 This draft, though, confusingly blended 
compulsion with coercion, when the former was unknown as a concept other than as a variant 
of common law duress. This draft did not survive long. 
 
On 22 February, 1923 Graham Harrison wrote195 to Bowker, Secretary to the Attorney 
General, enclosing his draft and stating, “This is what the L.C.’s recommendation looks like 
when written out tidily, and in this form it will appear in the Bill when circulated unless you 
take steps to the contrary”.   
 
 
LORD CHANCELLOR’S SECRET MEMORANDUM TO CABINET 
 
On 20 February 1923 the Lord Chancellor prepared a memorandum196 for Cabinet marked 
“Secret” in relation to the Criminal Justice Bill, stating which “it is proposed shortly to 
introduce in the House of Lords” and stating it has “already received the general approval of 
the Cabinet”. Page 3 of the memorandum provided that Clause 24 of the proposed Bill would 
abolish the rule by which a wife who commits an offence in the presence of her husband is 
presumed to have committed it under coercion by him. The Lord Chancellor added “The 
recent Peel case called public attention to this rule; but there have been many other cases in 
which the rule is believed to have led to the acquittal of persons who were not really under 
any kind of coercion”. A handwritten amendment to the memorandum has a line striking out 
the original word “many”.  The memorandum then inaccurately continues, “No such rule 
obtains in the Dominions”. Viscount Cave LC then concluded by stating, “I think it should 
now be abolished”, after referring to the fact that the proposal to abolish the presumption had 
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been recommended in 1878 by the Criminal Code Commissioners, by Sir James Fitzjames 
Stephens (sic) in his ‘Digest of the Criminal Law’ and thirdly, by the Avory Committee. The 
Lord Chancellor did not inform his Cabinet colleagues that each of the three sources had 
recommended the more robust abrogation of the entire doctrine of marital coercion and not 
just the termination of the presumption suggested in his memorandum. 
 
 
LORD PARMOOR’S RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Lord Parmoor197, a Law Lord, recommended and personally drafted a new clause 24 to 
replace that drafted by Parliamentary Counsel. His desired clause read: 
 
The whole doctrine of coercion by the husband as a defence for the wife is hereby abolished 
and a wife shall be in the same position as other people, free to establish any defence of that 
kind of compulsion which affords a defence to any person except in the case of certain 
specified crimes.198 
 
The effect of Lord Parmoor’s proposal was to implement the second alternative considered by 
the Avory Committee, whereas the draft government proposal intended to only implement the 
narrower and unadopted first proposal. In another detailed anonymous document, ‘Criminal 
Justice Bill Notes on Amendments (Lords) Lord Parmoor’199 clearly emanating from a 
Government legal adviser, the author complained that Lord Parmoor’s proposed new clause, 
“is taken almost verbatim from the words used in [the Avory] Report. The Committee, it may 
be conjectured, can scarcely have intended that their actual words should be adopted in this 
way”. In an important high-level disclosure, the writer stated that the reason why the 
Government had decided to reject the Avory recommendation of the second alternative and 
adopt the first alternative instead: 
 
was that it was felt that the relationship between husband and wife was substantially different 
to that which exists between two other persons, and that therefore it was not unreasonable to 
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allow wives to defend themselves by a plea of coercion not amounting to such compulsion as 
is required between two persons, not being husband and wife. 
   
This very important internal statement (never disclosed) is actually the key to understanding 
the intention of the language of what ultimately became s47 Criminal Justice Act 1925 [UK]. 
Throughout the legislative debates no statement approximating these terms was ever 
advanced by the government of the day to justify the enactment of the first ever statutory 
defence based on marital status. The writer stated that if the second Avory alternative had 
been chosen, still Lord Parmoor’s clause should not be adopted, but rather the words which 
appeared in an earlier draft of the Bill should be maintained but inserting, immediately after 
the phrase abolishing the presumption, the following words; 
 
and it shall not be a good defence for a married woman charged with any offence to prove that 
the offence was committed under the coercion of her husband, unless the coercion amounted 
to such compulsion as would have been a good defence if the compulsion had been applied 
otherwise than by a husband to a wife. 
 
 
OTHER JUDICIAL OFFICERS’ VIEWS ON THE PROPOSAL 
 
A government document called ‘Criminal Justice Bill, 1923. Memorandum on Amendments 
Suggested to be moved in the House of Commons’,200 further consider clause 24 of the Bill. It 
notes the Society of Chairmen of Quarter Sessions commended words should be added to the 
proposed sub-clause 1 of clause 24. The intention was to specifically provide for a final 
product in which; 
 
a wife who commits a felony or misdemeanour other than treason or murder in the presence of 
her husband should be entitled to prove that she in fact committed the offence under the 
coercion of her husband; and if the jury found that she was coerced she should be acquitted. 
 
The suggestion would retain the broad effect of the existing common law but place beyond 
doubt that it applied to misdemeanours. As appeals from magistrates were heard by Quarter 
Sessions, it is a strong inference that their Chairmen would have very considerable experience 
of the lesser criminal cases coming before them. The fact that these judicial officers 
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exercising minor appellate jurisdiction, collectively recommended the express retention of the 
common law defence (and the upgrading of it to statutory form plus its extension to all 
misdemeanours), suggests that there were still a significant number of cases coming before 
them, where marital coercion fact-pattern was plainly engaged. The Society made it 
unequivocal that what the law required was an amendment which would; 
 
leave coercion to be raised and proved as a defence at the trial and would also leave open to 
any woman – whether wife or not – the right to raise a defence of compulsion, which is 
different in law from coercion which is a doctrine applicable to married woman only, and 
compulsion imports in order to be a defence fear of death or serious bodily injury or actual 
force used to compel the doing of the criminal act and goes far beyond such influence as has 
given rise to the doctrine of coercion of married women. 
 
 
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS PRIVATELY COMMENTS 
 
In a six page unintituled ‘Memorandum’201 from the Director of Public Prosecutions to the 
Attorney General dated February 1923, paragraph 13 states the author had discussed clause 24 
of the proposed Bill with Mr Graham Harrison, the Law Draftsman, who had been in some of 
the earlier correspondence loop. The Director stated he had suggested to the draftsman that 
after that part of the clause abolishing the presumption there should be inserted the words 
“which should make it clear that to the wife there was still open to her the defence of 
compulsion as now recognised by law.” The writer opposed the amendment proposed by Lord 
Parmoor as “open, I venture to say, to a good deal of criticism”.   
 
Lord Parmoor, had proposed numerous amendments to the many provisions comprising the 
Criminal Justice Bill as a whole. No less than three separate committees had produced reports 
which together led to the various provisions suggested to be enacted by the Criminal Justice 
Bill. A committee on the detention in custody of prisoners committed for trial, under the 
chairmanship of Horridge J,202 a committee on alterations in criminal procedure, under the 
chairmanship of the Director of Public Prosecutions, together with the Avory Committee had 
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provided the materials for the new Bill. Some of the materials were technical refinements to 
the law and others were drafted to reverse legal rulings given by various courts.  
 
 
LORD CHANCELLOR MOVES THE SECOND READING OF THE BILL 
 
On 28 February 1923, Viscount Cave LC moved203 the Second Reading of the Bill. After 
introducing the other manifold proposals, he eventually referred, as the last separate matter in 
his speech, to clause 24. The Lord Chancellor informed the House the presumption of 
coercion was “a very old one, and in the case of all felonies other than murder and treason and 
all misdemeanours” it applied. He referred indirectly to R v Peel as one of “several cases, 
some in recent times” in which trial judges had most reluctantly ordered a married woman be 
acquitted without the matter having been left to the unfettered decision of a jury. He stated his 
opinion that this presumption ought now come to an end:  
 
The presumption that every husband beats his wife, and that every wife goes in terror of her 
husband and would commit any crime rather than disobey him, if it was ever true, is not true 
to-day. Not every wife is a Lady Macbeth, but, speaking generally, I think that wives are free 
agents, and the question of their guilt or innocence ought to be considered on the facts and not 
be subject to such a presumption.  
 
In support of this conclusion, he referred to the Draft Code of the Royal Commission of 1878 
which had recommended the abolition of the presumption. In addition, he recited from 
Stephen’s ‘Digest of the Criminal Law’ the time had come that married women “as regards 
the commission of crimes [should] be on exactly the same footing as other people”. He then 
noted that while the Avory Committee had recommended not only that the presumption but 
the whole doctrine should be abolished his position on behalf of the government was “I am 
not quite sure about that. I am not sure that where actual coercion is proved that should not 
continue to be a sufficient defence for the wife in nearly all cases, as it is today”.204 His 
speech concluded205 by inviting Members of the House “who have experience of the law on 
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this matter” to speak about clause 24, reminding their Lordships of his opinion, “I think for 
the moment the best course will be to abolish the presumption, and for the rest to allow the 
present law to take its course”. 
 
 
LORD BUCKMASTER OPPOSES THE PROPOSAL 
 
The next speaker was Lord Buckmaster who spent more than half of his entire speech devoted 
to his principled objection to abrogating the presumption. He lamented that in his opinion, the 
terms of clause 24 were dealing with a very serious matter in a very light way. He remarked: 
 
What is the history of this matter? From times long antecedent to the Conquest right down to 
the present time, it has been a Rule of Law that if a woman commits a crime in the presence of 
her husband she shall be assumed to be committing it under the result of his influence, and 
consequently shall not be independently convicted of the offence.   
 
He reasoned, the requirement of presence of the husband meant the offence was committed 
with his connivance and consent. 
   
This law is not based on foolishness; it is based on experience, and on something like 1100 
years of wisdom, and until quite recently I do not believe there has been any objection raised 
to it.206 
 
Lord Buckmaster referred to R v Peel and was agitated about the clamour of the press. He 
concluded the newspaper editorials subsequent to that case had essentially said “Oh, it is a 
shameful thing; here is this man sent to prison and the woman is not.” He saw no justification 
for clause 24 considering that the rationale for the defence was “not the physical violence, it is 
the personal influence that the man exercises over his wife, and to deny that such a thing 
exists is to deny one of the strongest of all influences in the world”. He stated any person with 
experience of law ought to agree that again and again examples of not just women entirely 
under the influence of their husband, but also of the converse situation existed. Lord 
Buckmaster emphasised Members of the House of Lords might generally be in a poor 
                                              
206
 Ibid p164. These assertions are quite inconsistent with the outcry following the acquittal in R v Torpey (1871) 
12 Cox CC 45. 
   
 122 
position to understand the reality that affected so many women. The appropriate sector of 
womanhood was still “the greater part of the population of this country, who still live under 
conditions in which they are in the habit of obeying their husbands, doing what their husbands 
desire them to do”.207 He rejected reasoning that recent legislation which had altered the 
status of women and promoted their independence was relevant. He rejoined that limited 
changes in the law by those recent statutes had attempted to equipirate the position of both 
genders and such a result would be more aspirational than real. 
 
You cannot change a woman’s nature by giving her a vote, or by enabling her to sit on the 
Bench, or by all the legislation you have passed recently. Woman’s nature will remain exactly 
what it was before, and if for over 1100 years the people of this country have believed that 
that nature is of such a character that in the presence of her husband the crime she will commit 
will be a crime committed under his influence, I see no reason why we should alter it.  
 
This speech was much more rhetoric than substance. He had, almost wilfully, overlooked the 
points made by Viscount Cave LC, namely that in 1879 and in 1922, the year before, two 
investigatory bodies had concluded that the presumption (at least) had outrun its course. Lord 
Buckmaster principally asserted the matrimonial conditions of the average person had not 
altered, in the sense that the husband remained completely dominant in all respects, such that 
his wife would still commit a crime at his behest. To the extent that his speech was based on 
the special relationship created by marriage, it had some intrinsic historical merit. It may well 
have been a valid but lofty sociological glimpse at perceived lower classes. But his conclusion 
did not flow inexorably, or at all, from his asserted premise. Personal influence of a husband 
bore little resemblance to the much more demanding standard of the law, that there had to be 
coercion, to overcome a wife’s free will and to generate excusable dependent conduct.   
 
The next speaker was Viscount Haldane,208 also an ex Lord Chancellor. He rationalised that, 
contrary to opinion of Lord Buckmaster, clause 24 is:  
 
hardly a question of getting rid of the coercive effect of the husband’s presence. What is 
proposed is that it should be left to the jury or the Judge to say whether there has been any 
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coercion or not. If the Bill passes, that will be the effect of that clause; and surely it is right. It 
has been the opinion of Judges in recent cases which they have tried, and it commends itself to 
common sense.209 
 
 
VISCOUNT ULLSWATER SUPPORTS THE BILL 
 
Viscount Haldane was followed by Viscount Ullswater who stated210 the presumption is 
“foolish and unnecessary”. He referred to the well-known case of Mr Bumble, a product of 
the authorship of Charles Dickens in 1837, who declared “the law is a ass” if it presumed 
women always acted under the coercion of their husbands. Viscount Ullswater stated he was 
“led to believe that popular opinion at that time was strongly in favour of the view which Mr 
Bumble then took”. In uncompromising terms he referred to the speech of Lord Buckmaster 
as “absurd”211 when it contended that the presumption was in accordance with facts which are 
well-known to all. Lord Ullswater stated: 
 
It is strongly resented by the advocates of women. After I raised this question a year ago, there 
was some correspondence in the newspapers, and many of the Women’s Rights Societies 
passed resolutions in favour of the abolition of the presumption. I feel certain that it is most 
desirable that, if we are to maintain a proper and due respect for the law, the law should 
embody the customs and views of the society of the present day, and not of the society of 
1100 years ago.   
 
He added in concurrence with Lord Haldane, “even if you abolish the presumption, it does not 
prevent the wife, if she is really coerced by the husband to commit a crime, making that plea 
in extenuation, and proving it”.   
 
 
LORD PARMOOR SUPPORTS THE CLAUSE AND GOES FURTHER 
 
Lord Parmoor, made his view clear212 that the presumption should be “swept away” and it 
was an overdue change. He complained the wording of clause 24 as it stood did not introduce 
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any substantial alteration in the law of marital coercion other than to delete the presumption. 
Therefore, he advocated “the strengthening” of clause 24 and proposed that the actual 
wording of the Avory Committee, in favour of abolishing the entire doctrine be adopted as the 
legislation. He was entirely unimpressed by contrary arguments that because the doctrine had 
been in operation for many years, that was a good reason to retain it.  The law was “a wrong 
one”.213  
 
 
LORD SHANDON SUPPORTS THE CLAUSE 
 
The last speaker was Lord Shandon,214 who stated he had been for two years Attorney 
General for Ireland and had had “continuous experience” of cases dealing with the 
presumption of marital coercion, as it was his duty as Attorney General to read all the 
depositions taken at Petty Sessions. He stated: 
 
I certainly was impressed in a way that has given me a conviction with regard to this 
presumption that nothing could alter. My view is that the presumption is absolutely ridiculous. 
The fact that it is eleven centuries old does not make it any the better, and the sooner we get 
rid of it the better.   
 
The Bill was then read a second time and committed to a Committee of the Whole House.215  
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THE MEDIA REPORT THE SECOND READING OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE BILL 
 
The Times216 delighted in the fact the Second Reading of the Criminal Justice Bill showed 
such divergent views being expressed by Law Lords as to the merits of the proposed abolition 
of the presumption. It noted in the debate the Lord Chancellor “dwelt especially upon Clause 
24” which would abrogate the presumption, noting he said that the underpinning historical 
rationale for the presumption, if it held true in the past, was no longer valid, as generally it 
would now be accepted that “wives were free agents. The question of their guilt or innocence 
ought to be considered on facts and not under such a presumption.” However, the newspaper 
noted that the Lord Chancellor was hesitant as to whether the marital coercion doctrine 
“should not continue to be a defence”.217 Lord Buckmaster had in opposition asserted the 
“influence which a man exercised over his wife was one of the strongest influences that 
existed in the world.”218 
 
 
COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE HOUSE CONSIDERS THE PROPOSAL  
 
On 8 March 1923, the House of Lords in Committee considered the Criminal Justice Bill, on 
a clause by clause basis. By this time, clause 24 contained a sub-clause (2) that this section 
would come into operation on a date to be notified after the passage of the Act. 
 
However, consistent with his earlier protestation that the Bill did not go far enough and ought 
to replicate the recommendation of the Avory Committee, Lord Parmoor219 moved an 
amendment to leave out clause 24 in its entirety and to replace it with his own version, 
namely: 
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The whole doctrine of coercion by the husband as a defence for the wife is hereby abolished 
and a wife shall be in the same position as other people, free to establish any defence of that 
kind of compulsion which affords a defence to any person except in the case of certain 
specified crimes.220 
 
Lord Parmoor argued it would be a mistake to deal with the law by only abolishing the 
presumption, as it did not go far enough. He particularly stressed that it would be a mistake to 
introduce unnecessary presumptions into the administration of the criminal law. “I think it is 
time that in these matters the position of husband and wife was reduced to the same condition 
as that in which it is in the ordinary criminal law in an ordinary case”.  Lord Buckmaster 
opened his speech in reply to it with these words: 
 
I remain entirely impenitent in this matter. I still think that it is unwise to assume that women 
who commit acts in the presence of their husbands are in the same position as free and 
independent agents.   
 
In support, he noted an experienced Police Magistrate had expressed himself strongly to the 
same effect “in today’s newspaper”.221 He complained that Lord Parmoor’s proposed 
amendment would only exacerbate the present situation, unnecessarily going much further 
than even the Government proposal. Viscount Cave came to the rescue and stated,222 “My 
object is to abolish the presumption. Most of us, I think, if not all, are agreed upon that. We 
want to get rid of a presumption which really does not correspond with fact”. He too rejected 
Lord Parmoor’s proposal but on the rather cutting ground that the wording of the clause, “is 
not suitable for a Statute. It is an extract from a Report, and if it were adopted the clause 
would certainly need remodelling”. But much more importantly, he applauded the intention of 
government policy: “But, on merits, I think that it is true that a wife can often prove coercion 
by her husband when another person not in the position of a wife could not successfully raise 
any such defence”. He therefore said the proposal in the Bill correctly ought to be to leave it 
open to a wife to prove that she had been coerced, if that had been the case. Lord Parmoor’s 
amendment was then withdrawn by leave and clause 24 was agreed to by the House of Lords; 
the prospect for an early enactment of the clause look propitious. 
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On 9 April 1923 the Director of Public Prosecutions sent to Schuster a copy of the 
memorandum on the Bill which he had earlier sent to the Attorney General and to Graham 
Harrison, the Parliamentary Counsel. He further made specific comments on the points raised 
by the Society of Quarter Sessions Chairmen. In point 8 of his letter, Sir Archibald Bodkin 
states, in relation to the proposed amendment to Clause 24 urged by the Society of Chairmen 
of Quarter Sessions; 
 
This suggestion as to the doctrine of coercion introduces rather a vexed question. In some 
quarters it is thought that all the Clause does is to abolish the presumption, leaving the wife to 
prove, as a fact, that she was coerced on the particular occasion, which coercion shall, if 
accepted by the Jury, procure her acquittal. On the other hand, it is thought that the whole 
doctrine of coercion, whether applicable to married women or not, has been abolished, and 
that even to prove that a married woman was coerced by her husband would not entitle her to 
be acquitted but only to affect sentence.   
 
The Director stated he understood that the Lord Chancellor took the former view with the 
result: 
 
that to a married women (sic) accused with her husband, there will be the defence, if she can 
establish it, of marital coercion, and she could also take advantage of the common law 
doctrine of compulsion. Unmarried women will only have the doctrine of compulsion to fall 
back upon as a defence.   
 
This formula raised another issue, as the Director was now seeking to confine the defence to a 
situation where husband and wife were jointly charged. There had been no such requirement 
in the common law. While in the great bulk of cases the very nature of the offence raising the 
defence would mean both spouses would be on trial together, it did not at all follow. The 
defence only required that the wife be on trial and that the husband had been present at the 
time of the offence. If the husband had died or become insane before any charge or any trial, 
the wife was still entitled to raise the defence.  Sir Archibald Bodkin, the Director of Public 
Prosecutions (who had been a member of the Avory Committee), concluded his letter to the 
Lord Chancellor by stating, “Probably this will be a fairly satisfactory position and therefore, 
the suggestion [from the Society of Quarter Sessions Chairmen] need not be adopted”.  The 
Director opposed the view of creating a general defence by seeking to have it available only at 
a joint spousal trial. 
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MR JUSTICE AVORY COMPLAINS TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
 
A letter from Avory J dated 20 April 1923,223 was written directly to the Attorney General. 
Avory J was obviously miffed with the real possibility that the government would not enact 
legislation to bring about the recommendation of his Committee completely abrogating the 
entire doctrine of marital coercion. He noted that Clause 24 of the Bill proposed to abolish 
only the presumption224 of coercion but urged the Attorney General to recall that the 
Committee had gone much further and had unanimously recommended “that it was desirable 
in practice” that the entire defence should be abolished. In his last paragraph, Avory J 
petulantly noted that the Lord Chancellor, speaking in the House of Lords, had stated that the 
government did not wish to abolish the defence, only the presumption. Avory J complained 
“but I think it will lead to great confusion if the presumption only is abolished”. He added that 
duress was recognised by the law as a defence and in most cases would be still available to 
any wife, so no justification existed for a novel overlapping statutory defence.   
 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL WRITES TO LORD CHANCELLOR 
 
On 24 April 1923, the Attorney General, Sir Douglas Hogg, wrote225 to the Lord Chancellor, 
Viscount Cave LC, enclosing the letter from Avory J, one “I think you ought to see”. The Bill 
was swelling in its number of clauses dealing with disparate matters in the criminal justice 
system. It was evident that the Government intended for there to be an omnibus Bill rather 
than put forward a number of minor Bills dealing with individual issues. For this reason, 
clause 24 became tied up with the retarded progress on the other contentious issues226 in the 
Criminal Justice Bill. The Attorney General had “received a number of communications from 
various societies and individuals” about different points in the Bill and observed “it will be 
necessary for me to obtain your instructions before I undertake to take the Bill through the 
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House of Commons”. He asked for an interview with the Lord Chancellor once a date had 
been fixed for the Second Reading in the House of Commons.   
 
 
THE BILL MOVES TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 
 
The Bill then moved to the House of Commons, having been originally introduced in the 
Lords. On 30 July 1923, the Solicitor-General, Sir Thomas Inskip, moved227 the Criminal 
Justice Bill 1923 be read a second time in the House of Commons. After introducing the other 
provisions in the Bill and hoping that the provisions would “not be found controversial by any 
party or section in the House” he eventually228 turned to clause 24.  He recounted that the 
necessity for it had been prompted by “one of two recent cases in connection with the 
coercion of a wife”. The possible alternatives for altering the law were restated and the 
Solicitor-General acknowledged that Clause 24 did not adopt the recommendation of the 
Avory Committee, but proposed instead to abolish the presumption but otherwise maintain 
the defence. 
 
It is remarkable that throughout the Parliamentary Debates to date there had been no 
questioning and no analysis directed to the core concept, namely, what constitutes “coercion”. 
At this juncture, the Solicitor-General sought to define the content of the concept by stating 
that “coercion” was intended to mean:  
 
not merely by physical compulsion or bodily fear, but by that power which the husband, when 
all is said and done, has over a woman…Hon Members…I hope…that that proposal agrees 
with the general feeling which we all have about the position of woman (sic). When all is said 
and done, although we recognise to the full her intellectual and spiritual, I was going to say 
equality, may I not say superiority over men, she is not yet, nor probably ever will be, built in 
such a way as to be able to hold her own against the domination of a powerful personality who 
also happens to be her husband, and we think that justice will be maintained if we allow a 
woman placed in such circumstances as those to show that, though she is not compelled by 
bodily fear or physical compulsion, she was in fact, dominated by the husband, and in those 
circumstances the jury may acquit her. 
 
                                              
227
 Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, vol 167, p1203, 30 July 1923.   
228
 Ibid 1210. 
   
 130 
This “coercion” in the new defence, was nebulous in the extreme. It excluded nothing from 
the equation apart from emphasising that “coercion” included psychological violence or fear 
beyond physicality. This ethereal approach betrays the thinking of the time that although 
women had been granted substantial equality by other statutory provisions, in certain respects, 
there was a strong lingering belief that in fact the “intellectual and spiritual” dimension of 
women never equipped them for the implications and rigours of full gender or spousal 
equality. This handy supposition of the continuing and irremediable ‘weakness’ of women 
perpetuated the long-standing stereotype of the defenceless female. In short, the government 
would not remove the common law defence because of its belief that physical or mental 
compulsion by a husband against his wife would lead to involuntary conduct because of her 
biological inadequacy as she was not “built in such a way as to be able to hold her own 
against the domination of a powerful personality, who also happens to be her husband.”    
 
Mr Cassels KC MP rose to speak229 as he had “a keen desire to leave the ranks of those who 
have not spoken in this House”. In his maiden speech,230 he regretted that clause 24 did not 
follow the recommendations of the Avory Committee. He stated: 
 
The presumption is one matter, and defence is another. Now that it has been legally 
discovered that wives no longer obey their husband, but on the contrary that husbands obey 
their wives, the defence of the coercion of the wife ought to be abolished lest juries should be 
under the impression that whenever a woman commits an offence, it has been done at the 
command of the husband. 
 
He argued that coercion ought to be a matter taken into account in mitigation but noted “in 
these days of equal rights women will claim to be punished just as much as men”.231 Cassels 
was followed by Mr W A Jowitt MP, KC232 who said he was in complete agreement with 
every word the previous speaker had said.  After a number of other speeches that did not 
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touch on clause 24, the Attorney General, Sir Douglas Hogg, moved233 that the Bill should be 
given a Second Reading and then committed to a Standing Committee and this was done.   
 
 
LAW SOCIETY OPPOSES THE AVORY RECOMMENDATION 
 
Over the next few months, the Law Society of England and Wales,234 urged the government 
to amend clause 24 of the Bill so as “to make clear that [the] defence of coercion is still 
available” and only the presumption was to be abrogated. By November 1923, clause 24 still 
had not been accepted by the Home Office.235 Both the Law Society and the Society of 
Chairmen of Quarter Sessions, highly influential bodies in relation to trials before 
magistrates, had each sought an amendment to the clause to ensure that the defence of 
coercion would remain available upon the demise of the presumption. Solicitors were 
responsible for not just legal representation but also for advocacy in the great majority of 
trials before magistrates in England and Wales.  
 
 
RAPID SUCCESSION OF PRIME MINISTERS 
 
Since the time of R v Peel, there had been a rapid turnover in the highest echelons of 
government. Andrew Bonar-Law had led the Conservative Party for seven months and 
Stanley Baldwin had succeeded him on 10 May 1923 as Prime Minister. In turn, Baldwin 
resigned after losing a vote of confidence in January 1924, toppling his Conservative Ministry 
with him. On 22 January 1924, Ramsay MacDonald became the first Labour Prime Minister, 
but in the absence of a Parliamentary majority, he was in turn displaced in November 1924 by 
Stanley Baldwin, who then served his second term as a Conservative Prime Minister. Within 
these political vicissitudes, the Criminal Justice Bill 1923 was becalmed, including the clause 
to create the new statutory defence of marital coercion. Each change of government 
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consequentially meant a new Lord Chancellor and Law Officers. The instability of 
government at this time meant a reshuffling of priorities and a lack of traction with the overall 
legislative agenda. So the Criminal Justice Bill 1923 died of its own inanition upon the 
successive collapses of the government. 
 
 
SECOND READING OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE BILL 1924 IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS 
 
The new Ministry resurrected the Bill in a considerably expanded form but the old clause 24, 
now clause 37 Criminal Justice Bill 1924, remained unaltered in content. On 26 February 
1924, Viscount Haldane, again the Lord Chancellor,236 moved237 the Second Reading of the 
Criminal Justice Bill 1924 which he stated he had inherited from the former Lord Chancellor, 
Viscount Cave, who had in turn inherited it from his predecessor, Viscount Birkenhead. 
Viscount Haldane LC238 considered the multifarious provisions dealing with the reform of 
probation in the Bill and eventually turned to the defence of marital coercion. He remarked 
that the administration of criminal justice in relation to the ancient common law defence of 
marital coercion had been identified as “deficient”239 and stated that consequently the “very 
powerful”240 Avory Committee had rendered a report on the subject. The impetus for the 
reform arose from “a well-known trial not very long ago, in which a lady escaped punishment 
in circumstances which led the Judge to make some comments”, a very thinly disguised 
reference to R v Peel. Viscount Haldane LC noted that there was in the law no presumption in 
favour of a husband and stated “I am afraid that it is the other way” on occasions. Yet, at no 
stage did he or the government justify why those husbands were not to be included within the 
statutory defence. The defence was to be anchored firmly in half of a marriage with no 
consideration ever to be given to the possibility of the creation of a spousal, rather than an 
                                              
236
 1st Viscount Haldane LC had been the Lord Chancellor 1912-1915.  His tenure as Lord Chancellor in 1924 
did not last even the year when he was replaced by Viscount Cave LC.  
237
 House of Lords Debates 1924, p306. The Times, 26 February 1924, p9 under the heading ‘Criminal Justice 
Bill – Sterner Penalties For Motorists – Wife Coercion’ reported the introduction of the Bill to the House of 
Lords, noting that Clause 37 of it proposed to abolish the presumption and noting that a memorandum issued by 
the Lord Chancellor “points out that not such rule obtains in the Dominions.”   
238
 Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, vol 56, p303, 26 February 1924. 
239
 Ibid 305. 
240
 Ibid 305. 
   
 133 
uxorial, defence. The new era of equality did not operate to put husbands on the same plane as 
their wives – a wife was still gallantly the beneficiary of avuncular affirmative inequality. 
This was to be chauvinism and paternalism in a modern statutory form. 
 
The government’s position was that the proposals emanating from the Avory Report had been 
carefully considered “and embodied in the Bill”.241 But this assertion was quite incorrect. The 
Avory Report had never recommended the proposal in the Bill and had actually recommended 
the complete extirpation of the defence, whereas the Bill was providing the defence with a 
commodious statutory basis. Lord Haldane stated that the intention of Clause 37 was that as a 
“presumption of law”242 the common law presumption would forever disappear from the law, 
yet the affirmative factual defence would remain.243   
 
The presumption, as a presumption of law, disappears, but the wife will still have the benefit 
of any defence which she can set up to the satisfaction of the jury that she was acting under 
the coercion of her husband. It thus becomes a question of fact and not a question of law.   
 
 
LORD DARLING MAKES HIS MAIDEN SPEECH IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS 
 
As if to complete the circle, Lord Darling244 who had been only recently ennobled, made his 
maiden speech245 and referred to the fact that the Bill dealt with matters that had come before 
him “as a Judge of the King’s Bench”246 and he thereafter referred to R v Peel “a case which I 
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myself heard”.247 He stated that the vital point was “whatever the evidence might be, whether 
it did or did not prove the offence”248 there was a presumption of law, as distinguished from a 
presumption of fact, that if a woman commits a crime and her husband is present, she 
commits it solely by his instigation and under his coercion.249  
 
Lord Darling acknowledged that for a very long time, the marital coercion rule was “a very 
good rule indeed.”250 although the rule was now justifiably the subject of “[m]uch ridicule”.251 
It had been formulated in times when a wife was in some respects “little better than a chattel 
belonging to her husband”252 so that the manners of the time dictated that the wife had no 
genuine free will, so the law understandably provided “She shall not be tried; he domineers 
over her in all the affairs of life, and we must presume that he coerced her by his dominance 
on this occasion”.253 But separate from the sociological analysis of gross inequality between 
the spouses, Lord Darling ventured “another and a softer reason”254 based on chauvinism – 
which he described as the instinctive dislike of punishing a woman at all – why the marital 
coercion defence had not been abrogated. Capital punishment had been the norm until the end 
of the eighteenth century for many crimes and the regularity of the mandatory requirement to 
inflict capital punishment on a woman “must have revolted the feelings of the Judges”255 so 
that the marital coercion defence ascended as an important safeguard for clergyless women. 
Wives were in a significantly better position than all other women. Lord Darling considered 
that the effect of clause 37 of the Bill would be to alter the common law which had imposed 
an irrebuttable presumption of law256 and to replace it with a rebuttable presumption of fact, 
so that the new statutory law would now require evaluation by the trier of fact as to whether, 
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on all the evidence, the wife, had been “a free agent”.257 If the wife could prove that the crime 
was dictated to her by her husband in the form of coercion she would succeed.258 He 
advocated the proposed amendment abrogating the presumption, because it still permitted the 
wife to have the defence of coercion decided in her favour as a question of fact. Viscount 
Haldane LC moved that the Bill be read a second time and committed to Committee of the 
Whole House.259 No one ever raised how the new defence would operate together with the 
retained general defence of duress at common law. 
 
On 18 March 1924260 the House of Lords moved that the House resolve itself into committee 
to consider the Criminal Justice Bill 1924. But the Bill stalled because of the causes which led 
to the further change of government in November 1924.  By the issue next the matter returned 
to Parliament 15 months would have elapsed.    
 
 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE BILL 1925: LORD JUSTICE ATKIN’S OBSERVATIONS ON THE 
CLAUSE 
 
The House of Commons ordered the Criminal Justice Bill 1925 to be printed on 23 June 
1925.261 By now the old clause 37 of the 1924 Bill was renumbered as clause 42 in the 1925 
Bill. On 1 July 1925 L S Brass wrote to Schuster enclosing a copy of a memorandum dated 
18 June 1925 prepared by Atkin LJ regarding clause 42. 
 
Lord Justice Atkin wrote an analysis of clause 42 concluding that its intention to abolish the 
presumption yet to create a defence which the wife would have to establish, would go too far. 
“The doctrine of marital coercion is a humane provision of our law: and is not to be attributed 
wholly or mainly to old fashioned doctrines as to the unity of husband and wife”.262 He noted 
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that prior to the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 [UK], which for the first time permitted an 
accused person to give evidence in his or her own defence in an indictable trial, a wife could 
not have realistically proved the defence at all, where husband and wife were tried together. 
This was because in most cases no third person would have been present to give the 
exonerating evidence of the husband’s coercion and the wife herself, prior to that Act, was 
incompetent in law to give evidence in support of her own case. Therefore, Atkin LJ 
concluded that over time judges devised the presumption of marital coercion to compensate 
for the inability of the wife to be able to give evidence. The husband ironically was equally an 
incompetent witness, in a joint trial, unless he pleaded guilty whereupon only then could he 
give evidence for his wife. The presumption was therefore necessary for such a defence to be 
factually possible. It would be a very rare situation in which there would be a third party 
present, who was not also a defendant and who would be able to independently attest to the 
nature of the domination of the husband over the wife.   
 
But a liberalising consequence of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898 now meant that the wife 
could give evidence in her own defence; but where her defence necessarily involved 
imputations of criminality and domination by the husband, to save herself the wife inevitably 
condemned her husband. It was apparent that the 1898 Act had serious ramifications for the 
common law defence, which had not been taken into account in any of the Parliamentary 
Debates and wholly overlooked by the Avory Committee. Atkin LJ stated that the effect of 
clause 42 was that “a defence by the wife necessarily affords evidence of guilt of the 
husband”. He added “[u]nfortunately the criminal classes do still coerce their wives: though 
more refined persons may not”.  Atkin LJ then analysed how the proposed statutory defence 
would work in practice as it was very improbable that there would be independent evidence in 
support of it. The two considerations that needed to be taken into account were: 
 
 1. On the hypothesis she has been under the coercion of a husband whom she 
fears, is the fear likely to be lessened if she goes into the box to give evidence? 
One would have supposed the likelihood of still stronger coercion restraining 
her from giving evidence – what will happen to her when the husband comes 
out? 
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 2. Such a defence by the wife necessarily affords evidence of the guilt of the 
husband. Apart from any legal question as to the competence of the wife (as 
she is an accused person – I think that she is competent!). ie. it is not a 
mockery to say that a wife may only raise an effective defence by giving 
evidence which must condemn her husband. Not only all the traditions of the 
criminal classes are against it: but also I think of other classes as well. Again, 
how will the wife fare with her associates when the husband is doing time on 
her evidence. 
 
He reasoned that if the provisions of the clause were intended to place the wife in the same 
position as all other persons who may plead the general defence of duress, then the intention 
failed, as the clause actually placed a wife in a worse position than under that defence. For by 
the proposed statute she would now have to prove that the offence had been committed “in the 
presence of and under the coercion of her husband.”263 The proposed statutory formulation, 
based on a notion of equality, would amount to a material disadvantage for any wife, as the 
ordinary defence of duress could be established by her without any requirement that the 
offence had been “committed in the presence of the coercer”.264 Atkin LJ added “[the 
husband] might be in the next room, or elsewhere: and yet his threats of death or violence 
might be operating on the mind of the offender”. He concluded the existing common law 
“appears to me to be humane and to do no injustice” and is not to be attributed wholly or 
mainly to old fashioned doctrines as to the unity of husband and wife.   
 
 
LORD JUSTICE ATKIN CONSIDERS R v PEEL 
 
Atkin LJ analysed that there was no need to change the law consequent upon the ruling of 
Darling J in R v Peel.  He was highly critical not of the law, but of the way the trial judge had 
applied it in that case. Darling J had erroneously proceeded on the basis that there was no 
evidence to rebut the presumption, whereas Atkin LJ stated “to my judgment” there was 
ample evidence of facts which rebutted the presumption, adduced within the totality of the 
prosecution evidence. He referred approvingly, in preference to the approach that had been 
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taken in R v Peel to the summing up of Coltman J in R v M’Clarens.265 The ruling in R v Peel 
that there was no case to answer was an aberrant ruling of law, that no evidence existed to 
rebut the presumption. 
 
 
CONSEQUENCES OF A WIFE HAVING TO PROVE THE DEFENCE   
 
Atkin L J also argued that if a change were to be made to the common law by abolishing the 
presumption, the wife ought to be able to raise an effective defence without having to go into 
the witness box, in view of the consequences to herself whatever the result of the case. He 
suggested that the fact that an offence had been committed by a wife in the presence of her 
husband, should be evidence of coercion on which alone a jury might acquit if they thought 
right: but that they should always have the defence left to them together with all other relevant 
facts which support or are inconsistent with the defence. On this approach the onus would 
always remain on the wife. The presumption he argued could not be abolished while the onus 
still rested on the prosecution to disprove coercion beyond reasonable doubt. Atkin LJ also 
formulated a draft clause to carry out his proposal into legislative fruition.   
 
The fact that an offence is committed by a wife in the presence of her husband shall not afford 
a presumption of law that such offence is committed under the coercion of the husband, but 
such fact shall of itself be evidence of such coercion: and a defence of coercion by her 
husband when raised by a wife shall be determined by the Jury or Court of Summary 
Jurisdiction as the case may be after consideration of the evidence of such fact and of all other 
relevant facts.266 
 
This draft clause, received by the Lord Chancellor, unfortunately never features in any of the 
subsequent external government communications or Parliamentary Debates. 
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CRIMINAL JUSTICE BILL 1925: HOUSE OF COMMONS  
 
The Criminal Justice Bill was amended by Standing Committee B of the House of Commons. 
It was ordered to be printed as Bill 201 on 23 June 1925 and was presented to the House by 
Sir William Joynson-Hicks, the Home Secretary, the Attorney General, Sir Douglas Hogg 
KC, the Solicitor-General, Sir Thomas Inskip KC, and Mr Godfrey Locker-Lampson This 
happened five days after Atkin LJ’s memorandum. There had been presumably no time for 
the government to consider his recommendations because it was only on 4 July 1925 that 
Schuster, on behalf of the Lord Chancellor, was able to deal with them. Only on that day did 
Schuster write to Rt Hon Sir John Anderson GCB267 about the criticisms of clause 44 which 
had been made by Atkin LJ in private correspondence, Schuster stated: 
 
The Chancellor is not moved by the criticisms so far as they are directed to the general policy 
of the Clause, and he asks me to say that if those criticisms have any effect upon the mind of 
the Secretary of State, the Chancellor thinks that before the clause is either amended or 
withdrawn there should be a consultation between the Secretary of State, the Attorney General 
and himself. 
 
Schuster continued, “On the minor point taken to the drafting of the clause, directed to the 
insertion of the words “in the presence of and”, the Lord Chancellor is somewhat impressed 
by Atkin’s argument and would be prepared to assent to the omission of those words from the 
clause”. If the government did adopt the suggestion by Atkin LJ, then the new clause would 
abolish the presumption, retain the defence but remove the pre-existing common law 
requirement that the offence be committed in the presence of the husband. That combination 
of features would mean that the outcome would eventually provide for the common law 
offence of duress to be in a statutory form but applicable for only married women, and with 
two differences. The first was that “coercion” was intended to have a broader inclusionary 
meaning than that encompassed by the comparative noun “duress”, at common law. The 
second was that the statutory defence would now place the burden of proof on the defendant 
wife to establish the new affirmative defence, whereas at common law, it was unquestionably 
for the prosecution to disprove duress at common law beyond reasonable doubt. No analysis 
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in the Parliamentary Debates was ever directed to the standard of proof that was to be placed 
upon the wife by this statute. The orthodox learning at the time would be that the only burden 
placed upon a defendant, save for the exceptional defence of insanity,268 was that the 
defendant had to establish a statutory defence on the balance of probabilities.269 However, the 
effect of a construction that interpreted the section as only imposing on the wife an 
evidentiary (rather than a legal) burden, would meet constitutional law norms and would 
revitalise the defence as being a less prescriptive form of duress, claimable only by wives.270 
 
The next edition271 of the Criminal Justice Bill 1925 now renumbered the clause as 44 and it 
now read: 
 
44. Any presumption of law that an offence committed by a wife in the presence of her 
husband is committed under the coercion of the husband is hereby abolished, but on a charge 
against a wife for any offence other than treason or murder it shall be a good defence to prove 
that the offence was committed in the presence of, and under the coercion of, the husband.   
 
The marginal note to the clause stated “Abolition of Presumption of coercion of married 
women by husband”.  Clause 46(3) provided that the Act would not extend to Scotland272 or 
Northern Ireland.273   
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HOME SECRETARY WRITES TO LORD CHANCELLOR 
 
On 15 July 1925 Sir William Joynson-Hicks, the Home Secretary, wrote to Viscount Cave 
LC, anticipating some difficulty in the passage of clause 44. He noted that “Greaves-Lord and 
several other lawyers” in the House of Commons, had put down in Committee, an amendment 
to the clause, which, if accepted, would make it merely declaratory of the law as it is at 
present, confirming the state of the existing common law determined in the Avory Report. 
The result of such an amendment would be to endorse both the presumption and the defence 
and to confirm that the defence applied to every criminal offence (felony and misdemeanour), 
save for murder and treason. Joynson-Hicks advised that the foreshadowed Committee 
amendment had not been pressed at that stage, upon an undertaking by him to reconsider their 
proposal before the Report Stage. The Lord Chancellor was advised that Greaves-Lord MP 
had now put down a proposal for the Report Stage to delete the entire clause 44, leaving the 
existing common law position completely untouched. The Home Secretary noted that clause 
44 in fact adopted the first of two alternatives considered by the Avory Committee, but 
reflected the very one they did not adopt. He cautiously added:274  
 
Yesterday Sir Archibald Bodkin told me that the Lord Chief Justice was anxious to see Clause 
44 amended by leaving out all the words after “abolished” in line 19. The Clause then would 
appear in effect to carry out the second alternative as recommended by the Avory Committee. 
 
The amendment proposed by the Lord Chief Justice would then simply provide that “Any 
presumption of law that an offence committed by a wife in the presence of her husband was 
committed under the coercion of the husband is hereby abolished.” That would not have had 
the effect of abnegating the defence, only the presumption; unless it could be argued that the 
defence could not separately survive without the presumption. But as the Solicitor-General 
was to inform the House of Commons that “coercion” in the Bill had a distinctly different and 
only partially overlapping meaning with that of “duress” at common law, the removal of the 
presumption in accordance with Lord Hewart’s formulation above, would still have provided 
wives with a separate and larger privilege under the criminal law than that enjoyed by any 
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other person or class of persons. The three year quest for detail had successfully obscured the 
underlying criminal law macro-issues. 
 
The Home Secretary also reacted that the terms of such a clause would then appear in effect 
to carry out the final recommendation of the Avory Committee. But that conclusion was also 
very doubtful because all that that legislation would have secured is the abolition of the 
presumption and not the abrogation of the defence. He stated to the Lord Chancellor the 
matter is certainly a difficult one and is complicated by the various opinions held in 
authoritative quarters as to what form the alteration of the law should take or whether any 
alteration of the present law is required. He added that Greaves-Lord MP and his cohort 
appeared to be in favour of an “alteration of the present law”.  But this was the exact opposite 
of what Greaves-Lord had wanted to achieve, which was to retain the existing common law in 
all respects. The Home Secretary requested a conference with the Lord Chancellor and 
Attorney General to “settle what line is to be taken”. He warned that the Report Stage in the 
House of Commons could be taken as early as 17 July and they would therefore need to talk 
tomorrow (16 July). The next day,275 Schuster sent to Viscount Cave a copy of: The Avory 
Committee Report, clause 44 Criminal Justice Bill 1925, Atkin LJ’s Memorandum and the 
Home Secretary’s letter of 15 July. On 17 July, Schuster made a file note “The Lord 
Chancellor spoke to the Secretary of State. They agreed to maintain the Clause as it 
stands”.276   
 
 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE BILL 1925: SECOND READING: ADJOURNED DEBATE 
 
On 16 November 1925, Sir William Joynson-Hicks277 moved that the clauses in the 
reintroduced Criminal Justice Bill 1925 be read a Second Time. The Adjourned Debate 
resumed a few days later278 and clause 44 was the subject of extended criticism by Mr 
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Greaves-Lord MP,279 who unsuccessfully moved for the clause to be left out of the Bill, 
asserting that the defence was “something like 300 years”280 old. He accurately described the 
defence as involving a rebuttable presumption of fact but erroneously stated that the defence 
“only applies…to theft or the receipt of stolen property...uttering of counterfeit coins and it 
applies to misdemeanours”.281 He noted that it was doubtful that the defence applied to 
robbery although he remarked that Stephen J held that the defence did so apply.282 
 
This information base was sloppy and ill-prepared. The trial of R v Peel283 was referred to and 
it was acknowledged that “[d]ecisions of that kind may create unfortunate precedents.”284 A 
reference to the Avory Committee recalled that it had recommended the total abolition of the 
defence, so that the general law of duress would apply so that a wife “should be left to the 
other portion of the law which gives a right to anyone to be excused of crime if the crime is 
committed – the crime being short of murder – under an immediately threat to kill or to cause 
grievous bodily harm.” Mr Greaves-Lord KC MP argued that there: 
 
is a very wide area of compulsion between an act committed under an immediate threat to kill 
or cause grievous bodily harm [as in the defence of duress at common law] and…one can 
realise what very wide powers of coercion a husband may have which fall short altogether of a 
threat to kill or cause grievous bodily harm.285  
 
The Member for Norwood observed that the clause neither carried out the recommendation of 
the Avory Committee nor was the wife left with any effective defence so clause 44 was an 
unsatisfactory half-way house compromise. “[T]he result of it is to preserve the defence for 
those women who are not coerced, but to take it away entirely for those women who are.”286 
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The force of the argument is that the wife could only establish her defence from the witness 
box by proving the guilt of her husband. It was remarked a wife who had been under brutal 
coercion from her husband would not have the real choice to give evidence in the first place 
and the attendant risk was that to exculpate herself, she had to effectively inculpate him. Such 
a coerced woman would not go into the witness box and would almost inevitably be 
convicted, because of her ongoing coercion (involving implied or actual threats perhaps to 
their children) which meant any decision not to give evidence was itself involuntary, caused 
by the effects of that coercion.  A wife under coercion at the time of the offence would not be 
able to realistically make a decision to allow herself to give evidence to prove the defence 
with the consequence of its success being the end of her marriage and the conviction of her 
husband. A wife might selflessly decline to avail herself of the defence because of the price it 
carried for matrimonial harmony, when the origins of the common law presumption and 
defence had been to enhance matrimonial harmony by not putting a wife in a position in 
which she could damage herself or the marriage, in exculpating herself.     
 
Mr Greaves-Lord also considered the unprotected converse scenario of a coercing wife, who 
had induced her overborne husband into crime. While a wife is not generally a compellable 
witness against her husband, the proposed statutory defence would have two immediate 
effects. It would compel the wife to go into the witness box287 and there she could be 
compelled to answer questions about her husband as a co-defendant to which she could not be 
able to claim privilege.288 Mr Greaves-Lord concluded that the proposal was a very serious 
inroad upon the defences of married women which should not be lightly taken away from 
them. He identified the reversal of the onus of proof “which has rested on the prosecution for 
hundreds of years”, moving from the prosecution at common law but to the wife by this 
statute, as a seriously unjustifiable step that could not be sanctioned in terms of principle. The 
Member then criticised the fact that “none of the woman’s (sic) organisations who talk so 
much about the rights of women have taken any very great interest in [this clause].”289 He 
declaimed them for their nonchalance in relation to this important matter. But this criticism 
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was seriously misplaced as the women’s organisations such as the National Council of 
Women had in fact staged a serious campaign in the press for the removal of the presumption, 
as to their mind, it stigmatised women as a class of subordinate beings. As early as 1871, the 
press had been urged by women to militate for the abrogation of the presumption. For the last 
half century, the groundswell of published material from women had been overwhelmingly in 
favour of the repudiation of the presumption. Mr Greaves-Lord MP, did acknowledge that the 
clause would put “…men and women on an equal footing”290 and wondered whether, as a 
strategy, the silence from that sector which he (wrongly) believed to exist, may have been 
motivated by seeing the clause as a further opportunity to secure practical equality under the 
law. He noted the proposed statutory defence, which applied to the matters, concerns and 
conditions of the spousal relationship, would make inroads upon the general intimacy of 
married life, which “would bring about a very serious defect in our Criminal Law.”291 
 
 
MR CASSELS KC MP OPPOSES THE CLAUSE 
 
Mr Cassels KC also moved the clause be deleted from the Bill, but for significantly different 
reasons from those advanced by Mr Greaves-Lord. His objection was that the Avory Report 
recommendation of complete abrogation of the entire doctrine had not been followed despite 
the “prevailing judicial opinion”292 to the same effect. Since the enactment of the Married 
Women’s Property Act 1882 [UK] and the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act 1919 [UK] 
their combined effect in principle, justified293 the rejection of the clause, so that upon 
abrogation of the entire doctrine, a married294 woman should have to take full responsibility, 
just as any other adult. “We live in times when every woman thinks that she is at least if not 
more than the equal of any man. She should take her full responsibility for anything that 
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happens and be equal in all matters, not only innocent matters but criminal matters as 
well”.295 
 
 
SOLICITOR-GENERAL JUSTIFIES THE CLAUSE 
 
The Solicitor-General urged the clause was not a technical legal matter but a matter of 
substance.296 He referred to a statement from the Avory Committee297 and remarked that the 
view there was appreciably wider as to the extent of the defence than the view commended by 
Mr Greaves-Lord, who had stated he relied in preference on the ‘Digest of Criminal Law’ by 
Sir James Fitzjames Stephen. The Solicitor-General stated that the marital concern doctrine 
raised only a prima facie and rebuttable presumption of fact. He referred to the “notorious 
case” of R v Peel298 and acknowledged it was the very reason for the creation of that 
Committee and declared there were three possible courses which the government could take 
in light of the Avory Report recommendation. The first was to make no legislative 
intervention so “the old presumption should continue”,299 with the possible consequence that 
the same result as happened in R v Peel could again ensue. The second course available was 
to abrogate the presumption completely and place a wife in the same position as a husband 
under the common law of “duress”,300 a term which the Solicitor-General stated, imported 
some fear of bodily harm – in the nature of physical compulsion. The third option was that 
adopted in the Bill to abolish the purely technical, legal presumption, “but leave it open to the 
wife to establish not merely the defence that she was compelled – that is to say, was driven to 
commit the crime by fear of bodily, physical injury – but to satisfy the jury that she was in 
fact coerced”.301 
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The Solicitor-General then importantly indicated what was intended by the vital noun 
“coercion” in the putative statutory provision. He said, in contradistinction to the law of 
“duress” that “coercion” gives the wife a rather wider and more extended line of defence than 
pure physical compulsion. Coercion in the clause “imports coercion in the moral, possibly 
even in the spiritual realm, whereas compulsion imports only something in the physical 
realm”.302 The expressed intention was to leave it to a wife to convince a jury that her acts or 
omissions, while not done under actual threats of physical violence, were done under moral 
and spiritual compulsion, in point of fact. The Solicitor-General accepted that to make a 
married woman the beneficiary of this statutory offence was to give her “a slightly extended 
form of protection which is not available to the members of the general public.”303 He stated 
that “the sense of a woman’s particular qualities will not blind us to the desirability of leaving 
it open to her to convince a jury, if she can, that she committed a crime…under such moral 
and spiritual compulsion in point of fact as is properly described by the word “coercion”.”304 
The Avory Report recommendation therefore was not a proposal which the government could 
adopt, which had chosen instead to advance “the sensible and humane course.”305 
 
 
SIR E HUME –WILLIAMS MP CHALLENGES THE SOLICITOR- GENERAL 
 
Sir E Hume-Williams MP questioned whether the defence would apply only where the 
husband was actually present at the time of the offence, instancing a situation where the wife 
was commanded “if you do not go round the corner and steal a purse I will shoot you.”306 The 
Solicitor General saw this as being within the ordinary defence of duress. He reiterated the 
proposed statutory defence only applied when the offence occurred in the presence of the 
husband and was caused by his coercion. Coercion “is something more than physical 
violence”307 – which connotes that it was intended to only encompass conduct other than 
physical acts or omissions. He stressed the necessity for the actual, physical presence of the 
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husband, because in his absence, the wife “ought to be humane enough to be able to avoid 
that spiritual or moral coercion”. While the wife was in his presence “the influence of moral 
or spiritual terror is very potent indeed”. To which E Hume-Williams immediately rejoined: 
“But the coercion ceases to exist when the husband is not present”.   
 
 
MR RAWLINSON KC MP CRITICISES THE CLAUSE  
 
Mr Rawlinson KC considered that of the Members of the House of Commons, only Mr 
Greaves-Lord KC was in favour of perpetuating the common law defence in its unaltered 
entirety. Mr Rawlinson stated that he had had 40 years of lecturing on law and that he had 
always understood that the marital coercion defence “was one of the anomalies of the law 
which was to come to an end very soon.”308 He opposed the government clause as he (like Mr 
Cassels KC) supported the Avory Report recommendation. His opposition to it was based on 
the need for a pervasive notion of gender equality within the substantive criminal law and that 
the proposed clause would introduce an unjustifiable derogation from such equality. He 
argued that for the criminal law, “there is no ground for treating a married woman in this 
matter in any way different from any other member of the community.”309 It followed, that 
the position of a woman living with a man to whom she is not legally married310 was 
indistinguishable from that of a married woman. “Is the coercion which is likely to be 
exercised any less than in the case of a man who is married to a woman?” In addition, he 
argued that the concept of coercion in its effect should equally apply where either parent 
instigated a child or some other member of the extended family, to commit a crime. This was 
because there is no less likelihood of coercion in those examples as there is between a man 
and wife. To suggest otherwise, was “ridiculous” and at odds with the reality that there was as 
much prospect of a husband being under the coercion of his wife. Although the Married 
Women’s Property Act 1882311 and the Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act 1919 [UK] were 
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important milestones towards equality, “long before they existed there was no sense in this 
particular law” so in criminal law terms, a married woman should be put in the same position 
as any other citizen.312   
 
Mr Rawlinson KC decried the fact that the recommendation of the Avory Committee, 
supported by Sir Harry Poland, had been rejected, as both Avory J and Poland had 
incomparable experience of the criminal law. In addition, he also remarked that there were 
statistically very few crimes committed in the presence of a husband by a wife. He argued that 
as “very few cases to which [the defence can] apply” came before the Courts, this was a 
further reason not to make an elaborate distinction for a class of womanhood. But he 
trenchantly inquired, “What is the definition of coercion313 here? I have no idea. An hon. 
Member opposite said there was not much difference between coercion and compulsion, but 
there is, legally, a great difference. What will the woman have to prove when she says that she 
acted under the coercion of her husband?”314 This was a very pointed criticism of the 
particularly evanescent attempt of the Solicitor-General to define what had been intended to 
be included within the critical expression. At no stage, either in its private correspondence or 
in public, did the government ever consider inserting a definition of “coercion” for the new 
section. The curious phraseology adopted by the Solicitor-General that coercion involved a 
“spiritual” dimension,315 is most unlikely to have been an allusion to ecclesiastical matters. It 
probably was a contemporary usage, meaning “of the mind” – in the sense of its fragility, and 
capacity to be overpowered by psychological domination. Mr Rawlinson KC considered that 
there was an insuperable difficulty in having a requirement that in practice a wife would have 
to enter the witness box to prove that she had acted under the coercion of her husband.  A 
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separate privilege for married women could not be justified as it “puts a married woman in a 
different position from any other woman, for instance, a woman living in adultery with a man 
or [residing with her] parent and so on.”316 The government made no reply to these 
observations other than to remind Members of the urgency of passing the entire Bill.  
 
 
MR T SHAW MP SUPPORTS THE CLAUSE 
 
Mr T Shaw317 stressed the clause underlined the fact a married woman was responsible for her 
own actions.  He added, “Whilst one can recognise the absolute right of a woman to equality 
before the law, one has also to realise the facts of actual life. Everyone knows that crimes 
have been committed by women under the coercion of their husbands”. He was in favour of it 
as it provided an opportunity for a married woman who had been wronged by her husband to 
escape liability. He was not perturbed by the absence of any definition of “coercion” as it 
would be an adverse reflection on judges and juries to suggest that they did not know what it 
meant.  Contemporary mores no longer allowed a woman upon marriage to become “the 
chattel of her husband”. 
 
 
GOVERNMENT SEEKS TO EXPEDITE THE WHOLE BILL 
 
Mr Godfrey Locker-Lampson, the Under-Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
implored the House of Commons to pass the Bill through both the Report Stage and the Third 
Reading that very day, as the pressure of business was such that “unless we get this Bill today 
it will very likely have to be sacrificed.”318 He noted that in return for speed, the Home 
Secretary had already “given up two of the contentious clauses altogether.” At this point, 
Captain Benn MP protested about the imposed rush, stating that there should be “due 
discussion”.319 
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CAPTAIN GARRO-JONES MP OPPOSES THE CLAUSE 
 
Captain Garro-Jones MP protested that after a three month vacation Parliament had only re-
assembled on 16 November 1925 and that the government was unduly pressurising the 
Members. He observed that clause 44 “now offers a great deal of scope for discussions. It 
seems to have been very badly drawn.”320 In particular, the expression “within the presence of 
and under the coercion of her husband” had not been drafted with any regard to the leading 
common law cases on the requirement. He drew attention to the fact that the requirement of 
physical presence of the husband meant that “crimes which extend over a long period of time 
or crimes of a double nature”321 would be wholly outside this new defence and anticipated 
that the clause would “lead to endless litigation” 322 as a result of its inept drafting. 
 
 
HOUSE OF COMMONS PASSES THE CLAUSE 
 
When the clause proceeded to a Division, it was passed without even a vote being actually 
taken323 as no Members were willing to act as Tellers for the Noes whereupon the Deputy-
Speaker declared the Ayes had it. Mr Rawlinson KC then withdrew his amendment which 
would have implemented the recommendation of the Avory Committee, but expressed the 
hope the government would reconsider the issue when the Bill moved back to the House of 
Lords. The resumed debate on other clauses in the Bill took place on 26 November 1925,324 at 
which point, the clause became further and finally renumbered as Clause 47. The Bill then 
came before the House of Lords for its Second Reading and Viscount Cave LC moved it 
accordingly. Viscount Haldane325 noted “this Bill has been through three Parliaments” and 
after Lord Phillimore, Earl Russell and Viscount Cave LC briefly spoke in support of the Bill 
as a whole, the Bill was read a second time and committed to a committee of the whole 
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House.326 On both the ninth327 and fifteenth328 December 1925, the Criminal Justice Bill 1925 
was considered, but the clause was simply “agreed to”. The Royal Assent was authorised by 
the Speaker of the House of Commons on 22 December 1925329 and the 1100 year old 
common law defence was abrogated, and the new statutory variant came into being for 
England and Wales330 from 1 June 1926.331 
 
 
THE INEXPLICABLE ABSENCE OF REFERENCE TO R v TORPEY  
 
The clamour in 1922 for urgent law reform to abolish both the presumption and the defence of 
marital coercion, precipitated by R v Peel, had had an almost exact parallel in English law 
some 50 years earlier. The eventual pedestrian pace, leading to the enactment of s47 Criminal 
Justice Act 1925, had occurred without the slightest bit of notice having been taken by either 
the Avory Committee or the government or any Parliamentarian or indeed anyone of the 
remarkable similarity between R v Peel in 1922, and the equally sensational decision of R v 
Torpey some 50 years earlier in 1871. Half a century before R v Peel, the newspapers of the 
time, the House of Lords, and leading advocates for female emancipation and equality had all 
thundered, but for different reasons, at the condition of the law which permitted the 
presumption of marital coercion to operate to set Martha Torpey free. It is remarkable that the 
audacity of the crime and the outcome of the trial in R v Torpey,332 which so incensed the 
public and Parliamentarians alike then should have been wholly overlooked in the Avory 
Report of 1922.  Only the cursory attention paid to existing law by that Committee can excuse 
the oversight. But as neither the government nor anyone else made the linkage over the four 
year period, it is excusable only on the basis of consistency. This omission is even more 
striking in view of the detailed analysis to which the common law position was subjected in 
the House of Lords, in its Parliamentary role, in the wake of the verdict in R v Torpey and the 
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additional fact that eight years after that cause célèbre333 the Criminal Code Commission in 
1879 recommended the complete abrogation of the presumption and the defence. The lessons 
from R v Torpey were undoubtedly in the minds of those Commissioners, but had evidently 
been forgotten334 for the purposes of the policy formulation culminating in s47 Criminal 
Justice Act 1925 [UK]. 
 
 
MRS TORPEY AND THE JEWELLERY ROBBERY 
 
In January 1871, Mrs Torpey and her husband systematically335 preyed on London jewellers 
by luring them together with their precious wares into what was passed off as the plush 
Torpey residence. On the occasion which led to her arrest, Mrs Torpey had chloroformed336 
the victim337 as her husband forcibly restrained him, allowing the robbery of the jewels338 to 
be effected. But her active role was not restricted to her combinative participation in the 
                                              
333
 The Times, 30 January 1871, p10 “The circumstances of this daring and skillfully-executed robbery have, to 
judge by the large crowds who blocked the narrow approaches to the court long before the arrival of the prisoner, 
excited great interest, and the insufficiency of the accommodation provided in this court for solicitors, reporters, 
witnesses, and police cause great inconvenience to those whom business obliged to be present.”   
334
 Infra fn 355-358. The Times 4 March 1871 p8 had expressly said that “The case should not be forgotten in 
future discussions on the subject”. 
335
 The prosecution case before the magistrate during the committal proceedings leading to the eventual 
indictment was that the spouses had committed a series of robberies and similar fact evidence was adduced to 
show that the husband had attended upon a number of jewellers inviting them to call (with their jewels) at the 
Torpey residence: The Times, 10 Feb 1871 p10.  Upon the acquittal of Mrs Torpey at trial, counsel for the 
prosecution informed the Recorder that there were other indictments against the spouses, including one for a 
misdemeanour which the case law (see R v Cruse (1834) 8 Car & P 541) and institutional writers (Hawkins PC 
c1 s10) agreed no defence of marital coercion was available; drawing a distinction between cases of felony and 
misdemeanour. However, counsel for the defence denied the suggested distinction, relying on R v Price (1837) 8 
Car & P 19. After consulting Bramwell B, the Recorder ruled that the defence was available for a 
misdemeanour, whereupon the prosecution offered no evidence on the other indictments and Mrs Torpey was 
again acquitted: See R v Torpey (1871) 12 Cox CC 45, 49. The report of the trial in The Times wholly omits any 
reference to the other indictments, albeit the other crimes of robbery had been noted in its earlier report of the 
committal proceedings. At the subsequent separate trial of her husband, he admitted that they had originally 
selected another jeweller as the subject of the robbery: The Times, 3 May, 1871, p11. 
336
 “[S]he then came quietly behind prosecutor and placed a handkerchief saturated with something over his face 
and mouth, whilst the male prisoner rushed at him and clasped him round the arms in front. They struggled 
together for two or three minutes, the female prisoner constantly applying the handkerchief to prosecutor’s face, 
who, after a short time, became unconscious, and was forced by the prisoners onto a sofa.” R v Torpey (1871) 12 
Cox CC 45, 46 
337
 Mr James Unett Parkes an employee of Messrs London and Ryder, Court jewellers, of 17 New Bond Street.  
338
 Valued at over 5,000 pounds. In People v Wright (1878) 38 Mich 744 it was held that where a wife choked a 
man while her husband robbed him, it had to be left as a question of fact whether marital coercion had occurred: 
noted sardonically in Note (1890) 2 The Green Bag 560. 
   
 154 
actual violence. She had in the days in advance of it set upon a course of action without which 
the robbery could never have taken place. Her initial act was to contact the jeweller by 
sending to him, from a purported third party,339 a forged reference commending to him the 
antecedents of the Torpeys as wealthy potential customers. The husband and wife had 
rented340 residential premises in a fashionable part of London and a maidservant was attached 
to their household. Mrs Torpey, on the day of the robbery, had by a letter in her own 
handwriting, directed the maid to attend upon an errand at a fictitious address on the other 
side of London which “kept [the maid] fully occupied until after the robbery had been 
completed”.341  
 
Immediately after the robbery Mr Torpey342 departed London for the Continent. Mrs Torpey 
bolted to the south of England and three days later a female relative received from her a 
parcel containing part of the stolen jewellery. A few days later Mrs Torpey was apprehended. 
Although co-indicted with her husband she stood trial alone,343 after a magistrate had 
committed her for trial.344 At the preliminary hearing advance notice that the defence of 
marital coercion would be relied upon at trial, was explicitly raised on her behalf. It was 
submitted that the law exonerated a wife from the consequences of her act where the husband 
was present. This provoked a sharp reply345 from the magistrate, who refused to grant Mrs 
Torpey bail.346 
 
 
                                              
339
 A Madame de Madaillon who wrote that she was “( imperfectly acquainted with the English language)”: R v 
Torpey (1871) 12 Cox CC 45, 46. 
340
 No 4 Upper Berkeley Street, W. The house had been rented for a week. 
341
 R v Torpey (1871) 12 Cox CC 45,47. 
342
 He had been “educated for the Church of Rome [but] disappointed the hopes of his friends by refusing to 
enter the priesthood”: The Times, 10 February 1871 p10. 
343
 In the gaol calendar she was described as a married woman, that this did not appear on the face of the 
indictment, which contained no description of her status. However, counsel for the prosecution Mr Metcalfe had 
opened the case to the jury on the basis that she was undoubtedly a married woman: R v Torpey (1871) 12 Cox 
CC 45, 48. The implications of the prosecution acknowledging married status is dealt with infra ch 3.   
344
 She was aged 28 and was described as “a small, slender women”, bearing in the dock a 6 week-old infant in 
her arms. The case even before the magistrate attracted huge interest under an imposing headline ‘The 
Extraordinary Jewel Robbery’: The Times, 10 February 1871 p10 
345
 Mr Mansfield, Stipendiary Magistrate, remarked if that submission was the law “Mrs Manning was most 
unjustly hanged”: The Times, 30 January 1871, p10, referring to R v Manning (1849) 2 Car & K 887. 
346
 The Times, 10 February 1871, p10.   
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MRS TORPEY ON TRIAL 
 
The facts of this robbery demonstrated all the hallmarks of a carefully organised plan, 
skilfully executed by concerted action in which Mrs Torpey had been significantly or 
dominantly involved. But these allegations did not avail the prosecution a jot as Mrs Torpey 
was acquitted by an Old Bailey jury after seven minutes deliberation, on the expressly stated 
basis347 the presumption of marital coercion had not been rebutted. The jury unanimously 
concluded the wife had acted throughout under the control of her husband. In opening the 
case to the jury, counsel for the prosecution immediately told them that an issue would be 
raised by the accused that she had acted under her husband’s coercion. The prosecutor 
specifically criticised the marital coercion doctrine stating it had been “to some extent 
misunderstood in some of the earlier cases quoted in books of law; but in these days of 
civilisation a different construction was put upon it”.348  Prosecution counsel emphasised that 
both the letter of reference to the jeweller and the letter to the maid had been written by Mrs 
Torpey independently of any domineering will of her husband. In addition she had been 
responsible for committing the first act of violence, by placing a chloroform-soaked 
handkerchief over the jeweller’s face which then permitted her husband to complete the act of 
robbery. There was nothing on the state of the evidence to show that she had been compelled 
to act as she did. Counsel for the defence unsuccessfully 349submitted that there was no case 
to answer, on the basis that even if the facts appeared to show that the wife had taken a more 
active part350 than her husband, she was absolved from criminal liability by the marital 
coercion presumption.351 The Recorder emphasised that the presumption was only a prima 
                                              
347
 R v Torpey (1871) 12 Cox CC 45, 49: the jury returned the following verdict “We are of opinion that the 
whole matter was pre-arranged by the husband, and the prisoner acted under his coercion and control at the 
time”.  
348
 R v Torpey (1871) 12 Cox CC 45, 47 emphasising that the real question was whether the wife had 
“committed certain acts of violence of her own will and accord, which rendered her clearly liable for the 
consequences” and adding that although there existed “a strong presumption in favor of a married woman that 
she had acted under the influence of her husband, was very easily to be rebutted by showing that she took active 
steps towards the perpetration of the crime”. 
349
 The trial judge was Rt Hon Russell Gurney, Recorder of London, who ruled whether the presumption was 
rebutted was a matter for the jury. 
350
 Relying on R v Cruse (1834) 8 Car & P 541 and R v Archer (1826) 1Mood CC 143. 
351
 An accused person could not give evidence on the trial of a felony until the enactment of the Criminal 
Evidence Act 1898 [UK]. 
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facie one so the decision was a question for the jury.352 In his closing address, counsel for Mrs 
Torpey asked plaintively of the jury why was the wife “to be made the scapegoat of a man 
who had been coward enough to take flight and leave the weaker vessel behind”?353 
 
The Recorder354 in summing up to the jury emphasised that the issue was whether the part 
taken by Mrs Torpey showed that she was exercising her own free and independent will and 
was not coerced. He made particular reference to the fact that there was no evidence that her 
husband had been present when she dispatched the letters to the jeweller or sent off the maid 
and that the presumption only applied where a wife committed an offence in the presence of 
her husband. The overall thrust of the summing up was strongly for a conviction to be 
returned, by stressing to the jury that a wife was not always bound to obey the dictates of her 
husband.355 
 
 
REACTION TO THE ACQUITTAL OF MRS TORPEY 
 
The verdict of acquittal provoked an immediate favourable356 reaction within the courtroom 
only from supporters in the public gallery, but otherwise incited a torrent of outrage from all 
quarters.357 Two days after the acquittal a sustained sarcastic piece was published,358 written 
to denigrate the entire marital coercion doctrine. 
 
                                              
352
 The Times, 2 March 1871 p11. 
353
 Ibid. 
354
 Rt Hon Russell Gurney, Recorder of London, the trial Judge, in R v Torpey, had earlier moved the Second 
Reading of the Married Women’s Property Bill 1870 in the House of Commons, 18 May 1870. 
355
 “A woman certainly was not to do a wicked act simply because her husband directed her to do it… was [she] 
exercising an independent will, or was she acting throughout acting under her husband’s coercion?”:  R v Torpey 
(1871) 12 Cox CC 45, 49. 
356
 The Times, 2 March 1871, p11 where it is recorded of the jury’s verdict “The announcement elicited some 
applause.” That reaction led the Pall Mall Gazette to write sarcastically “the applause which greeted the acquittal 
of Martha Torpey on the occasion of her trial for the late jewel robbery will awaken a chord of sympathy in 
every manly bosom”: reprinted The Times, 18 March 1871 p11. The press reported with discomfort that the 
verdict was greeted with “to the great satisfaction, as it appeared, of the audience in court”: The Times, 4 March 
1871 p8. 
357
 The Times, 2 March 1871, p11 under a heading ‘The Great Diamond Robbery’ spat that the jury “after about 
seven minutes’ consultation, without leaving their box, returned a verdict of Not Guilty”.   
358
 The Times, 3 March 1871, p11. 
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We are sorry for the shopman. Of course, it is not pleasant to be stupefied with chloroform, to 
have the arms tightly strapped, to be threatened with instant death, and then to be robbed; but, 
after all, the ligatures which bound the limbs were not so strong as those which bound that 
loving wife to her erring husband, and shopmen when they accept these situations, should be 
prepared for the consequences of conjugal affection. 
 
The article wished the couple well with the jewels and “many years of unalloyed happiness in 
some sphere well suited to their anaesthetic tastes.” 
 
 
MEDIA REACTION IN 1871 TO MARITAL COERCION DEFENCE 
 
The Times wrote a leader359 on the case, the “Great Diamond Robbery”, which it said had 
been executed with “consummate audacity and success” such that “[i]f two men, instead of a 
man and his wife, had planned this robbery, it could not have been executed, to all 
appearances, with a more equal division of labour.” The verdict exposed a law built out of the 
fact or theory of uxorial power imbalance; a law the continuance of which was dissonant with 
the aspirations of female equality. 
 
The case deserves all the more notice on account of the demand for women’s rights and the 
equality of the sexes now preferred. How is this alleged position of a wife to be reconciled 
with the alleged rights of a woman?  How can the sexes be equal before the law if a husband 
is to be convicted and a wife acquitted of a crime which they are proven to have committed 
between them, and with as much activity on one side as the other? 
 
Martha Torpey, as a being with equal rights, ought to have been beyond undue influence or 
control; yet she is considered as so notoriously unequal and subordinate, both by nature and 
position, that it would be unjust to make her accountable for her proceedings. This plea may 
be reasonable at present, but it certainly cannot be urged in future if marriage is to be 
transformed into a commercial partnership between two persons of similar rights and 
responsibilities in the eyes of the law. 
 
                                              
359
 The Times, 4 March 1871, p8. The editorial raised the pragmatic issue as to how the prosecution would ever 
prove the cardinal question that the wife was irresponsible for her acts. It also added: “How is this alleged 
position of a wife to be reconciled with the alleged rights of a woman? How can the sexes be equal before the 
law if a husband is to be convicted and a wife acquitted of a crime which they have proved to have committed 
between them, and with as much activity on one side as on the other?”   
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The Times concluded “The case should not be forgotten360 in future discussions on the 
subject.”  
 
Millicent Garrett Fawcett361 wrote a letter endorsing the leader in The Times; “It is therefore 
evident that the presumption which secured Mrs Torpey’s discharge is not based on fact, and 
that consequently the result of this trial is an additional argument for remodelling the law 
relating to the position of married women”. A further editorial in The Times stated362 Mrs 
Torpey had become famous and her acquittal was likely to produce, if not a change in the law 
of England at least an interpretation of it “less favourable to adventuresses of her order”.363 
The editorial argued a woman who is “accustomed to defer” under the control of a resolute 
husband was in the same position as “a young daughter or an aged mother”, yet they had no 
equivalent privilege presumptively placing them beyond the criminal law. The presumption 
was noted as a rule of the type by which common law used to be distinguished, in making 
special provision for married women. But such privileges had been “gradually softened, until 
practice has almost effaced them.” The abolition of the defence was strongly urged, arguing 
that even the rationale which exempted the defence from the offence of murder was 
unjustifiable, to demonstrate that the entire defence was on analysis unjustifiable. “But 
murder was felt to be a crime which forbad technicalities, and so wives who take part in a 
murder are hanged, though, if there be any species of husband who is likely to frightening his 
wife into obeying him, it is the murderer.” 
 
A sensational364 focus on the undeserving application of the defence in favour of Mrs Torpey, 
lead the press to mock the verdict and the apparent state of the law. The existence of the 
                                              
360
 But it was completely overlooked at the trial in R v Peel and in the evolution of s47 Criminal Justice Act 1925 
[UK]. 
361
 The Times, 9 November 1871, p4. Married to a British MP, she was later co-founder of Newnham College 
Cambridge, suffragist (not suffragette).   
362
 The Times, 11 March 1871, p9. 
363
 “No session [of the criminal calendar] passes without foolish verdicts, particularly where women are in 
question. Some philosophers may think that substantial justice is done by this manly weakness, and that the 
gentler sex ought not to be subjected to the strictest rigour of the criminal law, as not possessing that strong will 
and that clear moral perception which are attributed to the other sex. The Mrs Torpeys of every generation have 
escaped through the sympathy of their judges, and will escape to the end of time.” 
364
 Even her surname became the eponymous expression for jewel robbery; an attempted similar robbery in 
Bristol in the same month was described as “Attempted “Torpey” Robbery” in The Times, 27 March 1871, p6 
lamenting that no arrest of “this Torpey No 2” had been made. 
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uxorial presumption was an implacable obstacle to the quest for female equality. This is well 
illustrated by a deeply sarcastic letter published in Punch feigning support for the plight of all 
the Mrs Torpeys in England, on the basis that actively assisting in robbery was or ought to be 
a normal incident of the matrimonial relationship. The piece deeply ridiculed those supporting 
equal rights for women.   
 
But what do the Strong-Minded women say to this case? Are they willing, for the sake of 
Equal Rights, to forego the delightful arrangement by which a married lady who does 
anything wrong is supposed to have done it under martial coercion? Or are they so confident 
in their own strongmindedness as to despise the idea that they could be ‘made’ to do 
anything?365 
 
 
HOUSE OF LORDS CONSIDERS MARITAL COERCION 
 
While the press continued their sustained invective at the law and the verdict, the wider issue 
of female equality was concurrently raised in the House of Commons.366 But in the House of 
Lords,367 Earl Stanhope368 referred to R v Torpey in some detail, as a case of a “flagrant and 
glaring instance of the violation of justice.” He urged the law under which she had succeeded 
“was doomed and its fall was near…and Martha Torpey would be entitled to public credit if 
the case led to a reformation of the law where it was much needed.” He argued if the defence 
had validity it should apply to all offences “small and great, but the truth was it was found so 
repugnant to all ideas of equity and justice that a wife should escape punishment for murder” 
that it and treason were outside the defence. Lord Stanhope argued that the just solution was 
the abolition of the presumption that currently applied to any wife “in the same way that a 
child or an idiot escaped responsibility.” He protested that it was not the incompetence of the 
jury but the “defective law” that was responsible for the miscarriage of justice. 
                                              
365
 Punch, 18 March 1871, p114, ‘The Affair-Diamond’. 
366
 The Times, 11 March, 1871, p6 under a cross heading ‘The Case Of Martha Torpey’. By an irony, on Monday 
13 March 1871 the House of Commons had been petitioned by seven men to enact the Women’s Electoral 
Disabilities Removal Bill: The Times, 14 March, 1871, p5. 
367
 In the House of Commons Mr Osborne Morgan MP gave a Notice of Motion on 21 March in the Committee 
on Supply that he would make a statement about R v Torpey “and the necessity of abolishing the rule of law in 
certain cases which exempts married women from the results of their own criminal acts”: The Times, 14 March 
1871, p5. 
368
 The Times, 11 March 1871, p6. The published index of the day’s paper made reference to two different pages 
dealing with R v Torpey; p6 ‘The Case of Martha Torpey’ and p9 ‘The Torpey Case’.   
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Lord Cairns, a former Lord Chancellor,369 asked a factual question about the trial of Mrs 
Torpey to which he plainly already possessed the answer. He enquired whether it was correct 
that Mrs Torpey had in fact made a detailed confessional statement to the police that “she had 
been the author of the robbery that her husband acted under her directions.” That statement, 
his Lordship protested, had not apparently been placed before the jury. The Lord 
Chancellor,370 Lord Hatherley371 then followed and accepted that a miscarriage of justice had 
“certainly occurred” but went out of his way to criticise the jury (not the law) and to bewail 
the unfortunate fact that prosecuting counsel at trial had never been instructed as to the fact of 
Mrs Torpey’s statements, adverted to by Lord Cairns. The law was satisfactory,372 asserted 
the Lord Chancellor. He argued the acquittal did not point to a defect in the marital coercion 
doctrine but “point[ed], if to anything, to a defect in our law with reference to the constitution 
of juries.” This retort was a standard device and a traditional refuge for a Lord Chancellor 
embarrassed by a forensic result that did not comport with the government’s existing 
jurisprudence. 
 
 
LORD CHANCELLOR CONSIDERS MARITAL COERCION DEFENCE 
 
Lord Hatherley LC, in an even more determined way than earlier then attacked the acquittal 
so as to salvage the law.  He reminded the House of Lords that before the magistrate at 
committal that, Mrs Torpey had stated “she had planned the whole, that her husband had done 
                                              
369
 1st Baron Cairns, Lord Chancellor in 1868 and as 1st Earl Cairns, Lord Chancellor 1874-1880. 
370
 1st Baron Hatherley, Lord Chancellor 1868-1872. 
371
 To conflate wives with infant and lunatics in terms of disability of criminal responsibility was the orthodox 
contemporary classification in criminal law texts. The Lord Chancellor added consistently with the viewpoint of 
Earl Stanhope, there were offences outside the defence which tended “to impugn the expediency of the law 
itself.” 
372
 Ibid: noting it “has come down to us from Saxon times, and has existed a thousand years”. He added that the 
presumption was rebuttable “by proving…that the wife had acted apart from her husband and had taken part in 
the crime in his absence and free from his control.” He stressed Mrs Torpey had indubitably written the 
fraudulent reference as well as the written direction to the maidservant, in the absence of her husband. But, these 
were acts preparatory to the offence of robbery and although designed to create conditions for it were not 
elements of the offence of robbery, the Lord Chancellor’s emphasis on these two incidents to highlight the 
absence of the husband as being a disqualifying factor for the application of the defence, was simply beside the 
point. If may be the jury also gave no weight to the same sort of analysis made by the Lord Chancellor and 
prosecutor at trial. The Recorder had pointedly told the jury that the presumption was unavailable in relation to 
either incident.     
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nothing in the matter, and that she was the author and contriver of it.” Therefore he concluded 
“the law, whatever its merits or demerits, was not the cause of the woman’s escape373 from 
condign punishment.” A second argument was because the indictment374 had charged Mrs 
Torpey “as [Mr Torpeys] wife”, no inquiry was able to be made at the trial by the prosecution 
as to whether there actually existed a valid or any marriage. This was clearly an attempt to 
impeach by innuendo the acquittal by implying that a lawful marriage as a foundational 
requirement of the defence had never existed; again with the implication that the law as it 
stood was itself thoroughly sound. 
 
   
LORD CHANCELLOR RECOMMENDS SCOTTISH LAW FOR ENGLAND 
 
Lord Hatherley then referred to a communication with Lord Colonsay, a Scottish Law Lord, 
who had informed him that under Scottish law375 a woman could be acquitted on the ground 
of her husband’s “coercion”, but that in Scotland there was no presumption of marital 
coercion. The Lord Chancellor stated that on this point the Scottish position was preferable to 
that under English law, but as any consequential reform would involve the  
 
larger department of the law as to husband and wife – how far she should be allowed to act as 
a free agent in the disposal of her property,376 and other questions – and it would not be right 
on the spur of the moment and on a single377 case to hurry into an alteration of the law. 
                                              
373
 He attributed the acquittal to the fact that “[t]there was one unfortunate circumstance which I am afraid we 
cannot prevent – the appearance of the prisoner in the dock with an infant in her arms. (A laugh) That was a very 
effective feature of this case.”  
374
 This was factually incorrect. No reference at all to Mrs Torpey’s marital status appeared on the face of the 
indictment. She was indicted as “Martha Torpey” without any description, rank, occupation or status expressed: 
R v Torpey (1871) 12 Cox CC 45 where this point is expressly made. 
375
 This assertion by Lord Colonsay is inconsistent with the law expressed in every Scottish law text which 
unanimously stated that Scotland had never adopted any variant of marital coercion as its criminal law. The 
general defence of duress was available, which applied to married women as much as any other person. Lord 
Colonsay had instanced H M Advocate v Burke and Hare (1828) where Mrs Burke had been acquitted on the 
basis of “coercion”. It may be that the Lord Chancellor by adopting the word “coercion” in his speech really 
intended to use the different term “duress”. But that inference seems unlikely as it is countered by the Lord 
Chancellor’s immediate and explicit comparison with the law of England in relation to coercion “I do not think it 
would be tolerated in this country that a woman should be convicted when the crime was clearly shown to have 
been committed under the husband’s coercion”. But the existing general defence of duress would have amply 
covered that very situation. 
376
 Only the rudimentary Married Women’s Property Act 1870 [UK] was then in force. It was not until the Act of 
1882 that any substantial equivalence of matrimonial property rights was granted. 
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MEDIA REJECT LORD CHANCELLOR’S APPROVAL OF MARITAL COERCION 
DOCTRINE 
 
The Times378 noted the Lord Chancellor “thinks the miscarriage of justice is due solely to the 
jury… [i]f this view be right, there is nothing more to be said”. It was apparent the Lord 
Chancellor’s explanation was as unconvincing as it was inconvenient. The fault lay with the 
law not the application of it as there was “no reason why the question whether the wife was a 
free agent should not be decided in all cases by the jury, on the evidence as it comes before 
them, without any presumption at all.” The notion of presumed innocence already existed in 
the criminal law and to add upon it the additional presumption of marital coercion was to 
stack the system too highly in favour of any woman. The very fact of the defence was an 
unjustifiable affirmative discrimination in favour of all women irrespective of their own 
position. 
 
 
MR TORPEY ARRESTED AND GOES ON TRIAL 
 
Mr Michael Torpey379 was eventually apprehended380 in England after his jaunt in Belgium381 
where he had sold at a vast undervalue most of the diamonds the proceeds of the robbery. He 
                                                                                                                                             
377
 But there had been numerous acquittals. There had been significant negative commentary by judges as to the 
continued existence of the presumption, if not the doctrine itself. 
378
 The Times, 11 March 1871, p9, adding that “the question is whether a married woman should be excused 
from using due courage in resisting iniquitous commands.” 
379
 The Times, 15 April, 1871, p10, aged 28.   
380
 Ibid p10, under the heading ‘Capture Of Michael Torpey’. A minor sequel occurred in Pitt v Ryder The 
Times, 14 December, 1871, p8, which was an action to recover the reward of £100 which had been offered by 
the Bond Street jeweller to anyone giving information leading to the recovery of his property and the conviction 
of the Torpeys. The plaintiff kept a lodging-house and claimed that by her information Mrs Torpey and her 
husband were arrested. Before Hannen J a civil jury found the defendant jeweller liable to pay £56, reflecting the 
proportion of the recovered jewellery: The Times, 15 December, 1871, p11. By an oddity defence counsel at trial 
for Mrs Torpey was one of the counsel for the plaintiff Miss Pitt: The Times, 14 December, 1871, p8.  Miss 
Charlotte Pitt of Leamington had reported her suspicions to the police and had taken to them a letter Mrs Torpey 
had asked her to post to a “Mr Thornton, Poste Restante, Ostend”, which they read. Mrs Torpey was then 
arrested. The Times, 10 February 1871, p10. Miss Pitt gave evidence at the committal proceedings against 
Michael Torpey: The Times, 21 April, 1871, p11. 
381
 Ibid p10. Upon his arrest amongst his possessions was “a Bible, and a book called ‘The Garden of the Soul’, 
in which was the name “Michael Torpey”.  
   
 163 
was brought, initially unrepresented,382 before the same magistrate. On the next occasion 
evidence was given by Mr Ryder the jeweller that of the 37 diamonds found on Torpey he 
was able to identify one in particular383 as having been taken from his employee. Torpey was 
then committed for trial at the next session384 of the Central Criminal Court before which he 
pleaded guilty385 in front of the same judge who had presided over the trial of his wife. The 
Recorder stated that the robbery “had been carefully and artfully conceived, and carried out 
with extraordinary determination and violence, resulting in success”.386 He was sentenced to 
eight years imprisonment. 
 
 
THE CRIMINAL CODE COMMISSIONERS OF 1879 
 
The Royal Commissioners on the Criminal Code387 were tasked with the preparation of 
codifying the indictable offences under English law. Lord Blackburn was the chairman and 
another of the four members was Sir James Fitzjames Stephen. A few years after R v Torpey 
Stephen wrote (with “the assent of the Attorney General”) to The Times388 appending to his 
letter a lengthy synopsis of the code, in an effort to attract public support389 for it. It 
highlighted its major proposals, which were divided into two classes, with Class I390 being 
“the more important of the proposed changes” to the substantive criminal law. The abrogation 
of marital coercion featured prominently as Item 2 in Class I: 
                                              
382
 Ibid p10. A police officer gave evidence that Mrs Torpey had been constantly watched by detectives since she 
had been set at liberty upon her acquittal.   
383
 The Times, 21 April, 1871, p11 under the heading ‘The Jewel Robbery’, the centre stone described as “a thick 
and very peculiar one”.   
384
 The Times, 28 April, 1871, p11 specifically noted that the next session would commence “on 
Monday…Among the prisoners for trial is Michael Torpey for the great jewel robbery”.  
385
 The Times, 3 May 1871, p11, under the heading ‘The Great Diamond Robbery’. Counsel for the prosecution 
stated that since his apprehension Torpey had volunteered a statement explaining that he and his wife had lost 
£700 on horseracing. The concept for the robbery arose in the minds of himself and his wife after “reading a 
work of fiction in which a similar crime, in the mode of executing it, were portrayed”.   
386
 The Times, 2 May 1871, p11. 
387
 ‘Report of the Royal Commission appointed to consider The Law Relating to Indictable Offences: With An 
Appendix containing a Draft Code embodying the Suggestions of the Commissioners’, Her Majesty’s Stationery 
Office, London, 1879, Cmnd 2345, p10 (The Commissioners sat between May 1878 and April 1879). See 
generally John Hostettler ‘Politics and Law in the Life of Sir James Fitzjames Stephen’ 1995 Barry Rose Law 
Publishers, Chichester, p175 ff. 
388
 The Times, 27 June 1878 p10. 
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 Ibid p10.   
390
 Which contained 17 numbered proposals. Class II contained 55 such proposals. 
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MARITAL COERCION 
2. By the existing law a married woman committing a crime in her husband’s presence is 
presumed to have acted under his coercion, and is excused thereby. It is doubtful to what 
crimes this rule extents, and coercion is not held to be an excuse for crime in the case of 
persons other than married woman. By Section 22 one rule is laid down for all persons alike, 
whether married women or not. The rule is believed to express the existing law in all cases 
other than the case of married women. 
 
He entreated that the necessary legislation “can be discussed during the present session [of 
Parliament]” and expected that the publication of his letter setting out the draft would provide 
a platform for constructive discussion so that England and Wales could shortly have a 
Criminal Code.   
 
Later, in the formal Report of the Royal Commission appointed to consider the ‘Law Relating 
to Indictable Offences’391 at p18 the Commissioners dealt very tersely with the law of marital 
coercion: 
 
 With regard to compulsion we have already expressed our views. We recommend the 
abolition of the presumption as to the coercion of married women by their husbands. Upon the 
matter of compulsion generally the Draft Code and the Bill differ, but we need not notice their 
difference.  
 
In the appendix to the Report the Commissioners they set out their Draft Code. Section 23 of 
it refers to p10 of the Report and Note A. 
 
 Compulsion by threats of immediate death or grievous bodily harm from a person actually 
present at the commission of the offence shall be an excuse for the commission of any offence 
other than high treason as hereinafter defined in section 75 sub-sections (a) (b) (c) and (e), 
murder, piracy, offences deemed to be piracy, attempting to murder, assisting in rape, forcible 
abduction, robbery, causing grievous bodily harm, and arson:  Provided that the person under 
compulsion believes that such threat will be executed: Provided also that he was not a party to 
any association or conspiracy the being party to which rendered him subject to such 
compulsion. No presumption shall henceforth be made that a married woman committing an 
offence in the presence of her husband does so under compulsion.392 
 
                                              
391
 George Eyre & William Spottiswoode, ‘Law Relating to Indictable Offences’, Her Majesty’s Stationery 
Office 1879 at p18. 
392
 It is to be noted that draft became almost identically s24 Criminal Code Act 1893 [NZ] and the technique of 
listing exceptions has been adopted in the modern defence of compulsion in s24(2) Crimes Act 1961 [NZ]. 
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A number of reasons393 have been advanced for the failure to enact the Code: the extensive 
changes it made in the law, criticism by Chief Justice Cockburn that it amounted to only 
partial codification of the criminal law, lack of Parliamentary time and the change of 
government in 1880. Three additional reasons have been subsequently proffered for its 
demise: organised labour’s reservations, concern about the quality of Stephen’s work shared 
by a number of influential people and the detailed programme of gradual reform put forward 
by the Statute Law Committee.394 The 1879 Code was never enacted but its attempt to 
eradicate marital coercion was still in the mind of the profession.395 It was therefore even 
more surprising that in the creation of the 1925 provision no recourse had ever been made to 
the periodic attempts to remove the presumption and the defence. There had been a formal 
recommendation in 1845396 by the Criminal Law Commissioners to abolish the presumption 
some 80 years before s47 was enacted yet there was no reference during the Parliamentary 
Debates or the internal government papers to any of these repeated historical attempts to show 
that the law had fallen out of correspondence with its environment.  
 
In R v Peel Darling J had made a ruling on the law of marital coercion which three years later 
led to the new statutory defence. His second ruling, although obiter, was that two spouses 
                                              
393
 M L Friedland, ‘R.S Wright’s Model Criminal Code: A Forgotten Chapter in the History of Criminal Law’, 
(1981) 1 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 307, 324. A contemporary American journal had favourably reviewed 
the English Code noting that the “comments of the English press upon this bill would lead one to suppose that it 
was likely to be passed; but the government have lingered over it, and a long letter from the Lord Chief Justice 
of England, which was printed along the Parliamentary documents last summer, may lead one to some distrust; 
the Lord Chief Justice closes his letter with a statement of his “profound conviction that the bill is as yet far from 
being in a condition in which it ought to become law”: Review (1880) 14 American Law Review 68, 69; noting at 
p71 that marital coercion is to be abrogated. 
394
 Sir Rupert Cross, ‘The Making of English Criminal Law: (6) Sir James Fitzjames Stephen’, [1978] Crim LR 
652, 657. Its “fate had already been sealed by a letter from [Lord Chief Justice] Cockburn to [Attorney General] 
Holker dated 12 June 1879. Its synchronisation with the publication of the Royal Commission’s report can 
hardly been a coincidence”. A particular point noted was that the proposed Bill would alter the substantive law 
on a number of points: the accused would become a competent witness, the abolition of the distinction between 
felonies and misdemeanours and “the abolition of marital coercion”. Described as “progressive changes”. 
395
 W Knox Wigram ‘The Justices’ Notebook’ (1885) 4 ed, London: Stevens and Sons, 119 Chancery Lane, Law 
Publishers and Booksellers, p252 “Criminal Liability of Wife – According to a superstition which, Blackstone 
tells us, is upwards of a thousand years old, if a woman commit theft, burglary, or other like indictable offence in 
company with her husband, she is to be considered as acting under his coercion and treated as irresponsible. But 
murder or manslaughter are not thus to be exhausted. This venerable doctrine would at last have had its day if the 
Criminal Code Bill of a recent session had become law of the land. As regards non-indictable offences, 
cognisable under summary jurisdiction, a married woman has always been held answerable for herself. A 
husband and wife, if joint offenders, may be jointly charged, and jointly or severally convicted. But, in any case, 
if a wife be sentenced to a fine, she must pay or provide her own penalty, or undergo the alternative 
imprisonment, as her husband’s goods cannot be levied upon for the amount.” 
396
 Criminal Law Commissioners, Second Report, (1845) vol 24 Parliamentary Papers, pp12-13. 
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could not alone conspire together at common law. That ruling also had a lineage of over a 
thousand years. The husband, by status of marriage, also qualified for this special position in 
the criminal law. To examine the history, justification and refutation for that exemption this 
work now turns. It will be found that what Darling J had said was the position at common law 
in England, was some 50 years later affirmed there by statute. But other common law 
jurisdictions have denied the exemption as being unnourished by reason or valid social policy. 
The lengthy gestation period leading to s47 Criminal Justice Act 1925 was a function of the 
instability of successive British governments during 1922-1925. The Avory Committee had 
compiled its report for the Lord Chancellor, a document replete with controversial 
assumptions as to the existing law and containing demonstrable errors as to the status of the 
law in other common law jurisdictions that it had sampled. It was a shallow document, hastily 
written in less than three weeks. However, the committee had formidable experience in 
substantive criminal law and its unequivocal recommendation that the entire marital coercion 
doctrine be finally put asunder was ignored. That recommendation was consonant with the 
momentum of recent British legislation equalising the rights and responsibilities between men 
and women.  No substantial reason was satisfactorily advanced for bypassing the Avory 
Committee conclusion – even a petulant letter from Avory J complaining to the Attorney 
General about the report being disregarded did not elicit a meaningful response. An upshot of 
the manner in which the legislation came into being was that the section was created without 
any consideration of the directly relevant debates in the House of Lords and the media in 
1871, consequent upon the audacious acquittal in R v Torpey. Apart from an unsatisfactory 
cryptic insight provided by the Solicitor-General in the House of Commons that “coercion” 
extended to the influence of the “spiritual” dimension, at no stage (in its internal work or 
otherwise) did the government ever seek to define the critical noun in the legislation. There 
was never any direct commentary on the allocation of the burden and standard of proof. Nor 
was it ever contemplated that the defence would be available to women living in the nature of 
marriage, despite a last-minute objection to this omission from one parliamentarian in an 
attempt to derail the entire proposal. The legislation ignored doctrinal and structural criticisms 
that had been particularised by Atkin LJ, which were also sidelined without engaging (for 
political convenience) in the substantive issues that had wide criminal law implications. The 
fundamental defect of the legislation was that it only protected a sub-class of womanhood 
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from the criminal law when the overwhelming ethos was directed at eliminating exactly those 
types of discriminatory distinctions, which had generally existed to the detriment of women. 
The legislation met the paternalistic aspirations of the Conservative government that wives, as 
a special class of woman, also still needed special protection in relation to their husbands 
under the criminal law.397 This legislation, which still exists, was a progression in the criminal 
law but not a development of it. One of the first female solicitors ever admitted in England 
said in the very year it was passed: 
 
In several respects women are still subject to legal disabilities; but there can now be little 
doubt that the effect of the changes which have been made has been to alter the very principles 
of English Law with regard to the status of women. These changes have been gradual and 
unsystematic; alterations have been made in one branch of the law independently of 
alterations in other branches.398 
 
                                              
397
 In the same year Parliament had enacted the Summary Jurisdiction (Separation and Maintenance) Act 1925 
[UK], Guardianship of Infants Act 1925 [UK] and the Administration of Estates Act 1925 [UK], all designed to 
eliminate distinctions between men and women. The Sex Disqualification (Removal) Act 1919 [UK] had 
eliminated discrimination on the basis of gender or marriage in relation to the exercise of public functions or in 
the appointment to or holding of any civil or judicial office. 
398
 Maud I Crofts ‘Women Under English Law’ (1925) The National Council of Women of Great Britain, 
London, p xi.  
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3 
 
STATUTORY DEFENCE OF MARITAL COERCION 
 
 
 
 
 
THE NEW STATUTORY DEFENCE: INITIAL REVIEWS 
 
In 1922, the very year that R v Peel1 was decided, ‘Stephen’s Commentaries on the Laws of 
England’2 had remarked in a non-committal way that, “the expediency of maintaining the rule 
[of marital coercion] has from time to time been questioned.” After R v Peel, Professor Percy 
H Winfield3 in 1925, castigated the presumption as, “one of the most stupid presumptions 
                                              
1
 A number of biographies have referred to the trial of R v Peel:  R Wild & D Curtis-Bennett, ‘King’s Counsel: 
The Life of Sir Henry Curtis-Bennett’ (1938) Macmillan Company, New York, p99 states the Peel trial was 
popularly known as “the Society Turf Sensation” as Capt Peel was well known on the turf. The trial was 
followed by a fashionable society and racing crowd. At p101 the authors stated: “Curtis had shown the absurdity 
of the law as it stood. And when the Press rumbled and thundered on the theme the next day, the judgment was 
also criticised as being an illustration of one law for the rich and another for the poor, since a month before, a 
labourer had been sent to prison with hard labour for a similar offence. The law, which Sir Charles Darling had 
called “a melancholy doctrine” was now called “musty and antiquated, a fly-blown legal doctrine”. Quite 
wrongly it was said at p.101: “The Peel case was the last, therefore, in which the doctrine was heard that a 
woman was inevitably under the influence of her husband”. Sidney Theodore Felstead, ‘Sir Richard Muir A 
Memoir of a Public Prosecutor’(1927), John Lane The Bodley Head Limited, London p367-368 states, “The 
main object in the defence was that Mrs Peel should be saved from prison and, although those responsible for it 
would have preferred to have gotten a clear acquittal from the jury, they could not afford to risk not undertaking 
what they considered the perfectly safe point of coercion.” Douglas G Browne, ‘Sir Travers Humphreys A 
Biography’ (1960) George G Harrap & Co Ltd, London, p193-197. At p196, “She had signed eight of the forty-
five telegrams, she had obtained the name of the winning horse from her caller on the telephone, and she had 
helped to enter that name on the forms. It had to be shown – and this was the difficulty – that such actions did 
not come under the head of conspiracy”. The autobiography, ‘Lord Darling and His Famous Trials’, Hutchinson 
& Co (Publishers) Ltd, London, (undated) does not refer to R v Peel as a trial that met the author’s classification. 
It may be inferred that Lord Darling did not wish to be remembered by his ruling. At p263-266 his maiden 
speech in the House of Lords is reproduced and at p265 there is an allusion to R v Peel. 
2
 Edward Jenks (ed) ‘Stephens Commentaries on the Laws of England’ (1922) 17 ed, Butterworth & Co, London, 
vol ix, p29. 
3
 ‘The Chief Sources of English Legal History’, (1925) Harvard University Press, Cambridge at p44. He 
criticised Darling J for insufficient attention to the original texts noting that R v Peel was a “curious illustration 
of the need for a complete legal bibliography in general and of Anglo-Saxon law in particular.” A review of the 
1922 text by F L Attenborough, ‘The Laws of the Earliest English Kings’, noted it was the first English version 
of the Saxon laws since Benjamin Thorpe’s 1840 work for the Record Commission which states “Anglo-Saxon 
law is not so exclusively the property of the antiquarian as might be imagined.  In March, 1922 … a wife was 
acquitted on the ground of that irrational presumption of marital coercion which still disfigures the English 
criminal law. The learned Judge traced this doctrine back to the Laws of Ine, No 57 of which provides “if a 
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which still disfigures our criminal law”. Upon the passage of s47 Criminal Justice Act 1925 
[UK], with the demise of the presumption, legal commentators turned to evaluate the modern 
defence and understand how it differed from its common law counterpart. It did not take long 
at all for textbook writers to provide initial commentary, as two monographs4 on the Act were 
very quickly published.   Both monographs were in turn reviewed immediately upon 
publication5 with one text described as “very workmanlike” and the other being reviewed 
even less favourably, particularly as it scarcely confronted the “difficulties of construction 
that may arise” in s47. 
 
That reviewer, concluded6 the critical noun “coercion” in s47, should bear the meaning “that 
it bears elsewhere in the criminal law”; a curious observation as that word was only known 
there as a synonym for compulsion in the context of the common law defence of duress. If 
“coercion” now only meant duress, then the new statutory defence was not only otiose, but in 
attempting to deal with the special position of married women it had now placed them in a 
significantly disadvantaged position, in comparison to that of all other persons. For by this 
remedial legislation married women, exclusively, would bear the onus of proof to establish 
the duress-like defence of coercion, which under the common law defence of duress, by 
contrast, remained throughout firmly on the prosecution to disprove. It would be a radical 
conclusion that the new statute had not only removed the common law uxorial privilege, but it 
had now inflicted upon only married women, a new and striking legal disability. Married 
women would have had their prior privilege toppled and instead of gender-equality would be 
now subject to a special liability distinguishing them from all others. Further, it had never 
been a requirement of the general law of duress, unlike in the marital coercion statute, that the 
offence be committed “in the presence of her husband”, therefore, leading to the conclusion 
                                                                                                                                             
husband steals a beast and carried it into his house, and it is seized therein, he shall forfeit his share of the 
household property, but the wife is exempt because she must obey her Lord”. 
4
 Albert Lieck and ACL Morrison (1926) ‘The Criminal Justice Act 1925, with explanatory notes’, Stevens & 
Sons Ltd (respectively the Chief Clerks of the Marlborough Street and Lambeth Police Courts, London). The 
second monograph was R E Otter and G B McClure, ‘The Criminal Justice Act 1925, with notes’, Gordon E 
Touche & Frederic E Ruegg, London (1926) (respectively a retired judge of the Supreme Court of Rangoon and 
a barrister; McClure was then co-editor of R E Ross and G B McClure (eds), ‘Sir W O Russell: A Treatise on 
Crimes and Misdemeanours’ (1923) 8 ed) Sweet & Maxwell, London. 
5
 [1926] 42 LQR 541, ‘Coercion of Wives and the Criminal Justice Act 1925’.     
6
 Ibid at 541.   
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that the new defence of coercion, was a significantly more limited one than that generally 
available to even other women. 
 
Master Diamond pre-emptively and inconsistently concluded that common law insights as to 
what “coercion” meant were of no assistance in construing the section (having earlier decided 
that the continuity of common law meaning applied), as those cases had only determined on 
their own facts whether the presumption applied or was rebutted. This was a direct attack on 
common law method. Diamond contented himself that the “explanation of this pretty puzzle” 
was the rejection of the recommendation of the Avory Committee to abrogate the entire 
doctrine.7 In particular he criticised “some loose language” in the monograph by Lieck and 
Morrison, as to their opinion of the effect of s47. They had stated: 
 
Coercion, we suggest, would include previous ill-usage designed by the husband to enforce 
compliance with his criminal purposes generally, whether this operated by breaking the wife’s 
spirit, or by arousing fear of future ill-treatment. Prolonged moral domination by the husband, 
the wife being reduced to a meek condition in which she habitually followed his instructions, 
would operate as coercion on a particular occasion. A threat to cut off supplies, so that she and 
her children would suffer shortage of food and shelter, would, if believed, be coercion. 
Insistent entreaty with a veiled suggestion that she would be abandoned for a more compliant 
female partner might well be coercion.8 
 
Those authors,9 in their first edition explained that s47 was put into its form to avoid the 
controversy whether the effect of simply abolishing the presumption was to do away with the 
whole doctrine of coercion. The section as enacted, left open the defence and therefore 
affirmed the remainder of the doctrine. But there was no inkling of what specially constituted 
“coercion”, as compulsion by physical force or by fear was always a long-standing general 
defence. The authors concluded that to show coercion; “she has, we suggest, to show she 
                                              
7
 Lieck and Morrison were also criticised at p91 of their book, for theorising that the probable effect of public 
opinion would tend to narrow the operation of the defence. In [1928] LQR 127, Diamond reviewed the second 
edition of the work and noted the authors had removed the portion of the explanatory note to which he had taken 
objection. He asserted there was no useful purpose in an authoritative forecast of the sense in which the courts 
will interpret s4, complaining “It is useless to lay it down, for example ‘insistent entreaty with a veiled 
suggestion that she would be abandoned for a more compliant female partner might well be coercion’ of a wife 
by her husband.” 
8
 Albert Lieck and ACL Morrison, ‘The Criminal Justice Act, 1925, with Explanatory Notes’ (1926) Stevens and 
Sons Ltd, Chancery Lane, London p90-91. 
9
 Ibid p90.  Note the similar discussion in (1923) JP 245, 248. 
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acted under his direction. She acted in reasonable fear of painful consequences, or was so 
subject to her husband that she had no real will of her own”. This was insipid stuff. 
 
The special relationship of husband and wife might realistically mean that a wife often 
cannot, except at the risk of grave inconvenience or suffering to herself and her children, 
escape from that relationship. From that it could lead to a conclusion that intraspousal threats 
are potentially as a class, more serious, as opportunities for carrying them out and fear of their 
execution will be constantly reinforced by cohabitation. Actual assaults, besides their 
immediate pain and ego-displacement, will induce apprehension of recurrent violence. 
 
A little later, Anthony Hawke,10 the editor of ‘Roscoe’s Digest of the Law of Evidence’, in the 
first edition published after the passage of the Criminal Justice Act 1925 [UK] referred to 
“s47 Criminal Justice Act 1915” (sic) and concluded that although the presumption had gone 
the Act now puts the onus on a wife of proving she was acting under her husband’s coercion. 
Unhelpfully the author states, “it is impossible at present to get any guide as to what a wife, 
who has committed an offence in her husband’s presence, will have to prove in order to put 
forward this defence successfully”. The authors of ‘Harris’s Criminal Law’11 suggested that 
the elusive feature of coercion was that it now conflated moral coercion with violence and 
threats of physical violence, thereby distinguishing it from the common law concept of 
duress. 
 
The leading English text-writers were plainly perplexed by the scope of the defence. The 
initial commentaries were tentative and opaque.12 The essence of the new defence was seen as 
                                              
10
 ‘Roscoe’s Digest of the Law of Evidence and the Practice in Criminal Cases (chiefly on indictment) in 
England and Wales’ (1928) 15 ed, Stevens & Sons Ltd, London. At p1153. Anthony Hawke ‘Roscoe’s Digest of 
the Law of Evidence and the Practice in Criminal Cases (chiefly on indictment) in England and Wales’ (1928) 
15 ed, Stevens & Sons Ltd, London. This edition of Roscoe was the first published after the passage of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1925 [UK]. At p1153 the author refers to s47 Criminal Justice Act 1915 (sic) and concludes 
that although the presumption has gone, the defence of coercion is still available.  
11
 H A Palmer & Henry Palmer, ‘Harris’s Criminal Law’ (1954) 19 ed, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, London. At p24, 
they rely upon R v Tyler & Price per Lord Denman CJ. In the 20 ed published in 1960 by the same authors, there 
was now only an anodyne reference to s47 Criminal Justice Act 1925. The reality may have been that there 
simply was no case law and no proportionate need to discuss the separate statutory offence.   
12
 Anthony Hawke, ‘Roscoes Digest of the Law of Evidence and the Practice in Criminal Cases (Chiefly on 
Indictment) in England and Wales’ (1928) 15 ed, Stevens and Sons Ltd, London, p73: ‘It is impossible at present 
to give any guide as to what a wife, who has committed an offence in her husband’s presence, will have to prove 
   
 172 
a facet of civil subjection, namely conjugal subjection. Coercion they reasoned had to be 
actively13 operating on the wife so that if the husband was immobile, he was incapable of 
coercion, and the defence ought to fail. But this approach wholly overlooks the effects of the 
moral dimension and the power of psychological control of the duressor, which need not be 
reinforced by physical power. It was argued14 that marital coercion was no general defence as 
“the apprehension of personal danger does not furnish any excuse for assisting in doing any 
act which is illegal.”15  But this too is unsustainable – the defence is plainly excusatory. One 
writer16 unhelpfully concluded that: “Now it is for the wife to prove coercion, whereas 
previously the law presumed it,” but offered no commentary as to what coercion meant. In 
attempting to identify coercion, J W Cecil Turner17 found an examination of the old 
authorities on duress or compulsion quite unprofitable as “the law of the matter is both 
meagre and vague”. As to marital coercion, he argued that this “singular privilege thus 
accorded to the wife, yet denied to the child, has an obscure history,” describing it as “hesitant 
legislation,”18 as beyond a declaration that the defence existed for the benefit of every wife, 
the scope had not been identified with any particularity. Edwards,19 in 1951 asserted that there 
                                                                                                                                             
in order to put forward this defence successfully.” It was now ‘a question of fact’ under ‘s47 Criminal Justice 
Act 1915 (sic).’ The approach to coercion in the law of marriage requisites was that a marriage procured by 
threats or duress was invalid: Harford v Morris (1776) 2 Hag Con 423; Scott v Sebright (1886) 12 PD 21; 
Bartlett v Rice (1894) 72 LT 122. 
13
 Alexander Cairns, ‘Eversley’s Law of the Domestic Relations’ (1937) 5 ed, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, London, 
p159. In R v Pollard, cited in R v Cruse (1837) 8 Car & P 541, the defence at common law failed when the crime 
was carried out at the direction of a bed-ridden husband. The common law requiring a direct physical presence 
rather than a long range psychological one. The rationale appears to be based on the ability of the husband to 
reinforce his command by physical abuse of the wife.  
14
 A M Wilshere, ‘Harris’s Principles and Practice of the Criminal Law’ (1950) 18 ed, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, 
London, p22-23. 
15
 Adopting R v Tyler and Price (1838) 8 Car & P 619. 
16
 Edward Hooton, ‘Wigram’s Justice’s Note-Book’ (1951) 15 ed, Stevens & Sons Ltd, London, p206. 
17
 J W Cecil Turner, ‘Kenny’s Outlines of Criminal Law’, (1952)16 ed, Cambridge University Press, p54. J Ll J 
Edwards ‘Compulsion, Coercion and Criminal Responsibility’, (1951) 14 Modern Law Review 297 stated that 
“the absence of any satisfactory modern authority” demonstrated the rarity of the defence. 
18
 Noting that the trial judge in R v Caroubi had repudiated the entire doctrine in 1911, (“when a woman was 
regarded as far more a chattel of her husband than she was since the Married Women’s Property Act, she was 
considered to be free from guilt although she agreed with her husband to do the thing. I am bound to instruct you 
that is not the law to-day”: R v Caroubi (1912) 7 Cr App R 149, 150. But that it was reinstated by the court of 
Criminal Appeal in 1912 quashing the conviction and explicitly stating that “The law is correctly laid down is a 
passage cited from 1 Hale 516”: (1912) 7 Cr App R 149, 152 (CCA).    
19
 J Ll Edwards ‘Compulsion, Coercion and Criminal Responsibility’, (1951) 14 MLR 297, 313. 
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existed “a considerable proportion of married women who regard their husbands as their lord 
and master, to disobey whose commands would be unthinkable”.20 
 
Professor Glanville Williams in his seminal text, ‘Criminal Law: The General Part’,21 
examined duress at common law. The English Criminal Law Commissioners of 1833 had 
admitted duress as a defence to all crimes except treason and homicide. The draft Code of 
1879 provided a more limited defence of duress and it was substantially embodied in the 
criminal law of: Canada,22 New Zealand,23 Tasmania,24 Queensland,25 Western Australia26 
and India.27 Glanville Williams noted that the legal burden of proof has always been on the 
prosecution to negative common law duress.28 He found the language of the new section to be 
so impenetrable that resort to the common law to supplement its deficiencies would be 
needed. Some writers29 still clung to the belief that wives needed a wider protection than that 
given to all others by duress, on the ground that something of the notion of subordination still 
survived in social mores, yet Stephen, who held the special defence in contempt, had stated 
bluntly seventy years earlier that it was absurd to give a wife more protection than that given 
to her 15 year old daughter.30 The outcome provided by the new statute was that a wife 
involved in a non-exempt offence had a complete defence, no matter how grave her conduct 
was. Yet the legislation imposed no overt requirement that the quantum of marital coercion 
should be compared with the gravity of the offence: a precursor to the integration of 
proportionality of response, with subjectivity of perception of the threat. 
 
                                              
20
 See: Law Commission Working Paper No 55 para 63 and Law Commission No 83, ‘Criminal Law: Report on 
Defences of General Application’, (July 1977) para 3.8. 
21
 Glanville Williams, ‘Criminal Law: The General Part’ (1958) Stevens & Sons Ltd, London. 
22
 s20 Criminal Code [Can] 
23
 s44 Crimes Act [NZ] 
24
 s20(1) Criminal Code [Tas] 
25
 s31 Criminal Code [Qld] 
26
 s31 Criminal Code [WA] 
27
 s94 Penal Code [Ind] 
28
 R v Purdy (1945) 10 J Cr L 182. Glanville Williams “The Criminal Law : The General Part’ (1962) 2 ed p 765 
29
 Eg, Edwards, ‘Compulsion, Coercion and Criminal Responsibility’, (1951) 14 MLR 297, 311. ‘Coercion – 
The Peel Case’, (1922) 86 JP 137, 139 “No one is prepared to deny that there may still be numerous cases in 
which women are dominated by their husbands. But the point is that it is no longer reasonable to presume that 
such is the case.” R v Robins (1982) 66 CCC (2d) 550, 563 (Qué: CA): “No one continues to believe that the 
married woman, in the presence of her husband, only acts as his puppet”. 
30
 Stephen, ‘A History of the Criminal Law in England’, (1883) Macmillan & Co, London, vol 2, p106. 
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Almost thirty years after the introduction of s47, J F Garner in The Defence of Coercion31  
stated, there “seems to be no reported decision32 on the point” as to what constituted 
‘coercion’. One significant reason for the paucity of caselaw may have been that a wife will 
avoid employing the defence because to do so she will need to give evidence, perhaps 
irremediably damaging to the character of her husband. In a joint trial her defence is likely to 
be seriously prejudicial to him.33 This problem was very much in the mind of Atkin LJ who in 
the months  before the section was enacted had argued to maintain the existing common law 
and avoid the introduction of the statutory defence because of this very consequence. What 
had not been considered though, was that the common law position probably developed 
because of the very fact that the wife had been incapable at law to give evidence at all.  Prior 
to 1898 accused persons were incompetent witnesses under English law. She therefore could 
never personally in court implicate her husband to exculpate herself. (This inability indirectly 
sustained the marriage – an original objective of Biblical imperative.) Stanley Yeo34 has 
argued that the fact of the very low volume of litigation engaging the statutory defence 
justified its elimination. A reason for the virtual absence of legal literature pertaining to it, 
includes that the defence scarcely comes before the appellate courts and is therefore not noted 
by the journals. Trial decisions ending in acquittals are only very rarely the subject of legal, as 
opposed to salacious, review. The cases may also be of an ordinary nature where there is 
simply no distinctive feature other than the deployment of the defence itself, to command 
attention.35 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
31
 Anonymous [1954] Crim LR 448, 449.  
32
 Overlooking the obscurely reported decision in R v Pierce; (1941) 5 Journal of Criminal Law 124. 
33
  
34
 ‘Coercing Wives into Crime’, (1992) 6 Australian Journal of Family Law 214 in fn 1. J C Smith & Brian 
Hogan, ‘Criminal Law’, (1992) 7 ed, Butterworths, London, p245 “it is thought that the very absence of cases in 
which it has been relied on goes a long way towards showing that it is an unnecessary anomaly at the present 
day.” This passage was not repeated in the 8 ed.  
35
 R v Quissamba (Jacqueline) 6 July 1998, Manchester Crown Court; letter from Circuit Judge Peter Lakin, 22 
July 2005. Prosecution for fraud, marital coercion relied upon, prosecution offered no evidence. 
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CASE  LAW ON s47 CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT 1925 [UK] 
  
There have been very few decisions in which the statutory defence of marital coercion has 
actually been invoked. It took twelve years after the statute before the first reference at all can 
be found of the defence being even referred to in any case, R v Wright and Wright,36 but as it 
is an attenuated comment of a subordinate court it is of little other interest. The second 
occasion was in R v Pierce37 where a wife unsuccessfully relied upon the defence, involving 
forgery of entries in a Post Office Saving Bank book. (Her husband, son and daughter all 
pleaded guilty.) She gave evidence that her husband had a dominating personality who 
became petulant if his wishes were not met and that he had required her to participate in the 
offence. The Common Serjeant directed the jury as to the meaning of ‘coercion’38 in 
accordance with the common law. The defence failed – petulance was never going to be a 
synonym for coercion. Thereafter the defence did not feature at all for some considerable 
time. But in R v Grondkowski and Malinowski,39 Lord Goddard CJ, delivering the judgment 
of the Court of Criminal Appeal had to deal on appeal with whether a separate trial should 
have been ordered between co-accused. He instanced the position where both duress and 
marital coercion may be relied upon as optimum examples when there should be a joint trial 
of spouses.  
 
Suppose, for instance, that the defence of one was that he or she was acting under the positive 
duress of the other. It would be obviously right that they should be tried by the same jury, who 
might see in one prisoner a harmless or nervous-looking little man or woman and in the other 
a savage brute whom they might deem capable of forcing his co-prisoner against his will into 
assisting in a crime. Another instance would be the case of an indictment against husband and 
                                              
36
 (1937) 1 Journal of Criminal Law 366, 367. Police v Howe (1948) 12 J Cr L 123 examines the same issue 
where marital coercion and the law relating to stolen property intersected. The wife was acquitted by directed 
verdict as in R v Brooks (1853) 6 Cox CC Jervis CJ had said: “A wife cannot be an accessory after the fact in 
receiving her husband bodily when he has committed a felony, nor can she, in my opinion, be guilty as a receiver 
of stolen goods if she receives them from him.” 
37
 (1941) 5 Journal of Criminal Law 124. 
38
 Relying upon Webster’s International Dictionary: “an application to another such force either physical or 
moral, as to induce or constrain him to do against his will something he would not otherwise have done.” The 
Common Serjeant also referred to R v Caroubi (1912) 7 Cr App R 149, where Hamilton J had said “The law is 
correctly laid down in a passage from Hale: “If it appears that the wife was principally instrumental in the 
commission of a crime, acting voluntarily and not by constraint of her husband, although he was present and 
concurred, she will be guilty and liable to punishment.”” 
39
 [1946] 1 All ER 559, 560 H. This approach was followed as to joint trials of spouses in: R v Quiring and 
Kuipers (1974) 19 CCC (2d) 337 (Sask: CA); R v Black [1970] 4 CCC 251 (BC: CA) and R (on the application 
of S v Waltham Forest Youth Court [2004] All ER (D) 590 (Mar) (DC) at p18.   
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wife; the latter is no longer presumed in law to be acting under the coercion of her husband, 
but may nevertheless prove that she was. It would be very desirable, not only in the interest of 
the prisoners, but of justice, that the same jury should try them both, and it is by no means 
beyond the bounds of possibility that so far from finding that the wife acted under the 
coercion of her husband, it might be found that the husband was coerced by the wife, and if 
the same jury ought to try them, it would be absurd to say that they should be tried 
separately.40 
 
In R v Bourne41 which involved bestiality, a husband had forced his wife to allow a dog to 
vaginally penetrate her. The husband only was charged with the offence as the wife was 
patently an unwilling victim of it. An appeal against his conviction was argued on the basis 
that the self-evident marital coercion of the wife meant that she was not capable of being a 
principal in the offence and therefore he could not have aided and abetted any notional 
offence by her. But Lord Goddard CJ dismissed the appeal on the basis that “duress” of the 
wife did not deny the wrongdoing of the duressor. In the following year a legal commentator 
referred to a “recent case at quarter sessions” (called Anonymous42) where a young married 
couple were charged with breaking and entering premises, had no means and were carrying 
on a “nomadic existence, not having any food for two days”. The husband pleaded guilty and 
the wife relied on the 1925 statutory defence on the basis that she had begged her husband not 
to commit the offence and said she would not accompany him. He had said he would leave 
her if she did not go with him and they broke into the premises and ate some of the food they 
found there. The wife was aged only 16 years and the Recorder told the jury they should not 
take any notice of fanciful threats but threats of unpleasant consequences could constitute 
                                              
40
  Where a cut-throat defence existed in which a wife denied her involvement on the basis of duress and blamed 
her husband for the murder, an application for separate trials was properly refused: R v London and London, 
unreported Court of  Appeal of Trinidad and Tobago Crim App 31 & 32/2002, 29 July 2004, Hamel-Smith, 
Jones and Kangaloo JJA cf R v Lee Shek Ching [1986] HKLR 304 (CA) where a conviction for murder was 
quashed on the basis of improper spousal joinder. Upon a retrial another conviction was entered: R v Lee Shek 
Ching [1987] HKLR 31 (CA). 
41
 (1952) 36 Cr App R 125 (CCA). The Court accepted that his overbearing negatived the existence of her mens 
rea. He was convicted as a principal in the second degree to the bestiality. Lord Goddard CJ said “If this woman 
had been charged herself with committing the offence, she could have set up the plea of duress, not as showing 
that no offence had been committed but as showing that she had no mens rea because her will was overborne by 
threats of imprisonment or violence so that she would be excused from punishment”. This passage in Bourne can 
also be criticised as it suggests duress is a matter which only affects punishment rather than liability. That would 
be heretical, as where duress applies it must lead to an acquittal unless disproved. John Beaumont, ‘Abetting 
Without a Principle: a Problem in the Law of Complicity’, (1979) 50 Northern Ireland Law Quarterly 1,13 fn 50 
notes that R v Bourne was actually argued on the basis of the defence of marital coercion, and no reason for Lord 
Goddard CJ to speak of duress instead is known. 
42
 J F Garner, ‘The Defence of Coercion’, Anonymous [1954] Crim LR 448, 449. 
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coercion. The jury acquitted the teenage wife.43 This decision is of little intrinsic legal 
interest, yet from it Garner44 extrapolated that coercion meant something “less than the duress 
per minas that would be a sufficient defence for that charge in the case of any defendant?” He 
concluded that the statutory defence must be appreciably wider than common law duress, 
otherwise the statutory defence would be wholly redundant. Eight years later no clear 
definition of ‘coercion’ existed,45 yet any evidence of initiative by a wife, would count against 
her under the defence.  
 
No example of the defence is known in the twenty years from Anonymous until 1974 when 
the defence was successfully invoked in a trial at the Central Criminal Court. In R v White 
(Heather),46 which involved a graphic fact pattern, the evidence disclosed that the defendant 
aged 20 and married for two years, had been terrorised into crime by her “dangerous and 
violent” husband, after suffering seven years of brutality. She was raped at 13, ran away from 
home at 16 and married at 18. Her husband was now serving ten years imprisonment for 13 
robberies, and had slashed her with an open razor. Another time he knocked her senseless, 
revived her and knocked her out again. When she told him she was pregnant he threatened to 
rip open her stomach, when she said she was leaving him he pointed a gun at her and said he 
would kill her. On the night he ordered her to take part in the robbery she said she was too 
frightened to disobey. Mrs White, her husband and another couple booked into a hotel, were 
shown to their room by a 16 year old female receptionist who was gagged and bound and 
thrown face down on a bed.  Mrs White and a Mrs Archbold guarded her while their 
husbands, who pleaded guilty to the offence at trial, attacked the hotel keeper downstairs. 
After a retirement of three hours Mrs White and Mrs Archbold were acquitted. 
 
                                              
43
 ‘Halsbury’s Laws of England’, 3 ed, vol 10 (1955) para 542 deals with marital coercion in six lines. A 
footnote states: “A married woman cannot be convicted as accessory after the fact to her husband’s felony or of 
receiving stolen goods from her husband. There cannot be a criminal prosecution for a libel by a husband on his 
wife or vice versa and there cannot be a conspiracy between them alone”.  
44
  J F Garner, ‘The Defence of Coercion’, [1954] Crim LR 448, 449. 
45
 J W Cecil Turner, ‘Kenny’s Outlines of Criminal Law’, (1962) 18 ed, Cambridge University Press, p65. 
46
 The Times, 16 February 1974, p3 where duress or coercion is successfully pleaded. The will of the person who 
acts under coercion has been “overborne”.   
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In 1975, the defence was tangentially considered by the House of Lords in Director of Public 
Prosecutions for Northern Ireland v Lynch,47 which held by a majority48 that on a charge of 
murder, the defence of duress was open to a person charged with aiding and abetting the 
murder. (That decision has however been repudiated by the House of Lords49 and the Privy 
Council50 although it is consonant with South African law.51) In the Court of Criminal Appeal 
for Northern Ireland, in R v Lynch,52 it had been argued that notwithstanding that s37 
Criminal Justice Act 1945 [NI]53 specifically exempted murder and treason from the defence 
of marital coercion, there was no reason why common law duress should not be available in a 
murder prosecution.54 Lord Lowry CJ giving the judgment noted that the trial judge had 
considered the effect of s37 Criminal Justice Act 1945 [NI] and had held that the section 
“gives some indication that Parliament regarded the analogous defence of duress as generally 
not available in these two cases [murder and treason]”. Further, he observed that s37 does not 
distinguish between principals in the first and second degree “which is the more significant 
because a wife acting under coercion might frequently play an auxiliary role.”55 In the House 
of Lords both Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest and Lord Simon of Glaisdale discussed the 
conceptual congruence between statutory coercion and common law duress.56 Lord Morris 
was dismissive that any material implication could be yielded from the statutory defence, for 
                                              
47
 [1975] AC 653 (HL (NI)). 
48
 Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, Lord Wilberforce and Lord Edmond-Davies; Lord Simon of Glaisdale and Lord 
Kilbrandon dissenting. Apart from a single reference by Lord Bingham of Cornhill in R v Z [2005] 2 AC 467 
para 19, noted in R v Quayle [2005] EWCA Crim 1415 at para 35 by Mance LJ, Lynch remains the only House 
of Lords decision to have considered the defence: the only Privy Council decision is the common law case of 
Brown v Attorney General for New Zealand [1898] AC 234 (PC).   
49
 This actual decision was not followed in R v Howe [1987] AC 417 (HL), but the enduring value is the 
comparative references to duress and marital coercion.   
50
 Abbott v The Queen [1977] AC 755 (PC). 
51
 S v Goliath 1972 (3) SA 1 (AD per Rumpff J ) [translation at p456] 
52
 [1975] NI 35, 46B.  In 1944 1 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 170 anticipated that s37 Criminal Justice Act 
1945 [NI] was a “very necessary reform of the common law”. 
53
 Identical to s47 Criminal Justice Act 1925 [UK]: see [1975] AC 653, p661H. 
54
 [1975] AC 653, 658 C-D Mr C M Lavery QC argued to “distinguish between coercion between husband and 
wife and duress. The former in order to operate does not require the same degree of threatening as the latter. 
Undue influence has never come within the criminal law.” At 660 H-661A Mr JBE Hutton QC (now Lord 
Hutton) for the prosecution replied that “The victim of duress has made a conscious, though unwilling, choice 
and intentionally, though reluctantly, committed a crime.” He submitted that “s37 of the Act of 1925 (sic), while 
recognising that coercion might be a good defence in all other offences, excepted murder and treason.” At 662B 
“s37 draws a distinction between the case of a wife charged in the first or second degree or as an accessory 
before the fact.”   
55
 Ibid 46 C As in R v Bourne (1952) 36 Cr App R 125 (CCA). 
56
 At 676H Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest describes the defence of marital coercion as being “analagous” to the 
defence of duress. Also 684A-E per Lord Wilberforce.  At 685 Lord Simon of Glaisdale said coercion was a 
“closely cognate juridicial concept” with duress. 
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determining the scope of duress.57 He additionally stated there were no indicia that the 
separate position of aiders and abettors had been specially considered in the formulation of 
the statutory defence.58 Lord Simon accepted that “the law for a long time”59 recognised the 
notion of uxorial obedience and specifically referred to the marital coercion position (based 
on unquestioning obedience) as understood by Bacon.60 There was “a strong presumption”61 
that every wife acted under her husband’s coercion. Lord Simon unexpectedly equipirated 
coercion as understood in the law of probate,62 with the concept in criminal law and reasoned 
that the doctrine of coercion and its limitations were of crucial significance in defining 
duress.63 The state of mind in coercion was precisely that produced by duress, but threats are 
not necessary to constitute coercion.64 He concluded that the exact scope and effect of the 
statutory defence is “obscure in the extreme”.65 Parliament had recognised coercion as a 
subsisting defence in law, without it being defined by antecedent law, nor by the statute itself. 
                                              
57
 Lord Wilberforce at 684E found that the statutory defence caused “some difficulty for it seems to reflect a 
Parliamentary opinion that murder and treason are exceptions to the defence of coercion: and if so it may seem 
difficult to differentiate the case of duress.” However, he consoled himself that the section was one of 
“considerable obscurity.” He adopted the view of Glanville Williams, ‘Criminal Law’, (1961) 2 ed, pp764-766 
that the section raises an almost insoluble problem of interpretation and is an incomplete statement of the 
common law, which therefore still exists to supplement the deficiency of the section. As a guide to the principles 
of duress, the statutory defence “such light as it shed is too dim to read by.” At 684G.      
58
 Ibid 677A. This is entirely correct.  The issue was never raised at any stage of the debates in the three years of 
the making of the defence. See infra chp 2. Note on the general issue though J Ll Edwards, ‘Duress and Aiding 
and Abetting’, (1953) 69 LQR 226 and the reply by R Cross (1953) 69 LQR 354.   
59
 Ibid 693D. 
60
 ‘Maxims’ reg 5. At that time a wife was, “like the infant or the insane…disqualified or disabled from forming 
a criminal intention”:  ibid 703C. 
61
 693D-E. The defence of coercion is a gesture of a humane system of criminal law to not hold a person 
responsible for an act or omission made as an “agonizing” decision where he is overborne. 
62
 Wingrove v Wingrove (1885) 11 PD 81, 83; Baudains v Richardson [1906] AC 169, 185 an appeal from the 
Royal Court of Jersey (Superior Number) where Lord Macnaghten distinguishes “degrading and pernicious” 
influence from ‘coercion’ which is so overbearing that it renders the actor’s conduct not his “wish and will”. In 
Szechter (orse Karsov) v Szechter [1971] P 286, 296 Sir Jocelyn Simon P himself, had referred to the 
dirimentary effect of a coercion-induced marriage. Where there was coercion, “-a yielding of the lips, not of the 
mind – it is of no legal effect”, Bishop, ‘Commentaries on the Law of Marriage and Divorce’, (1881) 6 ed, vol 1, 
p177, para 210. Christine Davies, ‘Duress and Nullity of Marriage’, (1972), 88 LQR 549, 551, notes Cooper v 
Crane [1891] P 369, 377, “though she understood what she was doing her powers of volition were so paralysed 
that, by her words and acts she merely gave expression to the will” of the duressor. Watson SJ held in In the 
Marriage of S (1980) FLC 90/280 in the Australian Family Court, that “a sense of mental oppression can be 
generated by causes other than fear or terror…This is so howsoever the oppression arises and irrespective of the 
motivation or propriety of any person solely or partially responsible for the oppression”, applying Director of 
Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland v Lynch [1975] AC 653, 694 to family law; noted H A Finlay, ‘Family 
Law in Australia’ (1983) 3 ed, Butterworths, Sydney, p177. 
63
 Stating at 694F that the two concepts were “habitually treated by jurists as cognate.” 
64
 693F-G. In Osborne v Goddard (1978) 21 ALR 189, 196 Lord Simon’s approach was applied to the statutory 
defence of marital coercion in South Australia. 
65
 [1975] AC 653, 694C. 
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Any constraint on the defendant due to external human pressure might suffice.66 Self-induced 
terror leading to blind obedience does not suffice. The essential differential is that for duress, 
the method of pressure is limited to threats67 whereas for coercion it extends to any type of 
external force, psychological, physical or otherwise, overbearing voluntary conduct. Lord 
Edmund-Davies adopted Smith and Hogan,68 that coercion is a wider69 defence than duress, 
incorporating the unstructured response advanced by the Solicitor-General to a question, 
during the debate on the Criminal Justice Bill 1924.70 
 
But in Lynch v Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland71 the jurisprudential 
theory that the result of the will being overborne meant an accused had never formed the 
mens rea necessary to constitute the crime charged, was correctly rejected.72 The House of 
Lords held that the defence of duress was superimposed across the other ingredients of the 
offence, so that although the person who acted under duress completed the act with the mens 
rea required, the element of duress excusingly prevented the conduct from having a criminal 
complexion. Someone who successfully relies on duress had no choice in relation to the 
prohibited conduct, although in control of their bodily movements, aware of the relevant facts 
and also foresaw the relevant consequences of that conduct. It was involuntary.73  
                                              
66
 Michael J Allen, ‘Textbook on Criminal Law’, (2001) 6 ed, Blackstone Press, p194: “In Lynch at p693 Lord 
Simon stated that coercion in its popular sense denotes an external force which cannot be resisted and which 
impels its subject to act otherwise than he would wish. While duress suggested threats, he considered that 
coercion extends to any force overbearing the wish. In view of the decision in R v Shortland, [1966] 1 Cr App R 
166 it would seem that a wife could not plead coercion on the basis that she committed the offence out of love or 
a sense of duty; there must be some pressure from the husband”.  
67
 At 694E; but it also includes actual violence, not just apprehended violence. Lord Kilbrandon observed that 
coercion reduces a person’s constancy so that he or she is forced to do what is known to be wrong and would not 
have done it save for the threat or violence: 703C.   
68
 ‘Criminal Law’, (1973) 3 ed, Butterworths, London, p169. 
69
 Peter Murphy (ed), ‘Blackstone’s Criminal Practice’ (2003) Oxford University Press at p57 in relation to s47 
Criminal Justice Act 1925 [UK]: “This section imposes a legal burden of proof on the wife, but it has not been 
clear what exactly constitutes coercion and in what sense it differs from duress. Coercion is presumably wider 
than duress since otherwise the defence is otiose, the wife having to prove duress plus the actual presence of her 
husband. It seems that it is wider in that there is no need for threats of death or serious injury, it being sufficient 
that the wife acted because of the dominating influence of her husband, her will being “overborne by the wishes 
of her husband” so that “she was forced unwillingly to participate” (See Shortland [1996] 1 Cr App R 116, 
following R v Richman and Richman [1982] Crim LR 507)”. 
70
 “Coercion imports coercion in the moral, possibly even in the spiritual realm, whereas compulsion imports 
something only in the physical realm.” 
71
 [1975] AC 653 (HL). 
72
 Lord Bingham in R v Z [2005] 2 AC 467 accepted that the intention exists, but it is not the product of free will.  
73
 The victim of duress has made a conscious, though unwilling, choice and intentionally, though reluctantly, 
committed a crime. In Attorney General v Whelan [1934] IR 518, 526 a decision of the Irish Court of Criminal 
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In R v Neilson,74for reasons which remain unclear, the statutory defence was not relied upon 
in an apparently optimal situation.  A wife was charged with encashing for her husband, while 
he was standing beside her, a number of large postal orders, which he had stolen.  The 
husband gave evidence that he had said to her he was prepared to use violence towards her to 
maintain his status as “boss” in the household.  He had been convicted of four violent 
murders, prior to her trial.  The fact pattern has a broad similarity with the case of Goddard v 
Osborne.75 
 
The next decision to consider the statutory defence of marital coercion was R v Richman and 
Richman.76 The defendants were tried for fraud upon an allegation that money had been 
obtained from an insurance company by deception, in making false claims of burglary. The 
husband pleaded guilty but the wife alleged that in relation to two of the charges, although she 
knew that the claims were dishonest, she signed the documentation because she was coerced 
to do so by her husband. The defence relied on the investigating police officer who said in 
evidence for the prosecution that the husband had a strong personality and that the wife was 
likely to have been dominated by him. The prosecution then submitted that the statutory 
defence should not be left to the jury in the absence of an actual threat by the husband to the 
wife. Judge Gabriel Hutton left the defence but stressed that “modern wives were not like 
Saxon wives”, also ruling that it was for the wife to prove coercion on the balance of 
probabilities. The judge accepted that coercion did not necessarily mean physical force or the 
threat of physical force, agreeing it could be either physical or moral, but the wife had to 
prove that her will was overborne by her husband, which was wholly different from 
                                                                                                                                             
Appeal the court held that “threats of immediate death or serious personal violence so great as to overbear the 
ordinary power of human resistance should be accepted as justification for acts which would otherwise be 
criminal”.  “The law must…take a commonsense view. If someone is forced at gun-point either to be inactive or 
to do something positive – must the law not remember that the instinct and perhaps the duty of self-preservation 
is powerful and natural? I think it must. A man who is attacked is allowed within reason to take necessary steps 
to defend himself. The law would be censorious and inhumane which did not recognise the appalling plight of a 
person who perhaps suddenly finds his life in jeopardy unless he submits and obeys.” 
74
 The Daily Telegraph, 28 September 1976. 
75
 (1978) 18 SASR 481 (SC) and (FC). 
76
 [1982] Crim LR 507. 
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persuading someone out of loyalty. A commentary77 to this trial ruling (no appeal having ever 
been brought) notes the uncertainty78 which surrounds the extent to which coercion differs 
from the general defence of duress. A wife has to establish that her will was “overborne” 
which “smacks of duress”; but voluntarily assisting a husband out of a sense of love or loyalty 
is excluded, even if the wife is unhappy with the enterprise and would prefer him to desist. 
The essence of coercion is pressure directed at the wife to the point she involuntarily conducts 
herself, this being consonant with what Lord Simon said in Lynch that coercion denotes “an 
external force which cannot be resisted and which impels its subject to act” otherwise than 
she would wish. 
 
No further consideration of the defence is known until the important decision of R v Ditta, 
Kara and Hussain79 in the Court of Appeal, which provided English criminal law with a 
direct confrontation with the intersection of marital coercion, polygamy and Muslim marriage 
and divorce laws.80 The Court of Appeal, in dismissing the appeal by Madam Kara, referred 
to the facts and law in a rather superficial manner, which obscures the far-reaching nature of 
the underlying issues. The trial papers and particularly the summing up by the judge to the 
                                              
77
 The jury convicted Mrs Richman: [1982] Crim LR 507, 509 Professor Diane Birch there notes the English 
Law Commission in its Report No. 8 at p19 recommended the abolition of coercion as a general defence, partly 
because there was no definition of coercion. The commentator noted the irony that the definition has emerged 
after the recommendation for abolition.   
78
 Edward Griew, ‘The Theft Acts 1968 and 1978’, (1986) 5 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London p346 notes “the 
defence of marital coercion is rarely pleaded and, because s47 has not yet received authoritative judicial 
interpretation, may give rise to difficulty in the future, both because the nature of the threats covered by marital 
coercion is not certain, although they are probably not limited to threats of personal violence and because the 
words ‘presence’ may require elucidation”. At p365 the author instances an example of where a husband induced 
his wife to enter a house for the purpose of stealing something, by threatening to leave her if she did not comply 
with his wishes, while he remained outside and kept watch. Both difficulties will arise in that situation.   
79
 Unreported, English Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Lord Lane CJ, May LJ, Caulfield J, 6 August 1987, 
noted [1988] Crim L R 42. 
80
 The first encounter with polygamy in the English criminal law is R v Hadijah Ahmed Caroubi (1912) 7 Cr 
App R 149 (CCA), The appellant was convicted with others, including her husband, of theft. Hamilton J noting 
the appellant was a Muslim said the court “need not consider how far [the presumption of marital coercion] 
applies in the case of persons who are permitted to be polygamous by the law of their religion or their domicile”. 
Her husband had distracted the shopkeeper while she stole money from the till. The Court applied a visual test, 
namely “He could have seen her, and she him, at any time during the transaction, and therefore they were in the 
presence of one another”. At trial the Recorder took the view that as the crime was preconcerted there was no 
basis for marital coercion to operate.  But Hamilton J said “He failed to appreciate that the very fact of such an 
arrangement might be evidence, and perhaps strong evidence, that the husband has been coercing his wife”. The 
court quashed the conviction.  
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jury,81 provide indispensable detail to show how the rival issues were framed and to establish 
that expert evidence had been called in relation to the competing contentions of Muslim law.82 
No previous consideration of this trial is known. 
 
Mr Mahmood Hussain, Mr Alla Ditta, Mrs Sarifa Kara and Mrs Khatiza Begum were jointly 
charged with drug trafficking by the importation of heroin from Pakistan to England. Hussain 
pleaded guilty and Ditta was convicted by the jury. The jury acquitted Mrs Begum on the 
basis that she acted under common law duress from Hussain. But it is the trial of the other 
woman, Mrs Kara, that is of enduring importance, as she relied upon marital coercion.83 The 
judge in summing up to the jury recounted the evidence and stated that the two female 
accused, Mrs Begum and Mrs Kara, denied that they willingly imported heroin into the 
United Kingdom.84 He then reminded the jury that it was only Mrs Kara who relied upon 
marital coercion, yet she did not “in any way allege that she was under duress, merely that she 
was under coercion.”85 The restriction of the defence being available “only to a wife who 
commits what would otherwise be an offence in the presence of her husband because she was 
under pressure from him” was emphasised. There had been a concession by the prosecution 
that what Mrs Kara had done was “technically at any rate in the presence of her husband, 
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 R v Ditta, Hussain, Begum and Kara, unreported Isleworth Crown Court, ref 191/F2/87 and 142/E3/87, 11 
December 1986, His Honour Judge Hopkin-Morgan and a jury.   
82
 Ibid, summing up of Judge Hopkin-Morgan, p2B: “Matters that arise out of the allegation concerning 
marriage, divorce, and all these complications which have taken days to sort out and which you have to decide as 
a matter of fact.” 
83
 Mrs Begum was stopped as she came through the green channel in Terminal 3 at Heathrow Airport, London. 
Her suitcases revealed a considerable quantity of heroin hidden in cigarette packets. A piece of paper with the 
name and address of a male co-accused Hussain was also found on her. Further packages of heroin, strapped to 
her body were also found. Hussain had been on the same flight from Pakistan and had sat on an adjoining seat to 
Mrs Begum on the flight. Hussain pleaded guilty at trial and stated that he had arranged for the two women 
Begum and Kara to carry heroin into the United Kingdom. By a controlled delivery Hussain deposited the drugs. 
Ditta arrived and uplifted the drugs and he was arrested. 
84
 Ibid p4H-5B. “She also maintains in effect, as she has to under the law on duress, that those threats might well 
have caused a reasonable woman of her characteristics - and that is important, a Muslim wife with an unhappy 
marriage history - a reasonable woman of her characteristics who had suffered considerably in the past - these 
are the characteristics - suffered from a heart condition and who knew that the threatener, Mahmoud Hussain, 
was a violent man, because she had met him with his first wife. So that she has to convince you that a reasonable 
person with her characteristics would in the circumstances act as she did in such a situation.” “First of all duress, 
which is raised by Mrs Begum and is not raised by Mrs Kara. Now Mrs Begum maintains that she brought in 
this heroin against her will solely because of threats made to her by Mahmoud Hussain [the second accused] of 
death or serious injury to her, made at the time of the offence being committed, and those threats of death or 
serious injury if she did not do what he told her to do. So that what she did, she maintains, was not a voluntary 
act because she could not reasonably be expected to resist such threats and they broke her will.” 
85
 Ibid 6B. This is a very odd approach, to rely upon marital coercion yet to deny that there had been any generic 
duress. The adverb “merely” diminishes the statutory defence. 
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Mahmoud Hussain, because they were both on that aeroplane.”86 The degree or sufficiency of 
coercion required to be demonstrated by Mrs Kara bewildered the judge (and presumably the 
jury).87  
 
Now the standard of such pressure it seems may be less than that required under the defence 
of duress. The law is not clear on this but that may well be the situation. But the House of 
Lords88 has said that the mental state of the wife caused by the pressure of her husband must 
be the same, that is the question of being coerced by the husband, that her mental state must 
be the same as that of a person suffering from fear, because of threats made in the case of 
duress or in a case of duress.   
 
The jury were directed that the relevant fact was “Mrs Kara’s mental state” at the time.   
 
It is not essential that there be threats causing fear of death or serious physical injury as in the 
defence of duress, and Mrs Kara does not allege that there were any such threats. She just 
maintains that Mahmoud Hussain was still her husband and that being a Muslim she had to do 
what her husband told her to do, and that therefore her mental state was that she had to do 
what he said she must, although she did not want to.89 
 
The judge identified that an initial issue for the jury to decide in considering the statutory 
defence, was whether in fact Mrs Kara was married at the time of the alleged crime, or 
whether she had been by that time divorced, according to Muslim rites. On this issue expert 
evidence was called by both the prosecution and the defence. “So you have to decide whether 
she had been irrevocably divorced or not at the time in May or before May 1986, way back in 
1982.” An expert in Islamic law, Dr Hinchcliff, had given evidence, in the absence of the 
jury, as to the minimum formal requirements for an oral declaration of divorce under Muslim 
                                              
86
 This also appears to be wrong in law. Presence in a large vehicle, such as an aeroplane, is not presence for the 
purpose of the defence which requires an immediacy, and an accessibility of physical proximity between 
husband and wife. Yet the drugs were strapped on the body of Mrs Kara inside the toilet of the aeroplane, with 
only Mrs Begum present. When she returned to her seat, swaddled in bandages encasing the drugs, then the 
husband was present. But he was not ‘present’ when she walked through the green line at the customs arrival 
hall at the airport, which was the conduct constituting the offence. 
87
 Summing-up 6H. 
88
 Presumably, a reference to Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland v Lynch [1975] AC 653. 
89
 The judge then contrasted the specific nature of marital coercion with duress, illustrating this by stating at 7J 
“That was also the mental state alleged by Mrs Begum of course, because her case is that she felt she had to do 
what Mahmoud Hussain told her to do, and that mental state of hers being brought about by fear caused by his 
threats.  So the mental states reached were the same. This is very unusual, as counsel have pointed out, but the 
burden of proof in coercion is on Mrs Kara, not on the prosecution.” 
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law.90 The judge then stated that although it was a matter of fact for the jury to decide whether 
there had been a divorce (precluding thereby any recourse to the statutory defence), they 
would be assisted in understanding the foreign legal context adverted to by the expert. The 
expert evidence was that if both parties agree to a divorce there and then, under Islamic law 
that constituted an irrevocable divorce known as a mubarat divorce. To help the jury decide 
that issue the judge then referred to the evidence of a Mohammed Arif who gave evidence for 
the prosecution that the husband, Hussain, had a first wife called Shafkat, with Mrs Kara 
being his second wife. Some four years before the material date of the arrival at Heathrow 
Airport, the witness stated that Hussain had divorced Mrs Kara, because his first wife had 
returned to him. That divorce, if it was so, had occurred in circumstances in which Hussain 
had caused Arif to record on paper that the parties, Mrs Kara and Hussain, agreed to divorce, 
although that document had not been signed by the husband. Dr Hinchcliff gave evidence that 
that written document did not establish there was a divorce in terms of the requirements under 
Islamic law. The written document exhibited by the prosecution to negative the existence of 
the marriage failed,91 but the expert also stated the oral consensual agreement to divorce was 
fully valid.  
 
The judge then turned to the evidence of Mrs Kara, who had been previously married and 
divorced “under Muslim law and then also divorced in the Coventry County Court in 1980. 
After that she met Mahmoud Hussain and she was married by a Muslim priest.” Mrs Kara 
said in evidence there was a time when Mahmoud Hussain had both Shafkat and herself as 
simultaneous wives. She stated that she had consented to the oral divorce, albeit, in anger 
because the former first wife had walked into the house and “my husband Hussain expected 
me and that other woman to sleep under the same roof, so I was angry.”92 That night, she 
departed the home as the returned first wife remained there. Hussain accompanied her to a 
new address and now with the status of former wife, he had sexual intercourse with her, 
                                              
90
 Summing-up p8E: “But she [Dr Hinchcliff] raised a point which was a complete surprise to everyone in the 
Court, namely that if each party agreed to a divorce there and then taking place when the agreement was made, 
that would constitute an irrevocable divorce. So that is the question you have to decide.”   
91
 Ibid 65B, the expert’s evidence was of this document “It doesn’t make divorce revocable or irrevocable 
because it wasn’t signed by the husband so it doesn’t constitute a divorce.” 
92
 Ibid p61B Summing-up. 
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“within two hours of his divorce” from her. This point, Dr Hinchcliff found to be decisive as 
signifying the irrevocability of the oral divorce.93  
 
However, Mrs Kara’s case was that her former husband (if the divorce was valid) had 
remarried her under Islamic law (and if the divorce was invalid) then the second marriage was 
as valid as the first undoubtedly had been. In a voir dire to decide on the status of the 
marriage(s) or divorce the prosecution therefore called a second expert on Islamic law,94 who 
stated because Mrs Kara was a British citizen she could not have gone through a second 
ceremony of marriage, unless the man had been free to marry her. Although debarred under 
English law, under pure Islamic marriage law, the marriage would be valid subject to meeting 
certain conditions.95 A Muslim divorce by oral talaq reduced to writing, was irrevocable.96 
The defence then called expert evidence97 on the point as to whether the omission of dower at 
the original marriage meant that the marriage was null and void. His evidence on divorce98 
under Islamic law qualified the evidence of Dr Hinchcliff by stating that although an oral 
                                              
93
 Ibid 66B. Dr Hinchcliff emphasised that for mubarat, common consent of the spouses was required. In 
contrast, in answer to a question from the judge, the prosecution expert on Islamic law opined that the husband 
having “divorced” the wife, and who then went to her new premises and had sexual relations with her, had the 
effect that the divorce would have been thereupon revoked by the acts of the husband. The prosecution expert 
also stated that the divorce was invalid because of non-compliance with the provision in each marriage that 
before a divorce can take effect, an arbitration council composed of one representative of the wife and one 
representative of the husband, should try and reconcile the parties. In the absence of that taking place there 
cannot be a valid divorce.       
94
 Mr Mahmood Ali Nusrat, a member of the English Bar and an advocate of the High Court of Pakistan.   
95
 Marriage is a matter of offer and acceptance with stipulation of dower: ‘Mulla’s Mohammedan Law’ 1981 
edition p308, para 286. There must be an agreement to pay dower and it must not be less than ten dirhams to be 
valid the marriage must occur after tuhr.   
96
 ‘Mulla’s Mohammedan Law’ (1981 ed) p331 para 313. If the parties intend to remarry the wife must go 
through an intermediate marriage with another person: Hayaad Khatun v Abdullah Khan 1937 AIR Lahore 270. 
Tek Chand and Skemp JJ, dismissed an appeal by a Pardanashin lady who had been divorced by her husband 
who then remarried each other and then later redivorced. Tek Chand J at p271 held that the original divorce was 
“irrevocable” and it was not possible for the parties by reconciliation to “restore their relationship of husband 
and wife” without an intermediate marriage by the wife to another, so it meant the second divorce by Talak was 
“a meaningless formality”. The expert Mr Nusrat, stated, as recounted at p10B of the summing-up, that the 
reason for the need for the intermediate marriage was “That is a punishment.”      
97
 Mr Mohammed Ali Syed, a practising member of the English Bar and a practising member of the Bangladesh 
Bar, formerly a member of the East Pakistan Bar. The evidence showed that no dower had been paid. The expert 
stated that the absence of dower or mahr, in Islamic law, did not render the marriage invalid; although the dower 
had to be paid. To be valid, the only point to be considered is whether the husband was a Muslim or not, as even 
the wife could be a Christian or a Jew, yet the marriage would still be valid under Islamic law.  
98
 Divorce was prescribed in the Holy Koran ch4 v35, ch2 vs 228 and 229 and ch.65 v.1. Those verses authorised 
an oral divorce.   
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consensual divorce was permissible, its validity depended on the physiological99 status of the 
wife at that time. In short, the expert for the defence said under Islamic law the marriage was 
valid and that the divorce invalid. The expert for the prosecution said the marriage was invalid 
and the divorce was valid. All the experts agreed that under English law the marriage was 
invalid as Hussain was already married.  His bigamy precluded the lawfulness of the marriage 
ceremony.100 Although the marriage was valid under Muslim law it was common ground that 
it was not valid under English law. 
 
The Court of Appeal concluded that the defence of marital coercion probably did not apply to 
polygamous marriages101 but could, in any event, only apply where the wife was in fact 
married according to the law of England, so the fact that the putative ‘wife’ honestly and 
reasonably believed herself to be married, but was in fact not, in law debarred her from 
raising the defence of marital coercion. One important aspect of the appeal centres on the 
marital status of Sarifa Kara and the defence of marital coercion in a polygamous or 
potentially polygamous situation. As Lord Lane CJ said102 of her:  “Kara, on the other hand, 
was genuinely a courier – indeed she was not even that. What she had done was to go to the 
lavatory in the aeroplane with Khatiza Begum to assist Begum to strap around her body the 
consignment of heroin” noting the unsuccessful invocation of marital coercion at trial.103 Her 
                                              
99
 No divorce could be pronounced during the wife’s menstruation period or tuhr. In addition, there must elapse 
three menstruation periods before the divorce is irrevocable. The witness stated that the importance of that is to 
ensure that the wife is not pregnant and to confirm the legitimacy of any children conceived from the previous 
husband. 
100
 But the experts had no right to give evidence on English law. Expert evidence can only be given of foreign 
law, not national law, which is a matter exclusively for the judge.  Summing-up p8G. 
101
 R v Ditta, Kara and Hussein, unreported English Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), 6 August 1987 p4. 
“We very much doubt, albeit in the absence of argument, whether the Judge was right”, to direct the jury that a 
polygamous Islamic marriage was a proper foundation for a defence under the section. The Court of Appeal 
went a long distance to try to avoid dealing with the issue. Lord Lane stated that the marriage, though valid 
under Islamic law was “polygamous and invalid for most purposes so far as the law of this country is 
concerned”. This is very questionable. JHC Morris, ‘Dicey and Morris, Conflict of Laws’, (1987) 11 ed. Sweet & 
Maxwell, London “Rule 77. A marriage which is polygamous under Rule 73 [which defines polygamous 
marriages] and not invalid under Rule 75 [marriage celebrated in England with polygamous forms] or Rule 76 
[where either party is domiciled in England at the time of the ceremony] is a valid marriage unless there is some 
strong reason to the contrary”. The editors submit that there is now sufficient authority to warrant this 
generalisation. 
102
 Ibid p2 Transcript: Marten Walsh Cherrer: Court Reporters. 
103
 The jury acquitted Mrs Begum on whom the drugs were physically strapped, on the basis of Hussain’s duress. 
Most oddly, duress, as opposed to marital coercion, does not appear to have been left (or argued) as a further 
defence, on behalf of Sarifa Kara. Coercion is a defence for a wife in addition to that of duress by threats, not in 
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putative husband’s first wife was still alive, yet Hussain had married Kara as his second 
wife104 under Islamic law. Lord Lane CJ stated that a polygamous marriage was “invalid for 
most purposes so far as the law of this country was concerned”.105 Lord Lane read s47 
Criminal Justice Act 1925 [UK] which “has very seldom been brought into play” and then 
said of it: 
 
There is a body of opinion which asserts that all that it did was simply to alter the burden of 
proof so far as coercion was concerned, since the defence of coercion of a wife by a husband 
has been something which at common law had been in existence for very many years.106 
 
The prosecution case at trial had been that the second marriage had been properly dissolved 
according to Islamic practice and procedure. The Court of Appeal held, that the “[e]xtremely 
complicated” matters of Islamic matrimonial law were matters of foreign law and therefore 
“the judge rightly ruled that it was a matter for the jury to decide”.107 
 
Because the jury had convicted by a general verdict of guilty it is not possible to divine 
whether the jury had decided that there was no marriage in existence so the defence could not 
apply at all, as the prosecution primarily contended, or whether if there was still a marriage, 
the defence of marital coercion otherwise failed. The trial judge had ruled that Kara had been 
validly married under the law of Islam to the co-defendant Hussain.108 But the real importance 
                                                                                                                                             
substitution for it: Director for Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland v Lynch [1975] AC 653, 684 per Lord 
Wilberforce and at p713 per Lord Edmund-Davies.  
104
 Judith E Tucker ‘In the House of the Law - General and Islamic Law in Ottoman, Syria and Palestine’, 
(1998) University of California Press noted that the Islamic practice of polygamy permitted a man “to be married 
to as many as four women at one time – but women were not permitted a parallel privilege”. Polyandry was not 
contemplated by the common law.   
105
 Ibid p3. This statement is completely inconsistent with Mawji v The Queen supra and the authorities cited 
therein. 
106
 Ibid p3. 
107
 Ibid p4. But this counter-intuitive approach completely contradicts R v Hammer [1923] 2 KB 786 (CCA) 
where Sankey, Salter and Swift JJ correctly held where the appellant was convicted of bigamy, that a question of 
foreign law was an issue of fact, (whether a marriage under Jewish and Russian law was valid), but because of 
s15 Administration of Justice Act 1920 [UK] it was for the judge, not the jury, to have decided it. The argument 
for the prosecution was that this remedial act was restricted to civil law but as Sankey J observed at p791 “It 
would be a strange result if in a civil case foreign law was for the judge and in a criminal case for the jury.” See 
the casenote [1988] Crim LR 42, 43. In New Zealand, it would undoubtedly be a matter for a judge alone to 
decide: s19C Judicature Act 1908 [NZ].   
108
 See PJ Richardson (ed), ‘Archbold 2001 Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice’, Sweet & Maxwell, 
London, 2001, p1630 para 17-133, which laconically notes that the court left open the question whether a 
polygamous Islamic marriage was a proper foundation for the defence under s47 Criminal Justice Act 1925 
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is if that second marriage was lawful under the lex domicilii of both Kara and Hussain. Why 
should she not be permitted to avail herself of the statutory defence. A valid polygamous 
marriage under the lex domicilii of both should not preclude the defence. The judgment of the 
Court of Appeal does not state whether either or both were domiciled in Pakistan where the 
marriage would have been quite lawful, as it had been found to be properly carried out in 
accordance with Islamic rites. This important point was simply not addressed and it is not 
possible to detect whether their domicile was in Pakistani. On the basis that they appeared to 
reside in England, that still cannot be definitive, because plainly a temporary occupation or 
residence in England does not constitute a change in their domicile. The prosecution urged the 
jury to find that although there had been an Islamic marriage it had been dissolved by “an 
unusual Islamic divorce by consent”.  
 
This point identifies where the Court of Appeal case took a strange turn. Counsel for Mrs 
Kara argued in a written ground of appeal “notwithstanding that at the time that [Kara] 
committed the offence she held a genuine and reasonable belief that she was still married to 
the said co-defendant”.109 Now the argument had become that the defence of marital coercion 
extended to a woman who mistakenly but reasonably believed that she was married to the 
coercer, even if she was not. This argument is designed to miss the point. Firstly, her domicile 
and that of Hussain had to be established.  If they were domiciled in Pakistan then it was a 
lawful Islamic marriage, then that would have required the Court of Appeal to decide whether 
a polygamous marriage was valid for the purposes of s47 Criminal Justice Act 1925 [UK]. To 
do that the decision of the Privy Council in Mawji v The Queen110 would have been relevant. 
In fact counsel for Kara advanced a number of analogous situations to justify that marital 
coercion was extendable to a polygamous marriage. In particular he argued that the general 
law of a wife’s competence to give evidence against her husband and also questions of 
                                                                                                                                             
[UK]. This is too generous as Lord Lane CJ for the Court of Appeal expressing a very strong (“we very much 
doubt”) but provisional view against the polygamous marriage being a sufficient platform for the defence. 
109
 See the appeal papers filed by Counsel for Mrs Kara in the Court of Appeal: 191/F2/87 and 142/E3/87. A 
Commentary to R v Ditta, Hussain and Kara [1988] Crim LR, 42 states: “The issue of foreign law would not 
have arisen if the court had decided that a polygamous marriage, even if valid, was not a proper foundation for a 
defence under section 47; but the court did not hear argument on this point and found it unnecessary to decide it. 
It is understood, however, that the expert evidence could lead to only one conclusion, namely that the defendant 
was not married, even according to Islamic law, at the date of the offence.” 
110
 [1957] AC 126 (PC) 
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conspiracy were relevant. If a wife was incompetent as a polygamous wife, or if a wife who 
was polygamous was held not to be able to conspire with her husband, that showed some 
insight as to whether marital coercion was applicable in a polygamous marriage. But the 
Court of Appeal dismissed this approach without argumentation, in a single line “there again, 
in our judgment, those matters are entirely irrelevant to the question we have to decide here 
today”. No explanation was given why a thematic approach in the criminal law, based on the 
unity of husband and wife, failed upon a surplussage of wives or either why the privilege 
against spouse-incrimination was not an appropriate analytical point of entry.  
 
Lord Lane CJ said for statutory coercion there were two halves to the defence; firstly, was the 
woman coerced, which could be: “either by physical, moral, psychological or mental 
processes”? But the second issue is: was there a valid marriage? That question he reasoned 
had nothing to do with the belief of the putative wife, although a different approach applied to 
the offence of bigamy. In R v Gould111 the Criminal Court of Appeal had held where a 
defendant to a charge of bigamy, at the time of the second marriage honestly and reasonably 
held the mistaken belief the decree absolute dissolving his previous marriage had been 
granted, the conviction had to be quashed. Lord Lane distinguished s47 Criminal Justice Act 
1925 [UK] as being a statute in simple terms, which did not intend to additionally incorporate 
a special defence of reasonable belief112 of marriage, as in the case of ss6 and 19 Sexual 
Offences Act 1956 [UK].113 He concluded that before a woman could bring herself within the 
saving terms of s47, it must be shown that she was a lawful wife, in the strict sense of the 
term and that the person who coerced her was her lawful husband. The Court of Appeal 
decided, in a very confusing oral judgment, that because her counsel had argued that she 
                                              
111
 [1968] 2 QB 65 (CCA) holding that a polygamous marriage gave the spouses the intraspousal conspiracy 
immunity. 
112
 Michael Jefferson, ‘Criminal Law’, 4 ed, Financial Times Pitman Publishing, 1999, at p243: “The court 
distinguished the defence of mistake to bigamy, which is available only when the accused erred on reasonable 
grounds, as being concerned with mistake as to a vital element of the offence, where as in coercion the mistake 
was one to a defence. Therefore, if one believes on reasonable grounds that one’s husband is dead, one is not 
guilty of the offence of bigamy, but if one believes on reasonable grounds that one is married one does not have 
the defence of coercion”. 
113
 Michael J Allen:  “When duress is pleaded there is no need to show that the person who issued the threats was 
present at the time the offence was committed; it is sufficient that the threats were imminent. In coercion, 
however, the husband must be shown to be present when the offence was committed. Duress may be pleaded 
even though the accused acted under a mistaken belief, provided this mistake was a reasonable one. In coercion a 
mistaken belief in marriage, albeit a reasonable one, will not avail as the statute is interpreted strictly (see Ditta, 
Hussain and Kara [1988] Crim LR 42]”. 
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thought she was married, that would not do. But that she thought she was married was only 
the secondary argument, the primary argument was that she was married, an argument that the 
Court of Appeal did not deal with, for then it would have had to deal with the direct 
implications of polygamy. 
 
The common law of duress has required the duressee to hold genuine and reasonable belief of 
the executable threat. The wider subjective approach applicable to self-defence in which a 
genuine but unreasonably held belief suffices has not been adopted. Beckford v The Queen.114  
What possible difference can it make to the perspective or culpability of the duped “wife” 
that, unknown to her, the husband-apparent was already married at the time of their marriage 
ceremony? If she genuinely believes he is her husband, if there is coercion she is no less 
under his domination than if he were her husband in law. In the cognate defence of duress, it 
has been decided that the defendant is to be judged on the facts as he reasonably believed 
them to be.115 The courts have been consistently and implacably opposed to extending to the 
defence any notion of the sufficiency of an honest and reasonable belief as to the existence of 
a marriage. 
 
Ten years elapsed before the defence was next encountered in R v Shortland116 where the 
“somewhat unusual defence of marital coercion”117 was engaged in relation to two 
convictions for making a false statement to procure a passport.  On appeal the convictions 
were quashed because of misdirection to the jury as to the meaning of coercion in the Act. 
The wife had signed application forms for passports in the presence of and under the 
coercion118 of her husband. Kennedy LJ found that “the burden of proof is clearly on the 
defendant to prove it on a balance of probabilities in accordance with normal principles”.119 
                                              
114
 Beckford v The Queen [1988] 1 AC 130 (PC) – genuineness of subjective belief the touchstone; although the 
more unreasonable it is, the less likely it is to be genuine. 
115
 See R v Howe [1987] AC 417 (HL). 
116
 [1996] 1 Cr App R 116 (CA) (Kennedy LJ, Steel and Hooper JJ) 
117
 Ibid 117 b-c. 
118
 The court noted there was evidence that the wife was in constant fear of the husband as “he torments me”.   
119
 Ibid 117 E, conformably with the decision of the Crown Court in R v Richman and Richman [1982] Crim LR 
507 (Judge Gabriel Hutton). That decision had been followed in relation to identical legislation in R v Kong Man 
Heung [2000] 1 HKC 406 (decided in 1986), HKSAR v Au Yuen Mei [2000] 1 HKC 411. In R v Holley [1963] 1 
WLR 199 (CCA) it had earlier been established. In Richman it was unsuccessfully argued that only an evidential 
burden was imposed on the defendant. The apparent intractability of the language in s47 Criminal Justice Act 
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The approach of Lord Simon of Glaisdale in Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern 
Ireland v Lynch120 was “a useful start” to unlocking the meaning.121 Kennedy LJ, lamenting 
the absence of a definition of coercion in s47, found that a distinction necessarily existed 
between duress and marital coercion. The Court of Appeal approved passages in R v Richman 
(supra) that had emphasised “coercion did not necessarily mean physical force or the threat of 
physical force, it could be physical, or moral, she had to prove that her will was overborne by 
the wishes of her husband”.122 The wife had to establish that she had been overborne by her 
husband and had to succumb to his will. The convictions were quashed because the trial judge 
had emphasised the absence of actual or perceived threats of death or grievous bodily harm, 
without ever providing examples on the evidence at trial of what was properly within the 
defence.123 The trial judge had therefore failed to differentiate between duress and coercion.  
 
A second case on the defence came before the Court of Appeal within six years: R v 
Cairns.124 A number of accused were tried for conspiracy to supply heroin. Mrs Cairns 
pleaded not guilty, her husband admitted the offence and gave evidence implicating the co-
accused, but exculpating his wife.125 The ground of appeal was that the judge had misdirected 
as to the meaning of coercion. Keene LJ accepted it had a broader meaning than duress, 
                                                                                                                                             
1925 [UK] would be no bar to a conclusion that it could be read down to impose not a legal burden, but only an 
evidential one: R v Lambert [2002] 2 AC 545 (HL); HKSAR v Hung Chan Wa [2006] 3 HKLRD 841 (CFA). 
This dichotomy had been anticipated in R v Gill [1963] 1 WLR 841 that s47 inconsistently places the burden of 
proof in coercion on the wife whereas the common law defence of duress only imposes an evidential burden. In 
Victoria, s336(5) Crimes Act 1958 [Vic], which provides a defence of marital coercion, introduced in 1977, 
imposes an evidential burden which the prosecution must negative beyond reasonable doubt. There is no 
evidence at all to substantiate the assertion in Michael Jefferson, ‘Criminal Law’ 4 ed, Financial Times Pitman 
Publishing, (1999) p242: that “The reversal of the burden of proof may be the sole reason why s47 was enacted”.  
This very hypothesis was described as “naïve”: Glanville Williams, ‘Criminal Law: The General Part’ (1953) 
p604, Stevens & Sons Ltd, London. In R v Cairns [2003] 1 Cr App R 662 (CA) at para [56] Keene LJ held that 
the burden of proof was on the defendant on the balance of probabilities.     
120
 [1975] AC 653, 693 “ ‘Coercion’ in its popular sense denotes an external force which cannot be resisted and 
which impels its subject to act otherwise than he would wish.” 
121
 [1996] 1 Cr App R 116, 117 G. 
122
 The Court of Appeal emphasised that coercion “was different from persuading someone out of loyalty and 
that the jury should try and put themselves in the position of the wife and ask themselves whether from what 
they had heard she was forced unwillingly to participate.” 
123
 At 119 B Kennedy LJ referred to an extract from the evidence where the wife had said she was tormented by 
the husband and she would ultimately agree with anything he said.   
124
 [2003] 1 Cr App R 662 (Keene LJ, Forbes J and Judge Rant QC). At the trial of Alison Cairns, aged 30, the 
evidence was of “persistent violent conduct of Barry Cairns during the whole of their relationship”. R v Cairns 
unreported, Portsmouth Crown Court, 31 May-27 July 2000, Judge Chubb and a jury (V Watson & Associates: 
Official Court Reporters) summing up page 19 C-D. 
125
 Ibid para 55. Mrs Cairns put forward both the defence of duress and marital coercion. 
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otherwise the defence was not only otiose it additionally required the wife to prove the 
coercion in the presence of her husband, neither step being a requirement for duress. As a 
conspiracy is a crime of agreement, the prosecution argued that marital coercion was very 
difficult to apply when the criminous acts extended, as here, over a period of months as the 
husband could not have been continuously in the wife’s presence. It followed, that a crime 
constituted by a single incident of act was the only type of offence to which the defence 
applied. This submission was rejected as it would have introduced a new class of exclusion 
which the statute had not prescribed. The presence of the husband was required for the 
agreement not the overt acts. Keene LJ accepted “moral force or emotional threats”126 were 
encompassed by the defence and that the trial judge had, just as in R v Shortland, given no 
explicit reference or example to any form of coercion less than involving physical force, 
therefore the conviction had to be quashed for non-direction. 
 
The House of Lords made an en passant reference to the statutory defence in R v Z.127 The 
Crown informed the House of the significant, recent increase in reliance upon the common 
law defence of duress. Technological advances “had lead to the elimination of many false 
factual defences which could now be disproved”. Duress was being consistently relied upon 
“in drug cases”.128 It was submitted, but not decided, that in marital coercion “the legal 
burden of proof [is] on the married woman,”129 but as that proposition involves the imposition 
of a reverse legal burden it is now very doubtful, as being inconsistent with the presumption 
of innocence.130 In contrast with marital coercion, only threats of death or serious injury will 
suffice for the defence of duress.131 Lord Bingham accepted the correctness of an approach in 
which the threat must be directed against the defendant or his immediate family132 or someone 
close to him, as a more open-textured defence would weaken its rationale. Baroness Hale of 
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 Ibid para 64.   
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 [2005] 2 AC, 467 para [19] (HL). 
128
 See R v Z [2005] 2 AC 467, 475 G. 
129
 R v Z [2005] 2 AC 467, 477 B. The House of Lords did not deal with this point and only an oblique reference 
to the defence was made at all: “ the only criminal defences which have any close affinity with duress are 
necessity…and, perhaps, marital coercion under section 47 of the Criminal Justice Act 1925” per Lord Bingham 
of Cornhill p489.  
130
 R v Lambert [2002] 2 AC 545; HKSAR v Hung Chan Wa [2006] 3 HKLRD 841 (CFA). cf Hansen v The 
Queen [2007] 3 NZLR 1.  
131
 R v Abdul-Hussain [1999] Crim LR 570; R v Maurirere [2001] NZAR 431, 434 para 14. 
132
 R v Z [2005] 2 AC 467, 490. 
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Richmond identified that a special characteristic of duress (and inevitably of marital coercion) 
is that the facts on which the defence is founded are not necessarily part and parcel of the 
incident during which the offence was committed.133 Yet in relation to the statutory defence 
of coercion this is not correct, as the requirement for the presence of the husband at the time 
of the offence, is to demonstrate that the coercion, which may have been initiated earlier, is 
still subsisting and materially operative at the time of the offence.134 The battered wife knows 
that she is exposing herself to a risk of unlawful violence if she stays, but she may have no 
reason to believe that her husband will eventually use her broken will to force her to commit 
crimes.135  
 
The 1925 model was exported to the Colonies, Dependencies, and as will be demonstrated, 
still remains in force in many jurisdictions. In the Crown Colony of Hong Kong the Attorney 
General moved the First Reading of the Criminal Procedure Amendment Ordinance 1930 in 
the Legislative Council, by noting that “Amongst other things it abolishes, as in England 
under the Criminal Justice Act 1925, the presumption of coercion136 in felonies where 
husband and wife are charged together.” This short statement remarkably contained two 
errors: the presumption did not only apply to felonies and the doctrine did not only apply 
where the spouses were jointly charged.137 On the Second Reading of the Bill the Colonial 
                                              
133R v Z [2005] 2 AC 467, 510 para [72] “[The facts of the duress] will characteristically have happened well 
before, and quite separately from, the actual commission of the offence” on this basis however the plea of 
marital coercion will fail because of the lack of the presence of the husband at the actual commission of the 
offence. The requirement of the presence of the duressor is commonplace in criminal codes in ensuring that the 
defence is strictly controlled and scrupulously limited to situations that correspond to its underlying rationale. 
134
 J Ll J Edwards, ‘Compulsion, Coercion and Criminal Responsibility’, (1951) 14 Modern Law Review 297, 
308 reasoned that the husband need only be present at the completion of the offence. In a continuing offence, or 
a conspiracy (as opposed to a single-focus offence) this is likely to prove a serious practical obstacle to the 
successful utilisation of the defence. cf R v Cairns [2003] 1 Cr App R 662. 
135
 See R v Z [2005] 2 AC 467, 511 para 77. 
136
 In Hong Kong the noun “coercion” is also referred to but undefined in s26(2) Sale of Goods Ord Cap 26; 
s10(2) Merchant Shipping (Liner Conferences) Ord Cap 482; s5(4)(d) Human Organ Transplant Ord Cap 465 
and A15(2) s8 Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ord Cap 383. 
137
 In moving the introduction of the First Reading of the Bill, the Attorney General of the Colony of Hong Kong 
stated that it was considered desirable to assimilate the position in the Colony with that of England. It is quite 
unclear what prompted the Bill other than an inference that the Colony simply followed the leader. There was no 
known example of the common law defence of marital coercion ever having been relied upon between the 
creation of the Supreme Court of Hong Kong on 5 April 1843 or in the Magistrates Court, and the ensuing 87 
years until 1930. The effect of the Bill was to abrogate the common law defence of marital coercion – a point not 
made by the Attorney General to the Legislative Council. The Bill was not precipitated by any criminal law 
litigation or by any policy other than that of following in the furrow of the British Government to whom the 
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Secretary referred to clause 9 of it as being almost identical138 to s47 Criminal Justice Act 
1925 and laconically in eight lines summarised its effect and proffering a single reason for its 
enactment, namely “it seems desirable that this Colony should follow suit”.139 The Attorney 
General offered no insight as to what was intended by the critical noun “coercion”. There was 
no discussion of the wider issue of whether or why a wife, or any woman or person, should 
enjoy this defence. No reference to the common law of duress was made. No reference was 
made as to whether the common law defence of marital coercion had hitherto existed in Hong 
Kong. There was no consideration of the position of wives in general140 or of interface 
between the defence and the status of Chinese customary concubinage.141 The 1930 
amendment can be seen as entirely reactive legislation, with the exclusive intention to achieve 
parity with the modern English position. It was adhocracy in England and then Hong Kong; 
with no or little contemplation of the wider significance of enacting a special substantive 
defence for a limited class of adults. In 1930, it was the only substantive criminal statutory 
                                                                                                                                             
Governor of the Colony had to report and who was bound by Royal Instructions and the Letters Patent of the 
Colony. The Legislative Council was a particularly somnolent body. Consensus politics was the norm.  
138
 The punctuation of the provision is immaterially different from the 1925 Anglo-prototype. 
139
 Andrew Bruce (ed) ‘Criminal Procedure Handbook: Criminal Procedure Ordinance (Cap 221) (with 
annotations)’139 Butterworths, Hong Kong, (2004) refers to s100 Criminal Procedure Ordinance and states at 
p232: “This section was added pursuant to s9 of the Criminal Procedure Amendment Ordinance 1930 (17 of 
1930), commencing 17 October 1930.” No case law is referred to in the text.   
140
 The marital coercion legislation continues to exist in England where there has not been a focus on the issue. It 
would be unpopular in Hong Kong to make a specific repeal, in the absence of an obvious precipitator. But the 
wider issue is striking: criminal capacity. It is a particularly strange irony that whereas in the nineteenth century 
woman were categorised for the purposes of criminal intention with lunatics and children, that by modern 
legislation it is conceived that wives need extra help because of their continuing subjugation, the same is 
reintroduced. The only remaining justification for the exemption is that it has been thought to be the law for 
centuries. So it has its roots in the institutional arrangement of matrimony. 
141
 The official statistics of the time shows that very few women (let alone married women or concubines) came 
before the superior Courts. There are no statistics for a gender analysis before the magistrate’s courts at the time. 
No system of law reporting existed in Hong Kong before 1905, although occasionally newspapers reported 
matters of mixed legal and society interest. The Law Reports reveal that almost no female accused ever came 
before the Hong Kong Courts for serious crimes. But a European woman, Mrs Carew, (see The Graphic, 13 
January 1897 for her contemporary pretrial biography)  was convicted of murder before Judge Mowatt and a jury 
of 5 persons. and sentenced to death on 1 February 1897 at the Consular Court of Japan at Yokohama. She had 
been found guilty of poisoning her husband with arsenic (who was 15 years older than her). Her sentence was 
commuted to life imprisonment with hard labour, and she was conveyed from Japan to Hong Kong. See 
generally House of Commons Debate, 14 February 1898 for a response by Sir W M Ridley that she had been 
transported to Hong Kong and England from Japan pursuant to the Colonial Prisioners Removal Act 1884 (47 
and 48 Vict c31) to undergo her imprisonment, while her petition for special leave to the Privy Council was 
heard. Special leave (argued on the basis of lack of constitutive jurisdiction for the trial to take place in Japan) 
was refused on 14 July 1897: Carew v The Crown Prosecutor in Japan (1897) 13 TLR 512 (PC) Lord Halsbury 
LC, Lord Hobhouse, Lord Morris, Sir Richard Couch, Sir Henry de Villiers and Sir Henry Strong). Apart from 
the absence of official law reporting the invasion of Hong Kong by the Japanese forces in World War II lead to 
the destruction of enormous numbers of official documents, lending the need for special remedial legislation in 
relation to property titles. 
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general defence in Hong Kong that applied to any adult.142 Provocation and diminished 
responsibility came over 30 years later; whereas all other defences, justifications, excuses, 
capacity or incapacitating conditions remain wholly common law. 
 
The Legislative Council in Hong Kong was under the special constraint that Bills could only 
be introduced by the government.143 This meant that the government did not have to consider 
law reform on a macro-level. It could dictate the pace and content of all legislation. Unless 
there was an imperative for change the existing laws would be sufficient. The more rigorous 
dynamics of full democracy did not exist. The finer points of intellectual detail were left to 
the judges. 
 
The same legislation in 1930 introduced a number of other reforms, some of which also had a 
parallel with the Criminal Justice Act 1925 [UK].144 It was completely typical of the era for a 
collation of generic reforms to be made in a single amending Ordinance.145 But there is no 
explanation as to why the introduction of a substantive criminal law defence should be 
classified as a matter of “Criminal Procedure”.146 There is no doubt that the Legislative 
Council (and the Westminster Parliament) intended to place a persuasive, as opposed to a 
merely evidential burden, on the defendant wife. Yet if only an evidential burden is incurred, 
then the statutory defence makes much more sense. No longer is a wife worse off than under 
the common law of duress. The equipiration would be meaningful because what it would then 
do is signal that the content of “coercion” is wider than that of “duress,” otherwise the new 
statutory provision is completely otiose. The statute provides an additional enhanced defence 
in comparison with the rights of other women. Why should a wife have a higher hurdle to 
surmount? The statute would then return to its common law roots that the physical presence 
                                              
142
 But infancy or nonage were and remain statutory defences. 
143
 Even seventy years later only the government can introduct a Bill with fiscal implications: Leung Kwok Hung 
v President of Legislative Council  [2007] 1 HKLRD 387 
144
 Sections 15, 28, 29, 84 and 100 of the Criminal Procedure Ord Cap 221 [HK] survive. Section 15 was s4 of 
the 1930 Ord and deals with the right of the Attorney General not to prosecute. Sections 28 and 29 were 
respectively sections 5 and 6 of the Criminal Procedure Amendment Ord 1930 and deal with copies of an 
indictment and service of it. Section 84 was introduced as s8 of the 1930 Ord and deals with restitution of 
property in cases of conviction. 
145
 In 1930 the Ordinance had not been the subject of any amendments at all since 1906. 
146
 The Long Title to the Ordinance since 7 July 1899 is “To consolidate and amend the laws relating to criminal 
procedure, evidence and practice”. 
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of the husband was the dominant feature. Whereas for duress the threat to kill or cause 
grievous bodily harm would form part of the tableau, the immediacy of husbandly action and 
influence became central. A married woman is not precluded from simultaneously relying 
upon both (or more) defences, so the statutory defence must be seen as an additional 
147protection to married women.148  
 
Under Hong Kong common law the defendant need only advance, from any witness, 
sufficient evidence to raise duress as a live evidential issue, then149 the prosecution must 
disprove the defence beyond reasonable doubt.150 
 
It is remarkable in itself that there is no reported instance of the invocation of the common 
law defence of duress (let alone the statutory defence of marital coercion) in Hong Kong until 
1946. In Lai Kit v R151 the appellant, a Japanese collaborator had been convicted of treason. 
On appeal it was argued that if it were shown that there was the threatened application of 
force or fear of death a legal presumption arose that the force or fear of death continued until 
the opportunity to escape presented itself. The Full Court in dismissing the appeal held that no 
such presumption of law existed, it would be at most a presumption of fact which the jury 
would be entitled to draw from all the circumstances. “Duress…has long been recognised as a 
general defence under the English common law, and likewise incorporated into the common 
law of Hong Kong.”152 The caselaw shows that there have been very few occasions since 
                                              
147
 The provision [s100 Criminal Procedure Ordinance] does not affect the common law rule as to duress which 
is capable of application between husband and wife: see R v Bourne (1952) 36 Cr App R 125 CCA. 
148
  
149
 R v Howe [1987] AC 417, 435 per Lord Hailsham of St Marylebone L C‘Halsbury’s Laws of Hong Kong’, 
(1998) vol 9 Criminal Law and Procedure, Butterworths Hong Kong p30 reveals no Hong Kong case law other 
than R v Kong Man Heung. It also notes “A husband and wife alone cannot be found guilty of conspiracy 
because they are, in law, one person.” 
150
 HKSAR v Buitrago [1998] 3 HKC 113, 116 per Power ACJHC. The accused was unanimously acquitted on a 
retrial: [1998] 3 HKC 113, 118 C. Her defence was that she had been coerced to carry drugs because her five 
year old son had been kidnapped in Colombia which “made coercion a live issue”. 
151
 See Lai Kit v R (1946) 31 HKLR 7 (FC), then 12 years until 1958 in Leung Wing Cheung v The Queen [1958] 
HKLR 49 (FC). cf Wong Ching Chu v The Queen [1957] HKLR 61 (FC) – cross-examination of wife as to 
whether she harboured her husband held improper. In R v Purdy (1945) 10 JCL 182 it was held that duress could 
amount to a defence in treason, but only if the threat was one of death. See also Mark Findlay and Carla 
Howarth, ‘Criminal Law in Hong Kong Cases and Commentary’ (1992) Butterworths Asia, p462. 
152
 Michael Jackson, ‘Criminal Law in Hong Kong’ (2003) Hong Kong University Press, p300. Frank Addison 
‘Digest of Hong Kong Criminal Case Law 1905 – 1967’, Government Press, Hong Kong (1968) refers to no 
relevant case law, but, Leung Wing-Cheung v R [1958] HKLR 49 (FC) is authority that duress provides a lawful 
excuse for unlawful conduct.  
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1846 when the common law of duress has been relied upon in Hong Kong and the defence of 
marital coercion has equally been very rarely invoked. The number of criminal trials in the 
Supreme Court was low, with robbery and kidnapping being the most numerous offences,153 
so it had been very rare indeed for married women to be accused persons in a trial upon 
indictment. The courts had virtually no experience of their defence being deployed. 
 
Hong Kong law has encountered the defence on five occasions154 and in only one case has it 
been successful.155 While no case engaging the defence and customary concubinage is known, 
such a concubine should have the benefit of the defence in the reasoning which held that a 
concubine was an incompetent witness against her husband.156 
 
 
CUSTOMARY CONCUBINAGE AND POLYGAMY 
 
The Privy Council explicitly recognised the notion of a valid polygamous marriage on a 
number of occasions.157 By 1932, Beckett158 noted that it159 had repeatedly recognised 
                                              
153
 Sir William Meigh Goodman ‘Reminiscences of a Colonial Judge’ (1907) The Kingsgate Press, London 
p170. “The Chief Justice’s Criminal Lists contained ninety or a hundred cases per annum”. (Chief Justice of 
Hong Kong 1901–1904).  
154
 Wong Ching Chu v The Queen [1957] HKLR 61 (FC); Lee Kei Yick v The Queen [1978] HKLR 510 (CA); R 
v Lee Shek Ching [1986] HKLR 304 (CA); R v Kong Man Heung [2000] 1 HKC 406 (HC); HKSAR v Au Yuen 
Mei [2000] 1 HKC 411 (CFI). 
155
 HKSAR v Au Yuen Mei [2000] 1 HKC 411 (CFI); see the extended Editorial Note by the present author 
[2000] 1 HKC 411, 412-414. 
156
 Chan Hing Cheung v The Queen [1974] HKLR 196 (FC) infra chp 5. 
157
 In Cheng Thye Phin in 1920 the Privy Council said that it was not disputed that the Chinese law of marriage 
permits concubinage. The judgment considered the situation of the principal wife (or tsai) and of the secondary 
wife (or tsip) and it was said that “The position of a secondary wife is superior to that of a mere concubine, 
though this term is sometimes applied to a tsip”: [1920] AC 369, 375 quoting with evident approval from the 
judgment of Braddell J in the Six Widows Case (1908) 12 Straits Settlements Law Reports 120,209. Further the 
Privy Council accepted [1920] AC 369, 374 that by Chinese ideas the child of the tsip would be regarded as one 
of the next of kin. “Concubinage is recognised as a legal institution under Chinese law conferring upon the tsip a 
legal status of a permanent nature, which subject to divorce, entitles her to maintenance during the lifetime.” 
Khoo Hooi Leong v Khoo Hean Kwee [1926] AC 529; Khoo Hooi Leong v Khoo Chong Yeok [1930] AC 346. 
See also: Re Choo Eng Choon decd (Six Widows Case) (1908) 12 SSLR 120 (discussed by Thomson J in 
Dorothy Yee Yeng Nam v Lee Fah Kooi [1956] 1 MLJ 257) and Au Hung Fat v Lam Lai Ha [1959] HKLR 527. 
In Anonymous (1866) 3 Mad HC Rulings VII (approved in Attorney General of Ceylon v Reid [1965] AC 720, 
731 (PC)) it was held that as Hindu law recognised polygamy a second marriage according to Hindu rites would 
not be invalid, still less so, per Lord Upjohn “by reason of the earlier marriage under the Roman Catholic faith 
which Hindu law would not have recognised”. In Drameh v Drameh unreported Privy Council Appeal No 35 of 
1968, 7 April 1970, Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest, Lord Pearson, Lord Diplock at p3 noted that in Gambia 
marriage and divorce were separately regulated for Christians and others.  
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polygamous marriages and the legal rights that flowed from them; although none of those 
cases had involved the criminal law. Occasional dicta to the effect that English law did not 
recognise polygamous marriages160, were over-broad.  In a number of African jurisdictions 
the criminal courts had concluded (with somewhat mixed results) that polygamous marriages 
                                                                                                                                             
158
 W E Beckett, ‘The Recognition of Polygamous Marriages Under English Law’, (1932) 48 LQR 341.  Sir 
Dennis Fitzpatrick reviewed polygamy and the civil law of marriage in the Victorian era. ‘Non-Christian 
Marriage’ (1900) 2 Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation (NS) 359; ‘Non-Christian Marriage’ 
(Second Article) (1901) 3 Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation (NS) 157.  
159
 Cheng Thye Phin v Tan Ah Loy [1920] AC 369; Khoo Hooi Leong v Khoo Hean Kwee [1926] AC 529; Khoo 
Hooi Leong v Khoo Chong Yeok [1930] AC 346. See also: Re Choo Eng Choon decd (Six Widows Case) (1908) 
12 SSLR 120 (discussed by Thomson J in Dorothy Yee Yeng Nam v Lee Fah Kooi [1956] 1 MLJ 257) and Au 
Hung Fat v Lam Lai Ha [1959] HKLR 527. 
160
 R v Naguib [1917] 1 KB 359 (CCA) (Egyptian Muslim – contracted second marriage in England). 
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were to be respected for evidential purposes.161 The issue of the competence or 
compellability162 of “natives wives”163 in Canada164 and in Africa165 arose.    
                                              
161
 In R v Sukina [1912] TPD 1079 a “wife” within the meaning of an immigration statute which entitled a 
woman, otherwise a prohibited immigrant, to enter South Africa, did not include a polygamous spouse.  The 
female spouse of a polygamous marriage (either wife) was not regarded as a “wife” under the common law rule 
which prevented a wife from being compelled to testify against her husband:  Nalana v R [1907] TP 407; R v 
Mboko [1910] TP 445. Wife of a potentially polygamous North American Indian customary marriage were held 
valid: Wall v Williamson (1845) 8 Ala 48. Goldthwaite J at p50 distinguished the dictum of Lord Brougham in 
Warrender v Warrender (1835) 2 C6 & F 532 that English law “clearly never should recognize the plurality of 
wives, and consequent validity of second marriages”. Affirmed Wall v Williamson (1847) 11 Ala 826 per Collier 
CJ especially at 838. Note also Morgan v McGhee (1844) 24 Tenn 13 per Turley J confirming on appeal the 
validity of a Cherokee Nation customary marriage, in an action where the plaintiff instituted an action of detinue 
for slaves. The defence was that the plaintiff was a feme-covert and therefore incapable of suing. R v Bear’s Shin 
Bone (1899) 4 Terr LR 173 (SC) (first marriage according to the customs of the Blood tribe was valid and could 
give rise to a conviction for polygamy); R v Davendra 1 MC 51, 55 per Bucknill CJ (Singapore). M L Agabwala, 
‘Asiatic Mixed Marriages’, (1895) LQR 373, 374 noted Wall v Williamson. Other early American decisions are 
also considered in In re Ullee (1885) 53 LT 711, affirmed 54 LT 286 (CA), where the Nawab Nizam of Bengal, 
a Muslim married two English women in England and the Courts upheld the descendent children’s interests in 
the succession. To the same effect is Royal v Cudahy Packing Co (1922) 199 NW 427 (Iowa SC). Thus 
debarring her from suing her husband on a promissory note (as a wife then was incapable of claiming “a separate 
estate”).  But without such a customary marriage the woman was not a lawful wife and therefore remained a 
competent witness against her assumed husband. In Ex parte Cote (1971) 22 DLR (3rd) 353, 355 (Sask CA) it 
was held that in the absence of a religious or civil ceremony, (there being no evidence of any customary Indian 
marriage) a woman cohabiting with a man on a Native Indian reservation was both competent and compellable 
as a witness against her cohabitee.  In R v Kingi (1909) 29 NZLR 317 Chapman J in a trial ruling in the Gisborne 
Supreme Court held that a Maori customary marriage (which was potentially polygamous) did not prevent a wife 
being a compellable witness against her husband. Chapman J relied upon R v Neddy Monkey (1861) 1 W&W (L) 
40 in relation to Australian Aborigines. Counsel for the accused was never going to succeed in his objection to 
the prosecution application to call the wife by his initial concession at p372 that a Maori customary marriage 
was not a “marriage”. Chapman J robustly refused the objection stating that if the rule of evidence was 
applicable “it would apply to as many wives as a Maori had,” distinguishing the law of succession applied before 
the Native Land Court.  But cf R v Tom Williams (1921) 37 CCC 126, 127 Gregory J, British Columbia Supreme 
Court, in a murder trial, held on a voir dire to determine admissibility that a witness the prosecution intended to 
call was polygamously married to the accused some 20 years earlier “according to Indian custom”. The accused 
had several wives, and an expert stated that the Department of Indian Affairs recognised such a marriage as 
valid. The judge agreed and followed R v Nan-E-Quis-A-Ka (1889) 1 NWTR 21; 1 Terr LR 211. 
162
 In the formative years of the incompetence concept, a generous view of matrimony was taken, so that 
someone who was passed off as a wife was taken to be a wife: Campbell v Twemlow (1814) Pri 81. This was 
possibly influenced by the widespread penalty of capital punishment. But in Batthews v Galindo (1828) 4 Bing 
610, 614 a mistress, even if treated as a wife and held out as the man’s wife, was a competent witness against the 
husband: “the witness is not to be excluded unless de jure wife of the party” per Best CJ. C.f R v Lologa [2007] 3 
NZLR 844, 847 at para [17] which held a de facto partner does not have a “just excuse” in terms of s352 Crimes 
Act 1961 for not giving evidence against the father of her children charged with murder: but otherwise where she 
is the victim of the offence: R v CTB (No 2), unreported, High Court Dunedin, T16/81, 18 February 1992, 
Williamson J. The true ratio of R v Junaid Khan (1987) 84 Cr App R 44 is not that a wife or husband of a 
polygamous marriage is a competent witness against the spouse; but rather the much narrower formulation that a 
spouse who is already married and who is domiciled in a country which prohibits polygamy may not enter into a 
further marriage. To date the law has erroneously abided in the conclusion that a polygamous marriage cannot be 
a lawful foundation for either bigamy or to claim spousal incompetence under the laws of evidence. In Ali v 
Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) (1998) 84 ACWS (3d) 338 Rothstein J of the Federal Court 
Trial Division of Canada, correctly found that a polygamous marriage valid in the country where it was entered 
into and where the parties were domiciled, would be recognised as valid by Canadian courts. Further, the 
   
 201 
It was a marriage of a member of the House of Lords that starkly threw up the implications of 
polygamy for the criminal law. The eldest son of the late first Baron Sinha of Raipur in the 
                                                                                                                                             
validity of that marriage did not depend upon where the spouses reside after marriage or whether there was 
cohabitation in both marriages at the same location.  
163
 In Robin v Rex (1929) 12 KLR 134 (East Africa Court of Appeal) Sheridan ACJ, Guthrie-Smith and Muir 
Mackenzie JJ rejected a submission that the evidence of a native wife, married by customary law in a 
polygamous marriage, was admissible against her husband, because of the “essential difference between the two 
unions” ie. Christian marriages and polygamous marriages. See R v Amkeyo (1917) 7 EALR 14 holding that the 
privilege accorded to marital communications by s122 Evidence Ord  [East Africa Protectorate] was restricted to 
couples under Christian marriage. But Hamilton CJ held that in East Africa by native law “the woman is not a 
free contracting agent but is regarded rather in the nature of a chattel for the purchase of which a bargain is 
entered into between the intending husband and the father or nearest male relatives of the woman. In the second 
place there is no limit to the number of women that may be so purchased by one man and finally the man retains 
a disposing power over the woman he has purchased.” It could not be said that in any way the native custom 
approximated any legal idea of marriage according to Christian mores, so the rationale for spousal incompetence 
simply did not apply. At p18 Pickering AJ concurred: “Wives are acquired from their male guardians at a price. 
There is no limit to the number which can be acquired other than those imposed by the inclination and financial 
means of the purchaser.”  
164
 In The Queen v ‘Bear’s Shin Bone (1899) 3 CCC 329 an Indian who according to the marriage customs of his 
tribe takes two women at the same time as his wives, and cohabits with them, is guilty of an offence under s278 
Criminal Code 1892 [Can]. The evidence showed that the prisoner had been married according to the marriage 
custom of the Blood Indians to two women, ‘Free Cutter Woman’ and ‘Killed Herself’, both of whom were 
living with him as his wives, and that there was a form of contract between the parties which they supposed 
binding upon them. The Queen v Van-E-Quis-A-Ka (1888-9) 1 Terr LR 211 against a prisoner, an Indian, on a 
criminal charge, the evidence of two Indian women, M and K was tendered for the defence. M stated: “that she 
was [in point of time the second]wife of the prisoner; that he had two wives, and that K was his other wife; ... 
that she and the prisoner got married Indian fashion; that he promised to keep her all her life and she promised to 
stay with him”. Wetmore J rejected the evidence of M and admitted that of K. c.f. R v Tom Williams (1921) 37 
CCC 126. In Connolly v Woolrich (1867) 11 Lower Canada Jurist 197 affirmed on appeal. sub. nom. Johnstone 
v Connelly (1869) 1 Revue Légale 259 the trial court decided nine days after the existence of the Canadian 
nation that a marriage could lawfully exist between a native Indian and a non-native by an adaptation of 
customary law. 
165
 R v Sukina (1912) TPD 1079 the appellant had been convicted of being found in the Transvaal as a prohibited 
immigrant. Her husband had married her in 1895 in India according to Muslim rites. The husband had contracted 
a second marriage according to Muslim rites in Johannesburg in 1905. He alleged he had since divorced, leaving 
the appellant the only wife. The Court (Wessels, Bristowe and Curlewis JJ) held that a woman married according 
to Muslim rites which permits polygamy, is not a “wife” under immigration law. Wessels J at p1081 dissenting 
correctly stated: “I have no doubt whatsoever that we cannot admit as valid a Mahomedan marriage which has 
taken place in the Transvaal; nor can we admit a Mahomedan divorce. The question, however, arises whether we 
should admit a woman who was married in India by Mahomedan custom and who was acknowledged as the wife 
of the immigrant Hassan before he came to this country.”  In R v Fatima  (1912) TPD 59  it had been held that 
an Asiatic married according to Muslim custom was entitled to bring one, but not more, of his wives to the 
Transvaal. Innes CJ, in a non-criminal case Mashia Ebrahim v Mahommed Essop, [1905] TS 59 was dogmatic: 
“It is quite certain that if this marriage were a polygamous one it would not be recognised in this country no 
matter whether it was recognised as valid in other countries or not.” This decision was consistently to deny the 
validity of native polygamous marriages: Nalana v R [1907] TS 407; Rex v Mboko [1910] TP 445; Kaba v 
N’Tela [1910] TP 964; Seedat’s Executor v The Master (Natal) 1917 AD 302; not followed in Southern 
Rhodesia: Estate Mehta v Acting Master High Court (1958) (4) SA 252, 253 “It is now clear that it is abundantly 
essential, if an intolerable situation is to be avoided, that foreign polygamous marriages, valid by the laws of the 
country in which they were contracted, should be recognised by our courts for certain purposes, however limited 
those purposes may be. Unless this is done the effectiveness of private international law, the  system without 
which it would be impossible to maintain the legal relationships existing between that inhabitants of the various 
countries constituting the civilised world, would be most seriously impaired.” 
   
 202 
Presidency of Bengal166 prayed for the issue of a writ of summons to the House of Lords. His 
father had married in India according to Hindu rites which then permitted polygamy. After his 
marriage “he and his wife joined the religious sect known as the Sadharan Brahmo Samaj” 
which practised monogamy. The marriage was plainly a potentially polygamous one. 167  In 
the Sinha Peerage Claim,168 the Committee for Privileges decided that the marriage was 
lawful, but were very doubtful as to the position if actual polygamy had occurred.  It is a 
firmly established rule of private international law that status is determined by the lex 
domicilii of the parties, so the existence of the husband’s right to take an additional wife was 
to be determined by the husband’s lex domicilii as an application of his personal law. Where a 
husband can take an additional wife under his personal law that second marriage is lawful 
unless it occurs in a country where the statutory law does not permit it. What characterises a 
valid marriage, at any rate at its inception, as monogamous or polygamous is the law of the 
country in which it was conducted.169 English law contemplates that a marriage will be 
monogamous hence the law of bigamy.170 Marriage law in New Zealand171 too only permits 
unmarried persons to marry, so, where the husband’s personal law permits polygamy, by 
going through a ceremony of marriage in the country of his domicile, he does not commit 
bigamy.172  
                                              
166
 Who as Sir Satyendra Prasanna Sinha, one of His Majesty’s Under-Secretaries of State for India, had been 
elevated by Letters Patent dated 14 February 1919 as Baron Sinha of Raipur. 
167
 G W Bartholomew ‘Polygamous Marriages’, (1952) 15 Modern Law Review 35, 39. 
168
 Decided 25 July 1939 but reported [1946] 1 All ER 348n, Lord Maugham L C delivered the decision of the 
Committee for Privileges and found that the claimant was entitled to the hereditary peerage; but was explicit that 
this decision was not to be taken as a precedent where such a claimant was “claiming as a son of a parent who 
has in fact married two wives, eg Hindu or a Mohammedan who has had a plurality of wives. It is apparent that 
great difficulties may arise in questions relating to the descent of a dignity where the marriage from which 
heirship is alleged to result is one of a polygamous character.”  
169
 Lee v Lau [1967] P 14 per Cairns J. 
170
 A-M v A-M (Divorce: Jurisdiction: Validity of Marriage) [2001] 2 FLR 6 para 50 per Hughes J. 
171
 To the same effect is English law: see s11 Matrimonial Cases Act 1973 [UK]: “A marriage celebrated after 
July 31 1971 shall be void on the following grounds only, that is to say…(b) that at the time of the marriage 
either party was already lawfully married.” 
172
 An offence contrary to s205 Crimes Act 1961 [NZ]. The note in B Robertson (ed), ‘Adams on Criminal Law’, 
Wellington, Brooker’s (1992) (looseleaf 2004) CA 205.18 and 205.21B is erroneous. The commentary to 
‘Adams on Criminal Law’ states “New Zealand law does not recognise a polygamous marriage as a marriage, for 
the purposes of founding a prosecution for bigamy.” This sentence is untenable. A person who has contracted a 
polygamous marriage out of New Zealand, consonant with their personal law (lex domicilii) who while still in a 
subsisting marriage, then married again in New Zealand, commits bigamy contrary to s205(i)(a) Crimes Act 
1961. The subsection is not restricted, unlike subsection (c) and (d) to “a New Zealand citizen”, who by domicile 
cannot practise polygamy. A polygamous marriage is valid for those whose domicile permits it. Such a husband 
may by marriage take an additional wife by his personal law, but not under New Zealand law. See Re Rah Chong 
(deceased) (1913) 33 NZLR 384 (SC). 
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Would an actual or potential polygamous marriage (eg by lawful customary concubinage) 
generate uxorial privileges in the substantive criminal law? This was exactly answered in the 
affirmative by R v Shaiamunda et Uxores173 an early Southern Rhodesia decision where the 
convictions of both wives were quashed because of their husband’s marital coercion. That 
conclusion comports with a proper understanding of conflicts of law jurisprudence that where 
actual or potential polygamy is lawful under the lex domicillii, the ordinary legal 
consequences (privileges and liabilities) ought to be available to the participants in the 
marriage.174 But the criminal law generally had great difficulty175 with the implications 
flowing from the concept of polygamy.    
 
                                              
173
 1916 SR 33, where Russell J quashed convictions of (only) the two wives, Kamadza and Maripa, who had 
“demurred to the theft, but their husband ordered them to accompany him” to steal with him corn from a 
neighbour. Both wives were successfully entitled to rely upon the common law defence of marital coercion.  
174
 It should follow that the intramarital conspiracy exemption and the accessory after the fact exemption too 
should be available to all lawful matrimonial configurations (involving at least one husband and one wife) where 
one husband (at least) and one wife (at least) would have had the relevant privilege or exemption available 
between them. An additional wife does not necessarily halve the coercion but may in fact double it. The 
principle must equally apply to polyandry as much as polygamy. 
175
 Criminal law is virtually never discussed in the authorities or texts. In R v Caroubi (1912) 7 Crim App R 149 
a woman married under the Muslim faith had been convicted of the offence of larceny. She appealed to the Court 
of Criminal Appeal. Hamilton J delivering the judgment of the court observed at p151 that the applicant was an 
Arab, presumably a Muslim. Her counsel had raised the issue that as the offence of theft had been committed by 
her in the presence of her husband, she was entitled to the presumption of marital coercion. The court expressly 
stated that they did not consider how far this presumption applied in the case of persons who were permitted to 
be polygamous by the law of their religion or their domicile. The court proceeded to deal with the issue as a 
matter of fact and found that she was entitled to have her conviction quashed. In Caroubi the Court of Criminal 
Appeal assumed that marital coercion applied to a valid polygamous marriage, noting that counsel for the Crown 
had raised no question as to the applicability of this law. There is a short and inconclusive discussion of R v 
Naguib [1917] 1 KB 634 in SG Vesey-Fitzgerald ‘Nachimson’s and Hyde’s Cases’ (1934) 47 LQR 253, 268-269 
who asserted that “there was no limit in English Law to the number of “silly girls” whom an unscrupulous, or 
perhaps a merely low-minded but honest polygamist can persuade to go through a ceremony with him.” The 
statement of Avory J at Assizes that even where the lex loci contractus allows polygamy, such a marriage would 
not be regarded in England as a marriage was politely ignored by the Court of Criminal Appeal. A marriage 
between a Muslim and a non-Muslim celebrated in a foreign country is valid under Muslim law if it is performed 
in accordance with the lex loci contractus or the rites of the communion to which the wife belongs. See Sied 
Ameer Ali Vol II p183. In Nahar v Cassab Gazette (1952) Des Tribunaux Mixtes (Egypt) IX 289 two Christians 
in Egypt were married before a Muslim Qadi and this was held to be a valid marriage in that it was effected 
according to the lex loci. Few decisions in criminal law have investigated the issue and those authorities tend to 
be involved with evidential competence and compellability.   
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Concubinage was a significant facet176 of Chinese customary law177. Concubinage178 amongst 
Chinese179 was recognised under lawful customary law all over Asia180. Concubinage under 
                                              
176
 In Public Prosecution v D J White alias Abdul Rahman [1940] MLJ 170 a husband who entered into a 
monogamous marriage could not, by changing his religion from Christian to Muslim, during the subsistence of 
that monogamous marriage, marry or go through a legally recognised form of marriage with another woman. “A 
conversion to another faith of either spouse of such a marriage has no legal effect on the status of that spouse.” 
Ibid p170. In R v Davendra (1940) 1 MC 51 per Bucknill CJSS  a Hindu had married monogamously under the 
law of Ceylon and had upon conversion to Christianity married another woman in the Straits Settlements and 
was convicted of bigamy. To the same effect are R v Rabia (1889) 4 Kyshe 513 and R v Nandi 1920 ILR Lahore 
440. The husband must “leave his polygamous freedom behind him and conduct himself while in this country as 
the husband of not more than one wife.” SG Vesey-Fitzgerald, ‘Nachimson’s and Hyde’s Cases’, (1934) 47 LQR 
253, 256, a discussion of Nachimson v Nachimson [1930] P 277 (CA) and Hyde v Hyde and Woodmansee (1866) 
1 P&D 130. Vesey-Fitzgerald at p263, refers to the Tanganyika Marriage Ordinance 1921 which contains “the 
same half-hearted hesitation” of how to deal with Christian, Hindu, Buddhist, Sikh, Muslim and Jain marriages 
in one statute. 
177
 In Ho Tsz Chun v Ho Au Shi (1915) 10 HKLR 69; Havilland De Sausmarez P said “The common law of 
China was secured to the Chinese inhabitants, as it had existed prior to cession”, equally in Lui Yuk Ping v Chow 
To[1962] HKLR 515, 523 Macfee J held that Chinese customary law “is part of the general law of Hong Kong”. 
Angu v Attah unreported Privy Council Appeal No 78 of 1915, 23 June 1916, Lord Buckmaster LC, Earl 
Loreburn, Lord Shaw, Sir Arthur Channell ruling that once a customary law had been the subject of “frequent 
proof” it “crystallised” and judicial notice could be taken of it. 
178
 A concubine in Hong Kong has rights to the administration of her husband’s estate. Cheang Thye Phin v Tan 
Ah Loy [1920] AC 369 (PC) (on appeal from the Straits Settlements); Chan Yeung v Chan Shew Chi (1925) 20 
HKLR 35. Her children are considered to be legitimate. s14 Legitimacy Ord Cap 184 (1971 ed) and s13(2) 
Interstates’ Estates Ord Cap 73. She is considered to be part of the family and the state of concubinage comes no 
moral obloquy being described by Macfee J as “perfectly proper”: Lui Yuk Ping v Chow To [1962] HKLR 515, 
523 “Nothing that I say is to be interpreted as casting any doubt on the respectability of the state of 
concubinage”. The matrimonial rights of a Hong Kong concubine are discussed in only a few works. DM Emrys 
Evans, ‘Common Law in a Chinese Setting – The Kernel or the Nut?’, (1971) 1 HKLJ 9, 28-29; DM Emrys 
Evans, ‘The New Law of Succession in Hong Kong’, (1973) HKLJ 7, 22-25. The Strickland Committee of 1953 
stated that: “The tsip is in law considered a wife, a secondary or inferior wife it is true, who, both in law and in 
practice occupies a very different position to the tsai, but nevertheless a wife and not a kept mistress.” The result 
being that a tsip is considered a second concurrent wife, a jural conception outside the Christian conception of 
marriage. 
179
 In Public Trustee v Ng Kwok Shi (1914) 16 GLR 405 Stout CJ held, after receiving expert evidence, that 
concubinage in China did not constitute polygamy. Noted JHC Morris, ‘The Recognition of Polygamous 
Marriages in English Law’, (1953) 66 Harvard Law Review 961, 974 who disagrees with Stout CJ and 
concludes that concubinage is polygamy, so that the distinction between secondary wives and concubines 
undoubtedly existed in theory, it was apt to become nebulous in practice. In Lee v Lau [1967] P 14 the husband 
and wife married in Hong Kong in 1942 according to customary law. Although a monogamous marriage “the 
husband had the right to take during the lifetime of the wife “tsip” or “secondary wives”, who had certain rights 
of succession and whose children were legitimate”. The marriage was therefore potentially polygamous and to 
find the marriage invalid “would result in a finding that the marriages of the majority of Hong Kong citizens was 
invalid” at p17. 
180
 In Re Ding Do Ca, Deceased [1966] 2 MLJ 220 (Fed CA of Malaya) (Thompson L P, Ong Hock Thye ACJ, 
MacIntyre J), it was accepted that a connubial relationship of polygamy was lawful in Malaya: “in the case of 
persons domiciled in this country the local law allows a different personal law to different classes of persons”. 
He added [1966] 2 MLJ 220, 224. that issues of polygamy: “go to the very root of the law relating to the family 
which, after all, is the basis of society at least in its present form…”. The Civil Code of the Republic of China 
having on 24 January 1931 prohibited polygamy and concubinage. But this did not affect the then British Colony 
of Hong Kong. Concubinage was lawful in Hong Kong until 7 October 1971 and it was only prospectively 
abolished. There remain a very significant number of lawful concubines in Hong Kong and much litigation still 
pertains to them: Hon. Foo Ping Sheung LLD, the Chairman of the ‘Civil Codification Commission of the 
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Chinese customary law had to be significantly differentiated from that practised in India181 
and Samoa182 which was also called concubinage183. Under the former it was given 
significantly enhanced formal and social recognition, carrying its own honour and legitimacy. 
Like the presumption of marriage available where persons lived together as man and wife, a 
presumption of customary concubinage existed. There was no recognition in the law of a 
mere mistress. “There is no presumption that because a married man keeps a mistress in 
another town where she passes for his wife, that the other woman is his wife, namely, a 
bigamous wife.”184  
 
 
                                                                                                                                             
Republic of China’, Kelly and Walsh Ltd, Hong Kong (1931) stated at p xxvii: “The enfranchisement of the 
woman, who is now placed on the same footing as the man, involves the disappearance of concubinage, and calls 
for equality with man in the matter of conjugal fidelity”. Polygamy and polyandry are both prohibited forms of 
marriage or conjugal union under Canadian criminal law – where the polygamy or polyandry was entered into 
under purported Canadian legal authority: Trudeau v The King [1935] 2 DLR 786 (Qué: KB) referring to s310 
Canadian Criminal Code. In R v Tolhurst [1937] OR 570 (Ont CA) it was held variants of polygamy, not 
adultery, was the aim of the section. 
181
 In Nagubai Manglorkar v Bai Monghibai 1926 AIR PC 73 Lord Darling delivering the judgment of the Privy 
Council said at p75 “This word concubine has long had a definite meaning, whether expressed in the language of 
India or Europe…a recognised status below that of wife and above that of harlot…Almost a wife, according to 
ancient authorities, the distinction of the concubine from harlots was due to a modified chastity, in that she was 
affected to one man only, although in an irregular union merely.” In Hindu law an avaruddha stri was a 
‘continuously kept concubine’. The Privy Council held that such avaruddha had now been emancipated so that 
the former requirement that she lived in the house of the man with whom she had the relationship, was no longer 
a necessary requirement, so that an avaruddha stri was entitled to maintenance from his estate, approving 
Ningareddi v Lakshmawa (1901) 26 Bombay 163. The position in relation to concubinage is clear in Hong Kong 
but a concubine under Chinese customary law was very much in the nature of a second but lesser ranking wife, 
but a wife nonetheless. The position under Indian law is distinguishable in relation to concubines as the status 
does not equate with that of an additional wife.  
182
 In Samoa, litigation lasted for 28 years in one case involving customary law and polygamy, culminating in 
the last decision of the New Zealand Supreme Court (as the final court of appeal for Samoa) before Samoa 
attained independence. The Samoan Public Trustee v Collins, unreported, Supreme Court of New Zealand, 
Hutchison and McGregor JJ, 13 December 1961 affirming the decision of Luxford CJ In The Samoan Public 
Trustee v Collins, unreported, High Court of Western Samoa, Apia, 23 June 1933, Luxford CJ stated, “Polygamy 
is not contrary to Samoan custom but the right to a plurality of wives at one and the same time was reserved 
(generally speaking) to the holders of the higher titles. The holder of the lower titles and the untitled men were 
allowed only one wife at a time, but as consent was necessary for the union, so was it necessary for severing the 
union.”. 
183
 The basis of a bigamy charge must be a monogamous marriage and not one under a lawful system of 
polygamy: R v Sagoo [1975] QB 885 (Sikh married in Kenya when polygamous marriage permitted until Hindu 
Marriage and Divorce Ordinance 1960 [No 28 of 1960] [Kenya]. That Ordinance was indistinguishable from 
the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 [India] considered in Parkasho v Singh [1968] P 233, 248.) No such legislation 
was enacted in Malaysia: Marimuthu v Thiruchitambalam [1966] 1 MLJ 203, 204 per Gill J. 
184
 W E Beckett, ‘The Recognition of Polygamous Marriages Under English Law’, (1932) 48 LQR 341. In 
Sastry v Sembecutty (1881) 6 App Cas 364,371 Sir Barnes Peacock for the Privy Council accepted that where 
concubinage was not considered as immoral it followed that the presumptions of the validity of marriage could 
equally apply to concubinage. 
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WHO IS A WOMAN? 
 
The definition of who is female or a ‘wife’ for the purpose of the statutory defence is itself 
elusive.185 Issues of gender-reassignment raise for this defence particularly poignant issues, as 
does the situation where legislation provides for homosexual civil unions. The early decision 
of Corbett v Corbett (orse Ashley)186 is no longer authoritative, in putting the basis of the 
determination of womanhood on the outcome of a congruence of chromosomal, gonadal and 
genital tests. Ormrod J had said “sex is clearly an essential determinant of the relationship 
called marriage, because it is and always has been recognised as the union of man and 
woman. It is the institution on which the family is built, and of which the capacity for natural 
heterosexual intercourse is an essential element.” 
 
In New Zealand,187 Ellis J declined  to follow Corbett v Corbett and emphasised that the 
modern approach ought to be to evaluate the psychological and social aspects of sex, in 
determining gender.  Charles J in W v W (Physical Inter-sex)188 held that where the biological 
sexual characteristics of an individual at birth were ambiguous and not congruent, other 
factors, including psychological and hormonal factors and secondary sexual characteristics 
should be taken into account in determining the individual’s sex for the purpose of marriage. 
There the wife’s genetic and gonadal sex was male, her genitalia were ambiguous and her 
body hiatus and gender orientation appeared to be female, resulting in a physical inter-sex 
                                              
185
 At common law the status of “hermaphrodites” was problematic: T E ‘The Lawes Resolution of Women’s 
Rights’ (1632) John More, Chancery-Lane, (reprinted 2005), The Law Book Exchange Ltd, Clark New Jersey, 
p5. 
186
 [1971] P 83. This approach was followed in South Africa in W v W (1976) (2) SALR 308 and in Canada M v 
M (A) (1984) 42 RFL (2d) 267. But rejected in Australia: Re Kevin (Validity of Marriage of Transsexual) [2001] 
Fam CA 1074, Chisholm J, affirmed by the Full Court of the Federal Family Court, Re Kevin (Validity of 
Marriage of Transsexual) unreported, Appeal No EA/97/2001, 21 February 2003, where the word “man” in the 
relevant marriage statute was held to include a post-operative female to male transsexual person.  The Full Court 
did not decide the “more difficult” question of pre-operative transsexual persons. In Goodwin v United Kingdom 
(2002) 35 EHRR 18 para 100 it was held that a test of congruent biological factors can no longer be decisive in 
denying legal recognition to the change of gender of a post-operative transsexual. 
187
 Attorney General v Otahuhu Family Court [1995] 1 NZLR 603 (HC) approving M v M (marriage: 
transsexuals) [1991] NZFLR 337 (Judge Aubin). The English approach was seen as too reductionistic in having 
regard only to the three factors of chromosomes, gonads and genitalia, ignoring the significance of the 
psychological status of the person. 
188
 [2001] Fam 111, also reported as W v W (Nullity:Gender) [2001] 1 FLR 324; MT v JT (1976) 355 A 2d 
204,211: a post-operative male to female transsexual was a female and a wife because her core identity was now 
female. 
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state. She had chosen to live as a woman before having hormone treatment and gender-
reassignment surgery and, although before such surgery would have been unable to have 
sexual intercourse either as a man or as a woman, after surgery she was capable of 
consummating the marriage; and was held to be female for the purposes of her marriage to her 
husband.  
 
In a criminal appeal, R v Tan189 the co-accused Gloria Gina Greaves was convicted of keeping 
a disorderly house and of (being a man) living on the earnings of prostitution. It was argued 
that although Ms Greaves was biologically a male, she had been psychologically and socially 
female for more than 18 years and was therefore “deemed to be female” and therefore 
incapable of being a man living off the earnings of prostitution. In argument counsel observed 
that Ms Greaves was “registered for national insurance purposes as a woman”. The approach 
in Corbett v Corbett (orse Ashley)190 was argued to be inapplicable to the criminal law, which 
should treat a person “in the way that that person is treated by society”. Parker J delivering the 
reserved judgment of the court, however,  rejected that argument “without hesitation”.191  
 
It would, in our view, create an unacceptable situation if the law were such that a marriage 
between Gloria Greaves and another man was a nullity, on the ground that Gloria Greaves was 
a man; that buggery to which she consented with such other person was not an offence for the 
same reason; but that Gloria Greaves could live on the earnings of a female prostitute without 
offending against section 30 of the Act of 1956 because for that purpose he/she was not a man 
and that the like position would arise in the case of someone charged with living on his 
earnings as a male prostitute.192 
 
The European Court of Human Rights in Rees v United Kingdom193 considered facts where 
the applicant was born with all the physical and biological characteristics of a female. The 
                                              
189
 [1983] 1 QB 1053 (CA). In M v M (marriage: transsexuals) [1991] NZFLR 337, 342 Judge Aubin in the 
Family Court, did not follow R v Tan, as it wrongly assumed the correctness of Corbett v Corbett. 
190
 [1971] P 83. 
191
 See 1064B-C. 
192
 [1983] 1 QB 1053, 1063. The appeal was dismissed and the Appeal Committee of the House of Lords (Lord 
Diplock, Lord Bridge of Harwich and Lord Brandon of Oakbrook) dismissed a petition by Ms Greaves for leave 
to appeal. 
193
 (1986) 9 EHRR 56. In Public Prosecutor v Mongkon Pusuwan, unreported Subordinate Court, Singapore, 19 
January 2006, Judge Bala Reddy; The Straits Times, 20 January 2006, the defendant Thai national whose 
passport showed that the holder was a male, but who looked female, was convicted of a drug offence which apart 
from imprisonment carried mandatory corporal punishment for males (but not a punishment for females). The 
defendant had undergone gender reassignment surgery and the court, on medical evidence, accepted that the 
defendant was to be considered a female and spared the punishment. 
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Registrar General had refused to amend the Birth Certificate to that of a male, after the 
applicant had undergone surgical sexual conversion.  Article 12 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights provides “Men and women of marriageable age have the right to marry and 
found a family, according to the national laws governing the exercise of this right.” The Court 
held there was no violation of Art. 12 because the provision only referred to the traditional 
marriage between persons of opposite biological sex. This view was first endorsed by the 
court in Cossey v United Kingdom194 in which a male had undergone surgical sexual 
conversion to female status. There three judges dissented stating that a dynamic interpretation 
of the Convention would embrace social and moral developments including recognition under 
the law of transsexualism. The fact that a transsexual, after gender-reassignment surgery, is 
unable to procreate was not decisive and they held that reproductivity could not be a 
prerequisite for a lawful marriage. On analysis, the majority had concluded that the only 
reason against allowing Miss Cossey to marry a man was the fact that she biologically was 
not considered to be a woman. The minority commended a humane solution based on the fact 
that psychologically and physically she was now a member of the female sex and socially 
accepted as such. As she also could not now marry a woman (on the reasoning of the 
majority), she therefore was being wholly denied the right to marriage of any kind.195 
 
In Bellinger v Bellinger,196 the English Court of Appeal maintained the view expressed in 
Corbett v Corbett that the criterion for the legal determination of gender remained as 
described in 1971. On further appeal, the House of Lords197 finessed the previous law as 
transsexual people198 were to be distinguished from inter-sexual people. But although nature 
                                              
194
 (1990) 13 EHRR 622. 
195
 Carol Smart, ‘Women, Crime and Criminology: A Feminist Critique’ (1978) Routledge & Kegan Paul, 
London at p112 accepts that both sex and marital status may affect the legal definition of an offence, the 
assessment of culpability and the protection of both the accused and the victims of criminal offences “In one 
special case both the sex and marital status of the offender is significant in terms of culpability, namely where a 
married woman commits an offence in the presence of her husband…This legal anomaly is based on the idea 
that husbands occupy a position of authority over their wives while wives dutifully obey their husbands, and 
although it may act as a form of discrimination in favour of married woman, it is founded upon the legal 
recognition of a woman’s inferior social status in society. However, like other legal anomalies, which are based 
on traditional paternalistic and chauvinistic attitudes towards women, this exception in the law is likely to be 
removed or fall into disuse as the position of women in society improves.” 
196
 [2002] 2 WLR 411 (a majority judgment). 
197
 Bellinger v Bellinger [2003] 2 AC 467 (HL). 
198
 Ibid para 7 per Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead: “Transsexual is the label given, not altogether happily, to a 
person who has the misfortune to be born with physical characteristics where are congruent but whose self-belief 
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does not always draw straight lines, the distinction between male and female was held to exist 
and confer a separate legal status that has differing legal consequences in “many areas of life, 
from marriage and family law to gender-specific crime and competitive sport”.199 In view of 
the resulting legal consequences, self-definition was not a sufficiently rigorous way to 
categorise gender, which therefore had to be based on publicly available, objective, biological 
criteria for the determination. The legislature was enabled to provide that for certain purposes 
that a person who has undergone gender reassignment surgery will be entitled to enhanced 
legal recognition, such as for the purposes of discrimination legislation.200 But the House of 
Lords reasoned that it did not mean that a person born with one sex may be regarded as a 
person of the opposite sex for the purposes of the criminal law. “A male to female transsexual 
person is no less a woman for not having had surgery, or any more a woman for having had 
it”: Secretary, Department of Social Security v SRA.201 The relevant surgery involves a 
significant change from the apparatus of the original gender but it “does not supply the patient 
with a uterus, nor with ovaries.  It is purely and simply an attempt to allow the person’s body 
to approximate to how they feel within themselves.” Under the criminal law therefore it is not 
possible for a person born a male to become a female, but that person may be treated for 
certain legislative or contractual purposes as being a female. The construct of marriage 
intensely engaged religious and social culture, but its fundamental arrangement was so 
intractable that it was held to exclusively apply to “two persons of the opposite sex.”202 
Legislation can alter those precepts, such as happened in New Zealand when Parliament 
extended to civil union partners the spousal privilege in relation to being an accessory after 
the fact to the other spouse;203 but the common law cannot change a man into a woman or 
vice versa. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                             
is incongruent. Transsexual people are born with the anatomy of a person of one sex but with an unshakeable 
belief or feeling that they are persons of the opposite sex.”  
199
 Ibid para 28. 
200
 See the Sexual Discrimination (Gender Re-assignment) Regulations 1999 (SI 1999/1102), [UK] 
201
 (1993) 118 ALR 467, 477. 
202
 Quilter v Attorney General [1998] 1 NZLR 523 (CA); M Henaghan ‘Same-Sex Marriages in the Court of 
Appeal’ [1998] New Zealand Law Journal 40;  Bellinger v Bellinger [2003] 2 AC 476 para 46. 
203
 s7 Relationships (Statutory References) Act 2005 [NZ] . 
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MARRIAGE  
 
The concept of marriage is the product of contemporary dominant ideologies.  It has a specific 
legal status which generates consequences.204 Marriage appears to have been based on 
Christian ideals and beliefs about family relationships.205 Other types of living 
arrangements206 may be broadly comparable to marriage but unless they are attained by 
certain formalities of the civic law and unless they exist for a specified minimum time they 
may not, unlike marriage, provide immunities under the law.  Where however a jurisdiction 
does have modern legislation which treats certain civil unions as not being so dissimilar from 
marriage, then in order to avoid an invidious hierarchy between marriage and civil unions, the 
legislative philosophy has been to provide the same exemptions from the criminal law. In 
New Zealand the only remaining uxorial privilege in the substantive criminal law is the 
exemption from being an accessory after the fact to the act of the other spouse.207  This has 
now been extended208 to civil unions of either a heterosexual or homosexual nature, thereby 
equipirating those unions with marriage for the purposes of the special exemption.  While 
there was significant debate as to whether these overall equalities were rational there was no 
consideration given as to whether the existing exemption should be totally removed from the 
legislation.  In the context of omnibus legislation providing a major reform of family law no 
specific consideration was given to the issue of whether the pre-existing law should have been 
completely abrogated rather than widened.   
 
                                              
204
 Mark Henaghan and Bill Atkin (eds), Family Law Policy in New Zealand, 2002 (2 ed), LexisNexis, 
Butterworths, Wellington. 
205
 In Quilter v Attorney General [1998] 1 NZLR 523 (CA) it was held that although the Marriage Act 1955 is 
silent on the explicit need for the parties to the marriage to be of the opposite sex, it is inherent in the object and 
spirit of that Act that the parties are of the opposite sex.  Two of the five judges were of the view that not 
allowing same-sex couples to legally marry was discriminatory against them on the grounds of sexual orientation 
and was a violation of the principles in s19 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. The majority ruled there was 
no discrimination because marriage is a heterosexual concept. 
206
 Mark Henaghan ‘Legally Defining the Family’ (2002) in Mark Henaghan and Bill Atkin (eds), ‘Family Law 
Policy in New Zealand, Second Edition’, Wellington, LexisNexis Butterworths, p7 states that the most critical 
statistic is “…the rapid growth of de facto relationships. Between 1981 and 1991 there was an increase of 
84%…of those aged between 20-39 years.” 
207
 271(2) Crimes Act 1961. 
208
 Ibid p 16 noting that the Domestic Violence Act 1995 first recognised de facto relationships as being “in the 
nature of marriage.” 
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There exists in current society a range of options to replace or approximate marriage. The 
House of Lords in Fitzpatrick v Sterling Housing Association Limited209 recognised a same-
sex couple as constituting a family210 for a particular statutory purpose.211 The issue was 
whether two male individuals had lived together as man and wife, or whether one was a 
member of the other’s family, for the purposes of succession to tenancies under various 
statutory regimes. In Harrogate Borough Council v Simpson212 it had been previously held 
that a woman who lived in council accommodation with another woman and who shared a 
“committed, monogamous, homosexual relationship” with her was not a “member of the 
tenant’s family” within s113(1) Housing Act 1985 [UK] and accordingly could not succeed to 
the tenancy on the death of the tenant. As legal rights have now been extended to persons in 
relationships that resemble marriage, a person who psychologically and socially acts as a wife 
should, despite the view in Bellinger, be entitled to raise the defence, if there has been gender-
reassignment surgery. The wider issue that arises is whether the existing inconsistent 
collection of statutory exemptions for wives should be fundamentally remodelled, not around 
a married woman, but around the concept of a person who irreversibly adopts the role and 
duties of a wife.213 There is no satisfactory single definition of the uxorial union, as marriage 
is a concept identified by any one of a bundle of rights214 and every definition of marriage 
may lack cross-cultural validity.215  
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 [2001] 1 AC 27 HL. In the Court of Appeal [1998] Ch 304 Waite LJ stated “If endurance, stability, inter-
dependence and devotion were the sole hallmarks of family membership, there could be no doubt about this case 
at all. Mr Fitzpatrick and Mr Thompson lived together for a longer period than many marriages endure these 
days.”   
210
 In De Burgh v De Burgh (1952) 250 P 2d 598, 601  “the family is the basic unit of our society, the centre of 
the personal affections that ennoble and enrich human life…Since the family is the core of our society, the law 
seeks to foster and preserve marriage”.   
211
 A Barlow and R Probert ‘Displacing Marriage – Diversification and Harmonisation within Europe’, (2000) 
12 Child & Family Law Quarterly 153. 
212
 [1986] Fam Law 359 (CA). 
213
 Law is really a codification of attitudes. In relation to wives, it is also a reflection of culture. Margaret J 
Chriss ‘Troubling Degrees of Authority: The Continuing Pursuit of Unequal Marital Roles’ (1993) vol 12 Law 
and Inequality 225 (University of Minnesota Law School). Maynard v Hill (1888)125 US 190, 211  stated that 
marriage “is an institution in the maintenance of which, in its purity, the public is deeply interested, because it is 
the foundation of the family and of society”.     
214
 For polyandry, said in 1900 to be practised “very extensively in Southern India” so that “the Madras Law 
Reports teem with cases”. See: Sir Dennis Fitzpatrick, ‘Non-Christian Marriage’, (1900) 2 Journal of the 
Society of Comparative Legislation (NS) 359, 362. H H Shephard, ‘Marriage Law in Malabar’, (1892) 8 LQR 
314 refers to the matriarchal system on which polyandry was based as being “a state of concubinage” in which 
the woman is “at liberty to change her consort when and as often as she pleases”. An Indian Act dealt 
specifically with polyandry: Malabar Marriage Act 1896. In Pazpena De Vire v Pazpena De Vire [2001] Fam 
Law 95 para 65 the High Court stated that polyandry was not recognised by the law of England. But this is too 
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A structural requirement in all the uxorial privileges is that there be in place a lawful 
marriage.216 The marital coercion defence is austere in its protection.217 No de facto218, 
putative219 or customary marriages220 are included. The “sanctity of marriage”221 has been 
                                                                                                                                             
wide. Lawrence Collins (ed), ‘Dicey and Morris on The Conflict of Laws’ (2000) 13 ed, vol 2, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, para 17-130 assert that the law of polygamy applies mutatis mutandis to polyandry; but not so 
if the statutory defence of marital coercion is predicted on a matrimonial power imbalance against the wife.  E R 
Leach ‘Polyandry, Inheritance and the Definition of Marriage’, (1955) Man 155, No 199, p183. 
215
 See E K Gough, ‘The Nayars and the Definition of Marriage’, (1959) 89 Journal of the Royal 
Anthropological Institute, 23, 32. Prior to British rule in India the polyandrous Nayar women customarily had a 
small but not a fixed number of husbands.   
216
 In R v Ditta, Hussain and Kara [1988] Crim LR 42 CA, it was held that before a woman can bring herself 
within the terms of section 47 of the 1925 Act, it must be shown that she is a wife in the strict sense of the term 
and that the person who coerced her was her husband in the strict sense of the term. The judges were not referred 
to Blackstone who had specifically stated that both the common law and church law condemned polygamy yet it 
was permissible in other European jurisdictions. 1 Blackstone Commentaries 436, noting that in Turkey “duas 
uxores eodem tempore habere non licet” [It is not unlawful to have two wives at one time.] Where in the 
indictment in which a husband and wife are jointly charged, it is averred that the female accused is the wife of 
the male accused, it is not necessary for the female accused to prove that fact: R v Knight (1823) 1 Car & P 116. 
217
 Joanna L Grossman, ‘Book Review: Separated Spouses’, (2001) 53 Stanford Law Review 1613, 1631: 
“Coercion - the existence of and protection from it - played an important role in the law of nineteenth-century 
marriage.” 
218
 Michael Jefferson, ‘Criminal Law’, 4 ed, Financial, Times Pitman Publishing, (1999) at page 243: “Certainly 
a mistress does not have this defence.” A de facto wife is not a wife for the purposes of the defence: Brennan v 
Bass (1983) 35 SASR 311. A de facto relationship is not that of a “married person”. Leaman v The Queen [1986] 
Tas R 223. The New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal, in R v Brown (Mary Veronica), BC9806791, 9 
December 1998, McInerny, Hulme and Barr JJ, did not accept an argument that there was in criminal law terms 
an equivalency between de facto relationships and actual marriage although acknowledging that both 
relationships could generally involve the same degree of permanence, commitment and support, because the 
description ‘de facto relationship’ covered a myriad situations and commonly involved no commitment beyond 
convenience the ancient exemptions of the criminal law did not apply to it. In New South Wales s14 De Facto 
Relationships Act [NSW] provided that only where such a relationship had existed for two years did the law 
recognise it, in contrast to the instantaneous recognition of marriage. The Victorian Law Reform Commissioner, 
‘Criminal Liability of Married Persons (Special Rules)’, June 1975 had concluded that the existence of the legal 
bond of marriage was of real relevance in deciding whether criminal law exemptions ought to be available. The 
fragile reasoning was that the State did not have the same concern to preserve the stability of de facto 
relationships as it had to preserve the stability of marriages; and it was that concern in the stability which 
justified the objective of exemptions which supported loyalty, cooperation and confidentiality between the 
spouses. The second reason advanced by the Victorian Commissioner adopted by the New South Wales Court of 
Criminal Appeal was that a married woman’s difficulty in resisting pressures from her husband “will commonly 
be increased substantially, it may be thought, by her awareness that they are husband and wife and her 
recollection of the ceremony of marriage at which they made a formal public exchange of undertakings which 
were intended and expected to be observed throughout their lives”. 
219
 In R v Court (1912) 7 Cr App R 127, 128 counsel unsuccessfully submitted that a woman living together with 
a man should be treated as a wife for the purposes of the presumption. Lord Alverstone CJ, in dismissing the 
appeal, added at 129: “It has been urged that the appellant might in some way to be given the benefit of the rule 
that a wife committing a crime in the presence of her husband is presumed to have acted under his coercion. I am 
not certain that this rule is beneficial in the administration of justice. It certainly ought not to be extended.” 
220
 In 1905, a 16 year old Maori lad had, in terms of contemporary Maori customs and usages, cohabited with a 
13 year 8 month old girl as a customary marriage. The girl’s father initially recognised the marriage but 
subsequently informed the police.  New Zealand Herald, 17 May 1905, Edwards J (in R v Hone Heiwari, 
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described as a phrase which “conceals, on a juristic level, a timid and irrelevant approach”.222 
The formal and public exchange of marriage vows could be involuntary or the result of a 
failure to resist her husband’s overbearing pressure.223 The first English ecclesiastical law 
treatise devoted to the requirements of marriage was published in 1686224 – it was a subject 
attended by many rules and specific requirement. The traditional view that non-marriage 
unions are less worthy than marriage is overtly moralistic, paying no heed to the interests of 
children or proprietorial interests. The formal legal undertaking of solemnised marriage is a 
wafer-thin justification for excluding de facto arrangements from any special protection of the 
criminal law, which fixes on the subjective position of the actor, not the actuality. If a 
marriage is valid according to the lex loci celebrationis then it “is good all the world over”225 
even if it would not constitute a valid marriage in the country of the domicile of either of the 
spouses. In some countries, a marriage can be effected by correspondence,226 by proxy227 and 
by habit and repute.228 Validating legislation may have to be enacted.229 Marriage celebrated 
                                                                                                                                             
unreported, Supreme Court, 16 May 1905 Auckland) stated the ‘marriage’ contravened the law of New Zealand 
(although it did not contravene Maori custom). The judge put the male youth on probation for two years and four 
months, noting that upon its effluxion the girl would be of a marriageable age. Where a North American Indian 
customary marriage occurred, which permitted polygamy, the first wife was incompetent to give evidence 
against her husband. R v Nan-E-Quis-A-Ka (1889) 1 Terr L R 211. But marrying two women under tribal 
custom, although permitted by it, contravenes the criminal law of Canada: R v Bear’s Shin Bone (1899) 3 CCC 
329. Requiring a “common law” spouse to testify against the accused does not infringe the equality R v Duvivier 
(1990) 60 CCC (3d) 353, affd 64 CCC (3d) 20 (Ont: CA).  To similar effect is: R v Thompson (1994) 90 CCC 
(3d) 519 (Alt: CA) rights of the testifying spouse as guaranteed by s15 Canadian Charter of Rights. 
221
 A prisoner, awaiting trial for murder, asked the director of his prison for permission to marry a woman who 
was to be an important prosecution witness at his trial. By statute s80 Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 
[UK] she would thereupon cease to be a compellable witness for the prosecution. The Crown Prosecution 
Service in England and Wales sought judicial review of the decision of the Registrar General of Births, Deaths 
and Marriages that he had no objection to the forthcoming marriage. The Court of Appeal held that entering into 
a lawful marriage which would have as a consequence that a witness would no longer be compellable could not 
amount to an offence of attempting to pervert the course of justice or otherwise be contrary to public policy. R 
(Crown Prosecution Service) v Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages [2003] 2 WLR 504 (Butler-
Sloss P, Waller LJ, Sir Philip Otton). 
222
 Bates, ‘The Enforcement of Marriage’, (1974) 3 Anglo-American Law Review 84, 85. 
223
 Hyde v Hyde and Woodmansee (1866) LR 1 P&D 130,135, “The matrimonial law is correspondent to the 
rights and obligations which the contract of marriage has, by the common understanding of the parties, created.”  
224
 Henry Swinburne, ‘A Treatise of Spousals, or Matrimonial Contracts’, (1686) (reprinted 2003) The Lawbook 
Exchange Ltd. 
225
 Berthiaume v Dastous [1930] AC 79, 83 (PC). 
226
 L Pålsson, ‘Marriage and Divorce in Comparative Conflict of Laws’ (1974)  Sijthoff, Leiden, p208ff.   
227
 A T Carter, ‘Proxy Marriages’, (1957) 35 Canadian Bar Review 1195. 
228
 As in Scotland: Wetherill v Sheik [2005] ScotCS CSOH 25, 10 February 2005, Lord Philip. 
229
 Starkowski v Attorney-General [1954] AC 155; Re Howe Louis (1970) 14 DLR (3d) 49 (BC: CA); s2 
Marriages Act 1970 [Ire] which retrospectively validated marriages celebrated by Irish Catholic couples at 
Lourdes, France, based on a Catholic ceremony only. French law only recognises civil marriages as valid. The 
legislation validated marriages solemnised “solely by religious ceremony in the department of Hautes Pyréneés, 
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on the high sea presents its own problems.230 A presumption of marriage from cohabitation 
has been accepted and occasionally supplies the omission of formal documents.231 In 1868, a 
Royal Commission concluded that a sound marriage law “ought to embrace the maximum of 
simplicity and the maximum of certainty.”232  
 
Wives willingly submitted to the husband’s rule in exchange for their protection, the 
appearance of married life was as good as an actual marriage. Common law marriage, a 
relationship given legal recognition despite the lack of a licence and formal solemnisation, 
played an important role throughout the nineteenth century.233 In the year 2000, several 
American states still permitted common law marriages.234 By the eighteenth century there was 
a marked rise235 in the number of irregular marriages, in which no banns were published and 
where no celebrant performed any ceremony236. A marriage of habit and repute was sufficient 
to establish the existence of a common law marriage237. In criminal trials where the defendant 
needed to demonstrate that a marriage was in place at the material time, the courts generally 
bent over backwards to assist, no doubt conscious of the severe limitations on a defendant (in 
custody) to be able to have access to and prove this fact in issue. A woman of marriageable 
age asserting she shared the same surname as her purported husband generally was 
                                                                                                                                             
France.” No thought seems to have been given to the position of estranged couples. See also, Fiji Marriages Act 
1878 [UK] c61 41&42 Vic (regularising marriages solemnised there prior to Fiji becoming a British colony). 
230
 In Du Moulin v Druitt (1860) ICLR 212 a marriage celebrated between a female stowaway and a soldier on 
board a troop ship headed for Australia was void (in the absence of a clergyman), the marriage was not one of 
necessity as en route various ports where the ship was calling, a clergyman would be reachable.   
231
 Frank Bates, ‘The Presumption of Marriage Arising From Cohabitation’, (1978) 13 University of Western 
Australia Law Review 341; Re Pennington Dec’d (No 2) [1978] VR 617, 630 per Harris J.  
232
 Report of the Royal Commission on the Laws of Marriage Cmnd (1868) at p xxv. 
233
 Ariela R Dubler, ‘Governing Through Contract: Common Law Marriage in the Nineteenth Century’, (1998) 
107 Yale Law Journal 1885, 1888-1890. 
234
 Brian H Bix, ‘State of the Union: The States’ Interest in the Marital Status of Their Citizens’, (2000) 55 
University of Miami Law Review 1, 11 n43. 
235
 Leah Leneman, ‘The Scottish Case That Led to Hardwicke’s Marriage Act’, (1999) Law and History Review, 
vol 17, p162, para 5. 
236
 R B Outwaite, ‘Clandestine Marriage in England 1500-1850’, Hambledon Press (1995) London, p76. 
237
 Until 2005, Scottish law still permitted such marriages. In Wetherhill v Sheikh [2005] CSOH 25, 10 February 
2005, Lord Philip “The theory of the present law on marriage by cohabitation with habit and repute is therefore 
that if a man and a woman cohabit as husband and wife in Scotland for a sufficient time and are generally held 
and reputed to be husband and wife and are free to marry each other, they will be presumed to have tacitly 
consented to be married and, if the presumption is not rebutted, will be legally married: Campbell v Campbell 
(1866) 4 M 876, affd (1867) 5 M (HL) 115, Nicoll v Bell 1954 SLT 314, 322.” See also Eric M Clive ‘Husband 
and Wife’ (1997) 4 ed, W Green,para 05.025. 
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sufficient.238 A valid marriage, which included a common law one, was essential, although it 
did not have to be strictly proved.239 In R v Green,240 a conviction was quashed, when on 
appeal it was proved that co-accused had been married at all material times, and as they had 
used different surnames and had been unrepresented at trial, they had been oblivious of the 
defence of marital coercion. Anglo-American criminal procedure provided that where in any 
indictment in which a husband and wife were jointly charged, it was averred in the 
intitulement of the indictment or in the particulars of the offence that the female accused was 
the wife of the male accused, it was not necessary for the female accused to prove that fact.241 
The term ‘spinster’242 in an indictment was ambiguous as it originally did not mean an 
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 In R v McGinnes (1870) 11 Cox CC 391, 392. It was a matter of fact for the jury to decide whether the 
marriage existed, on all of the evidence, there being no strict proof imposed upon the putative wife. Byles J 
directed a jury that the fact that a woman, who shared the same surname as her male coaccused by whom she had 
given birth to a child, did not respond when he had denied to a police officer that he was married to her, ought 
not be construed against her, as she may have “thought fit to hold her tongue, this being a criminal charge”. 
239
 R v Knight (1823) 1 Car & P 116, 117, fn (b). “Coercion is a (rarely used) defence akin to duress but available 
only to a married woman”. Michael Jefferson, ‘Criminal Law’, 4 ed, Financial Times Pitman Publishing (1999) 
page 242. In R v Good, (1842) 1 Car & K 185; the husband had been convicted of murder at a separate trial the 
day before. (1842) 1 Car & K 185 fn(a). At a trial before Alderson B and Coltman J, the Attorney General Sir F 
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there was some irregularity in the marriage “she had acted under the supposition that she was the wife of Daniel 
Good, and according to the duty which she considered to be cast upon her, the Court would have felt it right to 
have inflicted a very slight punishment upon her.” 239 Ibid 186. But in R v Ditta, Hussain and Kara [1988] Crim 
LR 42 (CA)it was held that the marriage had to be strictly proved and a wife’s reasonable but erroneous belief 
that she was lawfully married was insufficient in law.       
240
 (1913) 9 Cr App R 228 (CCA). 
241
 R v Knight (1823) 1 Car & P 116.  cf R v McShane  unreported Invercargill Supreme Court 12 June 1876, 
Williams J; Southland Times 13 June 1876 p2, where the prosecutor rejoiced in the fact that the indictment did 
not aver that the putative Mrs McShane was in fact married, so she would have to prove it. 
242
 J H Baker, ‘Male and Married Spinsters’, (1977) 21 American Journal of Legal History 255, 258 who notes 
that the Elizabethan Queen Bench twice confirmed the orthodox learning that “the wife of CD” was a valid 
description of status without more. ‘Married Women – Pleading Marriage – Evidence – Declarations’ (1881) 23 
Albany Law Journal 261, 279 the decision in US v De Quilfeldt (1881) 5 F 276 is noted. Hammond DJ held that 
if a married woman is described in an indictment as a single woman or be neither described as married or single, 
she may move to have the indictment amended or quashed. But even a general plea of not guilty, where she takes 
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facts essential to show martial coercion.” In J H Baker ‘Male and Married Spinsters’ (1977) 21 American 
Journal of Legal History 255 it is stated that the addition of the term “spinster” after the name of the accused on 
the indictment, was “to prevent the defence of marital coercion”, but that in R v Battersby and Others (1525) 
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a personal status.  See further Carol Z Weiner, ‘Is a Spinster an Unmarried Woman’, (1976) 20 American 
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2 Leon 183; R v Lasington (1600) Cro Eliz 750. The usual term employed until the fifteenth century was 
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unmarried woman. In United States v De Quilfeldt243 the judge ordered that in an indictment 
that a female defendant must be alternatively described as “‘wife of A.B.,’ ‘widow’, 
‘spinster’, or ‘single woman’. The reason being that the status of femalehood had forensic 
significance and also immediately conveyed information to the decision-maker as to the type 
of woman so charged, especially if she were by law incompetent to give evidence for herself. 
 
The Indictments Act 1915 [UK]244 introduced a number of reforms to the English law of 
criminal pleading. Clause 7 of the First Schedule to that Act provided that henceforth the 
description or designation of an accused person need only be such as to reasonably be 
sufficient to identify the person without having to state “abode, style, degree, or occupation”. 
No longer was a married woman required to be so described, as a separate class of individual, 
in an indictment. The issue of the description of females in criminal proceedings had been of 
significant importance in terms of the marital coercion defence. If the indictment stated that 
the accused female was a married woman there was no further requirement for her to establish 
that status. However, where she was indicted as a single woman it was open to her to 
challenge that averment by adducing evidence of it, for otherwise she was wholly precluded 
from asserting the defence. An accused married woman, discontent with being described in an 
indictment, filed against her alone, as a single woman, or not described at all as married or 
single, was entitled to move to quash the indictment or plead in abatement for want of a 
proper reference to her. If she did not challenge the erroneous status and denied the offence, 
this was treated as prima facie evidence that she was not a feme-covert. But on the general 
issue of the trial she was entitled to prove the marriage as well as any other facts essential to 
show marital coercion. In addition, her marital status was relevant to the crime of conspiracy, 
accessory after the fact and to issues of competence, compellability and spouse-incrimination. 
The importance of this issue pervaded the criminal law245 and was the subject of precise 
                                                                                                                                             
‘singlewoman’ the English translation of feme sole. But the term ‘spinster’ was used in Elizabethan and 
Jacobean indictments, either to exonerate innocent husbands or to prevent the defence of marital coercion: Carol 
Z Wiener, ‘Is a Spinster an Unmarried Woman?’ (1976) 20 American Journal of Legal History 27, 29. 
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 (1881) 5 F 276, 281. 
244
 5&6 Geo 5 c90. 
245
 In 1885, a wife, co-accused with her husband was still referred to as “Uxor”: R v Dykes et Uxor (1885) 15 
Cox CC 771. Still in use in New Zealand in Richards et Ux v Hill [1959] NZLR 415. 
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statements246 by judges, probably anxious to know the provenance of the person before them 
as much as to know the range of possible defences open to such a woman.  
 
 
PRESENCE OF HUSBAND 
 
The focus at common law247 had been on the need for the spouses to be physically present 
under the belief that the wife could not be coerced unless she was alongside her husband. This 
denied the insidious effect of psychological conduct which took place at a point in time 
separate from the physical presence of the dominating partner. If “he could have seen her, and 
she him, at any time during the transaction, and therefore they were in the presence of one 
another.”248 In R v Hughes,249 the presumption did not arise, since at the time of the wife’s 
offence, he was in the next room, albeit immediately after the offence he put his head into the 
room. However, inconsistently in R v Connolly,250 where the husband waited outside the door 
of the room while the wife committed the offence, the presumption applied. Irish251 law took 
a more liberal approach to the requirement of presence. The term ‘presence’ has not been 
closely analysed by the English authorities on the Act. But at common law in R v Caroubi252 
it was held that if the wife was within the sight of her husband that sufficed for the purposes 
of presence. This ocular test is inherently unworkable. There was no requirement that the 
husband be able to see the wife; on the common law test, the moment she had her back to 
him, the defence failed. It also followed that it would be improbable in the extreme that the 
husband could be ‘present’ as defined during the entire pendency of a continuing offence. A 
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 In United States v De Quilfeldt (1881) 5 F 276, 281 per Hammond D J; noted ‘Married Woman – Pleading 
Marriage – Evidence – Declarations’ (1881) 23 The Albany Law Journal 279. In R v Murray, [1906] 2 KB 385 
Lord Alvestone CJ said that since the Married Women’s Property Act 1882 by its s12 it puts a wife in respect of 
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 R v Caroubi (1912) 7 Cr App R 149.  Also if the wife is inside a shop and the husband is outside: R v 
Connolly (1829) 2 Lew CC 229; 168 ER 137.  But not if he was in the next room out of sight, but looked in 
immediately after the offence: R v Hughes (1813) 2 Lew CC 229. In Vukodonovich v State (1926) 150 NE 56 the 
husband was held to be present while upstairs, while the wife was downstairs. In Oklahoma the husband must be 
there by his “personal and physical presence”: Trapp v State (1954) 268 P 2d 913, 917. 
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 (1829) 2 Lew CC 229. 
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more expansive approach has been endorsed by the Australian Courts. In R v Whelan253 it was 
more cogently reasoned that “it is sufficient if the husband is in a situation where he is close 
enough to influence the wife in doing what he wants done, even if he is not physically present 
in the room”. This test of pervasive influence has a much greater congruence with the realities 
of life than a test based on visual acuity. A more liberal test of presence was persuasively 
adopted in Osborne v Goddard.254  
 
The requirement of the ‘presence’ of the husband to activate the defence, is best understood 
by a recognition that the overpowering of the wife’s will must be operative concurrent with 
the criminal conduct.255 As psychological terror or compulsion is within the spirit of the 
defence, it follows that there is no need to impose a requirement that the husband and wife be 
in a continuous direct line of sight.256 In Osborne v Goddard257 the South Australia Supreme 
Court decided in relation to its provision, indistinguishable from s47 Criminal Justice Act 
1925 [UK], “In our opinion it is sufficient if the husband is in a situation where he is close 
enough to influence the wife into doing what he wants done, even if he is not physically 
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 (1978) 21 ALR 189, 196. In R v Whelan [1937] SASR 237 a wife uttered a forged cheque inside a bank while 
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he is close enough to influence the wife in doing what he wants done, even if he is not physically present in the 
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of the law: Commonwealth v Munsey (1873) 112 Mass 287 and R v Connolly (1829) 2 Lew CC 229; but held 
otherwise in R v Hughes (1813) 2 Lew 229. In R v Caroubi (1912) 7 Cr App R 149 the court remarked of the 
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presence of one another”. Where the husband was in an adjoining room “sick upon a bed, and the door between 
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Commonwealth v Gormley (1882) 133 Mass 580. In R v Pollard, cited in R v Cruse (1837) 8 Car & P 541, the 
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257
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present in the room.” This notion of constructive presence258 is a significant departure from 
the more stringent common law which had insisted on his actual presence259. 
  
Whilst it is improbable that coercion by a friend or relative on behalf of the husband would 
suffice, immediate physical presence is not measured by separation distance, but is a function 
of relative control. In the common law defence of duress, the fact that the duressor is 
physically out of range does not stymie the defence, albeit, this factor has been recently 
criticised as being too liberally applied – particularly because it should be addressed together 
with the ability of the wife to be able to seek intervention or escape. Lord Bingham in R v Z260 
was particularly critical of R v Hudson and Taylor261 in this regard. If the wife has a “realistic 
choice to escape”,262 as her actions had to be “proportionate to the peril she faced”, it 
followed the defence would fail if she did not decamp when she could have.  
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 Constructive presence may be enough, on the basis that it suffices to render a person liable as a principal in 
the second degree to a felony. Rupert Cross and P Asterley Jones, ‘An Introduction to Criminal Law’, 3 ed 
(1953) Butterworths & Co (Publishers) Ltd, p65. The (4 ed) 1959 noted R v Bourne (1952) 36 Cr App R 125 
where a wife was forced by her husband to consent to a dog having intercourse with her. She was not charged 
with bestiality but would have had a complete defence of marital coercion or duress. 
259
 In R v Pickard [1959] Qd R 475, 477 Stanley J noted that the word “actually” was intended to exclude cases 
in which “a person might have the right to be present at the place where the criminal act or omission takes place, 
for example, in his own premises, in a house or a shop, but was not there at the relevant time”. This distinction, 
he said, was consistent with the common law in relation to marital coercion.  Stanley J held that the phrase 
“actually present” in a statutory formulation of the defence of duress did not encompass a person keeping watch 
outside while a colleague had entered a building to steal a safe. P J Pace ‘Marital Coercion – Anachronism or 
Modernism?’  [1979] Crim LR 82, 89 that there is no logical justification for a strict approach to the requirement 
of “presence”. He notes that the Solicitor-General in the Criminal Justice Bill 1925 [UK] debate argued that 
continuity of the presence requirement was mandated as “while you were not in your husband’s presence you 
ought to be human [sic] enough to be able to avoid that spiritual or marital coercion. While the woman is still in 
the husband’s presence the influence of moral or spiritual terror is very potent.” House of Commons Debates 
1925 vol 188 col 876. 
260
 [2005] 2 AC 467 (HL). 
261
 [1971] 2 QB 202. In New Zealand s24(1) Crimes Act 1961 does not impose any independent condition 
obligating the defendant to have attempted to escape. 
262
 R v Maurirere [2001] NZAR 431 (CA). The fact that the wife could have avoided the situation altogether by 
earlier terminating the abusive relationship that ultimately produced the threat, is not a relevant approach. R v 
Aitkens [2003] EWCA Crim 1573 (CA). The prosecution argued that as a matter of policy the defence of duress 
should be excluded where the risk of being subjected to coercion would have been obvious to an ordinary person 
R v Z [2005] 2 AC 467, 475 B. 
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The requirement that the wife be in the presence263 of her husband as a pre-condition to the 
availability of the marital coercion defence is echoed under New Zealand law by the condition 
that a duressor be present before the defence of compulsion264 can be available.  The emergent 
common law defence of duress of circumstances imposes an identical jurisdictional 
obligation. In R v Joyce265 the defendant agreed with other persons to rob a petrol station. His 
attempt to withdraw from the crime was met by a threat to shoot if he did not effect the agreed 
hoist.  He then acted as look-out while the robbery was carried out. The Court of Appeal held 
that the defendant was not threatened by a person who was “present” at the time of the 
offence266.  North P emphasised that the appellant “was not actually present when the assault 
occurred” notwithstanding that the adverb “actually”, found in the earlier version of the 
statute267 had been omitted from the new definition of the defence of compulsion in the 1961 
Act. The reasoning of the Court in justifying its construction of the section is plausible but not 
convincing268, involving a criticism of the law draftsman for having engaged in making (in 
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 Southern Rhodesia law required a husband to be actually present before marital coercion was available to any 
of his wives: R v Shaiamunda et Uxores 1916 SR 33. In South Africa, this defence was available until 1928: 
Irene Geffen, ‘The Laws of South Africa Affecting Women and Children’, R L Esson & Co Ltd, Johannesburg 
1928 p295.  
264
 s24 Crimes Act 1961 [NZ]. Michael J Allen, ‘Textbook on Criminal Law’, (2001) 6 ed Blackstone Press, 
p194: “When duress is pleaded there is no need to show that the person who issued the threats was present at the 
time the offence was committed; it is sufficient that the threats were imminent. In coercion, however, the 
husband must be shown to be present when the offence was committed.” In some criminal codes dealing with 
compulsion or duress there is a very strict requirement of actual physical presence of the duressor: R v Pickard 
[1959] Qd R 475, 478; R v Joyce [1968] NZLR 1070, 1077-1078 (accepting that this requirement “may 
sometimes be a matter of degree depending on the particular circumstances of the case including the means 
adopted in making the threat” – envisaging the duressor aiming a rifle at the duressee from a long distance or 
being able to detonate a bomb from afar); Kapi v Ministry of Transport (1991) 8 CRNZ 49, 57 (CA). Duress 
may be pleaded even though the accused acted under a mistaken belief, provided this mistake was a reasonable 
one. In coercion a mistaken belief in marriage, albeit a reasonably one, will not avail as the statute is interpreted 
strictly [see R v Ditta, Hussain and Kara [1988] Crim LR 42].” The defence of duress is “still uncertain, and in 
the process of judicial clarification”: R v Lawrence [1980] 1 NSWLR 122, 134 per Moffitt P. A model direction 
is set out in R v Abusafiah (1991) 24 NSWLR 531, 544 – 545. The effect of Australian law is (a) - There must 
have been a threat of a certain type; (b) D’s will to resist the person making the threat must have been overborne, 
and the crime committed by D at a time when D’s will was overborne (the subjective test); and (c) The threat 
must have been such that an ordinary or average person in the same position as D would have been likely to 
yield and, further, there must not have been an avenue of escape which D could have reasonably used (the 
objective test). 
265
 [1968] NZLR 1070. 
266
 ibid 1077 line 32; ibid 1077 line 49 
267
 s44 Crimes Act 1908 [NZ]. The same essential formula is found in Queensland legislation: R v Pickard 
[1959] Qd R 475 (CCA). Under Australian common law, there is no requirement that the threatener be present at 
the time of the commission of the offence: R v Williamson [1972] 2 NSWLR 281, 283 G. Kerr CJ at p286 D 
refers to the limits of the defence as a “matter of policy”.   
268
 G Orchard ‘The Defence of Compulsion’ (1980) 9 NZULR 105, 115 noting that the Court had simply 
reintroduced the word “actually” which had been legislatively deleted.  
   
 221 
accordance with the outcome by the Court) a gratuitous alteration to the section having no 
legal effect. The requirement set out in an earlier part of the section that there be an 
“immediate” threat reinforced the conclusion that the person under compulsion had to be 
facing the real risk of immediate death or grievous bodily harm from a person physically 
present so as to be able to carry it out.269 The decision is best seen as a pragmatic affirmation 
of a policy to tightly constrain the defence. By comparison, the Supreme Court of Canada in 
R v Ruzic270 has controversially271 upheld a constitutional challenge that the requirements in 
s17 Criminal Code [Can] for both the presence and immediacy of the duressor were 
unconstitutional, holding that the overriding imperative of the criminal law was that no one 
acting under compulsion and therefore acting involuntarily should be convicted, irregardless 
of either the physical absence of the duressor or the absence of a compelled immediacy by the 
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 [1968] NZLR 1070, 1079 “the appellant was on the street and Pihema was in the service station holding up 
the attendant and subsequently shooting him”.  In R v Teichelman [1981] 2 NZLR 64, 67 (CA) Richardson J said 
“The subsection is directly essentially on what are colloquially called stand over situations”.  A duressor is not 
“present” when he threatens a fellow prison inmate, from another cell: R v Carker (No 2) [1967] 2 CCC 190, 192 
(SCC); a woman who “incontestably was suffering from Battered Women’s Syndrome” could not avail herself 
of compulsion as her abusive partner was not present at the time of her drug offending, his constructive presence 
being insufficient: R v Maureen Christine Richards unreported New Zealand Court of Appeal, CA272/98, 15 
October 1998, p2; R v Witika [1993] 2 NZLR 424, 435 l 44-p 436 l 15, R v Raroa [1987] 2 NZLR 486, 490 “The 
person making the threats must be present whilst the offence is committed so that his ability to carry the threat 
out is apparent and there is no chance of escape.” 
270
 R v Ruzic [2001] 1 SCR 687 at [53] acknowledging however that “a threat will seldom meet the immediacy 
criterion if the threatener is not physically present at or near the scene of the offence”. In Law Reform 
Commission of Canada Report: Recodifying Criminal Law (No 30 Volume 1 1986) p33 the removal of the 
requirement for the presence of the threatener at the time of the crime was promoted on the basis that just like 
the requirement of immediacy “both are factors going ultimately to the reasonableness or otherwise of the 
accused’s response”.  The decision in R v Z [2005] 2 AC 467 (HL) declined to adopt the open-textured defence 
now available in Canada since Ruzic.  The House of Lords also emphasised that what had to be avoided was “the 
unfortunate effect of weakening the requirement that execution of a threat must be reasonably believed to be 
imminent and immediate” thereby inflicting upon R v Hudson and Taylor [1971] 2 QB 202 (CA) “such 
disapproving comment as to effectively render the decision no more than a historical anomaly”: Ryan and Ryan 
‘Resolving the Duress Dilemma: Guidance from the House of Lords’ (2005) 56 NILQ 421, 427.  Without these 
strictures the dictum of Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest in Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland v 
Lynch [1975] AC 653, 670 that duress “must never be allowed to be the easy answer” becomes more persuasive. 
This position does not represent English, Australian, or New Zealand law. 
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 R v Ruzic [2001] 1 SCR 687 at [53] acknowledging however that “a threat will seldom meet the immediacy 
criterion if the threatener is not physically present at or near the scene of the offence”. In Law Reform 
Commission of Canada Report: Recodifying Criminal Law (No 30 Volume 1 1986) p33 the removal of the 
requirement for the presence of the threatener at the time of the crime was promoted on the basis that just like 
the requirement of immediacy “both are factors going ultimately to the reasonableness or otherwise of the 
accused’s response”.  The decision in R v Z [2005] 2 AC 467 (HL) declined to adopt the open-textured defence 
now available in Canada since Ruzic.  The House of Lords also emphasised that what had to be avoided was “the 
unfortunate effect of weakening the requirement that execution of a threat must be reasonably believed to be 
imminent and immediate” thereby inflicting upon R v Hudson and Taylor [1971] 2 QB 202 (CA) “such 
disapproving comment as to effectively render the decision no more than a historical anomaly”: Ryan and Ryan 
‘Resolving the Duress Dilemma: Guidance from the House of Lords’ (2005) 56 NILQ 421, 427.   
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duressee. The possibility of constructive presence being sufficient for the defence of 
compulsion was eliminated by a strong policy consideration that the edges of the defence had 
to be sharply delimited and narrowly confined272. The austerity of the actual presence 
requirement required under s17 of the Criminal Code, wrongly permitted individuals who 
acted involuntarily, because of on-going duress (in the physical absence of the duressor), to be 
still found guilty of a criminal offence. The strict requirements of presence and immediacy 
were held to violate the Canadian Charter of Fundamental Rights as it was accepted that the 
pressure that may be maintained against an accused could be easily as great in cases where the 
effect make take place later. The Canadian Courts now provide a wider aspect to the defence 
but emphasise that the intrinsic limitation running thematically through the defence is the 
reasonableness of the conduct in all the circumstances, irrespective of temporal and proximity 
factors.   
 
The common law defence of duress of circumstances is contemplated by s20 Crimes Act 
1961 [NZ] as it is not inconsistent with the express defence of compulsion created by s24. But 
the common law defence does not preserve any notion of duress by a person not present at the 
time of the offence273.  While the Courts have consistently insisted on a tight formalistic 
notion of what constitutes the actual presence of the duressor, it is difficult to see why that 
requirement is not itself but a matter of fact, degree and circumstance.  For example, literal 
proximity between duressor and the compelled person at the time of the commission of the 
offence seems absurd when a bomb, which can be activated from a great distance by an 
electronic command, is strapped to the person under compulsion. The duressor, unless 
suicidal, will very sensibly be a considerable distance outside the explosion zone, yet is 
patently able to instantly carry out the threat without being physically present. The correct 
analysis of the presence requirement in the defence of compulsion, which is consonant with 
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 Explained later in R v Teichelman [1981] 2 NZLR 64, 66; R v Raroa [1987] 2 NZLR 486, 490 “The 
legislation provides a narrow release from criminal responsibility where its strict requirements are met. It reflects 
a policy decision that in those limited circumstances … a person … may property be excused … .” 
273
 Kapi v Ministry of Transport (1991) 8 CRNZ 49, 54-55 (CA). The Court emphasised that there was a 
“deliberate legislative intent to restrict the scope” of the defence of duress or compulsion. The common law 
defence of necessity arising from duress by threats has probably been wholly subsumed by the statutory defence 
of compulsion: R v Hutchinson [2004] NZAR 303 (CA). Heath J adding at p316 “there is a need for strict control 
of this defence”. If a common law defence of duress of circumstances exists via s20 Crimes Act 1961 [NZ], it is 
only available where the threat was from a person who was present at the time the offence was committed: 
Police v Kawiti [2000] 1 NZLR 117, 119 l 45.  
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the defence of marital coercion, is that the threatener need not be physically adjacent to the 
person under compulsion, but needs only to have the immediate capacity to implement the 
threat irrespective of the distance between them. In the great majority of cases, for example 
the classic stand over situation postulated in Teichelman, an immediate ability to carry out the 
threat requires an immediate physical presence. But the rule imposing the need for actual 
presence does a complete disservice to any notion of compelled involuntary behaviour if it 
cannot provide a defence where the person under duress can be blown up or shot from a very 
considerable distance. The theme of the “actually present” requirement must be understood 
not to exclusively impose a literal requirement, but a requirement that emphasises the actual 
capacity for immediately carrying out the threat. That approach in South Australia in relation 
to the defence of marital coercion, concluded that the presence requirement only meant that 
the husband be “close enough to influence the wife into doing what he wants even if he is not 
physically present in the room”.274 This extended approach to presence, is commensurate with 
the intrinsic excusatory nature of the special defence, underscoring that psychological control 
caused by threats or actions may remain operative in the physical absence of the abusive 
husband.275   
 
 
COERCION 
 
Duress at common law requires a threat of death or serious physical harm.276  Threats to 
property or a threat to expose a person’s immorality are insufficient to constitute the terror 
which the law expects. People are expected to be sufficiently robust to withstand a significant 
range of and intensity of pressures.277 Threats to cause psychological injury will only suffice 
if it constitutes immediate and serious psychological injury.278 The threat had to be directed at 
                                              
274
 Goddard v Osborne (1978) 18 SASR 481, 493 which is entirely consistent with R v Connolly (1829) 2 Lew 
CC 229.  
275
 For example, where a husband, over a mobile phone, threatens the wife he will kill their child unless she 
commits the offence. 
276
 R v Graham [1982] 1 WLR 294. 
277
 R v Valerama-Vega [1985] Crim LR 220 (threat to expose homosexuality). Holding it to be an immaterial 
misdirection for direction to jury that duress only availed when it operated “solely as the result of threats of 
death or serious injury”; Andrew Ashworth ‘Principles of Criminal Law’ 2 ed (1995) Clarendon Press, Oxford 
pp218-219. 
278
 R v Baker and Wilkins [1997] Crim LR 497, 498 of R v Burstow [1997] 1 Cr App R 144. 
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the defendant or his immediate family or someone in relation to whom there was a parens 
patriae relationship.279 The threat must involve an element of immediacy, one of imminent 
harm.280 Fear of harm is insufficient; a perceived actual threat is required.281 Mental injury 
would suffice.282 Psychological evidence would be admissible to verify the defence283 but a 
threat of really serious ‘psychological injury’ is accepted to be a threat of grievous bodily 
harm.284 “[L]ong and wasting pressure may break down resistance more effectively than a 
threat of immediate destruction.”285 
 
Initially the statutory defence of marital coercion was perceived as being only modern 
nomenclature for the versatile defence of duress or compulsion, but restricted to wives. The 
boundaries and content of the statutory defence ands its cognate common law counterpart 
were seen to be indistinguishable. This suggested overlap is illogical as it cannot justify the 
existence of the specific statutory defence; unless the only intended difference was an 
allocation of the burden of proof. It has become recognised that coercion is intended to be 
more flexible286 and broader in concept than that of duress.  
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 R v Ortiz (1986) 83 Cr App R 173. 
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 R v Abdul-Hussain [1999] Crim LR 570. The Court of Appeal, for the fourth time in five years emphasised 
the urgent need for legislative reform to define the defence of duress with precision. 
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 Rihari v Department of Social Welfare (1991) 7 CRNZ 586, 588. 
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 See the English Law Commission draft, Criminal Liability (Duress) Bill cl 1(3)(a) providing that duress 
requires that the harm threatened must be ‘death or serious personal injury (physical or mental).’ Cl 26(2) 
Criminal Law Bill (1993) annexed to the Law Commission ‘Report on Offences Against the Person’ was ready 
for adoption. 
283
 R v Williams [1998] 4 VR 301 (CA), R v Runjanjic (1991) 56 SASR 114, R v Singleton (1994) 72 A Crim R 
117. 
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 R v Chan-Fook [1994] 1 WLR 689 (CA); R v Mwai [1995] 2 NZLR 149; R v Ireland [1998] AC 147 (HL). 
285
 American Model Penal Code §2 2.09. Comment at 8 (Tent. Draft No 10, 1960). 
286
 For example it has been suggested that it would cover matters “such as a threat by the husband not to buy 
food for his wife and children, a threat to desert the wife and a threat to bring a mistress into the matrimonial 
home”. Michael Jefferson, ‘Criminal Law’, 4 ed Financial Times Pitman Publishing (1999) p242. “This leaves 
open the extent of a “moral threat”. Threatening to deprive the wife of her children would be a moral threat, but 
what about a threat to reveal her dishonesty to her employer? The answer must surely be “no”. A threat to the 
wife’s property would not seem to be a moral threat but it may be held that it can suffice if it has the requisite 
effect.” It is arguable that a threat against a child of the family will be for the wife imputed as a threat to her, so 
that a third party threat or moral coercion suffices. Marital coercion is not a defence necessarily of self-
preservation; this is true of duress. R v Hurley [1967] VR 526,543; R v Z [2005] 2 AC 461 para [21](3).   
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The Victorian legislation has uniquely defined ‘coercion’287 for the defence of marital 
coercion.  Section 336(3) and (4) Crimes Act [Vic] inserted by the Crimes (Married Persons’ 
Liability) Act 1977 [Vic] provides: 
 
(3) For the purpose of this section “coercion” means pressure, whether in the form of 
threats or any other form, sufficient to cause a woman of ordinary good character and 
formal firmness of mind, placed in the circumstances in which the woman was placed, 
to conduct herself in the manner charged. 
 
(4) Without limiting the generality of the expression “the circumstances in which the 
woman was placed” in sub-section (3), such circumstances shall include the degree of 
dependence, whether economic or otherwise, of the woman on her husband. 
 
The word ‘coercion’ has never been comprehensively defined in the caselaw,288 rather the 
case law is replete with examples of what it is not. A command from a husband to a wife had 
been held capable of constituting coercion but such forcefulness was not required as even a 
request might suffice, depending on the exact status and circumstances of the particular 
relationship. The will of then notionally average wife was considered to be so fragile that her 
own responsibility was subjugated by any material pressure.289 The doctrine incorporated a 
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 Its avowed aim was to protect a wife who may not be able to satisfy the austerity of duress, but who had not 
acted unreasonably in submitting to pressure to which she is susceptible because of her marital (and possibly 
maternal) role. Examples from P J Pace ‘Marital Coercion – Anachronism or Modernism?’ [1979] Crim LR 
82,88 include: 1) threat to take children away from wife, 2) threat to commit adultery, 3) threat to bring mistress 
to live in the matrimonial home, 4) threat to bring up their children in a religion different from wife.  No angelic 
standard of human fortitude need be displayed by a wife – law looks to a “reasonable wife”. In R v Ditta [1988] 
Crim LR 42 (CA) the test was “Was she forced by her husband either by physical, moral, psychological or 
mental processes, to do what she would not otherwise have done?” In the defence of duress a threat to expose the 
accused’s homosexuality is insufficient; is a threat to reveal one’s wife’s lesbianism to the tabloid press such a 
threat as to fall within moral, psychological or mental’ pressure? Michael Jefferson, Criminal Law (1999) 4 ed, 
Financial Times Pitman Publishing, p242-243. In R v Valderrama-Vega [1985] Crim LR 220 the defendant was 
threatened with the disclosure of his homosexuality and was under financial pressure and received threats of 
death or serious harm. It was held that the first two factors were incapable of amounting to duress but the court 
held that the jury was entitled to look at the cumulative effect of all of the threats and it was wrong to direct the 
jury that the threat of death or serious injury had to be the sole reason for him committing the crime, cf R v Ortiz 
(1986) 83 Cr App R 173 where the court upheld a direction that the threat to life should be the sole threat. 
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 In DPP for Northern Ireland v Lynch  [1975] AC 653, 694 Lord Simon said “Since coercion was defined 
neither by the antecedent law or by statute, I take it that it is used in its ordinary sense, as it is in the law of 
probate, and which I have just discussed. The state of mind produced, and which excuses from liability, is thus 
the same for both ‘coercion’ and duress – namely, ‘This is not my wish, but I must do it’ – and in both the 
constraint is due to external human pressure. The difference lies, first, in the method of pressure (for duress it is 
limited to threats, whereas for ‘coercion’ it extends to any force overbearing the wish).” 
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 R v Knight (1823) 1 Car & P 116, (1823) 171 ER 1126. The presumption was an assumption about the 
character of the model female actor in criminal law terms. Acting out of loyalty to the husband can never be 
sufficient to raise the defence. It is not a question of faithful commitment to the husband but rather the 
perspective of the husband overawing the free will and capacity of the wife. Peter Gillies, ‘Criminal Law’ (1997) 
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rule of evidence that required the prosecution to affirmatively demonstrate290 that a wife had 
acted on her own volition as in the absence of such evidence the presumption remained intact. 
 
 
BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF 
 
The Victorian legislation expressly291 requires that the prosecution negatives the defence as 
the wife only has an evidential burden and not a legal one. There can be no doubt that the 
original statutory defence in England was intended to place a legal burden on the wife292. 
However, modern constitutional law would now see that burden on the wife as being 
unconstitutional and interpret it as only imposing an evidential burden293. This would also 
synchronise the two defences of common law duress and statutory coercion and would then 
emphasise that the statutory defence was more expansive in concept than duress. 
 
                                                                                                                                             
4 ed, LBC Information Services, p358. “The form of pressure needed to ground coercion is not, that is, limited to 
threats of death or bodily injury, as is duress”. 
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 It was for the prosecution to rebut the presumption and it was not rebutted unless it was established that the 
wife had acted independently of her husband. This concept was itself problematic as it denied the wife 
independence of decision-making while she was in the presence of her husband. The defence was contracted into 
a situation whereby the presence of the husband became the presumptive defence, irrespective of the actual 
volition as expressed through act or omission by the wife. The concentration wrongly was on the husband’s role 
rather than on the role of the wife which was presumed not capable of being other than determined by him. 
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 Section 338(5) Crimes Act 1958 [Vic] “The accused shall bear the burden of adducing evidence that she 
conducted herself in the manner charged because she was coerced by her husband, but if such evidence has been 
adduced, the prosecution shall bear the burden of providing that the action or inaction charged was not due to 
coercion by the husband.” 
292
 R v Cairns [2003] 1 Cr App R 662 (CA). The same result had been reached in Hong Kong: R v Kong Man 
Heung [2000] 1 HKC 406 (decided though in 1986); HKSAR v Au Yuen Mei [2000] 1 HKC 411. Glanville 
Williams, ‘Criminal Law: General Part’ (1961) 2 ed, p762 conceived that the statutory defence might operate 
only to cast an evidential burden on the wife, leaving the legal burden of disproving coercion on the prosecution. 
Robert W H Fanner, ‘Wigram’s Justice’s Note-book A Short Account of the Jurisdiction and Duties of Justices 
and an Epitome of Criminal Law’, (1935) Stevens & Sons Ltd, London at p250: “Now it is for the wife to prove 
coercion, whereas previously the law presumed it. It will be observed that the defence of coercion may now be 
pleaded in the case of any offence other than treason or murder.” Michael Jefferson, ‘Criminal Law’ (1999) 4 ed, 
Financial Times Pitman Publishing, p242: “The reversal of the burden of proof may be the sole reason why s47 
was enacted.” 
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 R S O’Regan, ‘Married Women and the Defence of Compulsion under the Criminal Code’, (1979) 11 
University of Queensland Law Journal 20, 24 argues that the provision in the Criminal Code [Qld] as an 
excusatory provision only imposes an evidential burden on the accused for which the prosecution must negative 
beyond reasonable doubt; R v Lambert [2002] 2 AC 545 (HL) reading down a legal presumption to an evidential 
one, as otherwise being violative of the presumption of innocence. 
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At common law, the only persuasive burden placed on an accused was in relation to the 
defence of insanity294 but the general rule was subject to modification by statute295. 
International constitutional norms296, now echoed in domestic legislation in much of the 
common law world, affirm the presumption of innocence as an independent right of great 
importance, such that there cannot be any derogation from the concept of a fair trial. It has 
been urged that the presumption of innocence can only be safeguarded by imposing on the 
prosecution the persuasive burden of proof297 in a criminal trial, as that standard and onus, 
proportionately factor in the margin of error existing in litigation. But a limitation impinging 
on the presumption of innocence may be a justifiable derogation where there is a compelling 
reason for the legislation. The relevant methodology298 involves an analysis as to whether the 
objective to be served by the measure limiting that presumption is sufficiently important or 
compelling299 to warrant overriding the constitutionally protected right. The State as the party 
required to prove300 that the infringement of the presumption is constitutional, must also show 
that the impairment is no greater than is reasonably necessary to obtain the objective. Finally, 
an evaluation is called as to whether the limit to the presumption of innocence is in due 
proportion to the importance of the legislative objective. Critical to that evaluation is the very 
high level of importance301 that society attaches to the presumption of innocence. It is a 
bulwark between the resources of the State advocating the prosecution and the comparative 
position of the defendant against whom an allegation is propounded.302 The paradox being the 
more serious the intrinsic nature of the allegation, the greater the defendant is at risk and 
therefore the greater the importance of the presumption of innocence to that person.303 For 
that reason, the presumption of knowledge against a defendant flowing from the possession of 
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 Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions [1935] AC 462. 
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 HKSAR v Ng Po On [2007] 2 HKLRD 245 McMahon J held that a negative averment provision in relation to 
corruption ought to be construed as only imposing an evidential burden despite its language clearly speaking of a 
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 Art 14(2) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  
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 Speiser v Randall (1958) 357 US 513, 525-6. 
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 The approach in R v Oakes [1986] 1 SCR 103 has been widely adopted although in Attorney-General of Hong 
Kong v Lee Kwong Kut [1993] AC 951, 967 Lord Woolf cautioned against an overelaborate or mechanistic 
approach, either of which if unheeded could stultify proper parliamentary legislative initiatives. In De Freitas v 
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 R v Johnstone [2003] 1 WLR 1736 para [49] per Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead. 
300
 Multani v Commission Scolaire Marguerite-Bourgeoys [2006] 1 SCR 256 at para [43]. 
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 McGrath J in R v Hansen [2007] 3 NZLR 1, 67-68 identifies three factors in particular.  
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 Andrew Ashworth ‘Principles of Criminal Law’ 5ed 2006, Clarendon Press, p83. 
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 S v Coetzee (1997) 3 SA 527 (SA:Const Ct) at para [220] per Sachs J. 
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any article which contains drugs, has been ruled unconstitutional in most jurisdictions as 
impermissibly infringing the presumption of innocence.304 On analysis, the marital coercion 
defence is a varietal of the compulsion defence. It is inconsistent and illogical (poignantly 
demonstrated where a wife relies upon both defences at trial305) for different burdens to be 
placed on her. A legal burden realistically requires the wife to give evidence herself in most 
cases, and in the process prove that true nature of the pressure which caused her to commit the 
offence – thus likely destroying the marriage in many cases – a marriage which she may 
genuinely wish to exist. The persuasive burden on the wife is fundamentally unconstitutional 
being inconsistent with the presumption of innocence (and incidentally placing her in the 
same position as someone relying upon the defence of insanity). The English and Hong Kong 
decisions to date must be read in the light that no direct constitutional challenge to the burden 
of proof has been yet advanced.      
 
 
EXCEPTIONS TO THE DEFENCE 
 
For Victoria, the statute removed306 the problematic issue of categorising the exclusions307 to 
the common law defence. The list of exceptions was never definitively settled at common 
law.   
 
In each jurisdiction in which a statute has been passed approving or modifying the defence of 
presumed coercion arising from a wife’s commission of an offence in her husband’s presence, 
provision has been made in the statute to exclude specific offences.308 
 
                                              
304
 R v Lambert [2002] 2 AC 545: HKSAR v Hong Chan Wa (2006) 9 HKCFAR 614. The same presumption in 
relation to possession of firearms was also held unconstitutional: HKSAR v Lam Kwong Wai (2006) 9 HKCFAR 
574. 
305
 R v Ditta, Hussain, Begum and Kara, unreported, Isleworth, Crown Court, ref 191/F2/87 and 142/E3/87, 11 
December 1986, Judge Hopkin-Morgan 
306
 J C Smith and B Hogan, ‘Criminal Law’, 7 ed, (1992) p243: “the exact extent of the defence is uncertain. It 
did not apply to treason or murder; Hale excluded manslaughter as well and Hawkins ruled out robbery.”   
307
 D Mendes da Costa, ‘Criminal Law’, in R H Graveson and F R Crane (eds), ‘A Century of Family Law’, 
Sweet and Maxwell Ltd, London (1957) p169 states that the burden of proof has now been shifted to the wife 
and it is up to her to prove that she acted under her husband’s control. The section was arguably wider than the 
common law because it now undoubtedly extended to misdemeanors by the use of the expression “any offence 
other than treason or murder”.  
308
 David S Evans, ‘Criminal Law – Presumption of Coercion – Crimes Committed by Wife in Husband’s 
Presence’, (1956) 35 North Carolina Law Review 104 at p105: 
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Murder309 and treason310 had always been exceptions to the defence because of their inherent 
gravity. Marital coercion in both its common law311 and its statutory formulation312 does not 
apply to treason. Neither version ever applied to murder.313 These offences were self-
referential of extremely heinous behaviour. The consequences and enormity of those crimes 
underlined the obvious juristic basis314 for their special exempting status. Yet, manslaughter, 
grievous bodily harm and armed robbery were never definitively within the class of 
                                              
309
 In J W Harris, ‘Towards Principles of Overruling – When Should a Final Court of Appeal Second Guess’, 
(1990) 10 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 135, 185 fn 254 reference is made to the need for coherence of the 
law which denies necessity, marital coercion and superior orders, as valid defences to murder. In State v Kelly 
(1888) 38 NW 503 it was wrongly concluded that the presumption applied to a prosecution for murder. But in 
State v Reynolds (1920) 179 NW 308 that decision was overruled by the Supreme Court of Iowa holding that 
murder was no exception to the defence. In State v McDonie (1924) 123 SE 405, 407 the West Virginia Supreme 
Court emphasised that murder must remain an exception as it was an offence of “so much malignity as to render 
it improbable that a wife would be constrained by her husband” to involuntarily carry it out.  
310
 It is a fact that throughout the Parliamentary debate the issue of what offences should be excepted was 
literally never debated resulting from the unsatisfactory treatment of duress in the standard legal works of the 
era. The exception of treason was simply never considered in the passage of s47 Criminal Justice Act 1925 
[UK]; so the earlier examples (Oldcastle’s Case (1419) 1 Hale PC 50; R v McGrowther (1745) 18 St Tr 391, R v 
Ahlers [1915] 1 KB 616 of the defence of duress being invoked in relation to treason were never referred to at 
all. Neither the extended debates from 1922 – 1925 or any of the government papers or internal documents 
identify that the issue was ever addressed, but rather was assumed throughout “…because of the odiousness and 
dangerous consequence of the crime of treason itself, as because the husband, having broken through the most 
sacred tie of social community by rebellion against the State, has no right to that obedience from his wife, which 
he himself, as a subject, has forgotten to pay”. But duress is, by contrast, a defence to treason: R v M’Growther 
(1746) Foster 13, 18 St Tr 391; R v Purdy (1945) 10 J Cr L 182 cf Lai Kit v R (1946) 31 HKLR 7 (FC)/ 
311
 Coercion – The Peel Case (1922) 86 JP 137, 138, justified the two exceptions of treason and murder “because 
they are so heinous that a woman ought to revolt from them, even if pressed by her husband.” 
312
 Glanville Williams, ‘Criminal Law: The General Part’ (1953) Stevens & Sons Ltd, London p605 who 
describes the addition of treason “as a parliamentary mistake, resulting from the unsatisfactory treatment of 
duress in the standard legal works of the time. Parliament could not have intended to deprive the wife of a 
defence possessed by other people, so that she must still have the defence of duress at common law to a charge 
of treason”. 
313
 Bacon’s ‘Maxims’ 57; 1 Hale PC 45, 47; 1 Hawk PC c1 s11. Attorney General v Whelan [1934] IR 518, 526 
(CCA): “The commission of murder is so heinous that murder should not be committed even for the price of life 
and in such a case the strongest duress would not be any justification.” Note reference to justification is wrong in 
principle as the defence is excusatory in character: R v Z [2005] 2 AC 467. The early authorities treated 
coverture as a disability which eliminated, unless rebutted, a wife having the capacity to commit crime. In Bibb v 
State (1891) 94 Ala 31 Clopton J said: “The exceptions ingrafted on the general rule are based on the nature, 
grade, and heinousness of the felonies; and among these is murder”. In  R v Mtetwa (1921) TPD 227, 230 
Wessels JP considered that duress was a defence even to murder. In R v Alison (1838) 8 Car & P 423, 425 
Patteson J referred to a case in the reign of James I where a wife was acquitted of murder (a suicide pact between 
spouses in which she failed) “solely on the ground that, being the wife of the deceased, she was under his 
control; and inasmuch as the proposal to commit suicide had been first suggested by him, it was considered that 
she was not a free agent”.   
314
 In Commonwealth v Neal (1813) 10 Mass 512 the Attorney-General unsuccessfully argued that very serious 
assault and battery should be exempted from the defence as the wife “must know, as well as [her husband], that 
the action is wrong”. The emphasis is that every person should be able to discriminate between the most obvious 
categories of right and wrong. Even the immature moral sense of a wife or her diminished capacity for rational 
choice because coercion, was considered to be triggered in carrying out the most atrocious crimes, so that she 
ought to resist the husband’s authoritarian decision-making.  
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exceptions, although inconsistent nineteenth century trial rulings were the hallmark in this 
area. Duress is no defence to attempted murder,315 but marital coercion is a defence to that 
charge.316 Manslaughter,317 which usually carries life imprisonment as a maximum sentence is 
also within the defence. In s32 Criminal Code [WA] but, unlike at common law, the marital 
coercion defence has been modified so that it is now not a defence to an offence punishable 
with strict security life imprisonment or to an offence of which grievous bodily harm, or an 
intention to cause such harm, is an element. This was broadly comparable with the former 
position in Queensland.318 Because the common law was malleable it was able to adjust to the 
realities of the emerging wifely status – one where her position tended to be significantly 
ameliorated in comparison with those wives of even a generation before her. Judges were 
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 R v Gotts [1992] 2 AC, 412 (HL). There are differing opinions whether duress is available on a charge of 
attempted murder: R v Goldman (2004) 147 A Crim R 472. However, the common law defence of duress also 
excludes attempted murder therefore removing the symmetry with marital coercion, unless the approach in Gotts 
also applies. In Gotts, Lord Jauncey at p426 stated: “I can…see no justification in logic, morality or law in 
affording to an attempted murderer the defence which is withheld from a murderer.” As the intent for attempted 
murder can only be an intention to kill and not the generic intention of an intention to cause grievous bodily 
harm which suffices for actual murder, a more criminous intent is needed. If murder is excluded from the ambit 
of the defence of duress then there must be a powerful case, that on the true construction of the statutory defence 
of marital coercion, the reference to “murder” includes attempted murder and except where the two spouses are 
the only conspirators, conspiracy to murder. The difference between the attempted and complete offence of 
murder is so often a matter of chance and therefore not a deliberate act of withdrawal on the defendant’s part. In 
the Court of Appeal, Lord Lane CJ said “that the fact that the attempt failed to kill should not make any 
difference”. But if the real reason for the common law exclusion of murder from the defence of duress is the fact 
of death then the construction of the statutory defence of marital coercion is far less powerful. Further, as the 
intent of the action is conditioned by duress, does it follow that the more rigorous intent required for attempted 
murder (than murder itself), is of any consequence? 
316
 Lai Kit v R (1946) 31 HKLR 7 (FC): treason by a collaborator during the Japanese occupation. However, the 
common law defence of duress also excludes attempted murder, R v Gotts [1992] 2 AC 412, therefore removing 
the symmetry with marital coercion, unless the approach in Gotts applies. In Gotts, Lord Jauncey at p426 stated 
“I can…see no justification in logic, morality or law in affording to an attempted murderer the defence which is 
withheld from a murderer.” As the intent for attempted murder can only be an intention to kill, R v Whybrow 
(1951) 35 Cr App R 141. and not the generic intention of an intention to cause grievous bodily harm which 
suffices for actual murder, a more criminous intent is needed. If murder is excluded from the ambit of the 
defence of duress then it is arguable that on its true construction the reference to “murder” includes its variants 
eg. attempted murder and conspiracy to murder. The difference between attempted and complete offence of 
murder is so often a matter of chance and therefore not a deliberate act of withdrawal on the defendant’s part. In 
the Court of Appeal, Lord Lane CJ said “that the fact that the attempt failed to kill should not make any 
difference”. R v Gotts [1991] 1 QB 660. But if the real purpose for the common law exclusion of murder from 
the defence of duress is the gravity of the fact of death, then the statute should be narrowly so construed. 
317
 The Victorian Law Reform Commission Victorian Law Reform Commission, ‘Defence to Homicide Issues 
Paper’ (2002) chp 8.2, p94, noting s336(2) Crimes Act 1958 [Vic] in 2002 noted that the marital coercion 
defence was available for manslaughter (which carries the maximum penalty of life imprisonment) and 
consideration was to be given as to whether it should be extended also to murder. Ibid chp 8.8 p96. 
318
 M J Shanahan, ‘Carter’s Criminal Law of Queensland’ (2003) 13 ed, Australia Butterworths p1167 noted that 
the former s32(2) Criminal Code Act 1899 [Qld] which provided for the defence of marital coercion until 30 
June 1997 exempted treason, murder, piracy, attempted piracy or any offence of which grievous bodily harm to 
the person of another, or an intention to cause such harm, was an element of the offence.   
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responsive to the increasing assertiveness of women. It became increasingly unjust to provide 
a defence to a wife who was clearly at least an equal partner in very serious criminal conduct. 
In the result, trial decisions fluctuated as to the fixed nature of the exceptions to the defence. 
It became recognised that certain offences were almost the exclusive province of women, 
such as keeping a common bawdy house.319 Over time, the common law reacted by unevenly 
engrafting further exceptions to the defence. These had as their central feature the fact that the 
offences were commited inside the domestic dwelling. The rationale for widening the 
exceptions to include prostitution-related320 offences was that the wife ought to be responsible 
for the governance of the domestic sphere. When she commited prostitution there or 
organised it, at the insistence of and in the presence of her husband, no defence was available 
to her. But within the gallimaufry of trial decisions321 there was no unanimity by the Courts or 
by institutional writers as to the precise list of other exceptions at common law.  
 
 In R v Stratton322 it was said that the nature of the duress must be in proportion to the 
malignity of the crime323 yet in more than one case a wife was even provided with the defence 
of marital coercion where she was charged with aiding and abetting her husband in the crime 
of rape of another.324 Modern statutory versions325 of duress/compulsion have tended to adopt 
the approach of the English Draft Criminal Code of 1879 which additionally exempted a 
range of other offences from the defence, typically excluding manslaughter but including the 
offences of: wounding with intent, kidnapping, robbery and arson.  
 
                                              
319
 The Law Reform Commission of Ireland ‘Consultation Paper: Duress and Necessity’ (LRC CP 39-2006), 
April 2006, Dublin p48 para 2.160 accepts that “brothel keeping” was a common law exception.  
320
 In State v Weeden (1927) 114 So 604, 605 the Supreme Court of Louisana recognised this exception.  
321
 In particular, there was a serious question whether misdemeanours were exempt. It is remarkable that the 
Avory Report stated that the common law did apply to all misdemeanours as well as all felonies as the leading 
contemporary texts denied that very proposition. This is further evidence of the fragility of the report and its lack 
of scholarship. It may have been the view of the Avory Committee that as on their recommendation the entire 
corpus of the law was to be abrogated, it was pragmatic to accept that misdemeanours were included to achieve a 
neat solution. 
322
 (1779) 1 Doug KB 239. 
323
 See also Lai Kit v R (1946) 31 HKLR 7. See also HKSAR v Buitrago [1998] 3 HKC 113 (CA). 
324
 Commonwealth v Balles (1946) 62 Montg 293 (Pa Quar Sess); State v Owen unreported Supreme Court of 
North California, No COA 98-413, 15 June 1999.  
325
 Glanville L Williams, ‘Criminal Law: The General Part’ (1953) Stevens and Sons Ltd p594 lists the Codes 
of Canada, New Zealand, Tasmania, Queensland, Western Australia and India as such examples. Some 
jurisdictions additionally exempt a particular offence: s17 Crimes Ord Cap 200 [HK] substantially denies 
compulsion as a defence in relation to the taking of unlawful oaths. 
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RARITY 
 
J F Garner stated, 29 years after the passage of the 1925 Act, there “seems to be no reported 
decision on the point”326 as to what constituted coercion. The very rarity of this defence has 
been suggested as a sufficient justification for its repeal. Reasons for the paucity of case law 
may include that a wife may avoid taking advantage of the defence because to employ it she 
will need to give evidence and substantially blacken the character of her husband.327 This was 
very much in the mind of the English legislators who fought to maintain the existing common 
law and avoid the introduction of the statutory defence. What had not been realised by them 
was that the common law position probably existed because of the fact that the wife could not 
give evidence at all prior to 1898 when accused persons finally became competent witnesses.   
 
The policy background of the defence of compulsion/duress is for the defence to be sparingly 
available, it is austere in its demands. In New Zealand, it has been authoritatively said that the 
defence is “a narrow release from criminal responsibility where its strict requirements are 
met. It reflects a policy decision that in those limited circumstances (and where the offence is 
not in the grossest category excluded from the application of the defence under s24(2)[Crimes 
Act 1961] [NZ] a person faced with the threat of immediate death or grievous bodily harm 
may properly be excused if he chooses the lesser evil of committing the offence.”328 The 
                                              
326
 J F Garner, ‘The Defence of Coercion’, [1954] Crim LR 448, 449. 
327
 The absence of caselaw may be a function of prosecutorial decision-making, conscious of the implications of 
the defence for the marriage (and children). The concept of prosecutorial discretion was perhaps not well 
developed in earlier times  but it had been employed in favour of married women, even after the indictment had 
been laid. R v Good (1842) 1 Car & K 185. Charles W H Lansdown, William G Hoal and Alfred V Lansdown 
(eds), Gardiner and Lansdown ‘South African Criminal Law and Procedure’ (1957) 6 ed, vol 1, Juta & 
Company Ltd Cape Town, at p155 states that while the Transkeian territories have a specific provision 
immunising a wife from the offence of being an accessory after the fact to her husband’s offence, unlike the 
other parts of the Union, but “in practice so general has it become not to prosecute a wife who does no more than 
discharge towards her husband such a duties as he may reasonably demand, and she may reasonably render 
him”, that a well-established custom having the force of law exists to this effect: R v Mtetwa 1921 TPD 227. 
Another discretion in favour of married women was the successful recommendation for a pardon even where the 
defence had failed such as where the husband had been in prison, and therefore not present, when the wife 
committed the offence, but where the other evidence of her coercion was overwhelming: R v Brown noted in R v 
Knight (1823) 1 Car & P 116, 117 (a). Further the defence gave the court a considerable margin of discretion in 
deciding whether the prosecution had established a case: J M Beattie, ‘The Criminality of Women in Eighteenth-
Century England’, (1975) 8 The Journal of Social History 80, 95-96. 
328
 R v Teichelman [1981] 2 NZLR (CA) 64, 66. Lord Bingham notes “the features of duress…incline me, where 
policy choices are to be made, towards tightening rather than relaxing the conditions to be met before duress 
may be successfully relied on”:  R v Z [2005] 2 AC 467. 
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defence of duress has been so narrowly defined by legislation or by common law that it does 
not permit a defence except in extreme situations.329  
 
Stephen said 
 
in the course of nearly thirty years’ experience at the bar and on the bench, during which I 
have paid special attention to the administration of criminal law, I never knew or heard of the 
defence of compulsion being made except in the case of married women, and I have not been 
able to find more than two reported cases which bear upon it.330 
 
But the position expressed in 1886 by Stephen is no longer a valid overview.  Lord Bingham 
in R v Z  has recently referred to the huge growth in the number of cases in which the defence 
of duress is now invoked. 
 
In recent years, the popularity of the plea of duress has shown inexorable increase since it is 
easy to assert (with plausibility in a context of violent crime) and difficult for the prosecution 
to investigate and discharge its burden of disproving it beyond reasonable doubt, especially 
when, as is often the case, the defence only raises it (or discloses the details on which the 
claim is founded) at or just before the trial.331 
 
It was also argued that because the defence is very rarely raised, a reason for the paucity of 
cases is that it is nowadays “much more difficult for a wife to show that she had not taken an 
independent part”332 which is a compelling reason to terminate it. Because of its rarity, the 
defence has been bypassed as being worthy of academic study.333 Its very rarity has been 
convincingly advanced as a rationale for its abolition.334 It does not apply to relationships 
outside marriage and as the ratio of marriage per head of population diminishes, its immediate 
practical utility follows suit. There does not appear to be any decision of a superior court in 
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 In Rhode Island Recreation Center v Aetna Casualty & Surety Company (1949) 177 F 2d 603, 605 where it 
was noted that even in the mid-twentieth century the state of the law of duress was revealed by the observation 
that a part from “cases involving children, wives, and mental defectives, they do not seem to be many cases in 
point.”  
330
 Sir James Stephen, ‘A History of the Criminal Law of England’ (1883) Maccillan & Co, London, vol 2, p106. 
331
 Russell Heaton, ‘Criminal Law’ (2006) 2 ed, Chp 8.3. 
332
 Anthony Hooper, ‘Harris’s Criminal Law’, 21 ed (1968) Sweet & Maxwell, London, p103. (Now Lord 
Justice Hooper) 
333
 R v Z [2005] 2 AC 467, 491 Lord Bingham said “For many years it was possible to regard the defence of 
duress as something of an antiquarian curiosity, with little practical application”. 
334
 English Law Commission, Working Paper No 55, Defences of General Application (1974) p63.  Stanley Yeo, 
‘Coercing Wives into Crime’, (1992) 6 Australian Journal of Family Law 214 fn 1 states that the low volume of 
litigation justifies its disappearance. 
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England335 where the defence has been successfully invoked on the merits (as opposed to 
where a conviction was quashed for misdirection). 
 
 
AUSTRALIA 
 
In 1924 the Tasmanian legislature336 not only abolished the presumption but it also abolished 
the complete defence of marital coercion, in unequivocal terms. The Northern Territory 
legislature337 in 1983 introduced a Criminal Code which abolished the defence but also 
widened the cognate defence of duress. Courts of Appeal in Québec338 and New Zealand339 
concluded that despite the appearance of the statutory provision abrogating only the 
presumption, the net effect was to abrogate the defence, on the basis that the defence could 
not exist independently of the presumption. Other Australian jurisdictions,340 including the 
other two Criminal Code states of Western Australia341 and Queensland,342 removed the 
presumption but recast the statutory defence. But the position in Victoria343 is the most 
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 But in HKSAR v Au Yuen Mei [2000] 1 HKC 411 a jury acquitted a woman who relied only on marital 
coercion; the Hong Kong defence is identical to that in England. 
336
 s20(2) Criminal Code Act 1924 [Tas]. 
337
 s41 Criminal Code Act 1983 [NT]. 
338
 R v Robins (1982) 66 CCC (2d) 550, 562. Mayrand JA stated that the 1892 Criminal Code [Can] unlike the 
position in England abolished the antiquated defence of marital coercion “to place the woman on a equal footing 
with all other citizens” as “…no one continues to believe that the married woman, in the presence of her 
husband, only acts as his puppet.”   The defence of marital coercion was incompatible with the prevailing morals 
and state of Canadian law. 
339
 R v Annie Brown (1896) 15 NZLR 18. 
340
 s328A Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 [SA]. 
341
 s32 Criminal Code Act Compilation Act 1913 [WA]. 
342
 s32 Criminal Code 1899 [Qld]. It reads: “A married woman is not free from criminal responsibility for doing 
or omitting to do an act merely because the act or omission takes place in the presence of her husband. But a 
married woman is not criminally responsible for doing or omitting to do an act which she is actually compelled 
by her husband to do or omit to do, and which is done or omitted to be done in his presence, except the case of 
an act or omission, which would constitute [the crime of treason or…murder, or any of the crimes defined in the 
second paragraph of section eighty-one and in section eighty-two of this Code], or an offence of which grievous 
bodily harm to the person of another, or an intention to cause such harm to the person of another, or an intention 
to cause such harm, is an element, in which case the presence of her husband is immaterial.” 
343
 s336(1) Crimes Act 1958 [Vic]. In Katsuno v The Queen, M88/1998 (9 March 1999) p50 (High Court of 
Australia transcript)  Osborne v Goddard  [1996] 1 Cr App R 116 was discussed, noting that the offence there 
was a federal offence, so that marital coercion was therefore available as a general defence under s4 Crimes Act 
[Cth].  In Olsen v The Queen, unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal of the Northern Territory, Court of Appeal 
24 of 2001, 14 June 2002 Angel, Mildren and Riley JJ, in a sentencing appeal, there was unsuccessful recourse 
by an appellant to the acts of her de facto husband and to the marital coercion doctrine in Ewart v Fox  [1954] 
VLR 699.  In R v Dempsey, [2000] VSC 527, 28 November 2000, Supreme Court of Victoria, No 1437 of 2000, 
28 per Harper J, a child had died of severe injuries to his head and the husband was indicted for murder and the 
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significant as inconsistently with all other states and territories in Australia (and the great 
majority of the common law world) it introduced in 1977 a specific marital coercion defence; 
although the presumption was not introduced. In none of the other states or territories is there 
a definition of what constitutes “coercion”. The South Australian model is a virtual 
replication of s47 Criminal Justice Act 1925 [UK] whereas the code states retained a 
provision imposing the general requirement on the duressee of having been “actually 
compelled”, until repealed in 1997.  
 
Marital coercion had been invoked in Australian courts since 1826344 and a number of 
examples of the defence being deployed exist in the law reports. Academic writing also 
occasionally considered the defence345 An article in 1940346 notes that by that year in the State 
of Victoria there had been no legislation which impacted on the old common law. The 
significance was that “the question has arisen on a number of occasions within the last few 
months in Victorian Courts”. The early decision in R v Bolton347 was criticised because there 
the court had additionally exempted burglary from the common law defence, a position that 
had never been reached in English law.  On the contrary, Hale348 made it clear that burglary 
was well within the doctrine. Blackstone also accepted that burglary was within the defence: 
                                                                                                                                             
wife with manslaughter. They sought separate trials. Such a request under Australian law should be granted 
where its denial would result in “a substantial miscarriage of justice” or “improper prejudice…against an 
accused”. See Webb v R (1994) 181 CLR 41, 89 per Toohey J. The wife intended to rely upon the defence of 
marital coercion and counsel for the prosecution submitted that it was crucial that the one jury see both parties to 
the marriage in order to assess that defence. The judge ordered a separate trial. cf R v Lee Shek Ching [1986] 
HKLR 304 (CA).  In R v Dempsey the wife intended to adduce material, including the convictions of her 
husband and his violent and aggressive nature because her defence was that any neglect of the welfare of her 
child was attributable to her husband and she feared that he would cause her to suffer if she exposed him by 
taking the child for medical treatment.  M J Shanahan, ‘Carter’s Criminal Law of Queensland’ (2003) 13 ed, 
Australia Butterworths at p262 observes that ss32 (defence of marital coercion), 33 (spousal conspiracy 
exemption), 35 (liability of husband and wife for offences committed by either with respect to the other’s 
property) were all repealed by Criminal Law Amendment Act (No 3 of 1997) [Qld] in operation from 1 July 
1997.  
344
 R v Smithers and Smithers [1826] NSW SupC 81, 28 December 1826, Forbes CJ and Stephen J; Sydney 
Gazette, 30 December 1826 
345
 J G Norris ‘Private Civil Subjection’  (1928) 2 Australian Law Journal 10, where reference is made to the 
Avory Committee. D O O’Connor and P A Fairall, ‘Criminal Defences’ (1984) Butterworths, Sydney p131 
consider that the defence was developed as an aspect of the “matrimonial subjection of the wife to the husband.” 
346
 T K Doyle, ‘Marital Coercion’, (1940) 14 ALJ 239.  
347
 (1885) 11 VLR 776. 
348
 1 Hale 45, 47, 48. 
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“and therefore if a woman commit theft, burglary or other civil offences against the laws of 
society by the coercion of her husband … or even in his company, she is not guilty.”349 
 
The three Australian Code States (Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia) had 
provided for the defence, or otherwise350, in the initial formulation of their Criminal Codes.  
Victoria had no statutory law until 1977. In New South Wales, a common law jurisdiction, a 
provision was enacted removing the presumption from the law but it most ambiguously failed 
to provide whether the defence has been given its quietus.351 Academic writing is sharply 
divided352 as to whether the common law defence exists or not in New South Wales, the point 
never having arisen at trial. 
 
The position in South Australia is most informative. That jurisdiction enacted s328A Criminal 
Law Consolidation Act Amendment Act 1940 [SA] in terms identical to s47 Criminal Justice 
Act 1925 [UK]. The section had its genesis in the Second Reading353 of the Criminal Law 
Consolidation Act Amendment Bill 1940 [SA] which dealt with a number of substantive 
amendments to the criminal law. Clause 10 was introduced354 to abolish the presumption of 
marital coercion.  It was urged that the rule (actually the presumption) had been abolished in 
England since 1925 “and in some Australian States”, so that clause 10 upon its enactment 
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 4 Commentaries 28. Hawkins Pleas of the Crown (vol 1 c 1 s.11) excludes murder, treason and robbery. The 
author refers to the Avory Committee and accepts the correctness of that Committee that there were no 
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 Hansard, South Australia House of Assembly, 9 October 1940 at p856. 
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would produce a result “similar to the English law of 1925”. Hon H Homburg,355 who had 
been Attorney General of South Australia for several years,356 referred to clause 10 and 
emphasised its importance, by demonstrating that the need for the abolition of the 
presumption of marital coercion: 
 
was brought about by a case357 which came before our Courts last year in which a man and 
wife were charged with illegally selling intoxicating liquors. The wife set up the defence that 
she was influenced by her husband and raised the presumption of law that we now seek to 
abolish. In England it has already been abolished, still leaving it open to be raised if it can be 
proved. The amendment will bring our law into line with the amended legislation of Great 
Britain.358  
 
In R v Whelan359 only a few years earlier, the Court of Criminal Appeal of South Australia 
had dealt with the doctrine at common law but it had not led to legislative intervention. Upon 
the resumption of the debate360 there was initially no specific focus on clause 10, but the Hon 
C R Cudmore361 described the presumption of marital coercion as having been “more than 
once termed one of the most stupid provisions of our law” and correctly stated that it would 
bring South Australia into line with “other parts of the Empire” in abolishing the presumption. 
However no consideration at all was given to whether the vestigial defence should also be 
abolished.  The South Australian provision remains in force and has been the subject of 
litigation. In Goddard v Osborne362 a wife was convicted of presenting a false document to 
secure unemployment benefit. Her husband was found to be a man of brutal and violent 
nature and she was found to be a simple person. She initially refused to carry out his 
suggestion but after he hit her several times she agreed to his plan. He accompanied her to the 
government office but waited outside. The Supreme Court accepted that her fear of the 
unknown could be particularly potent. In an important contribution, the court accepted that 
                                              
355
 Ibid, at p889 on 10 October 1940, the member for Central No. 2. 
356
 Ibid, at p888. 
357
 Manuels v Crafter [1940] SASR 7.   
358
 Stanley Yeo, ‘Coercing Wives Into Crime’, (1992) 6 Australian Journal of Family Law 214,215 states that the 
demise of the marital coercion presumption “was welcomed and passed without opposition”, instancing the 
details of the amendments in the various Australian states. But the record of the Parliamentary debates show 
there were heated contests as to the doctrine, its modern rationale and significance, as the debates in South 
Australia and New South Wales amply demonstrate.  
359
 (1937) SASR 237. 
360
 Hansard, South Australia House of Assembly, 15 October 1940 at p911. 
361
 Ibid, 16 October 1940 at p948. 
362
 (1978) 18 SASR 481 Casenote [1978] 2 Crim LJ 228. 
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the mere fact that the offences were committed outside the physical presence or line of sight 
of the husband was not fatal to the defence of marital coercion.363 The Court also departed 
from the earlier South Australian decision in Manuels v Crafter364 which had held that the 
defence was not available at all in summary proceedings, so the defence was now a general 
one and not linked to the former felony/misdemeanour distinction which had conditioned 
much of the criminal law. The court further rejected a prosecution argument that the defence 
was not available in proceedings brought under an Act of the Commonwealth Parliament, but 
had to be confined to offences created by State Legislatures. In South Australia the defence 
had been reinvigorated by judicial interpretation; but it only protected a lawfully married 
wife.365 
 
Western Australia, which abrogated the intraspousal conspiracy exemption in 1987366 did not 
abrogate the marital coercion defence until 2003367 and then only as part of a legislative 
overhaul to give unmarried persons and persons in de facto marriage situations the identical 
legal rights as married persons. Section 35 Criminal Code [WA] which precluded theft 
charges between spouses was also repealed so spouses were treated “as if not married”. 
 
 
 
                                              
363
 This incidentally aligned with the law in the State of Massachusetts which had never imposed a requirement 
of immediate physical presence but accepted the constructive presence of the husband sufficed: Commonwealth 
v Flaherty (1886) 5 NE 258 per Oliver Wendell Holmes J; Commonwealth v Daley (1888) 18 NE 579, 580. By 
contrast in Oklahoma a strict personal physical presence test was applied: Trapp v State (1954) 268 P2d 913. 
364
 [1940] SASR 7. Manuels v Crafter had undoubtedly been the spur for the passage of the legislation in the 
same year which created the statutory defence. 
365
 Brennan v Bass (1984) 35 SASR 311. In White J held that the defence of marital coercion is available only to 
a lawfully married wife and does not extend to a de facto wife. Brennan, who was serving a term of life 
imprisonment, escaped and was harboured by his de facto wife. White J ruled that the words “husband” and 
“wife” in the statutory defence mean “lawfully married”. The subsequent statutory recognition of de facto 
relationships and putative spouses in the Family Relationships Act 1975 [SA] did not partially repeal s328A of 
the Criminal Law Consolidation Act Amendment Act 1940 [SA]. The court approved Smith & Hogan, ‘Criminal 
Law’, (4 ed) p209 “the defence is confined strictly to husband and wife and not be extended to unmarried 
couples living de facto as man and wife.”   
366
 s6 Criminal Code Amendment Act (No 2) 1987 [WA], in force 14 March 1988, Western Australia Gazette  14 
March 1988. 
367
 s118(2) Acts Amendment (Equality of Status) Act 2003 [WA]. The explanatory memorandum to clause 117 
(as it was then numbered) Acts Amendment (Equality of Status) Bill 2002 [WA] stated that upon the repeal of s32 
Criminal Code (marital coercion) the general defence of duress provided in s31 Criminal Code [WA] would be 
available to all “regardless of their gender or marital status”. 
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VICTORIA 
 
This defence (and other cognate reforms) was introduced upon the recommendation of the 
Law Reform Commissioner of Victoria (Hon T W Smith, a former Judge of the Supreme 
Court of Victoria) in 1975 in Law Reform Commissioner Report No 3: ‘Criminal Liability of 
Married Persons (Special Rules)’, Melbourne, June 1975.  He concluded that there existed a 
persuasive justification for a criminal defence that applied only to a limited class of women, 
notwithstanding that (almost 100 years earlier) an American judge had described the defence 
as a “relic of a belief in the ignorance and pusillanimity of women”368 and another American 
judge in the same era had seen the defence as treating a wife as “a marionette, moved at will 
by the husband;”369 neither reference being noted by the Commissioner. 
 
The Victorian Law Reform Commissioner recommended the enactment of the defence in 
1975,370 two years later the English Law Commission (without noting the Victorian work)371 
decided that the spousal conspiracy exemption should be put in declaratory legislation. All 
other Australian states had by 1975 abolished the presumption except Victoria, although later, 
in 1999, for the Australian Capital Territory there was to be a real shock when the Supreme 
Court of that jurisdiction concluded that the presumption was still part of its law. In Victoria 
the presumption was only abolished by s2(b) Crimes (Married Persons Liability) Act 1977.372 
A special defence was warranted, the Commissioner argued, because wifely status increases 
the susceptibility of coercion from a husband. 
 
Where a wife, as is still commonly the case, has to look to her husband for support and shelter, 
and especially when she has young children to care for, the pressure upon her of insistent 
demands, and of threats of abandonment, may in many cases be just as difficult for her to 
resist as threats of physical violence sufficient to found a defence of duress. Moreover, the 
duty and habit of loyalty and co-operation which arise from the special relationship of 
                                              
368
 United States v De Quilfeldt (1881) 5 F 276,278. 
369
 Smith v Myers (1898) 74 NW 277,278 (Supreme Court of Nebraska). 
370
 Law Reform Commissioner (Victoria), Report No 3, ‘Criminal Liability of Married Persons (Special Rules)’, 
Melbourne, June 1975. 
371
 ‘Marital Coercion – Anachronism or Modernism?  P J Pace [1979] Crim LR 82, 89. 
372
 Noted by P J Pace, ‘Marital Coercion – Anachronism or Modernism?’, [1979] Crim LR 82, 83. But the real 
significance is that over 50 years after the Avory Report which stated that the presumption did not exist in 
Victoria, it was still in operation.   
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husband and wife will commonly make it more difficult for a wife to resist pressure from her 
husband than from a stranger. 373 
 
He reasoned that non-physical threats or psychological harm may have as much impact as 
actual violence yet the common law defence of duress may not safely cater for that type of 
intraspousal cruelty.374 The recommendation of the Commissioner led to the irony that it was 
now again a progressive approach to reconsider the desiccated defence of marital coercion, at 
least as a short-term bridge to a more expansive reform in the law of duress. Therefore in 
Victoria in 1977 a complete defence to most crimes was enacted where a woman can establish 
affirmatively that she acted under “coercion by a man to whom she was then married”.  It was 
introduced by the Crimes (Married Persons’ Liability) Act 1977 [Vic], inserting s336 into the 
Crimes Act 1958 [Vic]. This extended criminal defence would promote loyalty and 
cooperation between spouses and tend, in the interest of public policy, to preserve the stability 
of marriages.375 The justification for the defence lay in the realities of married life, that certain 
wives in certain relationships were mired in oppressive circumstances that denied them 
genuine voluntariness in their conduct.376  If the existing criminal law was not sufficiently 
expansive to protect them then the new defence would go some way to prevent possible 
uxorial injustice.  The presumption of marital coercion however was now an absurdity but the 
inadequacy of the general criminal law to provide a sufficient defence via the law of duress 
was such that a special defence only for wives was required as compensation. The Victorian 
Law Commissioner found support for the marital coercion defence in the common law rule 
that a wife could not be convicted of harbouring her husband.377 The Commissioner 
                                              
373
 Victoria Law Reform Commissioner, ‘Criminal Liability of Married Persons’ (1975) para 16. Yeo gives 
various examples that would qualify in evaluating the Victorian defence: “threat of divorce as usual pressure to 
someone who believes in sanctity of marriage; economic threats, emotional threats to separate and leave her 
homeless.”: Stanley Yeo “Coercing Wives Into Crime” (1992) 6 Australian Journal of Family Law 214, 217. 
374
 Since the 1977 Act, the new Victoria Law Reform Commissioner has now unsuccessfully recommended that 
the marital coercion defence be repealed and assimilated into a wider reformulated general defence of duress: 
Report No 9, ‘Duress, Necessity and Coercion’ (1990), p47. 
375
 Victoria Law Reform Commissioner, ‘Criminal Liability of Married Persons’, 1975 para 83. 
376
 There is no requirement under the statute, unlike the common law, that the wife acted in the presence of her 
husband.  
377
 s338 Crimes (Married Persons’ Liability) Act 1977 [Vic]. 
“A married person shall not become an accessory after the fact to any indictable offences or guilty of –  
(a) an offence under section 40 of this Act; 
(b) an offence under section 52 of the Summary Offences Act 1966 ; or 
(c) the offence at common law of obstructing an officer of justice in the execution of his duty- 
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successfully recommended that this be extended to husbands. He also argued that the 
common law unity of husband and wife, recognised by the spousal conspiracy exemption 
should not be removed but should be given statutory recognition, excepting only treason and 
murder as being unprotected by the exemption. There was no sufficient basis for 
differentiating between the offence of conspiracy and that of incitement,378 so statutory 
provision for that law reform was also commended.  All of these recommendations became 
law.379 
 
While the Victorian Law Commissioner was of the opinion that the marital coercion defence 
should be inclusionary of any “working relationship between a man and a woman living 
together as a husband and wife”380 he ultimately found decisive against this novel extension 
the difficulty of establishing such a relationship, an issue which he concluded had 
unsatisfactorily bedevilled social welfare legislation. The relative ease of proving the 
existence of a marriage outweighed the considerable uncertainty which attended other 
relationships in the nature of a marriage. But an argument that the State was more concerned 
to preserve marriage than de facto arrangements is inconsistent with notions of stability and 
mutual integrity which are equally available outside of marriage. The subliminal reasoning 
was that marriage was such a unique institution it deserved special recognition even under the 
criminal law. 
 
A very important part of the new statutory defence is s336(5) which explicitly and uniquely 
states that while the wife must discharge an evidential burden it remains for the prosecution to 
                                                                                                                                             
By receiving, relieving, comforting or assisting his or her spouse, or the spouse and another person or 
persons, though with knowledge that the spouse, whether alone or with the other person or persons, has 
committed an offence and though the purpose of what is done is to enable the spouse, or the spouse and the 
other person or persons, to escape being apprehended, tried or punished.” 
378
 Ibid para 66 and 70. If duress or marital coercion negatives mens rea, then a person who incites another to 
commit a criminal act under those conditions does not incite another to commit a crime: I R Scott, ‘The Common 
Law Offences of Incitement to Commit Crime’, (1975) 4 Anglo-American Law Review, 289, 309. 
379
 Section 339 Crimes (Married Persons’ Liability) Act 1977 [Vic]. 
“1. A married person shall be criminally responsible for incitement or conspiracy to commit treason or 
murder and for any offence specified in s4 as if he or she were unmarried. 
2. Subject to sub-section (1), a married person shall not be criminally responsible for conspiracy with his or 
her spouse alone, nor for incitement of his or her spouse to commit a criminal offence. 
3. Nothing in sub-section (2) shall affect the liability of a married person as a principal offender in any 
offence except conspiracy or incitement.” 
380
 Vic LRC para 81. 
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negative it beyond reasonable doubt.381 This is not the interpretation given to the analogous 
English and Hong Kong provisions382 which have been held to impose a legal burden on the 
wife (subject to an argument that to do so is itself unconstitutional as implicating the 
presumption of innocence). The statutory defence expressly does not affect the law relating to 
duress.383 
 
In R v Williams384 the Victorian Court of Appeal had to deal “for the first time” with the new 
s336 Crimes Act 1958 [Vic]. A robbery of a supermarket took place.  Surveillance evidence 
showed that the applicant was involved in the planning and preparation of the robbery 
including driving one of the cars to the site, being able to communicate with them by walkie 
talkie and following their get away car in her car after the robbery. The applicant was married 
to one of the robbers and her defence was duress and also marital coercion. Section 336 
Crimes Act [Vic] provides for the statutory defence.385 In an unsuccessful appeal, the Court 
                                              
381
 Sub-section 5. Both s32 of the Queensland Criminal Code Act 1899 [Qld] and s32 of the Criminal Code Act 
1913 [WA] provided for an affirmative defence of marital coercion (until their abrogation in 1997 and 2003 
respectively) – while abolishing the presumption:  R S O’Regan, ‘Married Women and the Defence of 
Compulsion under the Criminal Code’, (1979) 11 University of Queensland Law Journal 20. 
382
 R v Cairns [2003] 1 Cr App R 662 (CA), R v Kong Man Heung [2000] 1 HKC 406 (HC), HKSAR v Au Yuen 
Mei [2000] 1 HKC 411 (CFI). 
383
 Sub-section 7. 
384
 [1998] 4 VR 301 (CA).  Winneke ACJ, Batt JA and Hampel AJA. In R v Williams it was held that for the 
defence to apply to events they must be shown to have had causal significance to the question of dependence 
required by s336(4) of the statute. The question of the degree of dependence was usually one for expert opinion: 
For coercion the violence to which the woman is subjected is psychological, whereas in duress it is fear of 
physical violence: R v Robins (1982) 66 CCC (2d) 550, 561 (Qué: CA).  In R v Batt unreported Supreme Court 
of Australian Capital Territory, SCC 18 of 1999, 27 September 1999, Crispin J accepted that expert evidence 
could be given by a wife relying on marital coercion to establish her degree of dependence on her husband, not 
limited to economic issues but resonating of his power and control. 
385
  “(1). Any presumption that an offence committed by a wife in the presence of her husband is committed 
under his coercion is hereby abolished. 
 (2). Where a woman is charged with an offence other than treason, murder or an offence specified in section 
4, 11 or 14 of this Act, that woman shall have a complete defence to such charge if her action or inaction (as 
the case may be) was due to coercion by a man to whom she was then married. 
 (3). For the purpose of this section “coercion” means pressure, whether in the form of threats or any other 
form, sufficient to cause a woman of ordinary good character and formal firmness of mind, placed in the 
circumstances in which the woman was placed, to conduct herself in the manner charged. 
 (4). Without limiting the generality of the expression “the circumstances in which the woman was placed” in 
sub-section (3), such circumstances shall include the degree of dependence, whether economic or otherwise, 
of the woman on her husband. 
 (5). The accused shall bear the burden of adducing evidence that she conducted herself in the manner 
charged because she was coerced by her husband, but if such evidence has been adduced, the prosecution 
shall bear the burden of providing that the action or inaction charged was not due to coercion by the 
husband. 
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noted that the wife had been actively involved in planning and preparation for the robbery 
including communicating with her husband and the others “by walkie-talkie and following 
their getaway car in her car”.386 On examination of the novel legislation, it concluded that 
subsection (3) imposed an objective test, while subsection (4) introduced subjective 
considerations focused on the question of the accused wife’s vulnerability, as her degree of 
dependence involved the effect of pressure by that husband in that specific marriage. The 
emphasis was that any question as to the degree of dependency within a relationship required 
“expert evidence”387, especially when the issue was whether and to what extent prior 
experiences of the wife causally created or exacerbated her dependency within the marriage.  
 
 
AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY 1999 
 
In 1999, the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory decided that the presumption 
and defence of marital coercion still existed in that jurisdiction.388 The Australian Code 
States389 had an express defence of marital coercion but the Australian Capital Territory had 
                                                                                                                                             
 (6). This section shall operate in substitution for the common law as to any presumption or defence of 
marital coercion. 
 (7). This section shall not affect the law relating to the defence of duress.” 
386
 [1998] 4 VR 301, 303. The defence was relied upon in a charge of manslaughter of an infant: R v Dempsey 
[2000] unreported, VSC 527, 28 November 2000, Supreme Court of Victoria, No 1437, Harper J. 
387
 In R v Batt, unreported Supreme Court of Australian Capital Territory, SCC 18 of 1999, 27 September 1999, 
Crispin J ruled expert evidence was admissible in relation to “battered women syndrome” and its relationship to 
the defence of marital coercion. It is striking that in the cases under the English defence no psychological or 
psychiatric expert evidence ever seems to have been adduced, yet this would be necessarily probative of the 
issue of uxorial dependency.   
388
 A decision reversed by legislation later in the year.  D Brown, D Farrier, D Neal and D Weisbrot’s ‘Criminal 
Laws, Materials and Commentary on Criminal Law and Process in New South Wales’ (1996), The Federation 
Press, vol 2 p778. “The Northern Territory was the last jurisdiction in Australia to abolish the presumption, in 
1983”. That statement proved to be incorrect. “This presumption was, of course, a relic from the period when 
women had no independent legal status (eg women were unable to vote, hold property in their own name, 
practice (sic) a profession, and so on). Thus, abolition was seen as a liberal reform aimed at ensuring equality 
before the law.” In 1992 a writer had made the same mistake in stating that the presumption had been abolished 
in all Australian jurisdictions, when this was not to happen until 1999 when the Australian Capital Territory 
legislature rapidly removed it after it had been raised in a trial there in the Supreme Court. Stanley Yeo, 
‘Coercing Wives into Crime’, (1992) 6 Australian Journal of Family Law, p214, 215. 
389
 Eric J Edwards, Richard W Harding, Ian G Campbell, ‘The Criminal Codes Commentary and Materials being 
Cases and materials on the criminal law in Queensland, Western Australia and the Northern Territory’ (1992) 4 
ed, The Law Book Company Ltd p329: “Section 32 of the Griffith Code sets out a rule that certain criminal acts 
committed by a married woman in the presence of her husband shall be free from criminal responsibility. This is 
on the basis of the stunningly dated presumption that her own will must, in such circumstances, have been 
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always followed the common law. In R v Batt 390 a husband and wife had been arraigned for 
armed robbery before Higgins J, who on 1 March 1999 refused to accept the 18 year old 
wife’s plea of guilty, on the basis that the totality of the prosecution materials suggested that 
the defence of marital coercion was available to her. The case was adjourned and on its 
resumption, Crispin J stated that, “it is clear that a presumption of marital coercion could have 
been raised”. He heard evidence from a number of persons including a psychologist,391 
Crispin J noted that the Australian Capital Territory was the only Australian jurisdiction 
where the presumption and defence still existed. He reasoned that for the defence to succeed, 
“it must involve a set of circumstances which involve force overbearing the wish and 
intention of the prisoner and coercing her in a real sense into committing the offence”.392 The 
judge accepted that the husband had imposed “a long history of violence and other 
intimidating conduct upon his wife”. The husband was “a violent and dangerously 
unpredictable man who had subjected her to physical violence and who had left her in a state 
of constant anxiety by threatening to take her child away from her and by the unpredictable 
and potentially violent nature which he constantly displayed.” The wife “was ensconced in a 
controlling and abusive relationship with an aggressive man who was nine years older and 
that relationship was characterised by frequent episodes of threats and violence”. But Crispin 
J held that the defence of marital coercion was not made out on the facts by the wife: 
 
The ultimate decision is simply did the prisoner commit this offence because she was coerced 
into doing so by her husband or did she commit the offence as a result of an independent 
decision, albeit one that was influenced by a persuasion from her husband and albeit one made 
in context of a diminished ability to make and adhere to a moral judgment as a result of past 
abuse.393 
 
                                                                                                                                             
overborne by his – constructive compulsion. The Murray Report recommended the repeal of this section.” It was 
apparent that s32(2) was wider than s31(1)(d) Criminal Code [Qld] which provided for the defence of duress.  
390
 unreported Supreme Court of Australian Capital Territory, SCC 18 of 1999, 27 September 1999, Crispin J. 
391
 Expert evidence is admissible in relation to “battered woman syndrome”: R v Runjanjic (1991) 56 SASR 114 
at 117, 123, 124. 
392
 Ibid, R v Batt p3. 
393
 R v Batt p5. 
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The decision that the defence existed was a catalyst for urgent legislative action to abolish the 
presumption394 and within a few months it had been abrogated by a statutory amendment 
supported by all parties in the Legislature.395   
 
 
THE SLOW DISAPPEARANCE OF THE MARITAL COERCION DEFENCE IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
 
A number of American states decided that modern Acts giving married women equal property 
and political rights had by implication abolished the presumption and in effect the entire 
defence.396 But in others it was held that the rules of the common law, modified in relation to 
property did not alter the presumption of marital coercion.397 Yet in other states, without 
reference to contemporary married women’s property legislation, it was decided that the 
presumption simply no longer existed because of a re-evaluation of the common law in 
contemporary society. In Neys v Taylor398 it was held in 1900 that the presumption remained 
                                              
394
 Stanley Yeo, ‘Coercing Wives Into Crime’, (1992) 6 Australian Journal of Family Law 214,216 exhorted that 
while the presumption was certainly gone, the new legislation did not state whether the defence still existed. 
395
 cf. R v Peel and its immediate legislative sequel. The Australian Capital Territory legislated responding to R v 
Batt and passed an amendment abrogating the presumption: “Any presumption of law that an offence committed 
by a wife in the presence of her husband is committed under the coercion of the husband is abolished.” The 
debate on the amendment via the Crimes Amendment Bill (No 2) 1999 was supported by all parties in the 
legislature: Mr J Stanhope MLA, Legislative Assembly of the Australian Capital Territory, 1999, Week 12 
Hansard (25 November) p3694  an “archaic and extremely sexist notion”. The ACT provision was enacted s407 
Crimes Act 1990 [notified in ACT Gazette No 50: 15 December 1999]. 
396
 See Morton v State (1919) 209 SW 644 and King v City of Owensboro (1920) 218 SW 297. In State v Cauley 
(1956) 94 SE 2d 915 a decision of the Supreme Court of North Carolina. (Winborne CJ, Denny, Parker, Bobbitt, 
Higgins and Rodman JJ). A wife was convicted of aiding and abetting the crime of her husband committing 
assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill their three year old child. The wife’s defence at trial was marital 
coercion. Parker J said at p922 “However, with certain exceptions not material to consider here, it is generally 
held that there is a rebuttable presumption that a married woman was acting under the influence or coercion of 
her husband where she committed a criminal act in his presence.” Parker J added that other American States take 
the view the presumption is “out of place in this age, and hold against it, and some states have abolished it by 
statute. See State v Seahorn 81 SE 687. Some courts have taken the view that under Married Women’s Acts 
completely removing the disabilities of coverture and emancipating married woman, this common law 
presumption no longer exists.”   
397
 Braxton v State (1919) 82 So 657 (Alabama) and State v Murray (1927) 292 SW 434 (Missouri). 
398
 (1900) 81 NW 901 Supreme Court of South Dakota. In Caldwell v State (1922) 137 NE 179 the Indiana 
Court of Appeals concluded that the scope of the statute providing for the property of married women was not 
wide enough to undermine the general nature of coverture and the marital coercion defence. The same result 
occurred a year later in the same state Dressler v State (1923) 141 NE 801; ‘Current Decisions’ (1923) 33 Yale 
Law Journal 670, 671. In Commonwealth v Jones 1 D&C 2d 269 (Pa 1955) the presumption of coercion was 
upheld, the court stating that it reflected human experience therefore the equalisation provisions in relation to 
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in force in South Dakota, notwithstanding the enactment of a Married Women’s Property Act 
in 1887. Corson J noted that ss6215 and 6219 of the Compiled Laws of South Dakota together 
provided together that the “involuntary subjection to the power of superiors” was a statutory 
defence and that “coverture” was listed as a specific example of subjection in the statute. 
Section 6221399 stated: “A subjection sufficient to excuse from punishment may be inferred in 
favor of a wife, from the fact of coverture, whenever she committed the act charged in the 
presence and with the assent of her husband.” The appellant argued that these sections had 
been impliedly repealed by the later matrimonial property legislation. This argument was 
firmly rejected as it was reasoned that there was no basis to conclude that the more modern 
and specific matrimonial law intended in any way to alter400 the long-standing criminal law, 
conferring the specific defence of coverture. In Kentucky401 and Tennessee402 the courts held 
that the Married Women’s Property Acts verified that a wife was no longer under control of 
her husband; other states seeing property legislation designed in favour of a wife as having no 
broader implications destroying either the presumption or the defence. The pattern of 
responses by the courts generally tended to show contiguous-state courts adopting the view of 
the neighbour. 
 
The most extreme position was taken in Oklahoma, Oregon and South Dakota which 
specifically provided that the law presumed coercion when the wife committed an offence in 
the presence of her husband.403 American writers404 were strongly opposed to the continuation 
                                                                                                                                             
personal and property rights that married women now had, was not a valid reference point; Benjamin Paul, ‘The 
Doctrine of Marital Coercion’, (1956) 29 Temple Law Quarterly 190, 195. 
399
 The statute is unique in speaking of an inference rather than a presumption in this context. 
400
 “But it is not in terms at all by inference declared that she shall not be entitled to the protection which the law 
had previously guarantied to her. We are unable to discover any conflict…we think the sections are entirely 
consistent”: Neys v Taylor (1900) 81 NW 901, 903 per Corson J for the court. 
401
 King v City of Owensboro (1920) 218 SW 644. 
402
 Morton v State (1919) 209 SW 644. 
403
 This is the opposite of the position reached by Lord Halsbury in Brown v Attorney General for New Zealand 
[1898] AC 234, 237 (PC). Those three states provided that subjection is inferred when the offence was 
committed in the presence of the husband.   
404
 Kenneth C Sears and Henry Y Weihofen ‘May’s Law of Crimes’, (1938) 4 ed, Little Brown & Co, Boston, 
p38;  At p40 “It is believed that there is nothing in our day to justify the continued existence of the presumption. 
Accordingly it has been frowned upon as a weak presumption; it has been regarded as inconsistent with the 
Married Women’s Property Acts; and it has been repudiated by a few legislatures. In spite of all of this the 
presumption in most States is still a part of the law”; 1929 91 JP 662, 663 has a significant statement that “the 
common law development was such that: it was thus sometimes shown what was not coercion, but never 
positively what was”.  
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of the presumption and the defence. But the defence was in 1976, available in Oklahoma405 
and it still existed in Missouri in 1977406 and 1993407 and in North Carolina in 1999.408 
 
In some states the defence had never been invoked at all so it was not until 1930409 that the 
State of New Mexico had to consider whether the common law defence existed or not in that 
jurisdiction. The nearby states of Louisiana410 and Texas411 had respectively concluded that 
because of their civil law and Spanish law lineages the common law defence had not been 
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 In 1976 In the matter of Gault (1976) 546 P 2d 639 (Wilma Gault, married, aged 17; 4 pounds of marijuana 
discovered in the matrimonial dwelling) the Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma considered the statutory 21 
Oklahoma Statutes 1971 s152(7), renders anyone incapable of committing an offence who does so “…under 
involuntary subjection to the power of superiors…”; s155 provides that the involuntary subjection of power 
“…exonerates…”; s157 “A subjection sufficient to excuse from punishment may be inferred in favor of a wife 
from the fact of coverture whenever she committed the act charge in the presence and with the absence of her 
husband, except where such act is a participation in: (exceptions omitted)”; s159 “The influence of subjection 
arising from the fact of coverture may be rebutted by any facts showing that in omitting the act charges the wife 
acted freely.” Brett PJ stating at p641 “The possibility that this presumption has become a legal anachronism, a 
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decision in Paris v State (1939) 90 P 2d 1078; Stewart v State (1941) 111 P 2d 200 that the sections created a 
true presumption and not a mere permissible inference – although, the presumption is a “slight one, rebuttable by 
slight circumstances”. 
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 In State v Davis (1977) 559 SW 2d 602 Missouri Court of Appeals (Shangler PJ, Welborn and Higgins 
Special Judges.) the defendant, Geraldine Davis was convicted of burglary and theft. The evidence was that she, 
together with her husband and another, committed the offences. The wife contended that the evidence showed 
she was under the compulsion of her husband. The wife was the driver of the getaway car used by her husband 
and another to remove items stolen from private residences. Inside the vehicle were found burglarious 
instruments proven to have been used in the various burglaries. At p605 Shangler PJ said that in the criminal law 
of the State of Missouri “A cognate rule, developed at common law and adopted into our jurisprudence, holds 
that a crime [other than those beyond the operation of duress] committed by a wife in the presence of her 
husband is presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, to have been done under the constraint of the 
husband is therefore excused.” There was “little in the present organisation of society upon which the prima 
facie presumption [that a crime committed by a wife in the presence of her husband results from his 
coercion]…can stand, and certainly nothing calling for any extension of the presumption”. . 
407
 A modified version of the marital coercion presumption still exists in some jurisdictions: State of Missouri v 
Isa (1993) 850 SW 2nd 876 rejecting a modified claim for the coercion presumption by Mrs Isa who was 
appealing a conviction for murdering her daughter committed in the presence of her husband.  “Marriage also 
imposed duties upon husbands. Husbands were obliged to support their wives, although this obligation did not 
extend beyond providing wives with necessities. Placing the duty on husbands to support their wives relieved the 
state of its burden of supporting women who, faced with the economic and social constraints of the time, would 
have been rendered destitute. Husbands also were held responsible for their wives’ premarital debts, as well as 
all debts that occurred during the marriage. [See generally Blackstone at 432].” 
408
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Lewis and Walker JJ concurring. 
409
 State v Asper (1930) 292 Pac 225 in which spouses were jointly indicted for selling liquor to a minor.   
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inherited. The New Mexico Court assumed that the common law position was applicable412 in 
that state but queried whether the principle may have disappeared “by reason of modern 
statutes, ideas and practices affecting the legal and social status of married women”.413  
 
 By 1930 the defence had been abrogated by statute in New York414 and had disappeared in 
Canada 40 years earlier.415 In Arkansas416 from 1860 the common law defence had been 
modified so that the presumption no longer existed although actual coercion was a defence for 
a married woman. Equally in Colorado417 since 1921 the statute provided that a woman is 
excused if she commits a crime in the presence of her husband “provided it appears from all 
the facts and circumstances of the case that violent threats, command or coercion were used.” 
It was recognised that the common law presumption arose out of the fact that a feme-covert 
had no legal status separate from that of her husband, a situation which had been radically 
altered by the Married Woman Acts and other legislation emphasising equality. The result 
was that in practice courts would “construe the presumption of marital coercion very strictly, 
and to give it less weight than formerly”418 as the historical reason for the rule no longer 
existed.419  
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 DSG ‘Note’ (1930-1931) 3 Rocky Mountain Law Review 220, 222 describing it as “in line with the current 
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413
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By the middle of the twentieth century a writer420 could state that allowing a wife the defence 
of marital coercion “is the policy followed in the majority of the states in America”. However, 
he noted that the doctrine was losing ground because of the elevated position of married 
women who had generally now achieved economic independence.421 Wives were no longer 
tied to the purse-strings of their husbands. For over 30 years a number of state Supreme 
Courts had decided that the emancipation of women should be followed by the imposition of 
full criminal responsibility in wives.   The attainment of a position of equality ought to be 
accompanied by correlative obligations and responsibilities which those rights and privileges 
entailed. The same conclusion had been reached in Canada and New Zealand by legislation in 
the late nineteenth century and was emphatically reaffirmed by twentieth century caselaw.422 
In addition there was a discernible tendency by the mid twentieth century in American courts 
to hold that the presumption was slight and easily rebuttable.423 Every American jurisdiction 
had also made some provision to exclude certain offences from the defence, although murder 
and treason had always been excepted at common law.424 David S Evans noted425 that there 
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 250 
was little uniformity426 in the different American states as to how the defence of marital 
coercion should be modified or applied. A number of states had abolished the doctrine by 
statute.427 The most remarkable provision was in the Penal Code of Georgia which required 
that the coercing husband was to receive the punishment that his wife would have got under 
the criminal law had she not been under his coercion. 
  
A married woman, acting under the violent threats, commands or coercion of her husband 
shall not be found guilty of any crime or misdemeanour not punishable by death or life 
imprisonment; and, with this exception, the husband shall be prosecuted as principal, and, if 
convicted, shall receive the punishment which otherwise would have been inflicted on the 
wife, if she had been found guilty.428 
 
In 1956 it could still be said that the majority of American states provided for the defence of 
marital coercion.429 Some states applied the common law,430 others civil law, Spanish-infused 
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 He asserts that four states had abolished the defence entirely, nineteen had abolished the presumption but left 
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law and others had modern criminal codes. Another writer sighed about the “ancient problem 
of marital coercion”431 which arose before the Supreme Court of North Carolina also in 1956.  
That court affirmed the existence of the presumption and the defence. Where a wife 
committed a felony in the presence of her husband it was a fatal error in a jury trial that the 
judge did not leave the defence even if it was obvious that the wife was taking an active 
part.432 It was held in another case,433 that the defence did not prevent spouses conspiring 
together. The presumption was a weak one and domination of husbands by wives is as likely 
as the reverse. Cases invoking marital coercion were not uncommon across the United States. 
 
Oklahoma434 still retained the presumption of marital coercion by 1976. The Court of 
Criminal Appeals435 of Oklahoma considered the statutory defence, Brett PJ noting: “The 
possibility that the presumption has become a legal anachronism, a rule whose reason has 
long since vanished, does not prevent appellant from claiming whatever benefits its 
employment might bring her because it remains a part of our statutory law.” The court held436 
that the statute created a true presumption and not a mere permissible inference in favour of a 
wife.  But Oklahoma had exempted from the defence a whole list of crimes437 yet a wife could 
still claim it successfully where she was charged with aiding and abetting her husband in a 
rape.438 In Texas, the modern law provides that evidence of marital coercion only goes to 
mitigation.439  
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By 1973440 marital coercion still existed in 24 of the 50 states441 with the defence uncertainly 
existing in four others. But legislative intervention had seriously whittled away much of its 
importance. As far back as 1885, the Californian statute only provided for the defence in 
offences other than felonies.442 This early approach was one of several legislative and judicial 
techniques to narrow the ambit of the defence. The American courts became frustrated with 
the defence and generally decided that it only raised a weak presumption easily rebutted.443 In 
Commonwealth v Barnes444 the entire defence of marital coercion was eliminated in 1976 by 
judicial decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. Braucher J for the court 
observed that the female claimant of the defence had been convicted of both breaking and 
entering a building to commit a felony and with being an accessory after the fact to murder. 
The court prospectively445 abrogated the defence of marital coercion and also examined a 
local statute that provided for a “defense of affinity”.446 The appellant inconsistently claimed 
at trial that she was married to the principal in Arkansas and/or Virginia in 1965 and under the 
common law of the State of Rhode Island. However she also relied upon the statutory defence 
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of affinity, if the court concluded that her marriage was invalid. That defence only applied “in 
a marriage context” and it was argued on her behalf that in failing to extend to a cohabitee it 
violated her equal protection guarantees.447 The prosecution rejoined by putting in issue the 
purpose448 of the affinity immunity, which it argued was as a matter of public policy restricted 
to persons lawfully married. The court, despite noting the view of a leading writer,449 
explicitly found that the statutory provision was constitutional as being not irrational in 
delimiting its coverage to include the broad categories of consanguinity, affinity and adoption 
yet excluding “close friends, employees, business partners and paramours”.450 The purpose 
and objective of the law was to only protect persons related by blood or by marriage. Other 
categories, no matter how possibly deserving they may be on an individual basis, were 
outside the central theme of this ameliorative law. 
 
In its consideration of the common law defence of marital coercion, Braucher J first referred 
to the history of the general defence of duress451 in Massachusetts and then to the “separate 
principle”452 of marital coercion. The latter defence had even a longer453 historical lineage, as 
it was imported with the common law which had actively engaged it for almost 1000 years. A 
significant reason why that separate defence had flourished was said to be attributable to the 
unavailability of the benefit of clergy to women in medieval England. As early as 1927 the 
same court had considered the defence and concluded454 that because of “the wider liberty of 
married women established by legislative enactments and by the usages of society” the force 
of the defence had considerably diminished. The disputable presumption of coercion was in 
contemporary society “more easily overcome by evidence”455 but until now it remained 
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extant. Braucher J noted that in many jurisdictions456 the presumption457 had been abolished 
and the court concluded that it would lay “this ghost to rest” so that the position of married 
women “or anyone else”458 would prospectively be, in terms of criminal law, 
indistinguishable in relation to duress or coercion from that of any other. 
 
The defence of coercion of marital coercion is still available in a few American jurisdictions 
today459, but it is now an exceptional rarity. However, it has been argued that the defence 
should be seen as a precursor to, and succeeded by, battered women syndrome.460 That 
modern syndrome is not gender-specific461, but almost every decided case involves a female 
victim. It permits a claim of excusatory conduct by women (as opposed to wives) to avoid 
criminal responsibility almost invariably in relation to males, where the focus is on the 
dynamics of the impugned relationship. It is open to criticism as reinforcing the same 
negative stereotypes about women implied in the marital coercion defence. This modern 
syndrome, it has been argued, is a valid reconfiguration of the former marital coercion 
defence, which unhappily is predicated upon assumed gender traits.462 A common and central 
feature of both the defence and the syndrome is the notion of excusable dependency. In the 
syndrome, the female is perceived as suffering from a mental health disorder463, explicated as 
‘learned helplessness’.464 It is distinguished by discernible emotional and behavioural 
disabilities, leaving the woman dysfunctional and incapable of resisting threats, pressure or 
coercion from the male abuser. That form of dependence, often reinforced by economic 
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pressures, is on analysis, little different from the very vulnerability which beset wives and 
underlies the ideology of the defence. The recognition and development of the syndrome did 
generally coincide with a number of international instruments465 recognising and affirming 
the rights and status of women. The slow demise of the marital coercion defence did not, 
however, lead to the creation of the battered women syndrome as was argued466. While a 
shared doctrinal connection exists, in terms of the provision for and recognition of the class of 
dependent women incapable of independent cognition, there is no causal link between them. 
One had very substantially atrophied before the other emerged as a result of enhanced 
understanding in the area of mental health analysis.  Both recognise that coercive conduct 
may be constituted by a disparate variety of threats or actual physical or psychological 
violence467, so that the woman is subjugated to the overriding will of the male which dictates 
her actions. There is no evidence that the defence spawned the syndrome. The syndrome is an 
enlightened approach designed to bridge the inadequacy of the defences of compulsion and 
duress. But it is not a defence in most common law jurisdiction in its own right, but a form of 
evidence. It is available as an adjunct to the defences.  
 
The syndrome eschews any reliance on the common law concept of the husband’s 
presence468, being a more protean form of excuse. It is a hybrid which engages aspects of both 
psychological dependence and the raison d’être for the defence of compelled involuntary 
behaviour469, but without the imprimatur of a free-standing defence. It efficacy lies in its 
ability to present how judgment and perception can be overborne. The syndrome provides 
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confirmation that uxorial dependence has been exploited by men for centuries and continues 
to do so.470 In that sense, it bridges the defence. The marital coercion defence for much of the 
previous millennium displayed vitality as its underpinning theory possessed a real moral 
force, which the syndrome now advances.   
 
 
COMPARISON BETWEEN DURESS AND COERCION 
 
Unless ‘coercion’ means something more than duress/compulsion as understood in that 
common law defence, the entire statutory defence is not only otiose, but actually imposes 
additional formidable hurdles in front of any married woman. It is a pointless gesture to create 
a statutory defence only for married women, if the operative content of the defence exactly 
coincides with the diameter of the common law defence. It is apparent from the speeches in 
Hansard that the government of the time intended, quite explicitly, to create a larger liberating 
defence than the common law provided. This could be achieved by either or both of two 
means: the widening of ‘coercion’471 beyond physical threats or actions as the concept, or the 
liberalisation of the requirement of presence, as understood in the cognate common law 
defence. To extend both concepts would introduce a significant benefit for married women 
and would validate the utility of the special defence. There is no discrete consideration of the 
concept of ‘presence’ in any of the parliamentary debates, where the principal issue was 
whether the special position of married women could justify a separate defence of virtually 
general application. Glanville Williams said of s47 “[t]hese simple-seeming words raise an 
almost insoluble problem of interpretation”472 as the issue is whether undefined ‘coercion’ in 
the section creating the defence is simply a synonym for duress/compulsion.  If a married 
woman only has to raise an evidential473 burden, rather than establish an affirmative burden, 
then the statute does provide a considerable advance beyond the common law position. The 
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affirmative defence would require the wife to establish the defence on the balance of 
probabilities474. There was, however, nothing in the parliamentary debates to give credence to 
this interpretation as the manifest intention was to squarely place the persuasive burden of 
proof on a wife. This is unequivocally apparent from the debates.  
 
Recent constitutional instruments such as the Human Rights Act 1998 [UK] now mandate that 
any derogation of the presumption of innocence (which is always implicated when the burden 
of proof on any element of an offence is placed on a defendant) must be justified according to 
the strictures of proportionality, with an increasing tendency for legislation to be read down 
so that an ostensible affirmative defence is interpreted by constitutional construction as only 
imposing an evidential burden. In relation to marital coercion such a construction would 
involve the overruling of every one of the existing few decisions on the defence, as all have 
either assumed or explicitly found that the wife carries an affirmative burden of proof. A 
reallocation of the burden of proof would mean that as with the common law defence of 
duress, so too would the statutory defence require the prosecution to disprove it beyond 
reasonable doubt, once the wife had raised the initial evidential burden to make the defence a 
live issue.  
 
The terminology in case law is distractingly inconsistent. Sometimes duress is erroneously 
used interchangeably as a synonym for coercion; sometimes coercion is seen as simply the 
orthodox defence475 of duress as merely applied to a married woman. One argument against 
the retention of the defence funded by this terminological confusion, is that it is not 
sufficiently distinct from duress ‘to give it much practical utility.’476 Marital coercion, as well 
                                              
474
 R v Hansen [2007] 3 NZLR 1, 18 para [30] per Elias CJ; Jayasena v R [1970] AC 618, 623 (PC). 
475
 In 1883 Sir James Fitzjames Stephen ‘History of the Criminal Law in England’ specifically doubted whether 
duress was available as a general defence, although as a trial judge he specifically permitted a (successful) 
defence of marital coercion as late as 1885 in R v Dykes et Uxor (1885) 15 Cox CC 771 where husband and wife 
were indicted for highway robbery with violence. 
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 Glanville Williams, ‘Textbook of Criminal Law’ (1978) Stevens & Sons, London, p585.  “It is plainly 
unrealistic to ascribe to Parliament the intention of treating the defences of duress and marital coercion in an 
altogether disparate manner”. Robin S O’Regan, ‘Essays on the Australian Criminal Codes’, (1979) The Law 
Book Company Ltd, Sydney at p126, “These statutory defences of marital coercion have a quaint ring about 
them …and serve no useful point if, …the defence of duress is not limited to threats of death or violence.” 
G L Peiris, ‘Duress, Volition and Criminal Responsibility: Current Problems in English and Commonwealth 
Law’, (1988) 17 Anglo-American Law Review 182, 197-198 also noting “the proliferation of decided cases” 
now relating to duress.   
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as duress, are unsuccessful where the wife acts “as an independent and autonomous 
individual”.477 Both defences involve involuntariness, where the cognition of the actor has 
been captured by the controlling power of another, a person in a position of dominance. By 
the presumption of marital coercion that dominance was taken to be a verity a natural aspect 
of ordinary married life. A husband was also able to coerce his wife by threatening not her, 
but a third party, such as their child.478  In that way the child became an innocent instrument 
who reflected the psychological awe of one parent against the presumed weaker one who 
lacked, the law believed, the fortitude to resist. The limits of fortitude are the stuff of duress.  
 
The statutory defence created by s47 Criminal Justice Act 1925 [UK] actually places a wife in 
a disadvantaged position in relation to the same comparator under the common law defence of 
duress. The section imposes the legal burden of proof to establish the defence on the wife, 
whereas in duress the wife has only an initial evidential burden which if discharged then 
requires the prosecution to negative the defence beyond reasonable doubt. Further the statute 
expressly removes from the protective covering of the defence the offence of treason; yet it 
has been accepted that the common law defence of duress is available in relation to treason.479  
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 See R v Fournier (1991) 15 WCB (2d) 314 (NWTSC) per de Weerdt J at para [11]. Wayne R La Fave and 
Austin W Scott Jr, ‘Handbook on Criminal Law’, (1972), West Publishing Co, St Paul Minnesota at p380 
“Something less in the way of pressure was required for a wife to be coerced than for an ordinary person to meet 
the requirements of the defence of duress: One early English case held that the husband’s near command would 
do.” But no analysis of the uxorial difference was made. 
478
 Paul H Robinson, ‘Criminal Law’ (1995)  Aspen Law & Business at p537 noting State v Toscano (1977) 378 
A 2d 75: conviction quashed for failure to allow jury to consider whether threats against defendant and family 
qualified as duress.   
479
 In Director of Public Prosecutions for Northern Ireland v Lynch [1975] AC 653 Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest 
accepted that duress was available as a defence to at least some forms of treason: relying on Oldcastle’s Case 
(1419) Hale 1 PC 50; McGrowther’s Case (1746) Fost 13; R v Stratton (1779) 1 Doug KB 239; R v Purdy 
(1946) 10 J Cr L 182 (Oliver J).  While hardly a common offence it does still get prosecuted in the common law; 
State v George Speight [2002] NZAR 922, 923 (Fiji High Court) which refers to other South Pacific instances of 
the offence. 
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LAW REFORM 
 
Law reform of the marital coercion defence was urged as early as 1845,480 then 1879,481 then 
1922,482 then 1977,483 then 1993484. As a defence, it has survived repeated attempts to remove 
it.485 It should be debunked as inimical to rights of equality. 
 
The English Law Commission in 1977486 and 1993487 proposed the abolition of the entire 
statutory defence. Earlier in the nineteenth century there had twice been recommendations 
made limited to removing the presumption. The Royal Commission in 1845488 recommended 
the abolition of the presumption (which was only adopted almost 80 years later). It was also 
supported in 1879 by the Royal Commissioners charged with creating the draft criminal 
code.489 The Avory Committee recommendation, by contrast, in 1922 had been to remove the 
presumption490 but only on the basis that the entire common law defence be abrogated. For 
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 The Criminal Law Commissioners (1845), Second Report ‘Parliamentary Papers’ 1846, vol xxiv, p 114. 
481
 The Criminal Law Commissioners (1879). ‘Draft Code’ s23. 
482
 The Avory Committee Report ‘Report on the Responsibility of the Wife for Crimes Committed Under the 
Coercion of the Husband’, Cmnd 1677, 1922. 
483
 Law Commission, ‘Criminal Law: Report on Defences of General Application’, Law Com No83 1977, p17-
19 para 3.9. This Report also proposed to liberalise the common law defence of duress.  
484
 Law Commission 1993 No 218 para 32.6 
485
 Even though it was removed in New Zealand in 1893, the modern version of that formula, s24(3) Crimes Act 
1961 [NZ], was itself recently amended to place beyond doubt that a wife in a “civil union” is equally denied it 
as much as a wife: Schedule 1, Relationships (Statutory References) Act 2005 [NZ]. In R v Elisha Barbara Brett, 
unreported, High Court Auckland, CRI-2006-44-7302, 8 August 2007, Priestley J at [15] stated that he would 
refer the “fascinating policy difficulty” under s71(2) Crimes Act 1961, which exempts spouses and civil union 
partners only from being an accessory after the fact to the offence of the other spouse or partner, to the Law 
Commission for further investigation.  
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 The Law Commission, Criminal Law Report on Defences of General Application, Her Majesty’s Stationery 
Office, London, 1977 (Law Com No. 83) at para 3.3 noted “As early as 1845 the abolition of this common law 
presumption was recommended, and this was also proposed in the draft Code of 1879”. 
487
 Under clause 36(2)(b) of the draft Criminal Law Bill, a wife would not have a separate defence of marital 
coercion. Law Commission, Legislating the Criminal Code: Offences against the Person and General Principles 
(1993), Law Com No. 218. “It might be though surprising that it has survived for so long.” Great Britain, Law 
Commission, Report No. 143, ‘Codification of the Criminal Law’, Draft Criminal Code Bill, clause 45. Michael 
J Allen ‘Textbook on Criminal Law, Sixth Edition’, (2001) Blackstone Press, p194. “The need for this defence is 
highly questionable as it is doubtful whether a woman coerced to commit an offence would give evidence in 
court which could be used to establish the guilt of her husband as her accomplice. The Law Commission (Law 
Com No 83) recommended the abolition of the defence and it is not included in the Draft Criminal Code (Law 
Com No 177).” 
488
 Criminal Law Commissioners of 1845, 2nd Report (1845) Parliamentary Papers XXIV 114.   
489
 Criminal Law Commissioners (Draft Code s23). 
490
 Avory Committee (1922) Cmnd 1766. 
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quite unsatisfactory reasons the British Parliament proceeded to revitalise the defence by 
recasting it as a unique gender-status and marital-status dependent statutory defence.  
 
The Law Commission Working Party in 1977 had drawn attention to the uncertain features of 
the statutory defence, which included its failure to address the position of any unmarried 
woman who was very likely to be as equally deserving of the shield of the special defence. 
The exclusion from it of women living in a de facto relationship in the nature of  a wife, or the 
position of a dependent female member in the same household or family,491 identified that the 
defence was designed to buttress the institution of marriage, thereby supplanting or displacing 
any rival forms of legal relationship. The primary issue considered by the Working Party was 
to decide whether  the defence was appropriate to modern societal conditions. That inquiry 
engaged the issue as to whether a defence in law which specifically glorified matrimony was 
a rational basis for excusatory behaviour. It concluded  after “consultation, wide support and 
no opposition” to the proposal, that advocating the abolition of the entire doctrine of marital 
coercion was the plainly deserving outcome. It proceeded curtly to deny the marital coercion 
doctrine on “the implicit assumption that no-one could seriously question that marital 
coercion had outlived its usefulness”.  
 
The Law Commission was convinced that the general common law defence of 
duress/compulsion already encompassed the position of married women as well as every 
other class of person and there was no sustainable basis for any differential treatment under 
modern law.492 A failed defence of duress would still provide to a wife as much as to anyone 
substantial possibilities in mitigation.493 The abrogation of marital coercion has been 
advocated upon the creation of a wider494 duress defence by state495 and national bodies in 
Australia,496 England and Wales.497 Both the Australian and English models turn on a 
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 The Law Commission, Working Paper No 55 paras 63 and 64. 
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 The Law Commission, Criminal Law Report on Defences of General Application, Her Majesty’s Stationery 
Office, London (1977) (Law Com No. 83) at para 3.8. 
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 This very point had been made by the Avory Committee in 1922. 
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 D O’Connor & P A Fairall, ‘Criminal Defences’, (1984) Butterworths, Sydney at p132 suggest that a possible 
justification for the retention of the separate defence of marital coercion is the limited character of the defence of 
duress. 
495
 Victoria Law Reform Commissioner, Report No 9, Duress, Necessity and Coercion (1990) para 5.03. 
496
 Review of Commonwealth Criminal Law, Interim Report, Principles of Criminal Responsibility and Other 
Matters (1990) paras 12.21 and 12.38. 
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narrowly defined scope for duress, confining it to its existing common law formulation in 
which threats of death or grievous bodily harm are required. While coercion has an obvious 
subjective element it ought to include a limiting boundary of reasonableness indexed to the 
gravity of the situation, so that the genuineness of the coercion is proportionate to the 
impelled crime. The Australian Commonwealth Review Committee would abolish marital 
coercion for all federal offences, leaving wives to plead a reformulated defence of duress. The 
ontological foundation of a gender-specific defence is destroyed when it does not apply to a 
person who reasonably, but mistakenly, believes she is married. That complexity is obviated 
by the general law of duress as are the difficulties occasioned by the implications of 
polygamy, customary law concubinage and gender-reassignment. 
 
While the law is entitled to protect the institution of marriage by the criminal law it is 
properly confined to the formalities of marriage eg bigamy. No other legal relationship 
provides a general criminal law defence. Stephen had considered it absurd to give a wife more 
protection than an adolescent daughter. He had unveiled contempt for the defence.498 A 
further alternative is to increase the exclusion zone, on the basis of a diameter of dominance, 
to include children, guardians and wards.499 It was rejected by the Victorian Law Reform 
Commissioner because of the difficulty of compiling a comprehensive list of such 
relationships and an incomplete list would be unsatisfactory. 
 
In the state of Victoria since 1977 a complete defence to virtually every crime was enacted in 
circumstances where a woman can establish affirmatively that she acted under “coercion by a 
man to whom she was then married”. The term “coercion” is defined in s336(3) to mean: 
 
pressure, whether in the form of threats or any other form, sufficient to cause a woman of 
ordinary good character and normal firmness of mind, placed in the circumstances in which 
the women was placed, to conduct herself in the manner charged. 
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 English Law Commission, No 177, A Criminal Code for England and Wales (1989) vol 2, para 12.11-12.18. 
498
 Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, ‘History of the Criminal Law’, vol 2 p106.  In Papua New Guinea R v Yigwai 
and Aku [1963] P&NG LR 40, 41 Mann CJ held that the defence of marital coercion in s32 Criminal Code 
[PNG] “and the common law rules antecedent to it” were based on marriage and were not of general application 
so the statutory defence of marital coercion did not apply to a daughter. 
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 Victorian Law Reform Commission para 80. 
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(That definition has eluded the common law with the English judges in particular floundering 
to identify what constituted the difference between duress and coercion. It was not until fifty 
years after the section had been enacted that the House of Lords tentatively identified the true 
characteristics of coercion in this statutory formulation.) The irony of the defence is that what 
was once considered to be desiccated was again seen as progressive, at least as a short-term 
bridge to a more expansive reform of the law of duress. The justification for the creation of 
this hyper-modern statutory defence was the notion that the “duty and habit of loyalty which 
arise from the special relationship of husband and wife”500 could not satisfactorily be dealt 
with by the general law of duress. The essential argument was based on a symbiotic 
understanding of the uxorial position in which the wife was dependent on the husband as head 
of the household. A second justification501 turned on the fact that a wife could be unfairly 
deprived of relying upon the general defence of duress by her failure to seek early or 
immediate intervention by law enforcement agencies.  Her risk was in being seen to have 
acquiesced in illegal conduct which provided the factual context for the coerced offence. Her 
omission to disengage from the relationship by reporting her husband to the police was 
capable of amounting to evidence that she had failed to avail herself of a reasonable 
opportunity to escape from the dilemma which she was now sheltering behind. This was seen 
to be a structural defect in the general law of duress and the Victorian Law Reform 
Commissioner considered it important to supplement that defence with the defence of marital 
coercion. There is however, little valid comparison between a person voluntarily joining a 
criminal organisation (with eyes wide open) and a wife trapped by psychological, economic 
and moral pressure in a lawful union with a lawless content.502 On this basis the suggested 
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 Victorian Law Commissioner, Report No 3, ‘Criminal Liability of Married Persons’, para 16 “Where a wife, 
as is still commonly the case, has to look to her husband for support and shelter, and especially when she has 
young children to care for, the pressure upon her of insistent demands, and of threats of abandonment, may in 
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 Victorian Law Commissioner, Report No 3, ‘Criminal Liability of Married Persons’, para 17. “A further 
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 In Kelso et ux v State (1953) 255 P2d 284, 288 per Jones J: “the law does not call upon her, in order to avoid 
being guilty of the offence, to abandon her home, separate from her husband, and dissolve the bonds of 
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rationale for the Victorian defence, namely the inadequacy of the common law of duress, has 
no plausibility.  
 
The other imperative for the Victorian legislation was to address the correlative loyalty 
between spouses. The inarticulate premise being that a wife (as the defence only operates in 
one direction) may not be able to resist a natural impulse to comply with her husband’s will. 
This makes the legislation a morality play about the feebleness of wives. The insult is 
aggravated by the objective test set out s336 (3) of the legislation which measures “coercion” 
in terms of “a woman of ordinary good character”.503 This legal test is as random as the 
“moron in a hurry”504 test, invented by one English judge in the tort of passing-off. It is 
perplexing  why the reputation of the wife should be relevant to any assessment. “Perhaps the 
underlying assumption is that a woman of bad character would be less hesitant in committing 
crimes because she has less moral compunction about harming others”505 The reverse assumes 
that women of good character can somehow better resist pressure to commit all kinds of 
crimes; she is considered to be appropriately equipped to weigh the consequences between the 
competing obedience to husband or to law. 
 
                                                                                                                                             
matrimony between them”. To like effect in R v Z [2005] 2 AC 467, 512 Baroness Hale of Richmond noted “it is 
one thing to deny the defence to people who choose to become members of illegal organizations, join criminal 
gangs or engage with others in drug-related criminality. It is another thing to deny it to someone who has a quite 
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males and females. But an early example of equality Viscount Simon in Holmes v Director of Public 
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Camplin [1978] AC 705, 718 (per Lord Diplock “the power of self-control to be expected of an ordinary person 
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 Foster J invented this legal test in Morning Star Cooperative Society Ltd v Express Newspaper Ltd [1979] 
FSR 113, 117 (Ch) 
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 Stanley Yeo ‘Coercing Wives into Crime’ (1992) 6 Australian Journal of Family Law 214, 222. 
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The Victorian defence is primly confined to legal marriage.506 The Commissioner concluded 
that the state does not have an interest to preserve the stability of de facto relationships that it 
does in relation to marriage.507 This was a myopic conclusion, as a female partner in a de 
facto relationship could be subject to similar levels of coercion as a legally married wife.  The 
“duty and habit of loyalty” which the Commissioner found arise from marriage are found in 
every species of personal relationship involving long term commitment. During this period 
the Victorian Law Commission never once paused to consider whether the implications of 
same-gender relationships were, in themselves, reason to preclude the creation of a special 
defence for married women. The exclusive perspective was whether married women might be 
slightly disadvantaged under the common law of duress; not whether all non-wives would be 
significantly disadvantaged if a special marital defence was enacted. 
 
In Ireland, the Law Reform Commission508 provisionally recommended that the defence be 
formally abolished by statute, noting that the defence of duress would remain available to 
married women. However, this Report is characterised by significant errors in its comparative 
law considerations.509 It adopted the view that the defence “presupposes a disparity in status 
and capacity between husband and wife which runs counter to the normal relations between a 
married couple in modern times”.510 A second and complementary reason was that the 
defence was repugnant to the concept of equality before the law, as a constitutional norm. The 
Commission ought to have additionally reasoned that it was a gender-specific defence without 
contemporary, rational justification such as distinguishably existed in the offence of 
infanticide (which operating as a gender-specific defence, reduces the offence from murder). 
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In Canada511 a modern draft reformulation of its Criminal Code wholly omitted reference to 
even providing for a section of the Code declaring that the defence was abrogated, as it was 
simply an anachronism. The American Model Penal Code512 for the avoidance of doubt 
explicitly removes both presumption and defence.      
 
The defence provides an endorsement of only one form of civil union to the exclusion of all 
others. As a defence predicated upon some innate power imbalance it could equally apply to 
the henpecked male or the other members of the family unit. Power imbalances in sexual 
relationships are unlikely to be exacerbated by the simple additional fact of the formality of 
marriage.513 In relation to marital coercion, there may well be a power imbalance in some 
opposite or same-sex relationships under different cultural conditions within the common 
law514, but there is no evidence that such an imbalance is aggravated only because it has been 
formalised by a marriage or civil union ceremony. Marriage, in criminal defence terms, has 
no principled advantage over other civil unions or relationships.515 The public policy engaged 
“in having stability and permanence of marriages” exists in other combinative personal 
unions.516 It has been argued that unless the defence is an anachronism,517 it ought to be 
extended on the basis of sexual equality to husbands acting under the dominating influence of 
their wives. 518 But that solution too would only create a further illegitimate distinction and 
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exemption from the general criminal law. An alternative theme is to extend519 the defence to 
include “a parent, spouse, employer, or any other person having actual or moral authority over 
such a person”.520 The critical objection is that this proposed differential treatment of certain 
adults under the substantive criminal law, fails constitutional muster. 
 
The original presumption of constructive compulsion was probably a sensitive response to the 
uxorial dilemma of a duty to the husband and a competing duty to the state. The bond of 
matrimony excused her, for otherwise the husband as the significantly dominant force 
between them determined her culpability, as she abided his will. The resilience of the doctrine 
in the common law is best demonstrated by its renaissance in the state of Victoria in 1977. 
The defence reinforces outmoded notions of: female inferiority, passivity and weakness. It 
normalises the institution of marriage as an ideal under the criminal law, deserving of special 
auxiliary protection.521 It also endorses a paternalistic form of gallantry, uniting a socio-
cultural notion of female dependence with consequential legal protection. The entire doctrine 
demeans the position of all women by conferring a special benefit by way of a virtually 
general excusatory defence.522 A class of womanhood is set apart for special protection of the 
law, justified only by the vulnerability that apparently descends upon them simultaneously 
with their exchange of marriage vows.  
 
Marriage was the only vocation to which women could realistically aspire for much of the 
period before the twentieth century. Much of society was geared toward women achieving 
this ambition and many influences ordained that outcome as a supreme attainment. The 
increasing education and economic independence of women began the transformation of that 
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ideal. The speed and dynamic effect of those changes in society was not matched in the 
direction and pace of criminal law reform. Wives were the beneficiaries of special solicitude 
to redress the power imbalance presumed to exist in every marriage. Her independence was 
dictated by her spouse so she was submissively accountable to him. However, even a wife 
was expected to successfully differentiate between right and wrong when it came to such 
serious crimes as treason and murder. The presumed susceptibility needed to be counter-
balanced by an ameliorating provision. Earlier science had concluded that women were 
biologically disabled by a cognitive defect.  
 
The abolition of the identity of marital property interests by both statutory and constitutional 
law had the effect of fatally weakening the underlying rationale for the excusatory defence of 
marital coercion. The package of uxorial privileges was slowly disaggregated not by just 
statutory intervention but by the powerful shaping effects of social change in its recognition 
of the right to equal status. But the marital coercion defence pegged women back to a definite 
linkage with the yoke of subordination. While they alone enjoyed the particular privileges 
from criminal conduct, that unique status is irreconcilable with equality. The modern 
emphasis is not the notion of obedience and the unquestioning compliance with the command 
of the male spouse, but of a partnership with emphasis on equality as a concept which 
transcends all features of the relationship. Although there will exist individual spouses of 
either gender who are emotionally and psychologically constrained or directed in their acts 
and omissions by the other spouse, the apparatus of modern society with its governmental 
resources designed to protect the members of families, now provides no justification for any 
exceptional set of rules to place those who have chosen to marry above and beyond those who 
have chosen to live combined lives other than pursuant to the dictates of marriage.  
 
The fact of the special marital coercion defence is suggestive of a scenario where a wife is 
potentially incapable of free individual will or decision-making, yet implicit in her own 
evidence exonerating herself by implicating her husband, is the notion that she does have the 
freedom to control her own actions. The defence (as well as for duress) is open to the 
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manipulation523 that where spouses have jointly and equally participated in a criminal offence, 
without any jot of coercion, the husband might, in order to prevent both spouses being 
imprisoned and thereby separated from their children, accept the sole blame for the offence 
and give false evidence that he had coerced an unwilling wife to commit the offence beside 
him. He thus ensured, together with her own meek evidence of submissiveness, that only one 
spouse will be found guilty. The defence actually institutionalises the dominant role of the 
husband by enticing him to exaggerate his dominance in order to secure her acquittal. Even if 
that did not succeed, sentencing considerations may mean that the wife is treated much more 
benevolently than the husband. In this way their agreement to falsify his coercion further 
perverts the course of justice. One real practical difficulty with these cognate defences is that 
it is difficult to identify spurious claims. This is compounded when the defence is only 
revealed during the course of the trial leaving little realistic opportunity for the law 
enforcement agencies to investigate its truth and reliability.  
 
In the last few years duress has undergone a resurgence in popularity.  For decades 
commentators had stated “little is heard of it”524 but the House of Lords in 2005 was able to 
refer to the marked increase in the frequency with which resort was being made to this 
defence.525 The very fact of this increased reliance upon duress at common law may be the 
catalyst for elimination of the marital coercion defence. 
 
Without an overarching framework securing legal equality and without discrimination, the 
marital coercion defence in the criminal law itself perpetuates injustice. The doctrine of 
coverture reinforced and maximised the principle of the unity between husband and wife.526 It 
                                              
523
 R v Cole [1994] Crim LR 582, 584: “Duress is a unique defence in that it is so much more likely than any 
other to depend on assertions which are particularly difficult for the prosecutions to investigate or subsequently 
to disprove.”  
524
 A L Hart, ‘Punishment and Responsibility’ (1960) p16; R v Harmer [2002] Crim LR 401: “50 years ago the 
defence of duress was very rare indeed”. 
525
 Ian Dennis, ‘Duress, Murder and Criminal Responsibility’, (1980) 96 LQR 208: “In recent years duress has 
become a popular plea in answer to a criminal charge”. In Scotland the defence re-emerged after a long period of 
dormancy: Cochrane v HM Advocate 2001 SCCR 655, 659-661. 
526
 William Blackstone, ‘Commentaries’, Vol 1, 442. “By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: 
that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is 
incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband; under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs 
every thing; and is therefore called out french-law a feme covert…under the protection and influence of her 
husband, her baron; and her condition during the marriage is called her coverture”. 
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was, on analysis, a very successful control mechanism of half the marriage by the other 
moiety. Its interrelated social and legal consequences significantly pervaded the criminal law 
and the long, slow process of the equalisation of spousal status within it (in contradistinction 
to the ambiguous cipher of spousal unity) still is incomplete.  
 
The uxorial privileges have dwindled in number but there has been no total atrophy, only 
piecemeal dismantling. One repugnant residuum of coverture – the irrebutable presumption 
that a wife consented to sexual intercourse with her husband – was only destroyed in the last 
20 years. The common law defence of marriage to marital rape was for so long based on the 
theory of the presumption of a wife’s irrevocable consent.527 However, that evisceration has 
inexplicably not affected the surviving remnants of coverture in the criminal law, the most 
prominent remainder of which is the marital coercion doctrine. 
 
                                              
527
 Jill Elaine Hasday, ‘Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape’, (2002) 88 California Law 
Review 1373,1391.  Rebecca M Ryan, ‘The Sex Right: A Legal History of the Marital Rape Exemption’, (1995) 
20 Law & Social Inquiry 941. 
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4 
 
COMMON LAW INTRASPOUSAL CONSPIRACY UNTIL 1957 
 
 
 
 
The broad definition or description, which is widely accepted, is that conspiracy1 is a 
combination of two or more persons to accomplish, by concerted action, some criminal or 
unlawful act or to accomplish by criminal or unlawful means some act not in itself criminal or 
unlawful. The same idea is substantially expressed by cases defining conspiracy as an 
agreement, confederation, or combination of two or more persons to do an unlawful act or to 
do or accomplish a lawful act or legal end by unlawful means, to do something wrongful 
whether as a means or an end, or to effect an illegal purpose whether by legal or illegal means 
or to effect a legal purpose by illegal means.  
 
 
SPOUSAL EXEMPTION IN CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY 
 
From at least the fifteenth until the end of the nineteenth century, English institutional writers 
were almost unanimous in proclaiming that at common law a husband and wife could not, 
based only on an agreement between themselves, be guilty of any crime of conspiracy. It was 
a distinct oddity of the criminal law that no English court would itself ever reach this 
conclusion as ratio decidendi. Although there were tangential references in a small number of 
criminal decisions, surmising that this exemption existed, those dicta were on analysis only 
conforming to an assumed theory of conjugal unity. The supposed rule existed only because 
                                              
1
 Ian Dennis, ‘The Rationale of Criminal Conspiracy’ (1977) 93 LQR at 51 stated: “A conspiracy is constituted 
by an agreement, it is true, but it is the result of the agreement, rather than the agreement itself, just as a 
partnership, although constituted by a contract, is not the contract, but is a result of it. The contract is 
instantaneous, the partnership may endure as one and the same partnership for years. A conspiracy is a 
partnership in criminal purpose.” Conspiracy is the articulation of a common intention expressed by an 
agreement to commit an unlawful act and at its purest incipient stage is the earliest form of concerted preparatory 
offence. A standard rationale for criminalising the conduct is that the very fact of combinative effort being 
engaged increases the potential perniciousness of the conduct agreed to be effected. 
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the criminal law, in adjectival, procedural and substantive law and practice, was otherwise 
considered to be inexplicable. The parrot-like repetition of the alleged exemption by text 
writers and judges alike, added nothing of substance beyond the effect of creating a verity 
from a fiction.  
 
The underpinning theory or theories supporting the exemption were subject to hesitant 
criticism by very few writers, who analysed it as an unconvincing remnant of the former 
doctrine of coverture, inconsistent too with the incipient emancipation of women under the 
general law. But the overwhelming substantial weight of learned writing remained ensconced 
in the thinking of the preceding centuries. Despite sustained and occasional excoriating 
criticism of the theory and a few ‘near misses’ in Commonwealth appellate courts,2 in the 
twentieth century, the spousal exemption has now taken even deeper root by the passage of 
legislation in England and a number of other common law jurisdictions, which specifically 
proclaim the spousal criminal conspiracy exemption. Other jurisdictions, including Canada, 
maintain the exemption via decisions of superior courts in the jurisdiction.     
 
This chapter traces the history3 and rationales of the spousal exemption, through comparative 
Commonwealth law, and how the exemption ontologically intermarries with the corpus of the 
criminal law, in relation to uxorial privilege from it. The spousal conspiracy exemption allows 
though both spouses to be beneficiaries of the exemption; not just the wife. The law could not 
at that point cleave apart the indivisibility of the marital union. The end point of this chapter 
is an examination of a decision of the Privy Council in 1957 which grappled with whether and 
how a polygamous marriage interfaces with the exemption born from deeply Christian 
origins.  The succeeding chapter considers the next half century of case law and legislative 
intervention and whether the exemption is justifiable as an exemption from the criminal law 
being pegged to matrimony. 
                                              
2
 R v McKechie [1926] NZLR 1 (CA) (3-2 decision upholding the exemption); Kowbel v The Queen [1954] 4 
DLR 337 (SCC) (4-1 decision upholding the exemption). 
3
 James Wallace Bryan, ‘The Development of the English Law of Conspiracy’, (1909 reprinted 1970) Da Capo 
Press, New York, at p113: “the English law relating to criminal conspiracy is unique. Being largely the creature 
of special circumstances, it has no parallel in the legal systems of France, Germany, and other continental 
counties in which the conditions under which it originated and grew were not duplicated”. Wienczyslaw J 
Wagner, ‘Conspiracy in Civil Law Countries’ (1951) 42 Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police 
Science 171 reviewing French, German, Italian and Polish law in relation to criminal conspiracies. 
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BIBLICAL ORIGINS OF THE EXEMPTION 
  
Chapter 2, Verse 24, Book of Genesis4 states: 
 
Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave5 unto his wife: and they 
shall be one flesh. 
 
Glanville Williams observed that “[t]here can be no doubt that it was this theological 
metaphor that produced the legal maxim.”6 The early Christian religion as well as the 
common law courts saw this metaphor as having profound legal significance, in providing a 
deific command that the wife should have no separate legal personality from that of her 
husband. Her autonomy was indistinguishably merged with that of her husband. They became 
one before God and the common law said that that one was the husband.7 This ideology, 
                                              
4
 Holy Bible, Old Testament, Matthew 19 v5-6; Mark 10 v8. In Midland Bank v Green (No.3) [1982] 1Ch 529, 
540 (CA) involving a tortuous spousal conspiracy, Fox LJ accepted the ancient exemption probably derived 
simply from biblical ideas about husband and wife being one flesh. That became the principle that in law 
husband and wife, were one person. Sir George Baker concurring at 542F said: “The legal doctrine, in so far as 
there ever was one, of unity of husband and wife, whether founded originally on unity of flesh from Genesis, 
Chapter 2 verse 24 (and it is to be remembered that the medieval lawyers and writers were clerics) or on the 
subjugation of woman to man resulting in the submersion of the wife in the husband, he being the head, the two 
are one and that one is the husband… To extend this rule or exemption to the tort of conspiracy because of the 
legal fiction of ancient times that husband and wife being one person could not agree or combine with each 
other, would to my mind be akin to basing a judgment on the proposition that the Earth is flat, because many 
believed that centuries ago. We now know that the Earth is not flat. We now know that husband and wife in the 
eyes of the law and in fact are equal.” Sir George Baker P had been President of the Family Division of the High 
Court.    
5
 Lesley Brown (ed), ‘The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles’, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford 1993 p415, states of the word ‘cleave’ that in context it can have either of two exactly opposite meanings 
– to separate or divide, or to stick fast and adhere to; apparently ‘cleave’ is the only verb in the English language 
capable of two exactly opposite meanings. 
6
 Glanville Williams, ‘The Legal Unity of Husband and Wife’, (1947) 10 Modern Law Review 16, 19.  Sir 
William Holdsworth, ‘A History of English Law’, (1944) 3 ed (impression 1982) vol 1X p197 “it was justified 
by Cooke, partly on the ground that husband and wife are one flesh” being one of the justifications for the non-
compellability of spouses. F Graham Glover ‘Conspiracy as Between Husband and Wife’ (1979) Family Law 
181, 182 “the connection between the common law doctrine and Scripture is tenuous. To identify the former 
with any passage in the latter would involve a false exegesis”. 
7
 In Midland Bank Trust Co Ltd v Green (No 3) [1979] 1 Ch 496, 512C Oliver J observed that the incompetence 
of a spouse can hardly be traced to the passage in Genesis at Ch 3 v 12 and 13 as “Adam, after all, was treated as 
a competent witness against Eve and his evidence was accepted and acted upon”. The Judge added that it was an 
absurdity that as a wife could enter into a contract with her own husband, that they could not agree to commit a 
crime. In Hoskyn v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1979] AC 474, 483-4, 488 (HL) Lord Wilberforce 
identified the true basis for the law as regards the incompetence of spouses as witnesses, as resting upon a 
combination of various considerations: the doctrine of unity, the privilege against self-incrimination, and a 
policy which embraces the danger of perjury and public repugnancy at seeing spouses testify against one 
another. In 1736 Lord Hardwicke in Barker v Dixie (1736) Cas temp Hard 264 gave the single rationale for the 
rule of spousal incompetence, “The reason why the law will not suffer a wife to be a witness for or against her 
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pronounced by God, reinforced the general helplessness of the wife and mandated her 
dependence upon her husband.8 As the head of the household she moved at his command.9 
The harmony of the marital union would be vulnerable if both combinants were to act as free-
willed10 individuals as the result may well be serious discord which in itself would unravel the 
fabric of the union. By the twelfth century11 the doctrine of the unity of husband and wife was 
referred to in an early English law tract as an established norm. Five centuries later, in Manby 
v Scott,12 Hyde J, who was considering the liability of a husband to pay for necessaries, 
ordered by his wife from whom he was separated, stated that there were two grounds upon 
which the applicable common law was founded. One being that a wife could not enter into a 
contract herself because she is “subject to the will or mind of her husband” and the “second 
ground of the law of England is the law of God.” 
 
Hereupon our law put the wife sub potestate viri, and says, quod ipsa potestantem sui non 
habeat, sed vir suus, and she is disabled to make any grant, contract, or bargain, without the 
allowance or consent of her husband. 
 
                                                                                                                                             
husband is, to preserve the peace of families.” The position of married women became radically altered by the 
Married Women’s Property Act 1882 [UK]. In Pearce v Merriman [1904] 1 KB 80, 83 Kennedy J highlighted 
since the Married Women’s Property Act 1882 [UK] there was nothing to prevent a wife from standing in the 
position of landlord to her husband. Since 1853, spouses have been competent witnesses against one another in 
civil proceedings; Evidence Amendment Act 1853 [UK]. In criminal proceedings where the allegation involved 
physical abuse of the wife, she has been competent since 1885. It was only much later that any accused person 
was generally competent to give evidence for themselves in a criminal trial; Criminal Evidence Act 1898 [UK]. 
In s5 Evidence Act 1875 [NZ] spouses became competent to give evidence “for or against himself or herself” in 
summary proceedings. 
8
 All English marriages to be valid, had to be celebrated and consecrated in a church, until s21 Marriage Act 
1836 [UK]. 
9
 Smith v Myers (1898) 74 NW 277, 278 (Supreme Court of Nebraska) “a marionette, moved at will by her 
husband.” 
10
 Tayler v Fisher (1591) Cro Eliz 246, it was held that the law did not permit a wife to give any person authority 
to enter her husband’s house. The majority of the New Zealand Supreme Court expressly followed Tayler v 
Fisher in Mackenzie v Harper [1937] NZLR 672 (FC) in holding upon antediluvian reasoning that while a 
licensee of a hotel, and even his lodger, could both supply liquor after hours to their own guests inside the hotel, 
the wife of the licensee could not do so lawfully as she had no inherent common law right to allow a person to 
enter her husband’s premises and be entertained there.   
11
 Johnson ed, ‘Dialogus de Scaccario’ (1950), C1100, book II, XVIII pp114-115, noted by Fauteux J 
(dissenting) in Kowbel v The Queen [1954] 4 DLR 337, 346 (SCC). Glanville Williams, ‘The Legal Unity of 
Husband and Wife’, (1947) 10 Modern Law Review 16 refers to it as “the earliest English law book”.   
12
  (1663) 1 Mod 124. 
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The doctrine was repeated by Bracton,13 who speaks of “Husband and wife, who are, so to 
speak, a single person, because they are one flesh and one blood.” In addition he added in 
reference to the proprietorial control of the husband, “the thing is the property of the wife, and 
the husband its custodian, since he rules his wife, in which case no answer will be made the 
husband without his wife nor conversely.” 
 
The doctrine of unity is descended from the biblical concept of husband and wife being “one 
flesh”.14 In addition the theological tenet that marriage is an institution created by God was 
furthered by principles which endorsed the biblical image of the relationship between man 
and wife. Therefore, the relationship of husband and wife was singled out as a divine 
specialty, surpassing all relationships of consanguinity.15 The spousal exemption had the 
natural appeal of an apparently self-explanatory axiomatic, biblical truth. It necessitated the 
conclusion that a wife was incapable of concluding an agreement with her husband. She had, 
in any event, no independent will, as it had been presumptively overborne by him.16   
 
 
THE EARLIEST CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY CASES IN ENGLISH LAW 
 
Writing of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries Pollock and Maitland17 said: 
 
If we look for any one thought which governs the whole of this province of law, we shall 
hardly find it. In particular we must be on our guard against the common belief that the ruling 
principle is that which sees an ‘unity of person’ between husband and wife. This is a principle 
which suggests itself from time to time; it has the warrant of holy writ; it will serve to round a 
paragraph, and may now and again lead us out of or into a difficulty; but a consistently 
operative principle it cannot be. 
                                              
13
 ‘De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae’, as translated in Samuel E Thorne, ‘Bracton on the Laws and 
Customs of England’ (1968) (Thorne ed) (1977), vol IV p335. There can be little doubt that the crime and the 
tort of conspiracy grew from a common root. Statutes in the reign of Edward I gave both a civil and a criminal 
remedy under the writ of conspiracy: see Prof Winfield ‘History of Conspiracy and Abuse of Legal Procedure’, 
(1921) Cambridge University Press.  
14
 Holy Bible, Old Testament Genesis II 24, also Matthew XIX 5-6; Mark X 8. 
15
 John H Wigmore, ‘A Treatise on the Anglo-American System of Evidence in Trials at Common Law’, (1940) 3 
ed v 8 §2227 which records the history of the privilege. Roman law had extended testimonial privileges to all 
family members. In R v Annie Brown (1896) 15 NZLR 18, 38 (CA) Conolly J noted that the position of a child 
or a servant was under this law much more unfavourable.   
16
 Under whose potestas she was: Midland Bank Trust Co Ltd v Green (No 3) [1979] 1 Ch 496, 521A. 
17
 Pollock and Maitland, ‘History of English Law’, (1923) 2 ed vol II pp405, 406. 
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Conspiracy as a modality for effecting a criminal wrong, was specifically referred to in a 
statute of 130518 in a Year Book. In 1330,19 in the fourth year of the reign of Edward III a 
statute was passed for the first time, devoted exclusively to criminal conspiracy. In a Year 
Book decision20 in 1345, conspiracy was alleged against spouses and another. In objecting to 
the validity of the proceeding, it was argued that:  
 
because it cannot be understood in law that a woman could be supposed to conspire, and 
particularly a feme coverte, for, if this writ were good, for the same reason one would be good 
if it were brought against a husband and wife alone, and it could not be understood that a wife, 
who is at the will of her husband, could conspire with him, because the whole would be 
accounted the act of the husband.  
 
Without reasons the proceeding was held to be regular. This decision was seen as the seminal 
statement that conspiracy would not lie against spouses alone. What emerges from this extract 
is the emphasis is on the predominant position of the male at whose behest the woman is 
deemed to act, rather than on the biblical notion of unity. In 1367 a husband and wife were 
sued in an action for trespass to property by wrongfully taking a horse. In argument on behalf 
of the wife it was said: 
 
At least for the wife it ought to be pleaded that there was nothing wrongful: for what she did, 
was with her husband, and that cannot be adjudged her act, since her husband did it: for the 
wife cannot conspire with her husband. 
 
                                              
18
 David Harrison, ‘Conspiracy as a Crime and as a Tort in English Law’ (1924) Sweet & Maxwell, London. At 
p7: “Conspiracy was finally and authoritatively defined (for it will have been noticed that neither the 21 Edw I 
nor the 28 Edw I c10, contains any definition of the offence, by the 33 Edw I st 2 (1305), commonly known as 
the Ordinatio de Conspiritoribus”. At p11 “there is no mention in the old writers prior to 1293 of any such 
crime”. 
19
 4 Edw III c11. Noted by James Wallace Bryan, ‘The Development of the English Law of Conspiracy’, (1909) 
(reprinted 1970) Da Capo Press, New York, at p51. The essential features of the crime of conspiracy were 
authoritatively expressed five centuries later by Willes J in Mulcahy v The Queen (1868) LR 3 HL 306, 317: “A 
conspiracy consists not merely in the intention of two or more, but in the agreement of two or more to do an 
unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means. So long as such a design rests in intention only, it is not 
indictable. When two agree to carry it into effect, the very plot is an act in itself, and the act of each of the 
parties, promise against promise, actus contra actum, capable of being enforced, if lawful, punishable if for a 
criminal object or for the use of criminal means”.   
20
 YB (1345) 19 E 3, RS 346. In a further decision, YB (1363/4) H 38 E 3, 3a, it was argued that spouses could 
not be guilty of conspiracy, though the report does not decide the issue. These references, aptly described as 
“scant authority”. Glanville L Williams, ‘The Legal Unity of Husband and Wife’, (1947) 10 MLR 16, 21 fn 16. 
The Year Book cases constitute the basis upon which a succession of early text writers formulated the rule of 
spousal exemption.   
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Earlier in Harison v Errington21 in 1365, it had been held that one person alone cannot 
conspire. From this basis it was only an elemental step to conclude that a husband and wife, 
ordained as one person in law, could not themselves conspire alone. It had never been, 
however, a requirement that both spouses should be brought to trial at the same time. One 
accused could be indicted for conspiring with another who could not be located, or was dead. 
It did not matter whether the co-accused was unavailable before22 or after23 the charge was 
laid. In 1471 Fortescue24 could say: “For a man is never so subject to his wife, though she be 
the greatest lady, as this free woman is subject to this serf, whom she makes her lord; for the 
Lord says to every wife, Thou shall be under the power of they husband, and he shall rule 
over thee.” 
 
 
IMPORTANCE OF MARRIAGE IN EARLY CONSPIRACY CASES 
 
Many of the early examples of criminal conspiracy cases involved as their subject matter 
aspects of marriage. Marriage was for the middle and upper classes a matter of great 
consequence as it involved a transmission of property and estates and was therefore, not a 
status to be entered into lightly. For that reason, serious protections were erected to prevent 
heiresses and females of potential means from being swindled into marriage or forced into 
matrimony. On occasions it would be a father desperate to protect his son or daughter25 from 
an unwise marriage that came before the courts under the umbrella of a criminal conspiracy, 
as there was an active industry of persons confederating to outwit the parental wishes26 or 
                                              
21
 (1365) Popham 202. In R v Anonymous (1353) Liber Assisarum, 137 pl 40, a woman was arraigned for having 
stolen 2/- worth of bread. She said that she did it by the command of her husband. A jury found that she “did it 
by coercion of her husband, in spite of herself. Wherefore she was acquitted. And it was said that by command 
of her husband, without other coercion there shall be no sought of felony etc”. Joseph Henry Beale, ‘A Selection 
of Cases and other Authorities upon Criminal Law’, (1907) 2 ed, Havard Law Review Publishing Association 
p475 refers to that decision. Beale refers to Commonwealth v Eagan 103 Mass 71 and State v Williams 65 NC 
398 as being leading American cases.    
22
 As in R v Nichols (1745) 2 Stra 1227.  
23
 As in R v Kinnersley (1719) Stra 193.  
24
 ‘De Laudibus Legum Angile’, (1942 Chrimes ed) at p105. 
25
 R v Thorpe (1696) 5 Mod 221, a conspiracy to entice a young man under 18 years of age to marry a woman of 
ill-fame.   
26
 A conspiracy to induce a female Ward in Chancery to marry a man in low circumstances which would 
constitute an interference with the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery: R v Locker (1804) 5 Esp 107. 
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even the parish laws27 to secure the rewards of property and title that occurred upon the 
marriage. Cases of impersonation in the marriage context also came before the courts.28  
 
It is apparent from the early cases and writers that the arguments for recognising the special 
position of married women in criminal law engaged the commingling of the notions of 
conjugal unity, the disability and effects of coverture and the domination of the husband. 
Bracton29 made mention of the offence of “conspiracy” by name. The special dangers to be 
apprehended from concerted evil-doing were understood. An inventory30 of the historical 
beginnings of conspiracy show that it was only in the fourth year of the reign of Edward III 
(1330) that a statute was passed31 devoted exclusively to the criminal aspect of conspiracy. 
 
During the period between the reign of Edward I and that of Charles II the criminal aspect of 
conspiracy was far less important than the civil. With the exception of several cases reported 
during the reign of Edward III, the books record practically no criminal prosecutions for 
conspiracy.32 
 
No case can be traced in which husband and wife were tried together for conspiracy alone. 
Conspiracies involving marriages33 as the subject of the crime existed, but not a conspiracy by 
married persons. The leading cases involving spouses are R v Cope34 and R v Robinson35 in 
which the defendants were punished for a conspiracy to marry under a false name in order to 
obtain the estate of the man personated.   
                                              
27
 R v Watson (1743) 1 Wils 41, the allegation was a conspiracy to procure a marriage between paupers for the 
purpose of charging another parish with their support.   
28
 R v Robinson and Taylor (1746) 1 Leach 37. In this case, the conspiracy included the act of the husband 
getting married, albeit under circumstances of impersonation so as to be able to defraud the new wife’s employer 
of his property.   
29
 Bracton, ‘De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae’, (Twiss ed) vol 2, pp335-337. In Best v Samuel Fox & Co 
Ltd [1952] AC 716, 731 (HL) Lord Goddard referred to Bracton and Blackstone in terms of there being “no 
books of higher authority.” 
30
 J W Bryan ibid p15. 
31
 4 Edw 3 CII. 
32
 Bryan ibid p52. 
33
 R v Watson (1743) 1 Wils 41; R v Herbert (1759) 2 Ld Ken 406; R v Fowler (1788) East PC 461; R v Tanner 
(1795) 1 Esp 304, where the conspiracy was to procure a marriage between paupers for the purpose of charging 
another parish with their support. In R v Locker (1804) 5 Esp 107; Ball v Coutts (1812) 1 Ves & B 292, 296; 
Wade v Broughton (1814) 3 Ves & B 172 a conspiracy to induce a female ward in chancery to marry a man in 
low circumstances (such acts constituting an interference with the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery) – said 
to be ‘a species of robbery’. 
34
 (1719) 1 Stra 144, a conspiracy to ruin the trade of the King’s card maker by bribing his apprentice to put 
grease into the card paste. 
35
 (1783) 1 Leach Cr L 38. 
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In 1471 Fortescue in ‘De Laudibus Legum Angile’,36 had stated:  
 
Is it not, then, more convenient that the condition of the son should follow that of the father 
rather than that of the mother, when Adam says of married couples that These two shall be 
one flesh, which the Lord explaining in the Gospel said, Now they are not twain, but one 
flesh. And since the masculine comprises the feminine, the whole flesh thus made one ought 
to be referred to the masculine, which is more worthy.  
 
By 1534, the writ of conspiracy was specifically the subject of consideration by Fitzherbert37 
who assigned as the rationale why no conspiracy could exist between spouses alone the 
simple conclusion that “they are but one person.”38 But, if any agreement made by them 
involved any additional person then conspiracy, “against husband and wife and a third person 
it well lyeth.” In Staunford, ‘Les Plees del Corone’39 the emphasis is on the subservience40 of 
the wife. In Law French he remarked that a husband and wife cannot conspire but 
acknowledged a wife had the autonomy to commit any offence by herself in the absence of 
her husband.41 Staunford emphasises a wife is subject in all respects to the will of the husband 
so what they decide between themselves is only the decision of the husband. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
36
 (1942) ‘Chrimes’ ed at p103 And at p105: “For a man is never so subject to his wife, though she be the 
greatest lady, as this free woman is subject to this serf, whom she makes her lord; for the Lord says to every 
wife, Thou shall be under the power of they husband, and he shall rule over thee.” 
37
 ‘La Nouvelle Natura Brevium’ (1567 ed) p1161.     
38
 Midland Bank Trust Co Ltd v Green (No 3) [1979] 1 Ch 496, 525C, where it is described as a “primitive and 
inaccurate maxim”. 
39
 Staunford, ‘Les Plees del Corone’, (1607 ed) p174. 
40
 There was a presumption of marital coercion that the physically weaker party to the marriage had been 
overborne: Sir William Holdsworth, ‘A History of English Law’, (1942) 5 ed reprinted 1991, vol III, p373. 
41
 Ibid: “Auterment est si el fait chose a parluy sans sa baron” [It is otherwise if she has acted without her 
husband]. 
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EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN GENERAL LAW OF CONSPIRACY 
 
The inchoate nature of the crime of conspiracy means that it is the agreement42 itself which is 
the offence. This understanding can be traced to the seminal decision in The Poulterer’s 
Case,43 which confirmed that the criminal law provided no immunity for the agreement itself 
or for actually carrying into effect the agreement. The overt acts were referable to the initial 
agreement and the intention to carry it out, therefore the subsequent facilitative steps were 
themselves neither the offence nor elements of it, but evidence of the pre-existing 
agreement.44 In relation to spouses, however, the common law had adjusted itself to the 
position that they were immune for the initial agreement, but not for the contemplated 
substantive crime. If the overt act was charged in its own right then neither spouse had 
immunity under the spousal exemption: although the wife might additionally have the 
privilege of defending the substantive crime on the basis of marital coercion. That defence 
might generally be awkward to apply to a conspiracy because the agreement may not have 
occurred in a face-to-face situation (so the husband would not be ‘present’). A letter agreeing 
to the proposal of the other spouse to commit an offence would be evidence of their 
conspiracy, but would not allow the marital coercion defence due to the lack of presence of 
the husband. Conspiracy was the only inchoate offence which provided for both uxorial and 
                                              
42
 Robert Spicer, ‘Conspiracy Law, Class and Society’, Lawrence & Wishart, London 1981 p149 discusses the 
rationales for the offence of conspiracy. The preventive factor inherent in the crime means that a conspiracy, 
being unlawful, enables the law to intervene at an early stage before a contemplated crime has actually been 
committed. The 1879 Law Commissioners stated: “…the formation of an intention necessarily precedes the 
achievement of the intended consequences and, during the period between these two events, there exists a clear 
social danger which ought if possible to be avoided. The law recognises the absurdity which would be entailed 
if, knowing that someone was on the way to achieving a prohibited event, it could only stand by until the event 
had happened. The law, therefore, steps in under some circumstances at an earlier stage than completion of the 
intended consequence and makes certain conduct during that time criminal. This it does by use of the inchoate 
common law offences of attempt, incitement and conspiracy…conspiracy is, of all the preparatory offences, the 
one which can occur at the earliest time”.  
43
 (1611) 9 Co Rep 55b. 
44
 Ian Dennis, ‘The Rationale of Criminal Conspiracy’, (1977) 93 LQR 39, 51, stated, refers to the dicta of 
Holmes J in US v Kissel (1910) 218 US 601, 608: “A conspiracy is constituted by an agreement, it is true, but it 
is the result of the agreement, rather than the agreement itself, just as a partnership, although constituted by a 
contract, is not the contract, but is a result of it. The contract is instantaneous, the partnership may endure as one 
and the same partnership for years. A conspiracy is a partnership in criminal purposes.’ Thus, the word 
“agreement” is being used in its contractual sense, as denoting an exchange of promises in respect of future 
action, rather than the mere ‘coming into accord’ or ‘mutual understanding’ which is its looser dictionary 
meaning. In addition it is seen as constituting a relationship of the conspirators inter se which will continue to 
exist until the enterprise is performed, frustrated or abandoned. This relationship has such harmful characteristics 
and consequences for the rest of the community who are excluded from it that society acquires an interest in its 
suppression and prevention”. 
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spousal immunity. An attempt to commit a substantive crime was not privileged. Nor was 
accessorial conduct before the fact. Incitement to commit an offence was not protected by the 
exemption either. A wife was though protected against being an accessory after the fact to her 
husband’s offence. The logic of the fiction45 was only prepared to exempt spouses for an 
agreement, but not prepared to exempt spouses for any other mode of criminal conduct which 
was also the product of their agreement.  The oddity of the law46 turned on the parameters of 
the conspiracy offence. Once a provable step had been taken to implement the conspiracy, in 
furtherance of it, where that overt act was itself a criminal offence, there was at that juncture 
no need for the exemption of the spouses from the criminal law. This suggests, quite separate 
from the figurative metaphor of conjugal unity, that an unimplemented, bare illicit agreement 
between spouses, as a matter of policy,47 was considered to be unnecessary for criminal 
intervention. The agreement had not thereafter gone far enough to outweigh the maintenance 
of family stability, which would otherwise be imperilled by any prosecution. In addition the 
immunity disappeared if at any time another person was a party to the agreement, so at that 
point both husband and wife became individually liable for a tripartite agreement. The 
concept of marital unity was disaggregated upon the interpolation of another person into their 
intimate relationship.   
 
                                              
45
 David Rosenberg ‘Coverture in Criminal Law: Ancient “Defender” of Married Women’, (1973) 6 University 
of California Davis Law Review 83, pp85-86 “Indeed, the legal fiction of coverture had its rightful place in the 
early law where the artificiality of fictions worked as a counter balance to the weight and severity of 
punishments”. 
46
 The gist of the tort of conspiracy is not the conspiratorial agreement alone but that agreement plus the overt act 
causing damage: Marrinan v Vibart [1963] 1 QB 234, 238-9 per Salmon J. See also S Todd, ‘The Law of Torts 
in New Zealand’, 2 ed Brookers (1997) p695. Because the tort of conspiracy requires actual infliction of damage, 
there is no public policy argument which would protect a spouse for liability in such circumstances. By analogy, 
in the criminal law, where the crime is carried into effect, the spouses have no immunity – if a substantive 
offence is charged. Because damage is essential in tort, the judges who developed and expounded the immunity 
in crime are unlikely to have contemplated an immunity where the actual offence took place.   
47
 Midland Bank Trust Co. Ltd v Green (No 3) [1979] 1 Ch 496, 521 G. Oliver J, noted “These limitations are, I 
think, important. They demonstrate when the parties to a common design chose to travel from mere agreement to 
the sphere of criminal action, the common law, which was, after all, a practical system, made a corresponding 
journey from fiction to reality.” In the tort of conspiracy damage upon the agreement being implemented is 
essential. In the crime of conspiracy the damage is the agreement itself. In R v Anonymous (1664) Kelyng 31, at 
the Cambridge Assizes, all the Judges held that if a husband and wife burgle a dwelling house in the night and 
steal the goods the wife had committed no felony “for the wife, being together with the husband in the act, the 
law supposeth the wife doth it by coercion of the husband”. The Court found that this principle extended to all 
larcenies but would not avail a wife in relation to a murder.     
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EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
 
The crime of conspiracy has characteristics and ingredients which separate it from all other 
crimes, including the spousal exemption. In 1719, Pratt CJ48 presided over R v Cope in which 
a husband and wife and their servants were convicted of a conspiracy to ruin the business of 
the King’s card-maker by putting grease into the paste thereby spoiling the cards. Such a 
family conspiracy, including a husband and wife, was held to be indictable being 
unobjectionable in law. The importance of this decision lies in the fact of the recent 
publication by Hawkins49 of his major text50 which stated of conspiracy “it hath been holden 
that no such prosecution is maintainable against a husband and wife only, because they are 
esteemed but one person in law, and are presumed to have but one will.” The fact therefore 
the spouses could not conspire51 together alone, did not deter them, as a juridic person 
(sharing a single will) from agreeing with one or more others. During this era it followed from 
the proposition of conjugal unity that a wife had no separate right to transact in relation to the 
property she brought to the marriage.52   
 
                                              
48
 The future Lord Camden CJ. R v Cope (1719) 1 Strange 144, 93 ER 438. In R v Whitehouse (1852) 6 Cox CC 
38, the conspiracy to defraud lodging-housekeepers and tradesmen involved spouses and their daughter. 
49
 William Hawkins, ‘A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown’, book 1 ch 72 s8. In 1716 Hawkins in ‘Pleas of the 
Crown’, (1824) 8 ed pp448-9 said, in relation to conspiracy: “Also upon the same ground it hath been holden, 
that no such prosecution is maintainable against a husband and wife only, because they are esteemed but one 
person in law, and are presumed to have but one will.” 
50
 William Hawkins, ‘A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown’, book 1 ch 72 s8. Hawkins appears to have based his 
statement on Fitzherbert’s ‘La Nouvelle Natura Brevium’, (1567 ed) p1161; Staunford, ‘Les Plees del Corone’ 
(1607 ed) p174. Subsequent writers tended to uncritically repeat what Hawkins had said without analysis: Sir 
WO Russell ‘A Treatise on Crimes and Misdemeanours’, (1896) 6 ed vol 1 p152 in a single sentence states “[a] 
prosecution for conspiracy is not maintainable against a husband and wife only; because they are esteemed as 
but one person in law and are presumed to have one will.” Lush, ‘The Law of Husband and Wife’ (1910) 3 ed 
p17; Halsbury’s ‘Laws of England’, (1909) vol 9 p264; ‘Russell on Crimes’, 8 ed vol I, p150; Roscoe’s 
‘Criminal Evidence’, 14 ed p520; H D Roome and R E Ross (eds) ‘Archbold’s Criminal Pleading, Evidence and 
Practice’ (1922) 26 ed para 1417; ‘English and Empire Digest’ (1924) vol 14, para 835-836. Even the year 
before, the United Kingdom Parliament gave statutory authority to the common law position in 1977, it 
continued to be asserted in the text by reference to the statement in Hawkins’ ‘Archbold Criminal Pleading, 
Evidence and Practice’, (1976) 39 ed para 4051d; Halsbury’s, ‘Laws of England’, (1976) 4 ed vol 11 para 59. 
The rule immunising a husband and wife from the law of conspiracy is not a judge-made rule but a jurist-made 
rule.  
51
 Lesley Brown (ed), ‘The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary’, 1993, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p487 
shows the derivation of ‘conspiracy’ to be “Con + spirare (breathe)” – breathe together. 
52
 In Firebrass v Pennant (1764) 2 Wils (KB) 254: “We are dealing with a fundamental maxim of the common 
law, and might as well repeal the first section of Littleton as determine this grant from the husband immediately 
to the wife to be good, and where there is not so much as the shadow of a person intervening.” 
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It was decided by 1746, that a subsequent marriage,53 however, did not prevent a husband and 
wife from being convicted in respect of an ante-marital conspiracy.54 The conspiracy could 
include the very act of the husband getting married.55 None of the three judges of the court of 
trial56 or counsel for the prosecution or defence raised any objection to the indictment 
involving the spouses. By the middle of the eighteenth century it was a non-issue that a 
conspiracy between persons who were at the time unmarried, but subsequently did marry, 
provided no exemption from the criminal law.57 There was no backdating of the exclusion. 
The marital unity theory could only prospectively operate.58 Then in 1765, Blackstone in his 
‘Commentaries on the Laws of England’59 stated:  
 
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal 
existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and 
consolidated into that of the husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs 
every thing; and is therefore called in our law-French a feme-covert, foemina viro co-operta; 
is said to be covert-baron, or under the protection and influence of her husband, her baron, or 
lord; and her condition during her marriage is called her coverture. Upon this principle, of an 
                                              
53
 It is a fundamental requirement for the exemption to operate that the spouses are in fact lawfully married. This 
criterion equally needs fulfilment for the defence of marital coercion. In People v Little (1940) 107 P 2d 634, 
Court of Appeal of California (Barnard PJ, Marks and Griffin JJ) the exemption failed because although the 
spouses had in fact gone through a form of marriage in 1938, both had spouses living from whom they had not 
been divorced. The offence of bigamy is no basis for a valid defence to the crime of conspiracy. “To give life to 
this rule the alleged conspirators must actually be husband and wife which implies a valid marriage” per Marks J 
p636. A mistaken belief of marriage will not do, even if reasonably held: R v Byast (1997) 96 A Crim R 61 
(Qld:CA), “For the purposes of that exceptional position, husband and wife should be taken to mean husband 
and wife constituted as such by a lawfully solemnised union.” 
54
 Tom Hadden, ‘The Original and Development of Conspiracy to Defraud’, (1967) 11 The American Journal of 
Legal History, 25, 30 refers to R v Robinson & Taylor (1746) 1 Leach 37 in which the defendants were 
convicted for conspiring together to entitle Robinson to her master’s estate by arranging for Taylor to 
impersonate him in a purported marriage ceremony with Robinson.   
55
 At p38 “and in pursuance of which conspiracy they were married.” In State v Thyfault (1972) 297 A 2d 873, 
the spousal conspiracy existed prior to, through and after the wedding. The Court found that the spousal 
exemption applied from after the wedding. 
56
 Lord Willes CJ, Foster J and Reynolds B. The prisoners were represented by counsel; see p39. Tom Hadden, 
‘The Original and Development of Conspiracy to Defraud’, (1967) 11 The American Journal of Legal History, 
25, 30 refers to R v Robinson & Taylor (1746) 1 Leach 37 as a significant development in the emergence of the 
crime of conspiracy to defraud.   
57
 Boots v Grundy (1900) 82 LT 769, 773; Comment (1955) 33 Can Bar Review 75, 76 n9. Glanville Williams, 
‘The Legal Unity of Husband and Wife’, (1946) 10 MLR 16, 21 n17. 
58
 In Ireland, a significant number of couples had travelled to Lourdes in France to get married at the Catholic 
shrine there. But under French law a valid marriage required a civil ceremony not a religious one. Years later it 
was realised these religious marriages of Irish people were all unlawful under French law. The Irish Government 
enacted the remedial Lourdes Marriages Act 1970 [Ireland] to retrospectively give validity to the marriages and 
by implication also retrospectively provided the defence of spousal exemption from any conspiracy they had 
committed during the years they assumed they were married.   
59
 Wayne Morrison (ed) ‘Commentaries on the Laws of England’, Cavendish Publishing Limited, London, 2001 
vol 1, [442] p339-340. 
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union of person in husband and wife, depend almost all of the legal rights, duties, and 
disabilities, that either of them acquire by the marriage. 
 
That robust statement summarised the legal position of married women under the criminal 
law. She could not have a separate agreement with her husband as her husband spoke for her 
in all legal matters. It followed that the nature of coverture incidentally provided a wife with 
protection from the criminal law generally unavailable to others. Her position was assimilated 
with that of lunatics and infants who were equally disabled. For each of those classes of 
person, the law excused them as they were not able to exercise unencumbered rational 
decision-making. 
 
 
NINETEENTH CENTURY ENGLISH LAW 
 
The general uncertainty of the limits and principles of the law of conspiracy is exemplified by 
a statement of the time,60 in a leading criminal law text: 
 
The offence of conspiracy is more difficult to be ascertained precisely than any other for 
which indictment lies; and is, indeed, rather to be considered as governed by positive 
decisions than by any consistent and intelligible principles of law. (Serjeant Talfourd, 1829) 
 
Yet that uncertainty as to the parameters did not extend to the spousal exemption which was 
treated as a verity. In R v Duncan61 a husband and wife and her brother, were indicted for 
conspiracy to defraud the London & North Western Railway Company. There, the allegation 
was the husband, wife and another conspired to falsely assert they had been injured in a 
railway accident. A doctor was sent to investigate the injuries. Mrs Duncan was in bed when 
the doctor arrived, and she gave a false account of an accident. At their trial the Recorder,62 
said the wife was “a mere tool in the hands of her husband”. He directed the jury that the wife 
had to be acquitted of the conspiracy because the defence of marital coercion clearly 
                                              
60
 K Dickinson’s, ‘Practical Guide to the Quarter Sessions’ (1885) 3 ed, Baldwin and Craddock, London. 
61
 (1849) 13 JP 220. 
62
 Hon C E Law. 
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succeeded. This ruling is one of very few examples known to the law in which that defence 
was applied to an offence of conspiracy.63  
 
A variant of a family conspiracy occurred in R v Whitehouse.64 A husband and wife and 
daughter were indicted for conspiracy to defraud, successively, tradesmen and lodging-house 
keepers, by obtaining services on credit representing to them that Joseph Whitehouse was “a 
person of considerable property and in opulent circumstances”, whereas the indictment 
alleged that the three family members were “evil-disposed persons, and in low and indigent 
circumstances”.65 Platt B directed the jury66 that “[w]ith respect to the daughter, it would be 
for the jury to say how far she might be acting under the control of her father or mother or 
both of them.” An acquittal of the daughter ought to have led to the acquittal of the spouses as 
the sole remaining co-accused, but the jury convicted all three members of the family of the 
conspiracy on two of the counts,67 so a direct opportunity to decide the assumption of the law 
became unavailable. The judge never indicated to the jury what verdict would follow had they 
decided as a matter of fact that the daughter was not a party to the various conspiracies. No 
special verdict was left to the jury should that scenario have become their conclusion. The 
summing-up contains no reference to the issue at all, presumably as that scenario (of 
convictions against her parents only) would be dealt with as a motion to arrest judgment. The 
trial is however informative because although defended and prosecuted by two counsel on 
each side68 and although a motion in arrest of judgment was unsuccessfully moved69 on other 
                                              
63
 R S Wright, ‘Criminal Conspiracies and Agreements’ (1887) Blackstone, Philadelphia, p59: “Proof, however, 
of coercion by the husband would in such a case [of a pure spousal conspiracy] have the effect of negativing the 
fact of conspiracy, since the force would avoid the agreement.” In Commonwealth v Kendig (1908) 18 Pa Dist 
659, the court held proper an indictment charging a husband and wife “and divers other persons whose names 
are as yet to the grand inquest unknown” with conspiracy, the court pointing out that if both conspired she might 
be protected by her coverture, but if she conspired with other persons in his absence, when she was not presumed 
to have been under his control, she could be convicted. In R v Howard, an unreported decision of the Supreme 
Court of New Zealand, The Lyttelton Times, 9 April 1886, p6, the prosecutor accepted, in a case where spouses 
were indicted together with two brothers for a conspiracy to defraud an insurance company, he would need to 
show “a combination not under coercion, between the husband and wife” if to secure a conviction of the wife. 
64
 (1852) 6 Cox CC 38 at Staffordshire Spring Assizes before Platt B. 
65
 At p44. 
66
 At p45 no reference by counsel or the judge was made to marital coercion; yet a direction on the common law 
defence of duress, by the parents, directed against the daughter was given. 
67
 Platt B sentenced the parents to 12 months imprisonment with hard labour and the daughter to three months 
imprisonment with hard labour. The differential sentencing outcome, it may be inferred, as being explained by 
the judge’s overall impression of the state of the parental domination of the daughter. 
68
 Mr Huddleston and Mr PM M’Mahon for the accused; Mr Greaves QC and Mr Hodgson for the prosecution. 
69
 The jury were asked a clarifying question about the 4th count, after delivering their verdict. See p48. 
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grounds, no issue was ever raised as to the fact of or effect of a conspiracy being proved only 
between father and mother. 
 
In the leading working text for English magistrates in the late nineteenth century, ‘The 
Justices’ Notebook’,70 the author stated, three years after the Married Women’s Property Act 
1882 [UK]: 
 
Criminal Liability of Wife – According to a superstition which, Blackstone tells us, is 
upwards of a thousand years old, if a woman commit theft, burglary, or other like indictable 
offence in company with her husband, she is to be considered as acting under his coercion and 
treated as irresponsible. But murder or manslaughter are not thus to be exhausted. This 
venerable doctrine would at last have had its day if the Criminal Code Bill of a recent session 
had become law of the land. As regards non-indictable offences, cognisable under summary 
jurisdiction, a married woman has always been held answerable for herself. A husband and 
wife if joint offenders may be jointly charged and jointly or severally convicted. But, in any 
case, if a wife be sentenced to a fine, she must pay or provide her own penalty, or undergo the 
alternative imprisonment, as her husband’s goods cannot be levied upon for the amount. 
 
It is remarkable that this accurate summary of the law of the time had lasted for over 500 
years without any English decision ever testing its ostensible validity. The position in 
criminal law of married women and substantive conspiracy was but one facet of the much 
wider special position which the law had hewn for wives. The apparatus of the law of 
coverture extended privileges to women but those privileges were only a necessary 
consequence of the supervening disabilities under which they laboured by it.   
 
 
R v HOWARD AND HOWARD (1886) 
 
Before the Supreme Court at Christchurch in 1886,71 a Mr Howard, and a Mrs Howard and 
two other persons, brothers surnamed Godfrey, faced an indictment72 for conspiracy to 
defraud and also a count of attempting to defraud an insurance company. The Godfreys went 
fishing at Taylor’s Mistake and “a hand apparently recently severed, and having a ring 
                                              
70
 W Knox Wigram, 4 ed, 1885, Stevens and Sons, 119, Chancery Lane, Law Publishers and Booksellers, 
London, at p252. 
71
 The Weekly Press, 8 April 1886, p20, under the heading ‘Conspiracy’. It was reported “The Court was 
crowded to excess”. 
72
 The Lyttelton Times, 9 April 1886, p6, under the heading ‘Conspiracy’. 
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bearing engraved letters, and with a recent wound upon it” was located on the beach. Some 
days earlier, Mr Howard had been reported drowned and his life had been heavily insured a 
short time earlier. Mrs Howard recognised the hand as being that of her husband and the 
Godfreys played their part in ‘finding it’, as it was the only evidence to establish that the 
drowning had resulted in the probable death of Mr Howard. The insurance company declined 
to pay out and in due course Mr Howard was arrested, very much alive. The prosecution 
stated that Mrs Howard was not lawfully married to her co-accused putative husband so no 
exemption from conspiracy arose but added that in any event there was no evidence of marital 
coercion between the husband and the wife for the purpose of defrauding the insurance 
company. The judge, Johnston J, was concerned that the apparent spouses would not be able 
to face an indictment for conspiracy if they were in fact lawfully married. They had been born 
in Scotland and the defence position was that they were lawfully married onboard the vessel 
by custom and repute in accordance with Scottish law. The ‘Janet Court’, on which they had 
emigrated to New Zealand, was registered and owned in Glasgow.73 The issue arose to 
whether a Scottish irregular marriage was valid onboard a ship. A marriage by repute and 
followed by co-habitation was valid under Scottish law.74 In addition, reference was made at 
trial to Dalrymple v Dalrymple,75 and Piers v Piers76 further affirming that a Scotch marriage 
could be established by habit and repute. The judge ruled that the marriage was not valid “by 
the law of England” and that English common law applied in the Colony of New Zealand.77 
He ruled that a husband and wife alone could not conspire together, but that in any event, the 
jury would have to treat the totality of evidence as insufficient to show a legal marriage,78 
adding that the matter could proceed to a higher court if a conviction was returned.79 The jury 
“consulted for a minute or two” and acquitted the Godfreys and both Mr and Mrs Howard on 
the conspiracy count and only convicted Mr Howard on the attempt to defraud, acquitting all 
the others. The judge had indicated on the evidence “that the wife took an active part in the 
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 The Lyttelton Times, 10 April 1886, p8. 
74
 Dysart Peerage Case (1881) 6 App Cas 489, 537 (HL) per Lord Watson: “The law of Scotland accepts the 
continuous cohabitation of a man and woman as spouses, coupled with the general repute of their being married 
persons, as complete evidence of their having deliberately consented to marry; but in order to sustain that 
inference their cohabitation must be within the realm of Scotland.”: Longworth v Yalverton LR 1 HL Sc 218.     
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 (1811) 2 Hag Con 54. 
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 (1849) 2 HL Cas 331. 
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 The Lyttelton Times, 12 April 1886, p6. But the domicile of the Howards was Scotland. 
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 But the issue was a question of fact for the jury; not a question of law for the judge. 
79
 Ibid. 
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absence of her husband, and therefore without coercion”.80 So by dint of a merciful verdict 
the opportunity for the Court of Appeal to decide the conspiracy issue was lost; but the 
judge’s ruling that spouses could not conspire remained. But the case was only a gentle 
forerunner of the complexities of marriage law within the criminal law. 
 
 
UNEVEN APPROACH IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY TO ADVANCEMENT OF 
WOMENS’ RIGHTS 
 
In Wenman v Ash81 Maule J declined to carry the common law doctrine of conjugal unity to 
the logical conclusion that as a husband and wife were one person in law the communication 
of a defamatory statement to the plaintiff’s wife did not amount in law to publication to a 
third party.   
 
In the eye of the law, no doubt, man and wife are for many purposes one: but that is a strong 
figurative expression, and cannot be so dealt with as that all the consequences must follow 
which would result from its being literally true. For many purposes, they are essentially 
distinct and different persons. 
 
A few years later though a more retrograde position was taken by the three judges in Phillips 
v Barnet.82 A divorced wife was held incapable of bringing an action for an assault which 
happened during the time of her marriage to her former husband. Blackburn J83 said that the 
objection to the action was “a requirement of the law founded upon the principle that husband 
and wife are one person.” 
 
The reason, therefore, why the wife cannot sue the husband for beating her must be because 
they are one and the same person, and the same reason exists in criminal law, where a woman 
cannot be convicted of larceny though she has in fact carried away her husband’s goods. Other 
instances might easily be given, all showing that the reason is not the technical one of parties, 
but because, being one person, one cannot sue the other.84 
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 Ibid. 
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 (1853) 13 CB 836. 
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 (1876) 1 QBD 436. 
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 Ibid 438. Later in 1879 Lord Blackburn was one of the Royal Commissioners for the Criminal Code who 
recommended the complete abolition of the presumption and the defence of marital coercion. 
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 At p441 Field J agreed that it is a “general principle of the common law that the husband and wife are one 
person.”  
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Lush J, who was the author of the leading contemporary text85 on the law of husband and wife 
said: 
 
Now it is a well-established maxim of the law that husband and wife are one person. For many 
purposes no doubt, this is a mere figure of speech, but for other purposes it must be 
understood in its literal sense. For example, the husband cannot covenant with or make a 
grant to his wife, and she cannot in law be convicted of stealing his property. 
 
A few years later, consistent with that almost literal rendering of the conjugal unity principle, 
in Wennhak v Morgan86 a libel action based on a publication by a husband to his wife failed. 
Huddleston B stating: “I think that the question can be decided on the common law principle 
that husband and wife are one. The uttering of a libel to the party libelled is clearly no 
publication for the purposes of a civil action.” Manisty J concurred but pointedly87 observed 
that the original policies of the law that had led to this theory of indivisibility were illusory. 
Six years earlier legislation had been enacted that provided for the separate rights of wives, 
who therefore had the right and duty to protect and enhance their property share. But as the 
asserted rationale for the rule was based on the intimacy of all marital communications, a 
cause of action which identified in the wife a separate right thereto, had potentially 
destabilising consequences for the primacy of the marital union. The judge distinguished the 
position in relation to defamation because there had been no judicial clamour or public 
momentum for change in this regard. This was reasoning by a self-serving formula:  
  
But what is the real foundation of it? It is after all, a question of public policy…Public opinion 
has altered in some circumstances, and no better illustration of that can be given than the 
change of view as to deeds of separation between husband and wife…what is there to show 
any change in judicial opinion or public policy with respect to communications between 
husband and wife hitherto held sacred? 
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 At p440 Lush J, ‘The Law of Husband and Wife’, 3 ed at p126 stated “For more than two centuries the 
stringency of the common law rule that the wife’s existence was merged in that of her husband.” 
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 (1888) 20 QBD 635. 
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 Ibid at p639. 
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NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICAN CASELAW: CRIMINAL LAW: SPOUSAL 
CONSPIRACY 
 
The marital conspiracy exemption issue, unlike the defence of marital coercion which was 
engaged in Massachusetts in the late eighteenth century, was not the subject of any caselaw in 
the United States until 1885. In the nineteenth century, the courts of the United States of 
America were as to this issue completely dominated by the assumed position of English law 
that the spousal exemption existed. In State v Clark,88 Cullen J, where spouses were among 
the accused, directed the jury in accordance with the orthodoxy89 that “it takes two to make a 
conspiracy – they being one in law” so no verdict of conspiracy could be returned if only the 
spouses were proved to be involved. This direction had been preceded two years earlier by a 
decision of the Supreme Court of California sitting en banc, to the same effect, in People v 
Miller.90 In a solitary page it declared that the assumed common rule existed91 and that there 
was nothing in either the California Penal Code or “statutes of this State to indicate an 
intention of the legislature to change it.” Four years earlier the same court92 had in the course 
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 (1891) 33 A 310, Court of General Sessions of Delaware. 
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court at p186 relied upon the criminal spousal exemption and defended it, “It is said this rule was a legal fiction, 
and in the course of modern legislation and judicial development it has been exploded. But it is no more a fiction 
than any other general principle by law, and we have seen no authentic account of the explosion”. The Supreme 
Court concluded “every sound consideration of the public policy, every just regard for the integrity and 
inviolability of the marriage relation, the most confidential relation known to law” justified the retention of the 
fiction that the wife’s civil existence merged with that of her husband. The remarkable insight was added: 
“When husbands and wives talk to each other alone, the conversation differs but little from the process of talking 
to one’s self, or, as it is sometimes called ‘thinking aloud’.  
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of accepting an argument that it was lawful for one alleged conspirator alone to stand trial 
(where the indictment expressly referred to an absent co-conspirator) had delivered apparently 
approving dicta93 in support of the unanimous position expressed by American writers94 at 
that time, that the spousal exemption existed. 
 
A few years later a new twentieth century approach was heralded by the Court of Criminal 
Appeals of Texas95 which heard argument where a father, mother and son had been jointly 
indicted for a substantive charge of murder. While unanimous in the result of allowing the 
wife’s appeal, the reasons for the decision given by Brooks J were considerably different from 
those of Davidson PJ,96 who agreed in the result but not the reasoning, flatly stating that a 
conspiracy between spouses was not possible; yet Henderson J in a further separate 
concurring judgment stated that a spousal conspiracy to commit murder was possible. The 
limited significance of the dictum is that it exposed the first crack in the doctrine.  Henderson 
J was to more fully return to the issue in Addison Smith v State,97 which involved the appeal 
of the son, in the same murder trial. Mr TE Smith and Mrs Catherine Smith and their son 
Addison were convicted of murder in the second degree. The family farm had been foreclosed 
by Court Order. Notwithstanding this, the dispossessed Smiths returned to the farm and 
regained possession. They were aware that police officers would attend to extract them, so 
they prepared arms and ammunition to resist the officers and barricaded the doors and 
windows of the house with sacks of wheat. In the course of the eviction, one of the officers 
was shot and killed. On appeal the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas referred98 to the 
earlier related decision involving her mother: Catherine Smith v State.99 In relation to her son 
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 At pp 829, 830, 831. 
94
 ‘Russell on Crimes’, (8 American ed) edited by Davis & Metcalf vol 2 p690; ‘Wharton on Criminal Law’, 
§1388; ‘Wharton’s Criminal Pleading and Practice’, § 305; The Court in People v Richards noted at p830 1 
Hawk PC c72 was only authority that “under the statute, 21 Edw 1, one person alone cannot be guilty of 
conspiracy; and therefore no prosecution under it was maintainable against a husband and wife only.” In State v 
Slutz (1901) 30 So 298 (Supreme Court of Louisiana) Monroe J accepted the crime of conspiracy was “known to 
ancient Common Law, antedating the statute of Edward I” (There is also an observation of the propriety of the 
conversion of nouns and adjectives into verbs, by the addition of the suffix, ize.) 
95
 Catherine Smith v State (1904) 81 SW 936. Brooks J for the majority at p939 stating obiter, that a pure spousal 
conspiracy to murder a deputy sheriff was possible. But the son did not fare so well: Addison Smith v State 
(1905) 89 SW 817. 
96
 At p945. 
97
 (1905) 89 SW 817. 
98
 At p820-821. 
99
 (1904) 81 SW 936. 
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Henderson J delivered the judgment of the court100 and acknowledged that in the judgment 
involving her mother, “we held that a conspiracy to commit murder could be formed between 
husband and wife. The question was not particularly discussed, and no authorities were cited 
in support of the proposition.” The court concluded that it should now closely analyse the 
position in law, as it had been argued that a husband and wife could not be co-conspirators 
and to the extent that the trial judge had used the law of conspiracy and merged it into the 
substantive offence he therefore fell into error. Henderson J accepted that the common law 
text writers and American caselaw was entirely uniform and the decision in Catherine Smith v 
State was the only known doubt thrown upon the uxorial conspiracy doctrine. On the facts 
there was always a conspiracy between spouses and son, so on any basis Henderson J 
reasoned the common law theory could not apply. But the Texas Court was not content with 
simply distinguishing the common law on that factual basis. The Court continued that the 
common law position was “speaking of a conspiracy pure and simple and not of a 
consummated act in which the conspiracy might be merged in the substantive offence”.101 But 
the court proffered a further and separate reason, “we believe that our statutes in this state 
contravene the common law rule in such measure as to render it entirely inapplicable, 
especially when viewed in the light of our advanced civilisation, which in a great measure has 
emancipated the wife from the thraldom under which she formerly laboured under the English 
system”.102 Henderson J observed that there was no exception in favour of the wife in the 
statute which created the crime of conspiracy, and concluded from that, that each individual 
person is equally amenable to the crime. He added that although Article 36 of the Texas Penal 
Code provided for the defence of marital coercion, that was a narrow exception, in favour of 
only a married woman, and no such issue arose in the present case. In addition, Texas law 
provided that although the wife may be a principal in her own right, an exception was 
provided so that neither husband nor wife could be an accessory to the other. Because the law 
provided these specific exemptions from criminal liability, in the absence of such a provision 
for the law of conspiracy, the court held that a husband and wife may conspire together, 
                                              
100
 At p825 Brooks J delivered a short concurring judgment stating he did not agree with the view of Henderson 
J that a distinction could be drawn between the law of principals and the law of conspirators. 
101
 At p821. 
102
 At p821. 
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without the intervention of a third person, to commit a murder.103 If there is a third party to 
the agreement then the conspiracy between husband and wife was also plainly good.104 
 
 
EARLIEST AMERICAN REPUDIATION OF SPOUSAL EXEMPTION IN CRIMINAL LAW 
 
Apart from the obiter remarks in Addison Catherine Smith v State,105 the first sustained 
repudiation of the entire spousal conspiracy exemption is found in Dalton v People, a 1920 
decision of the Supreme Court of Colorado.106 A trial Court had directed a jury that if the 
husband had entered into a conspiracy “with his co-defendants or one of them, to steal” this 
was a sufficient basis for a conviction.  
 
In Dalton v People,107 James Dalton was convicted of conspiracy to steal an automobile. The 
conspirators named were his wife Olive Dalton and one, Mrs Rose. Mr Dalton was tried 
separately. Mrs Rose pleaded guilty and was the principal witness against him. The trial judge 
had directed the jury that if the husband entered into a conspiracy with his co-defendants “or 
one of them” to steal the car it was an offence. It was argued on appeal that this direction 
wrongly permitted a conviction for conspiracy between a husband and wife alone. In the 
Supreme Court of Colorado, Denison J said: 
 
The prosecution, however, claims that the Married Women’s Acts of this State have removed 
the reason for the common-law rule that man and wife cannot conspire, which was because 
they are one person. We think this position sound. The proposition that man and wife are so 
literally one person that they cannot agree with each other to commit a crime is as discordant 
with the present policy and tendency of our laws as it was harmonious with the older laws of 
England.108 
 
                                              
103
 An application to the Court for a rehearing was overruled: Addison Smith v State (1905) 48 Tex Crim 247, 
Henderson J noting at p250 “The conclusion is irresistible if he entered into a conspiracy with one of them, he 
entered into a conspiracy with both.” 
104
 Shannon v United States 76 F2d 490 (1935) (CA 10th Oklahoma); People v Estep 104 NE 2d 562 (1952) 
(Illinois). 
105(1904) 81 SW 936. 
106
 (1920) 189 P 37.  
107
 (1920) 189 P 37: A decision of the Supreme Court of Colorado: Garrigues CJ, Scott, Teller, Bailey, Allen, 
Burke and Denison JJ. 
108
 (1920) 189 P 37, 38. 
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Denison J argued that the common law exemption was formerly explicable by two 
intertwined concepts:   
 
There were two reasons on which the proposition was based: First, that man and wife are one 
and that one cannot conspire; second, that the husband is presumed to control the wife. Both 
these propositions have been abandoned in all our legislation in respect to the marital relation. 
 
The Supreme Court of Colorado held that the presumption of marital coercion had to be taken 
as having been abolished by statute in 1861 in that state, and that as well now the spousal 
exemption from conspiracy also no longer existed in the state as they were fundamentally 
incompatible with the status of married women and their emancipation, recognised by modern 
statutes.   
 
The common law theory that control by the husband is presumed was in effect, abolished by 
Statute in 1861. R.S.1908, § 1616. The law of this State requires the coercion by the husband 
to be proved. We agree with the theory of Smith v State 89 SW 817 rather than with People v 
Miller 22 P 934. 
 
The exemption was now obsolete. 
 
On appeal it was argued that the direction permitted the jury to return a verdict based on the 
prohibited combination of husband and wife. The Attorney General of the State appeared 
before the Supreme Court and argued that the common law rule no longer existed in Colorado 
as “the married women’s acts (sic. Acts) of this State have removed the reason for the 
common law rule.”109 The court agreed holding that the proposition of unity on which the rule 
rested was “as discordant with the present policy and tendency of our laws as it was 
harmonious with the older laws of England.”110 Denison J for the court, deconstructed the 
common law position as being the product of the unity of will and the presumption of marital 
coercion, noting that in Colorado both propositions had been abandoned “in all our legislation 
in respect of the marital relation.” The presumption of marital coercion or control by the 
husband had been abolished111 by statute as early as 1861 as State law required any coercion 
                                              
109
 At p38. 
110
 Ibid. 
111
 Referring to: Revised Statutes of Colorado 1908, § 1616, and Denison J adding at p38 “in effect, abolished by 
statute.” cf Emerson v Clayton (1863) 32 Ill 493, 497 noting that the Married Women’s Property Acts were 
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of the wife to be proved by her. The decision of the Supreme Court of California in People v 
Miller112 was rejected in favour of the emerging Texan position stated in Addison Smith v 
State.113 However, a close examination of the authorities and legislation cited by the Colorado 
Supreme Court does not support the robustness of the conclusion it reached. In Wells v 
Caywood114 Thatcher CJ delivering the judgment of the court was engaged in a consideration 
of the relation of husband and wife with respect to the acquisition, enjoyment and disposition 
of property. It was noted that the general tendency of Colorado legislation had been to make 
husband and wife equal in all respects in the eye of the law: “The legislation…has doubtless 
been animated by a growing sense of the unjustly subordinate position assigned to married 
women by the common law, whose asperities are gradually softening and yielding to the 
demands of this enlightened and progressive age. The benignant principles of the civil law are 
being slowly but surely grafted into our system of jurisprudence.”115 
 
Thatcher CJ noted that under Colorado law a wife’s rights had to be decided under State 
legislation and she was not therefore the notional wife at common law. A State Act of 1874116 
provided that any married woman could bargain, sell and convey real and personal property 
and enter into any contract in relation to the same as if she were a feme sole. The court 
concluded that this statute asserted the individuality of a wife and emancipated her “in the 
respects within its purview from the condition of thraldom in which she was placed by the 
common law” so that husband and wife became strangers to each other’s estates. This 
decision was decidedly confined to the narrow issue of matrimonial property and did not seek 
to impinge on the common law defence of marriage which provided an exemption from the 
law of criminal conspiracy. In Williams v Williams117 Elliott J for the same court referred to 
the “modern American doctrine” which removed the disabilities of coverture, in relation to 
the law of tort and property. In Schuler v Henry118 Steele CJ, for the majority of the Colorado 
                                                                                                                                             
designed to “and did make, a radical and thorough change in the condition of a feme covert.” Per Breese J 
(Walker J concurring). One result was that the husband should no longer be liable for the torts of his wife: 
Martin v Robson (1872) 65 Ill 129, 133 “If she is emancipated, he should no longer be enslaved” per Thornton J. 
112
 (1889) 22 P 934, which tersely affirmed the existence of the common law rule. 
113
 (1905) 89 SW 817. 
114
 (1877) 3 Colo 487. 
115
 Ibid 490-491. 
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 An Act concerning married women. 
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 (1894) 37 P 614. 
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Supreme Court concluded that there was scarcely any semblance of the common-law 
reciprocal liabilities and duties remaining in property and tort law, between husband and wife, 
in holding that a husband was not liable for the tort of his wife committed during coverture 
and without his presence and in which he in no manner participated.  Reference to Bacon’s 
Abridgment119 which proclaimed that at common law the husband and wife were considered 
as one person, as having but one will between them and that seated in the husband as the head 
and governor of the family. The effect of this ethos was that the wife’s identity was 
completely merged in that of her husband120 and with few limitations he had the control of her 
person, her property, her children and her labour. A comparison of the position at law in a 
number of American states was examined to reach the conclusion that in none of the others 
was the wife so completely emancipated from the dominion of her husband as in Colorado.121 
It was observed that neither courts nor textbook writers now agreed as to what constituted the 
basis for the rule at common law that also made the husband responsible for the torts 
committed by his wife. The possibilities included: that the husband at common law had the 
power of correcting his wife and was therefore responsible for her conduct; that the husband 
had the control of her property and should therefore be answerable for her wrongs; that as the 
wife could not be sued alone, the injured party would be without redress unless the husband 
were held liable with her. An early American work122 regarded this last reason as the 
controlling reason for holding the husband liable. The Colorado Supreme Court rejected all 
these reasons including the supposed unity of husband and wife: 
 
The unity has been severed, and we have grafted into our system of jurisprudence the benign 
principle of the civil law, where under ‘husband and wife are considered as two distinct 
persons, and may have separate estates, contracts, debts and injuries.123 
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 ‘Baron and Femme’, D. See also State v Burlingham (1838) 15 Me 104 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine) 
“The merging of her name in that of her husband is emblematic of the fate of all her legal rights.  The torch of 
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The Supreme Court determined that where the reason, which is the spirit and soul of the law, 
fails, the law fails.124 But the decision was by a bare majority with Maxwell and Gabbert JJ 
dissenting. They reasoned that there had been no express repeal of the husband’s liability in 
tort for the acts or omissions of his wife. Any change to a long standing common law rule 
ought more properly be addressed by the Legislature as it will not be held to have intended to 
abrogate a common law rule unless the language used in the statute requires it. The dissenting 
judges noted that at the first session of the Colorado Legislature in 1861 an Act was passed 
entitled ‘An Act to Protect the Rights of Married Women’ but it was exclusively concerned 
with debts and liabilities of a wife contracted before marriage, therefore it did not follow that 
the courts should annul the law in any other particular, based on the Act. This reticence was 
consistent with the intimate relation of husband and wife and also with the nature of the 
control given by the husband at law and social usage125 over the wife’s conduct and actions. 
Reference was made to the responsibility of the spouses together – the family126 – being a 
juridical unit. In addition, the religious nature and effect of marriage127 was emphasised. In 
Whyman v Johnson128 the fiction of one legal personality in the law of tort, between husband 
and wife, was held no longer to exist. It followed that it was an easy and last step in Dalton v 
People to repudiate the common law exemption and its implications for womanhood. 
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 A dictum in Martin v Robson (1872) 65 Ill 129, 138 (Supreme Court of Illinois) was referred to “But a line 
has been drawn between them, distinct and ineffaceable except by legislative power. His legal supremacy is 
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In Dawson v United States,129 before the Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit the narrow 
issue was whether a man and wife could be convicted of conspiracy, there being no other 
party charged with complicity in the crime. McCamant, Circuit Judge,130 noted that apart 
from Addison Smith v State131 and Dalton v People,132 every other decision in the States or 
Federal system of America and all the text writers were agreed that a husband and wife could 
not conspire together alone, which was followed. The wife also relied on appeal upon the 
refusal of the trial court to direct the jury on the basis of marital coercion. The husband and 
wife were convicted of transportation of a woman from Idaho to Nevada for the purposes of 
prostitution. The intention was to establish a bawdy house in Nevada and the woman 
transported was taken there to engage in commercial vice. The evidence showed that the wife 
was the moving spirit in the enterprise. The court found that the presumption did not arise on 
the facts because an exception to the marital coercion doctrine was any offence which was of 
a nature “more likely to be committed by a woman than a man, such as keeping a house of 
prostitution or abducting girls for amoral purposes.”133 The Court in Dawson v United States 
said though of the conspiracy exemption, “The common law rule unquestionably supports 
defendants’ contention; a rule so well established and so generally recognised by the modern 
authorities should not be judicially repealed”. 
 
In State v Nowell134 a married woman was charged with the abduction of a 14 year old girl. 
The presumption of coercion was invoked. But the court there said: 
 
Among the crimes excepted from the rule are keeping bawdy houses and offences of a like 
character. This principle would cover, we are inclined to think, abducting girls by solicitation 
for immoral purposes, a business in which the defendant was more likely to be acting upon her 
own initiative, rather than under the coercion of her husband. 
 
The court found there was no error in relation to this aspect but held that husband and wife 
could not be guilty of conspiracy and that conviction was quashed. In Gros v United States135 
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the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, indicated that a conspiracy prior to the marriage, 
of parties eventually married, would have no immunity but the court felt constrained to follow 
its earlier decision in Dawson v United States that the general common law rule applied. So 
upon the acquittal of the third party charged with participancy in the conspiracy, it left but the 
two spouses, whose incapacity was not removed by the disproved charge against the third 
party. The Supreme Court of Illinois’s decision in People v Martin136 involved a conspiracy 
by the spouses to sell heroin. The Court acknowledged that caselaw as to whether the spousal 
exemption remained valid or ever was, was uneven throughout the width of American law.137 
Upon a consideration of the origin of the rule, the court concluded that it was based upon the 
disability of a wife to own separate property at common law, and her lack of capacity to 
institute an action, independently of her husband.138 It therefore concluded that the overall 
paradigm shift in both statute and decisional law necessitated the conclusion that this 
exemption no longer existed, particularly as the year before the Illinois legislature had 
abolished the presumption of marital coercion. 
 
 
TORTIOUS SPOUSAL CONSPIRACY: AMERICAN CASELAW 
 
Up until the turn of the twentieth century the spousal exemption was generally also applied to 
tortious conspiracies in most American jurisdictions. The first decision refusing to apply the 
exemption to tort was in Jones v Manson where, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin139 
recognised in 1909 that the defence of marital coercion would be available in a criminal 
conspiracy and that the “common-law doctrine undisturbed by statute”140 exempted the 
spouses from the crime of conspiracy – but not for the tort of conspiracy. Marshall J 
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delivering the judgment of the court added that although on the narrow basis of conspiracy a 
wife was exempt, she was still liable for the consequences of criminal acts in execution of the 
conspiracy committed jointly with her husband, which are of themselves subjects of criminal 
prosecution. This reasoning exempt the spouses for only the incipient agreement but not the 
overt acts committed in furtherance of and in evidence of it.141 That is an especially austere 
view of the law of conspiracy. The overt acts are encompassed by and contemplated by the 
agreement and it is wholly artificial to divide the concept or plan from the implementation of 
it. The crime cannot be disaggregated this way so as to very substantially reduce its protective 
purview as an exemption from general liability. The Wisconsin Court then however, closely 
and correctly differentiated the concepts of tortious142 and criminal conspiracy,143 
adjudicating that in the former, the gist of the tort is the actual damage caused, by the 
combination of acts, making it a substantive wrong; whereas in the criminal law it is the 
confederacy of intentions formed into an agreement which is the gist of the inchoate offence. 
In Worthy v Birk144 the decision in Jones v Monson was not followed, the Illinois Court 
observing that the Wisconsin decision was the only case which had held that a husband and 
wife could commit a civil conspiracy. It was reinforced in its conclusion by the fact that a 
husband and wife were generally incompetent as witnesses against the other. So if a 
conspiracy were possible “we do not see how the fact could be proved, if incompetent when 
called as a witness, upon what theory could it be held that her acts and declarations would be 
admissible?”145 Later English law would adopt the Wisconsin position. 
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SPANISH CIVIL LAW INFLUENCE ON TEXAN CRIMINAL SPOUSAL CONSPIRACY 
EXEMPTION 
 
In Marks v State146 a husband and wife were convicted of conspiracy to commit theft. The 
wife was a clairvoyant147 who duped a customer into parting with a very large amount of 
money. The ground of appeal related solely to the spousal exemption. Graves J acknowledged 
that in a number of American states the common law rule still prevailed that a husband and 
wife could not conspire alone together. But he stated that Texas was not such a state as it had 
inherited Spanish civil law148 concepts and this different history relative to the initial adoption 
of its laws provided a different answer to the status of a woman under coverture. Graves J 
referred to Addison Smith v State149 where it had been held that spouses could conspire to 
commit a felony, voiding the fiction of the wife being a chattel merged into the identity of her 
husband upon marriage. Texas law had introduced a radically different system of marital 
rights,150 as since 1905 it “had long been held” that a husband and wife can conspire together, 
a result justified in view of the inception of the adoption of the common law, mingled with 
the Spanish law, not only by statutes but by each succeeding State Constitution of Texas from 
1845 to 1876. In addition, Graves J referred to Article 32 of the Texas Penal Code which 
provided that where a wife commits an offence under marital coercion this does not amount to 
a defence, but the punishment of her offence shall only be met by one half of the punishment 
she would otherwise have merited. This was complemented by Article 33 of the Texas Penal 
Code which provided that where a wife was instigated or aided in committing an offence, by 
her husband, the husband was to be punished by twice the punishment he would otherwise 
                                              
146
 (1942) 164 SW 2d 690 (Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas). 
147
 She advertised in the Waxahachie Newspaper “Don’t fail to see Madam Thompson who answers all questions 
of love, business and law suits”. There is no evidence that she predicted either her own law suit or its 
unsuccessful outcome. 
148
 See 23 Tex Jur p36 “The Spanish civil law looked upon the marriage union as a species of partnership in 
which each might own and control a separate estate, as well as a common interest in a common fund called the 
ganancial goods. It accorded necessarily a great many rights and privileges to the wife that were unknown to the 
common law. The two systems were fundamentally opposed to each other.” 
149
 (1905) 89 SW 817 
150
 By an Act of 20 January 1840 ‘An Act to Adopt the Common Law of England, to Repeal Certain Mexican 
Laws, and to Regulate the Marital Rights of Parties’, referred to by Gaines CJ in Barkley v Dumke (1905) 87 
SW 1147. 
   
 301 
have received.151 It is extremely difficult to understand how the double-jeopardy of a husband 
is consistent with the very notion of equality being advanced as the reason for the annulment 
of the spousal exemption. The court noted the husband had performed his part of the 
conspiracy by arranging the trap and inviting the victim, while the wife performed her portion 
“by her chicanery and stratagems,”152 so that she was a non-coerced, manipulative woman 
who represented the very best of example as to why full unrelenting equality should prevail.  
 
 
R V McKECHIE: NEW ZEALAND LAW CONFRONTS THE SUPPOSED EXEMPTION 
 
In R v McKechie153 the New Zealand Court of Appeal (Sim, Reed and Adams JJ; Stout CJ and 
Ostler J dissenting) was confronted with the direct primary issue that had eluded the English 
courts.154 Although in R v Peel Darling J had remarked that the spousal exemption still 
existed at common law, his remarks in that case were obiter, no conspiracy having been 
charged. But, the influence of his ruling was such that it was adopted by the English texts and 
against that background the exact issue had to be decided under the Crimes Act 1908 [NZ] 
where no express provision had been made by the legislature to deal in any way with the 
common law defence, although it had specifically abrogated the common law presumption of 
marital coercion at the same time in 1893. In the Court of Appeal the prosecution was 
represented by the Solicitor-General. By a majority the court held that a husband and wife 
could not in law alone conspire together.155 
                                              
151
 The Court noted that the trial Judge had overlooked this provision and had failed therefore to impose “…a 
double penalty…” 
152
  A motion for a rehearing was denied: Marks v State (1942) 164 SW 2d 693 per Beauchamp J. 
153
 [1926] NZLR 1 (CA). 
154
 J L Robson (ed), ‘New Zealand – The Development of its Laws and Constitution’, (1967) 2 ed Stevens & 
Sons, London. ‘Criminal Law’, I D Campbell, at p365 “Many old common law rules which no longer 
commanded general acceptance were abolished”. Campbell adds a mischievous footnote at the end of this 
sentence “But there was one that got away” and refers to R v McKechie [1926] NZLR1(CA). 
155
 Three years after the Criminal Code Act 1893 was in force, the New Zealand Court of Appeal, Prendergast 
CJ, Williams, Denniston and Conolly JJ, indirectly considered the marital exemption in R v Annie Brown (1896) 
15 NZLR 18 a case where incidentally the defence of marital coercion was unsuccessfully relied upon.  In the 
only consideration ever by the Privy Council of the marital coercion defence, it affirmed the conviction: see 
Annie Brown v Attorney-General for New Zealand [1898]  AC 234 (PC) A husband and wife having been jointly 
charged with using an instrument to procure the miscarriage of a young woman, counsel for the prosecution 
conceded in argument (1896) 15 NZLR 18, 27 that the common law rule precluding a conspiracy between 
husband and wife had not been “attempted to be dealt with by the Code” and that s21 of the Act “preserves it”.  
Prendergast CJ, at p32, noted it did not follow that because a husband and wife in the eye of the law were still 
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TRIAL IN THE SUPREME COURT 
 
A husband and wife had been indicted at the Dunedin Supreme Court156 in August 1925 with 
four counts of conspiring between themselves, on individual days, to induce a young woman 
to commit adultery with the husband. It was plain that the Crown Prosecutor at Dunedin 
Mr F B Adams, took the innovative view that under the new Crimes Act 1908 [NZ] ( and 
indeed its predecessor the Criminal Code Act 1893 [NZ]) that a conspiracy between a 
husband and wife alone was now possible, irrespective of the apparent common law position. 
Prior to arraignment counsel for the spouses, pursuant to s399 Crimes Act 1908, applied to 
have the indictment quashed on the basis that the spouses could not be properly indicted for 
conspiracy.157 But Sim J stated that he would not accede to the applications for two reasons, 
“the indictment does not show on the face of it that they are husband and wife”158 and that the 
proper time to raise the objection was at “a later stage”.159 
                                                                                                                                             
“for many purposes one person, and cannot ordinarily agree together” that it precluded them engaging in 
“combination or concert, express or implied.” While expressly acknowledging that a husband and wife alone 
“cannot be indicted for conspiracy” narrowly delimited the exemption from uxorial criminality, to the crime of 
conspiracy. Williams and Conolly JJ refrained from the line of reasoning. Denniston J at p36-37 was evidently 
hesitant about the special spousal exclusion from conspiracy. The Chief Justice fortified his assertion that joint 
spousal action was no bar to prosecution, by stating that a wife would be liable as an accessory before the fact to 
her husband’s offence “by procuring or inciting him” to commit it. The criminal law instances a remarkable 
paucity of authority on uxorial incitement. That conclusion remains valid and represented the common law 
position too. However, the position in New Zealand of a wife as an accessory after the fact of her husband’s 
crime is the exact opposite.  At common law R v Good (1842) 1 Car & Kir 185 and by legislation: s92(2) Crimes 
Act 1908 [NZ] (defence only available to a “married woman”); s71(2) Crimes Act 1961 [NZ] (spouse-neutral 
language: now defence available to “a married person”). 
156
 On 6 August 1925 The Otago Daily Times reported the Supreme Court trial, before Sim J and a jury, of David 
Nevin McKechie and his co-accused and wife, Ruby Hinton McKechie. The husband was singularly indicted 
with the indecent assault of a female aged 19 and the spouses were jointly indicted with several counts of 
conspiring, by themselves, alone, together, of having by false representations induced the husband to commit 
adultery with a girl, contrary to s219 Crimes Act 1908. That offence (now repealed) provided: “Every one is 
liable to two years imprisonment with hard labour who conspires with any other person, by false pretences, or 
false representations, or other fraudulent means, to induce any woman or girl to commit adultery or fornication”. 
Section 136 Crimes Act 1961 now provides: “Every one is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 
years who conspires with any other person by a false representation is or by other fraudulent means to induce 
any woman or girl to have sexual intercourse with any male who is not her husband.” 
157
 Otago Daily Times, 6 August 1925. 
158
  Ibid. 
159
 This is difficult to follow. A motion to quash is almost always made prior to arraignment. R v Heane (1864) 4 
B&S 947, 956 (Cockburn CJ), 957 (Blackburn J) 958 (Mellor J), R v Asif (Masood) (1985) 82 Cr App R 123 
(CA) The reality may be that Sim J saw the implications of a successful motion to quash (with there being no 
right of appeal vested in the prosecution) and wished the matter to proceed, if at all, to the Court of Appeal by 
way of an appeal against conviction. Further, even on the motion to quash the accused could have called 
evidence on a voir dire to establish their marriage, if it was not formally admitted by the prosecution. But the 
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The allegation underpinning the conspiracy, the Crown Prosecutor said in his opening was: 
“The fraudulent representations appeared to have come entirely from the side of the wife, 
with the exception of the incident which might have been a pretence at intimacy between 
husband and wife.”160 At the close of the prosecution case counsel for the spouses again 
raised the question of quashing the indictment. Sim J again stated that there was no evidence 
before the Court that the accused were husband and wife. The judge said he would reserve a 
case stated to the Court of Appeal under s442 Crimes Act 1908 if the accused were convicted.  
Counsel stated if necessary he would produce evidence that the accused were in fact married 
at the material time.161 Neither accused gave evidence and the judge in summing up directed 
the jury that the intimacies, which included “smooging”,162 could constitute indecency or 
fornication, and a “conspiracy might be established between two persons without any words 
at all”.163  The jury convicted both spouses but with “a very strong recommendation”164 for 
leniency in favour of the wife. The judge sentenced the husband to five years imprisonment 
with hard labour on the indecent assault count and postponed sentence on the conspiracy 
counts. The wife was admitted to bail, with a surety of £10, pending the decision of the Court 
of Appeal. Sim J directed that the case stated be heard at the next session before the Court of 
Appeal.165 
 
By an oddity the Court of Appeal three years earlier in R v Leonard166 with a majority of the 
same judges having sat in that case, as well as in R v McKechie, had decided that a husband 
was included within the words “every person” in s127 (1) Mental Defectives Act 1911 [NZ], 
which criminalised the act of every person having sexual intercourse with any female 
detained under the provisions of that Act. The accused had had sexual intercourse with his 
wife, who was detained as a mental patient, and argued unsuccessfully that he was outside the 
                                                                                                                                             
indictment was plainly predicated on the existence of a subsisting marriage at the material time, between the 
McKechies, as the averment was one of adultery. 
160
  Ibid. 
161
 The Otago Witness, 11 August 1925 shows that the marriage certificate was adduced in evidence, showing 
they had been married since 1919.  
162
 A term which remained tantalisingly undefined, for the readers of The Otago Daily Times, 7 August 1925, 
Sim J, upon the entry of pleas of not guilty, had ordered the Court to be cleared during the hearing of the case, 
excepting the presence of the media. 
163
 Ibid. 
164
 Ibid. 
165
 Sim J was a member of the majority in the Court of Appeal which quashed the conspiracy convictions. 
166
 [1922] NZLR 721 (CA). 
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prohibited category of “every person” because he had a common law right to have sexual 
intercourse with his own wife, so that the provision meant on its proper construction, every 
male except the husband. In R v McKechie the majority were to conclude167 that a wife did not 
fall within the expression “[a]ny person” because of the on-going effects of coverture. In R v 
Leonard Stout CJ168 reasoned that the doctrine which provided that the relationship of 
marriage meant that a wife’s rights were merged in those of her husband was distinguishable 
by the very subject nature of the Act, as its stated169 that such a detained female person was 
incapable of giving a valid consent, in view of her mental condition. Sim and Hosking JJ 
concurred each like Stout CJ seeing the husband’s argument as an attempt to revive the 
vestigial remnant of the husband’s authority to physically abuse his wife, repudiated in R v 
Jackson.170 Adams J additionally concluded that if the wife had given any consent it would 
have been deemed to have been under marital coercion,171 and therefore no valid consent.  
Stringer J dissented on the basis that he could not accept that the Legislature had intended to 
criminalise the act of sexual intercourse between a husband and a wife, founding himself on 
words written by Hale hundreds of years earlier, “by their mutual matrimonial consent and 
contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot 
retract”.  He saw “the matrimonial rights of the husband” to include his entitlement172 to 
sexual intercourse with his wife. In addition he applied the approach in The Queen v 
Harrald173 where although s9 Municipal Corporation Act 1869 [UK] provided references to 
the masculine gender should include the female gender, for all purposes connected with the 
right to vote at the election of municipal councillors, it was held that this reference only 
ameliorated the disability of woman based on their general gender, but was not powerful 
enough to remove the additional disability of coverture of married women. Where therefore in 
                                              
167
 The result of the Court of Appeal majority decision was widely published, with, in one instance, a terse 
rendition of the ratio as headline ‘Conspiracy Not Legally Possible’, The Otago Daily Times, 21 October 1925 
and a factual outcome ‘M’Kechies Acquitted’ in another, The Otago Witness, 27 October 1925. 
168
 Ibid. 725-726. 
169
 s127 (4) Mental Defectives Act 1911 [NZ]. 
170
 [1891] 1 QB 671 (CA). 
171
 Referring at [1922] NZLR 721, 746 to ‘Archbold’s Criminal Practice’ 25 ed p21. 
172
 R v Clarence (1888) 22 QBD 23 per Pollock B “The husband’s connection with his wife is not only lawful, 
but it is in accordance with the ordinary condition of married life. It is done in pursuance of the marital contract 
and of the status which was created by marriage, and the wife, as to the connection itself, is in a different 
position from any other woman, for she has no right or power to refuse her consent.” This judgment remained 
good law until overruled in R v Dica [2004] QB 1257 (CA); R v Brady [2006] All ER (D) 239 (Oct) per Hallett 
LJ para [23]. 
173
 (1872) LR 7 QB 361.     
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an election in which a candidate succeeded by one vote but where two married women had 
cast votes for the candidate, quo warranto issued to quash the election result. Cockburn CJ 
stated “by the common law, a married woman’s status was so entirely merged in that of her 
husband that she was incapable of exercising almost174 all public functions.”175 The Lord 
Chief Justice ruled that the subsequent Married Women’s Property Act 1870 [UK] altered the 
status of married women in relation to property only176 and certainly had not “by a side wind 
given them political or municipal rights.”177   
 
In R v McKechie the principal argument for the spouses178 was that the common law 
precluded their conviction and that as the Legislature had not distinctly abrogated the 
common law exemption or defence upon the introduction of the first statutory criminal code 
in New Zealand, then the common law position remained.  By s119 Criminal Code Act 1893 
[NZ], reproduced as s219 Crimes Act 1908 [NZ], the offence of conspiracy to induce adultery 
or fornication by false pretences was created which provided: 
 
Every one is liable to two years’ imprisonment with hard labour, who, conspires with any 
other person, by false pretences, or false representations, or other fraudulent means, to induce 
any woman or girl to commit adultery or fornication. 
 
It was argued, on behalf of the spouses, that the common law unity between husband and wife 
was maintained, unless expressly179 abrogated and that the operative phrases in the section of 
the Crimes Act were not intended to override the longstanding protection. The Solicitor- 
General, Mr A Fair KC mounted an a priori argument by denying that the text books 
“accurately state the common law”. He argued that no reasons had been advanced to justify 
the anomaly and that the famous passage in Hawkins ‘Pleas of the Crown’ that spouses were 
“esteemed but one person in law, and are presumed to have one will” were but a figurative 
expression. A further argument was that it would be an extraordinary and anomalous thing if 
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 But marriage was the vital qualification for a jury of matrons in capital cases.   
175
 (1872) LR 7 QB 361, 362. 
176
 Hannen J agreeing at p364 “…not intended to extend in anyway to the political rights of women.”  
177
 Ibid 363, Mellor J stating that at common law marriage was a total disqualification so that a wife could not 
vote as “her existence for such a purpose” had merged in her husband. The outcome then was that the Act only 
applied per Cockburn CJ at p362 to females who were “spinsters and unmarried women”.   
178
 They were jointly represented by one counsel: [1926] NZLR 1, 2.  
179
 [1926] NZLR 1, 3 “Coercion is analogous to conspiracy: but the Legislature has not saw it fit to abrogate the 
common law with regard to conspiracy.”  
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conspiracy was the only case in the criminal law where husband and wife were to be treated 
as one. The independent legal status of a wife was now incompatible with the former common 
law, so once the reason for the rule had gone the rule had gone with it: “Reason is the soul of 
the law, and when the reason of any particular law ceases, so does the law itself.”180   
 
The majority judgment affirming the existence of the common law spousal exemption was 
delivered by Reed J181 who emphasised that the facts showed that the only possible 
conspirators were the spouses. The Legislature had first partially codified its criminal law in 
1893 as “an adaptation to the circumstances of New Zealand of the English Draft Code of 
1879.”182 It was correct to point to the virtually183 unanimous opinions of “text-book writers 
of repute”184 who accepted the validity of the exemption, which was a conclusion “too well 
established in this respect to be challenged.”185 (There had been, curiously, no reference to the 
ruling by Darling J in R v Peel by either counsel or the court, which affirmed the common law 
exemption, only three years earlier). Reed J stated that no case had been brought to the 
attention of the court where the law had been questioned.186The majority reasoned that 
                                              
180
 ‘Broom’s Legal Maxim’s’, 7 ed,  p126: “Cessante ratione legis, sessat ipsa lex”.   
181
 [1926] NZLR 1, 10-14 (CA). Conspiracy to commit a crime was a misdemeanour at common law: R v 
MacKenzie and Higginson (1910) 6 Cr App R 64, 71 (very low maximum sentence available) for 
misdemeanours. The considerable uncertainty as to whether the marital coercion doctrine applied at all to 
misdemeanours, may explain the almost total absence of the invocation of that defence in a conspiracy context.   
182
 Ibid 11. An explanation for the abrogation of marital conspiracy lies in the fact that it was removed in the 
very year female enfranchisement was granted. The spousal conspiracy exemption may have been simply 
overlooked as requiring specific attention in the 1893 Code, as the only example dealing with it was the 
unreported judgment in R v Howard (1886) where the judge ruled the marriage was not valid.  In short the 
defence of marriage was a non-issue in real terms in New Zealand.   
183
 Two contemporary texts disavowed the exemption R S Wright ‘The Law of Criminal Conspiracies and 
Agreements’, (1887) p59 where that writer doubted the effect of the ancient authorities. “The ancient writ of 
conspiracy appears not to have lain against husband and wife alone. It is said to have lain against husband, wife 
and a third person. (See Year Book 38 Edw 3, 3a: 40 Edw 3, 19: 41 Edw 3, 29: Fitzb, NB 116 1:Staundf, 174). 
But the effect of the ancient authorities is doubtful; and it may be questioned whether a husband and wife could 
not be convicted of conspiracy in any of its modern forms. Proof, however, of coercion by the husband would in 
such a case have the effect of negativing the fact of conspiracy, since the force would avoid the agreement”. The 
other was ‘Eversley on Domestic Relations’, (1906) 3 ed which provided “It is said that a husband and wife 
cannot be indicted for a conspiracy because they are deemed to be as one person in law and have but one will; 
but it is doubtful now whether that proposition would be held to be good law if it were shown that the agency of 
the wife was as active as that of the husband.” 
184
 ‘Stephen’s Commentaries on the Laws of England’, 16 ed vol 4 p213; ‘Halsbury’s Laws of England’, vol 9 
para 544; ‘Russell on Crimes’, 8 ed vol 1 p150 note (c) ‘Archbold’s Criminal Pleading’, 26 ed p1417; and 
‘Roscoe’s Criminal Evidence’, 14 ed p520.   
185
 At p12 Reed J described it as “that basic rule.” 
186
 In Dalton v People (1920) 189 P 37 the Supreme Court of Colorado had decided that spouses had no 
exemption from criminal conspiracy because of the general tenor of legislation in that state enhancing the civil 
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marriage was a formal defence187 to the offence of conspiracy at common law, and that as all 
common law defences not inconsistent with the Code had been preserved by the 1893 Act and 
carried on by s40 Crimes Act 1908 [NZ] it followed that the common law defence of marriage 
still existed.188 In particular s40 was “essentially the same as s19 of the English Draft Code of 
1879” of which the Royal Commissioners at that time had said:189 “While, therefore, 
digesting and declaring the law as applicable to the ordinary cases, we think that the common 
law, so far as it affords a defence, should be preserved in all cases not expressly provided 
for”. From this adopted basis, acclimatised to the pioneering conditions of New Zealand in 
1893, the majority deduced that no manifested intention to alter the common law was made. 
On the contrary, the thrust of s40 Crimes Act was to preserve the pre-existing common law 
position. In particular the court was highly conscious of the fact, that having recognised 
marriage as an actual defence in criminal law, if it were to decide that the common law had 
perished upon the passage of the 1893 Act, the court would be declaring that a very long-
standing criminal defence, traceable to at least 1365, had gone, without the slightest 
consideration of it by the Legislature. The court therefore adopted the orthodox penal 
construction190 approach to s40, which did not lead to a conclusion that the common law 
defence had dissipated at a time prior to the 1893 Act. The minority concluded that the 
common law defence had not travelled to the Code as it had already expended itself before 
that time. Reed J for the majority had argued that in “the closely connected case of 
compulsion in the case of a married woman,191 the common law is abrogated in plain and 
unequivocal terms” yet no such language had been employed in relation to the conspiracy 
exemption – the issue simply did not directly appear anywhere in the Act. The reluctance by 
                                                                                                                                             
and political rights of married women. In Smith v State (1905) 89 SW 817 a Texan court had by dicta anticipated 
that result.  
187
 At p12 “…it is quite rightly admitted by the Solicitor-General that, assuming the law to be as above stated, 
proof of the marriage of the parties alleged to have conspired would be a defence at common law to the 
indictment.” At p5 Stout CJ also referred to marriage as a “defence”. Ostler J at p14 referred to the “defence that 
they were man and wife.” 
188
 For necessity as a valid common law defence, via this same portal see R v Hutchinson [2004] NZAR 303 (A). 
189
 [1926] NZLR 1, 12 quoting ‘Report of the Royal Commission appointed to consider The Law Relating to 
Indictable Offences: With An Appendix containing a Draft Code embodying the Suggestions of the 
Commissioners’, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, London, 1879, Cmnd 2345, p10. 
190
 In Attorney General v Sillem (1864) 2 H & C 431, 509 Pollock CB said: “In a criminal statute you must be 
quite sure that the offence charged is within the letter of the law.” 
191
 In JP Bishop, ‘Commentaries on the Criminal Law,’ 6 ed vol 1 ch xxiv, para 357 it was stated that a married 
woman had not lost by marriage her general capacity for crime, only that “the law has cast upon her a certain 
duty to him, of obedience, of affection, and of confidence, it has compensated her by the indulgence” of the 
doctrine of marital coercion.   
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the majority to declare that a common law defence could be supervened by anything other 
than the Legislature itself is a major premise of their reasoning.   
 
There were two separate dissenting judgments. Stout CJ192 was trenchant in his criticism of 
the majority reasoning. The fact that the leading case for the proposition that the exemption 
ever existed occurred in the reign of Edward III, was itself the very reason needed for a 
contemporary justification of the common law position. He stated he would not “allow such 
an old law to dominate us” like the law assumed that a husband controlled and dominated the 
acts of his wife. As a wife and husband could jointly commit a crime, R v Cruse,193 there was 
no rational basis for exempting any antecedent agreement to commit that joint crime. Stout CJ 
reasoned that the rationale for the exemption was in fact the same rationale for marital 
coercion,194 namely a belief that the wife acted under the control of the husband, which by 
contrast was never the law of Scotland. It was an incident of coverture which had now 
disappeared upon the granting of civil and political rights to married women. The old 
common law was not in force for two reasons, firstly because the specific defence of marital 
coercion had been abolished by the 1893 Act and where the “common law has been invaded” 
in that regard the remnant could not independently survive. Secondly, the common law 
defence was inconsistent with the statute, so that the common law defence was not included 
within s40 Crimes Act.   
 
Ostler J dissenting concluded that “the separate criminal liability of wives had been fully 
recognised”. From the time of Bracton a wife who committed a crime by herself or committed 
a crime incited by her husband when he was not present, had no exemption from criminal 
liability. In neither situation was there any presumption of marital coercion so it followed that 
a wife had a freestanding separate legal independence in the criminal law from at least from 
before the time that the earliest known recognition of the judge-made conspiracy exemption 
was formulated in 1365 in caselaw. Therefore, no cogent analysis existed to rationalise why if 
                                              
192
 [1926] NZLR 1, 4-10. Stout CJ questioned whether now “even in England it would be held that a woman 
could set up this defence [of marital exemption from conspiracy]”.    
193
 (1837) 8 Car & P 541 where marital coercion failed as a defence on the facts although the husband was 
present. 
194
 [1926] NZLR 1, 6-8, referring to Joel Prentice Bishop, ‘Commentaries on the Criminal Law’, 6 ed  vol 1 chap 
xxiv, para 357.   
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spouses can be guilty of a crime individually in their own right, particularly a crime which 
implied a prior agreement between them, why they should they not be equally guilty of a 
conspiracy to commit that very crime.   
 
The abolition of marital coercion meant on this reasoning that the conspiracy exemption 
(which Stout CJ said was founded on the same rationale as that for marital coercion) 
necessarily disappeared upon the abolition of marital coercion. But a conspiracy between 
spouses where the husband was present would have raised the former presumption of marital 
coercion, but would not have excused the actual overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy if 
the husband had not been present throughout.195 Further, the natural meaning of the offence-
creating section of the Crimes Act and the critical phrase “any person” plainly included within 
it a husband and a wife. Taken together with the reforms of the Married Women’s Property 
Protection Act 1893 [NZ] and the grant of universal franchise the fact that there was no 
express provision in the Crimes Act to abrogate the conspiracy exemption was of no moment. 
 
The dissent by Ostler J, amounted to a sustained repudiation of the old common law 
exemption.196 Unlike Stout CJ, Ostler J would have found that the common law defence fitted 
within s40 Crimes Act 1908, but for the fact that he additionally concluded it no longer 
existed. He noted the last clear decision affirming the existence of the exemption was when 
the feudal system was in full vigour, before the first ray of light from the Renaissance had 
reached England, and when the social status of women was a little higher than that of chattels. 
The sole reason to justify the suggested exemption had been given in Hawkins’ ‘Pleas of the 
Crown’197 namely that a husband and wife are esteemed but one person. But that justification, 
if it was ever valid, was no longer true upon the enactment of the first Criminal Code. It had 
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 [1926] NZLR 1, 9.   
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 Rejecting the contention that it was legally impossible for a husband and wife to conspire with each other, the 
court in Johnson v United State:(1946) 157 F 2d 209: “The old rule was based on common-law fiction that 
husband and wife were one person. Acts of Congress have established the separation of husband and wife as to 
property, contracts, and torts in the District of Columbia, which ruled upon the question in denying the motion of 
the present appellant’s wife for a new trial, that this legislation has made the fiction obsolete. No reason remains 
why the law should not recognize the obvious fact that the relation of husband and wife does not prevent two 
persons from conspiring to commit an offense. The interest of society in repressing crime requires that the fact 
be recognized, and our common-law system does not require that its recognition await express legislative 
action.” 
197
 Hawkins 1 PC c72 s8. 
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been preceded by a “long series of decisions in Equity” that had abrogated the hard rule of the 
common law that the wife’s person merged in that of her husband. In New Zealand from as 
early as the passage of s38 Conveyancing Ordinance 1842 [NZ] the Legislature had enacted 
that a wife could convey property to her husband and the converse situation was equally 
lawful. This advance had been consolidated by the Married Women’s Property Act 1884 
[NZ]198 and a long list of similar reforms meant that although the law “did not completely free 
a married woman from the legal status” of a feme sole imposed by the common law, it had 
made such an inroad into that doctrine “as practically to eat it away.” The Legislature by the 
Destitute Persons Act 1877 [NZ] provided that wives were entitled to rights of maintenance 
from deserting husbands. These legislative developments were “sweeping changes in our 
social structure” so that the fact and implications of uxorial status were now animated by a 
very different spirit from that which had pertained “in the dark days of Edward III”.  
 
The merger caused by coverture between the husband and the wife had now been reversed by 
the acquisition by the wife of her own separate legal rights and liabilities. The courts in both 
civil and criminal law and the Legislature had removed the theory of the absolute subjection 
of the wife to her husband and; 
 
reason and the spirit of fair dealing required that a separate identity should be imputed to her. 
She had acquired the rights and liabilities, subject to unimportant exceptions, of a feme sole. 
Consequently the tooth of Time had eaten away the old rule before the passing of the Criminal 
Code, so that it was no longer common law in 1893.199 
 
By parallel reasoning, the English Court of Appeal in 1891200 had concluded that the common 
law right of a husband to administer reasonable castigation to his wife, confirmed only 50 
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 In Ewart v Sheerin (1908) GLR 145 Cooper J decided that it was unnecessary for a married woman as 
plaintiff to sue by a guardian ad litem, as a result of s4 Married Women’s Property Act 1884 [NZ], following 
Douglass (sic) v Warner (unreported) 1884. In the earlier case, Richmond J had held that Rules 67 and 70 of the 
Code of Civil Procedure in the Supreme Court of New Zealand were impliedly repealed. Rule 67 had grouped 
married women with “infants, idiots and lunatics” – as all required a guardian ad litem in order to sue or defend 
any cause.   
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 [1926] NZLR 1, 17. Sir John Salmond, ‘Theory of Judicial Precedents’, (1900) 16 LQR 383 had written: 
“The tooth of time will cut away an ancient precedent, and gradually deprive it of all authority and validity. The 
law becomes animated by a different spirit and assumes a different course, and the older decisions become 
obsolete and inoperative.”  
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 R v Jackson [1891] 1 QB 671, 679 (CA) in which Lord Halsbury LC overruled the “quaint and absurd dicta” 
holding otherwise.  
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years earlier,201 had been superseded as repugnant to the momentum of legislative and social 
development of the rights of women.202 In a peroration203 Ostler J argued, “the time has come 
to recognize that for all the purposes of the criminal law man and wife are separate persons, 
with separate wills and the power in law, as they undoubtedly have in fact, of conspiring 
together to commit a crime”. 
 
 
SIR ROBERT STOUT CRITICISES THE MAJORITY JUDGMENT IN R V MCKECHIE 
 
In a remarkable article,204 written by Sir Robert Stout, shortly after his retirement205 from the 
position of Chief Justice of New Zealand, published on 22 June 1926, he closely examined 
the majority judgment206 of the Court of Appeal in R v McKechie over which he had presided 
and in which he dissented.  For a judge to contribute to legal literature at this time was 
exceptional; but to write an article excoriating a majority judgment (in which the author had 
dissented) was simply unprecedented.  He had not given up at being outvoted. 
 
The granting of rights to women has been a slow process. At one time a married woman was 
looked upon as almost a slave or a vassal, and it has only been in recent years that her rights 
have been recognised. In olden times it was thought that the husband had power to punish her 
and thrash her. That was denied not so many years ago by one of the highest courts in 
England, but at the end of the last century and in this century her position has been greatly 
altered. 
 
Stout observed that because of the Married Women’s Property Protection Act a wife could 
now be a partner with her husband in business and had a right to her own property. No longer 
could her husband take it from her, and her property did not pass by marriage to her husband, 
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except with her consent. The advances of New Zealand law in terms of the equality of women 
were incomparable. Women had now been granted the rights of citizenship. Women could 
vote at a Parliamentary election and for members of local bodies. He lamented that because of 
the Ceylonese decision in Le Mesurier v Le Mesurier207 by the Privy Council the domicile of 
a husband was automatically her domicile and a wife was powerless to create a domicile for 
herself. He referred to Bell’s ‘Principles of Scotch Law’208 as well as Bishop’s ‘Law of 
Husband and Wife’209 to show the proper path for further advances towards the full 
emancipation of women under the law.   
 
He regretted that the provision in s224(1)(a) Crimes Act 1908, which provided for the offence 
of  bigamy as, “Bigamy is (a) the act of a person who, being married, goes through the form 
of marriage with any other person in any part of the world.” had been interpreted by the 
majority of the Court of Appeal in R v Lander210 (in which he had also dissented), as not 
being extra-territorial, following MacLeod v Attorney General for New South Wales.211 The 
extended jurisdiction was therefore held beyond the competence of the Legislative Council to 
enact. In the aftermath of R v Lander, the same section was reconsidered two months later in 
R v Jackson212 where the majority of the Court of Appeal, again Stout CJ dissenting, held that 
the last six words of the subsection considered in R v Lander “in any part of the world”, were 
severable, leaving the residuum valid: “we must say that it would be difficult to find a clearer 
case of separability.”213  
 
Sir Robert then gave a bitter commentary on the decision of the Court of Appeal in R v 
McKechie. He said of it that at the time the appeal was decided the court did not have 
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available214 to consider the powerful contradicting analysis made by various King’s Counsel 
in the House of Commons in relation to the cognate215 provision of marital coercion in clause 
44 of the Criminal Justice Bill 1925.216 He referred to the fact that the English Solicitor-
General reminded the House of Commons of the recommendation in 1922 of the Avory 
Committee, which exposed the fallacy of the common law presumption of marital coercion. 
That Committee additionally identified the artificiality217 of the whole doctrine of marital 
coercion. Section 44(2) Crimes Act 1908, which provided where a married woman commits 
an offence, the fact that her husband was present at the commission of it shall not of itself 
raise the presumption of compulsion was a relevant marker and he asked rhetorically whether 
the law in New Zealand could be different from that which the British Parliament had 
enacted. He said of that subsection:  
 
That leaves a married woman power to prove that she was compelled, but it was not to be 
presumed without proof. The Court of Appeal [in R v McKechie], however, held that this 
provision – and I suppose it would also have held the same with regard to the English 
provision – was not applicable because a married woman is not “a person” that she has no will 
of her own, that her will is dominated by her husband, and even if she and her husband had 
conspired to murder she would not be liable for any offence nor would her husband because 
there could be no conspiracy unless there were two persons. In this respect it may be said that 
our law is more kindly to the married woman than the English law but it is kindness at the 
expense of what? Of declaring that she is not “a person” that she has no will of her own, and 
that she is still under the dominance of her husband even in matters of crime. 
 
He noted that in the House of Commons the Rt Hon Mr Rawlinson KC was very sceptical of 
the clause proposed by the Solicitor-General as it would still maintain the marital coercion 
doctrine and give it statutory force. Rawlinson had argued “Can Honourable Members 
imagine anything more ridiculous than to suggest that there should be power given to a wife 
                                              
214
 Sir Robert Stout, ‘Married Women and the Law’, (1926) II Butterworths Fortnightly Notes p392. “There was 
not brought before the Court of Appeal – as the papers had not reached New Zealand when the case was heard – 
an interesting discussion that took place in the House of Commons when the “Criminal Justice Bill, 1925” was 
before the House. This appears in the English “Hansard” of Friday 20th November 1925”.    
215
 It was argued for the spouses in R v McKechie [1926] NZLR 1, 2-3 the fact s44 (2) Crimes Act 1908 
specifically abrogated marital coercion but had left the spousal conspiracy exemption unaltered indicated an 
intention to preserve that exemption. “My contention is that the common-law unity of person between husband 
and wife is retained in every case except where expressly abrogated by statute.” 
216
 Which became s47 Criminal Justice Act 1925.   
217
 The width of the spousal conspiracy exemption was wider than the purview of marital coercion, as it also 
applied to the heinous offences of treason and murder; there was no limit to its subject matter at common law. 
The State of Victoria in 1977 introduced legislation to provide for the spousal exemption in conspiracy, but at 
least aligned it with marital coercion, in specifically excepting both murder and treason from its protection. 
   
 314 
to say, ‘I acted under the coercion of my husband’ which is not allowed to any other human 
being to say in respect to anyone else? The Bill proposes to do this.”  Sir Robert despaired 
that the point that was successfully raised in R v McKechie could be taken in New Zealand218 
and concluded, “To leave a married woman in that position is surely not for her honour, and 
this, no doubt, could be amended by our law.”219 This legal article, particularly its comments 
on R v McKechie, shows a scarcely veiled derision of the reasoning of the majority as being 
antediluvian.220 That decision was the first time that an appellate court (outside the United 
States) in a common law jurisdiction had ruled on the validity of the common law exemption. 
A consequence of this decision, was that it was eventually considered and followed in the 
Supreme Court of Canada, and had attracted consideration in other jurisdictions as well.   
 
The issue that had confronted the New Zealand Court of Appeal in R v McKechie221 was 
identified by the tension between the court’s acceptance that public policy towards women 
and indeed marriage had changed, and whether that alteration justified the court at being at 
liberty to modify222 the contours of the common law. There was a reluctance in the common 
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law jurisdictions to erode what was an accepted immunity from prosecution. Express and 
unequivocal legislation compelling that result would be required. Just a year before R v 
McKechie, at a time when the New Zealand Court of Appeal had yet to develop its own 
ability to depart from judgments of the House of Lords, that tribunal in Edwards v Porter223 
on 31 October 1924,224 by a majority of three of the five Law Lords, held that a husband was 
still liable to be sued with his wife, for a tort committed exclusively by her during coverture, 
unless the tort was directly connected with a contract made with her. This conclusion was 
reached notwithstanding s1(2) Married Women’s Property Act 1882 [UK], which provided a 
married woman was now capable of suing or being sued as if she were a feme sole.  Viscount 
Cave stated, “the true explanation of the rule [that a husband was liable for the torts of his 
wife] is to be found in that legal unity between husband and wife which existed when the rule 
was formulated, and which in those days rendered it inconceivable to a lawyer that a married 
woman should sue or be sued alone.”225 The courts were hesitantly moving away from 
Victorian avuncular jurisprudence, reinforced by modern legislation underpinned by notions 
of uxorial equality.  But there was no confident and coherent reappraisal – merely a collection 
of individual decisions226 from which some definition would eventually emerge. The New 
Zealand Court of Appeal only a few years before R v McKechie, had demonstrated its 
capacity for a purposive interpretation of statutory criminal law relating to the rights of wives. 
In R v Leonard227 the accused was charged with the offence of having carnal knowledge of his 
wife at the time when she was detained in a mental hospital as mentally defective. The 
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majority of the Court of Appeal228 held that the words of s127(1) Mental Defectives Act 
1911229 extended to the husband of the person against whom the offence was alleged to have 
been committed and that therefore the accused had committed an offence in having carnal 
connection with his wife. The argument of counsel for the appellant was that s127 had to be 
construed so as not to interfere with the common law rights of intercourse between husband 
and wife. It was argued that “By the contract of marriage there is conferred on the husband an 
irrevocable right to intercourse, enforceable by a restitution decree, but subject perhaps to the 
wife’s right to relief in certain cases.” The common law rule was laid down in Hale’s ‘Pleas 
of the Crown’.230 Stout CJ said to counsel arguendo “You cannot go back to the old law of 
husband and wife. We have progressed somewhat, and the object of s127 may be eugenic.” 
Hosking J in Mitchell v Madden231 had held that there is no presumption that the wife of a 
licensee is authorised to sell liquor on behalf of her husband. The judge ruled that there had to 
be express evidence of the husband’s authority to the wife’s exposure of alcohol for the 
purposes of any contravention to be established, so there had to be some prima facie evidence 
of authority that the wife was entitled to sell or expose the liquor for sale in order to convict 
the husband as licensee vicariously. The judge added:  
 
In the present case there is no evidence to show that the licensee’s wife had any authority 
whatever to sell liquor at any time on behalf of her husband. It does not follow because she 
was his wife that she had such authority. Not infrequently the licensee’s wife, though living on 
the premises, has nothing whatever to do with the bar or the sale of liquor.  
 
 
ENGLISH LAW DEVELOPMENTS AFTER R v McKECHIE 
 
A few years later in Gottliffe v Edelston232 McCardie J said of the doctrine of marital unity, “It 
is not easy to discover the original basis of the doctrine as a common law principle.” He noted 
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that wives had achieved parity in almost all respects and had freedom of decision-making, 
when the absence of that had been the driving force for the protections given by the law to 
surround the wife. He said: 
 
I find it difficult to see how the old and conventional doctrine of unity can be said to operate at 
the present day. There is, of course, no physical unity, save in the most unlimited and 
occasional sense. There is no mental unity in any just meaning of the word. Husbands and 
wives have their individual outlooks. They may belong to different political parties, to 
different schools of thought. A wife may be counsel in the courts against her husband. A 
husband may be counsel against his wife. Each has a separate intellectual life and activities. 
 
McCardie J commended the law should proceed on the basis of a presumption of modified 
unity. The old doctrine233 had been significantly eroded and he spoke with evident 
disapproval of the decision of three judges in Phillips v Barnet.234 The criminal law had 
advanced to provide necessary exceptions so a wife was now competent to give evidence 
against her husband upon an allegation of physical mistreatment, for if not her, who? But he 
added: 
 
But in spite of all this the fact remains that marriage creates a most important status and one 
which should create also a substantial identity of social and other interests between husband 
and wife. Hence there seems to be a sound sociological basis for the view of the law that in 
certain respects there should be a presumption of modified unity between husband and wife. 
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MACKENZIE V HARPER 
 
In 1937,235 the Full Court of the Supreme Court of New Zealand, dividing 3:2, affirmed a 
conviction of a Mrs MacKenzie, who was the wife of the licensee of Tatterall’s Hotel in 
Christchurch. At 8.20pm on the material day, she had provided, in a lounge, alcohol to two 
men and two women. It was accepted that the four persons were bona fide guests of Mrs 
MacKenzie, and friends of her husband and herself. Her husband was not in the hotel and had 
left her in charge of it. She was charged with supplying liquor to persons not entitled to it. 
There was an exemption by s205(e) Licensing Act 1908 by which “the licensee” was entitled 
to lawfully supply liquor to bona fide guests outside licensing hours. The wife relied upon the 
fact that she was in charge of the hotel and could entertain and supply her guests in her home, 
identically to her husband. Myers CJ said236 the answer as to whether the wife had acted 
lawfully “must depend upon a consideration of her common-law rights as a married woman.” 
He then added, “it was held more than three hundred years ago that a wife has no inherent 
right to give a person authority to enter her husband’s house. Tayler v Fisher (1591) Cro Eliz 
246. If that was the common law then, it remains the common law now.” After referring to R 
v Jackson237 in which the right of a husband to chastise his wife was finally repudiated, 
Myers CJ stated that Tayler v Fisher238 had never been disapproved and stated “[i]t may 
possibly be said to be a relic of medieval times, but, nevertheless, there it is!” The 
exclamation mark did not cause him to conclude other than a wife is in no better position than 
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the licensee’s guest. A wife, it followed, was also a guest in her husband’s home. The same 
point was decided earlier in Waterson v Low239 by Adams J. Further, it had already been 
accepted that at common law mere lodgers could entertain their guests with liquor after 
closing-hours in Ryland v Foley,240 it should follow that a wife must have at least the same 
right in the matrimonial property.  But the interpretation of the common law right to entertain 
and grant hospitality, the Chief Justice decided, meant that a married woman had no right at 
common law to allow any person authority to enter her husband’s house and therefore no 
authority to entertain them there. A wife was therefore, in a significantly disadvantaged 
position in relation to the status of her own husband and was in law even worse off than a 
lodger at the hotel. The Supreme Court had held a few years earlier241 that a servant had no 
authority to entertain guests on the premises of his master; but could do so only with 
permission of the master. Myers CJ, had no difficulty in concluding “The same reasoning 
applies to the position of the wife and her guests.”242 Ostler J, also in the majority for 
affirming the conviction, initially concentrated on the wording of the germane provision243 in 
the Act. Where in any licensed premises any person other than the licensee either sells or give 
liquor to any person at a time when the license premises must be closed that person shall be 
liable to a fine.  He held that the licensee’s wife was a person other than the licensee and 
therefore the provision applied to the appellant. He recorded244 the argument, “because a 
licensee and a lodger may at common law without committing an offence entertain their 
guests with liquor after closing-hours, the wife of a licensee in his absence must be held to 
have the same right at common law, it being contended that there is no statutory provision 
taking away this alleged common-law right”.  
 
While a lodger245 had a common law right to entertain his guests with liquor after-hours in 
licensed premises, and the licensee246 a similar right, he denied that the wife of the licensee 
had such a common law right. Even in a private house a wife has no legal right to entertain 
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her friends without the express or implied permission of her husband.247 While distancing 
himself from the particular conclusion stated in ‘Bacon’s Abridgement’248 that the husband 
was entitled to keep the wife by force within the bounds of duty, Ostler J continued:249  
 
In modern times more liberal ideas have prevailed, and most of the disabilities under which 
married women formerly laboured have been removed by legislation. But some of them still 
linger. The old idea that on marriage the persona of the wife has merged in that of her husband 
still prevails to some extent in the criminal law. For example, to this day a married woman 
cannot conspire with her husband to commit a crime: The King v McKechie [1926] NZLR 1. 
 
The irony of this reference to R v McKechie was that Ostler J had delivered a sustained 
dissent in that majority judgment in which he denied that husband and wife were, by the 
fiction of the law, one person and therefore incapable of conspiring alone together. Ostler J 
stated that in view of the history described in ‘Bacon’s Abridgment’, the absence of a specific 
contrary decision to that of Tayler v Fisher in 1591 was unsurprising and indeed 
understandable. He reasoned that there was a strong obligation on the wife to identify a 
specific common law right to entertain her guests in her husband’s house and she needed to 
point to some express authority for that proposition. To say that she has such a common law 
right unless expressly forbidden to do so by her husband begged the question. It meant no 
more than that she has that right with his implied permission, but no such right if he refuses 
his permission. The wife was therefore under a legal “disability” which prevented her 
entertaining her own guests. The third majority judge, Kennedy J, also based himself upon 
‘Bacon’s Abridgment’250 where it was said, “The law looks upon the husband and wife but as 
one person and it therefore allows of but one will between them, which is placed in the 
husband as the fittest and ablest to provide for and govern the family”. While noting251 that 
“the law has in modern times not been lagging far behind prevailing notions as to her proper 
status” and accepting the anomaly that a wife could not do in her husband’s house what their 
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lodger could do, also found himself unable to discern that the wife had any individual 
common law right. “There is, so far as I am aware, no modern authority, and the tenor of old 
authority is to the contrary.”   
 
Two judges, Callan and Northcroft JJ dissented. However, the former, Callan J, by a most 
retrograde step reached the view that the wife was able to entertain guests because by 
“applying the ancient doctrine of the common law, that husband and wife are but one person” 
he reasoned that the wife had the inseparable right that the husband as licensee had. The 
majority had found that the wife was under a disability that not even a married woman lodger 
in their home would have been under by basing this on a decision in 1591. Yet Callan J found 
that the wife was under no special disability in this regard because of the doctrine of unity 
(which was otherwise a disability) but was, on his reasoning, actually a benefit in this 
particular case. He noted Gottliffe v Edelston252 in which McCardie J emphasised that 
marriage creates a substantial identity of social and other interests between husband and wife. 
Hence there seems to be a sound sociological basis for the view of the law that in certain 
respects there should be a presumption of modified unity between husband and wife. While 
his first reason turned on unity in the further and alternative he reasoned that guests invited at 
the matrimonial home by either spouse are prima facie guests of both. He considered Tayler v 
Fisher and caustically remarked that it did not follow that even in Elizabethan England any 
guests entertained by a wife in a matrimonial home belonging to the husband, without her 
husband’s express consent, were trespassers.   
 
But since a unity of two human beings requires a head, and since the common law gives that 
position of headship to the husband, it appears to follow that guests received their by the wife 
contrary to the express or implied will of the husband are, in law, the guests the of neither. 
 
Callan J would have quashed the conviction because the wife was granted the privilege of the 
common law via her husband, so that in law they were but one person and she was therefore 
incorporated within his own right and privilege. Northcroft J referred to the dictum of 
Pennefather J in Ryland v Foley,253 “It is the common law right of every man to entertain his 
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 [1930] 2 KB 378, 385. 
253
 (1898) 16 NZLR 670, 677. 
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guests as he likes” but as the majority had concluded it would not include the common law 
right of his wife. He reasoned contrary to the position of the other four judges that there was a 
common law right “of all citizens” to entertain their friends at home, which extended to the 
provision of alcoholic hospitality. This was the most expansive reasoning placing the right 
given at common law only apparently to a husband now on a full egalitarian basis of 
citizenship. “A person living privately has a right to entertain his guests in his home as and 
when he likes. The wife of such a person surely has the same right in respect of her guests in 
her husband’s home.” He concluded that the wife had the same rights as the husband and that 
she “enjoys the same immunity from conviction” that he had. 
 
 
TENACITY OF THE COMMON LAW RULE 
 
In 1933 a seven-judge Supreme Court of California254 held that where there had been an 
acquittal for a conspiracy, the fact that an essential or even the sole element of which was 
itself a substantive offence, did not amount to a successful plea of autrefois acquit in relation 
to the subsequent trial of that substantive offence – yet the reverse was true.255 But on a 
successful application to rehear the appeal before the Court of Appeal of California,256 28 
days later (and consisting of two judges fewer), the Court of Appeal by a majority of 3:2, 
reversed the earlier decision, on the quite new basis that it (and counsel) had together 
overlooked the direct applicability of the spousal exemption rule. Burroughs J delivering the 
judgment of the majority quashing the conviction, noted the consistency of the case law 
position in Californian law. By 1933, he said it could be safely stated257 that the common law 
rule “unquestionably” existed and that it was a rule that was so well established and so 
generally recognised in America by the modern authorities258 that it should not be judicially 
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 People v MacMullen (1933) 24 P 2d 793: Waste CJ, Curtis, Langdon, Preston, Shenk, Seawell and Thompson 
JJ, decided 1 August 1933. 
255
 Oliver v Superior Court (1928) 267 P 764. 
256
 People v MacMullen (1933) 24 P 2d 794: Tyler PC, Burroughs, Cashin, Curtis and Seawell JJ. The facts 
showed that two married couples, the MacMullen and the Connor spouses, were indicted with conspiring to 
commit theft. The Connors were acquitted by the jury and the MacMullens were convicted. 
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 People v MacMullen (1933) 24 P 2d 795. The only caselaw holding otherwise was: Dalton v People (1920) 
189 P 37 in Colorado and the earlier Texan dicta in Smith v State (1905) 89 SW 817. 
258
 In Commonwealth v Allen (1900) 24 Pa Co Ct R 65, 66 Yerkes PC stated that the exemption was the law of 
Pennsylvania, relying upon a passage in ‘Carson on Criminal Conspiracies’, p221. The case involved a 
   
 323 
repealed; any alteration of it was a matter for the Legislature. Burroughs J reasoned that for 
the Court to act contrary to the rule would amount to judicial repeal. However, the Attorney 
General of California, argued that the earlier 1889 decision of the same court in People v 
Miller ought no longer to prevail as since that time, “the status of married women has 
undergone a great change; and although at common law the wife was little more than a 
chattel, at the present time she occupies before the law practically the same status as the 
male.”259 But the court was not persuaded that there had been by statute such a conceptual 
alteration in the law. It accepted that there had been a positive enhancement of the civil rights 
and duties of women, but added that these changes did not purport to affect the criminal 
responsibility of women.260 In addition, s26 of the California Penal Code, provided for the 
defence of marital coercion and conspiracy was not excepted from that statutory defence. 
Burroughs J concluded that as the 1889 decision in People v Miller had never been overruled 
so the spousal exemption remained good law, noting though that the question merited further 
consideration by the Supreme Court of California or by the Legislature. The conviction of the 
spouses was quashed. Seawell and Curtis JJ261 dissented. The prosecution petitioned the 
Supreme Court to have the case heard, but it was denied.262  
 
The District Court of Mississippi263 later followed the decision in Dawson v United States that 
the exemption stood. But in a much more significant decision in Gros v United States,264 the 
                                                                                                                                             
conspiracy to obstruct “…the investigation of a horrible murder of a near relative” at p69. (1926) 10 F 2d 106, 
108. The court also discussed marital coercion but concluded that it could not have been successfully raised as 
the intention of the conspiracy was “…to establish a bawdyhouse …” (at p108) and held it was well established 
that the presumption of marital coercion will not be indulged in when the charge pertains to the keeping of a 
house of ill fame: applying State v Jones (1903) 45 SE 916; People v Wheeler (1905) 105 NW 607; Haffner v 
State (1922) 187 NW 173 and State v Gill (1911) 129 NW 821. Further the Supreme Court of North Carolina in 
State v Nowell (1911) 72 SE 590 had held that the offence of abduction of girls by solicitation for immoral 
purposes was outside the marital coercion defence. The court also rejected a submission that a question in cross-
examination of Mrs Dawson was prejudicial: “A great part of your life, you had seen a great many sporting 
women, had you not?” Her answer in denial must have been held by the jury to be rocambolesque. 
259
 At p796. 
260
 At p796 the Court distinguished the Texas and Colorado approach, on the basis that those courts had 
concluded in their states, that the legislatures had intended to alter the criminal responsibility of women.   
261
 Both had been members of the original decision to dismiss the appeal: People v MacMullen (1933) 24 P 2d 
793. 
262
 On 28 September 1933; People v MacMullen (1933) 24 P 2d 794, 796. In People v Eppstein (1930) 2 90 P 
1054 (Court of Appeal of California) en passant reference to the common law position was found at p1058, 
noting too that s31 of the California Penal Code provided for the defence of marital coercion. 
263
 United States v Shaddix (1942) 43 F Supp 330, Mize D J oddly stating that he could find no authority 
inconsistent with Dawson v Unites States, presumably meant no authority in the Federal Court system. 
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United States Court of Appeals affirmed the existence of the spousal exemption. A husband 
and wife were convicted for conspiring to disclose to the German Reich information affecting 
the national defence in violation of a federal statute. An appeal to the United States Court of 
Appeals was initially dismissed. However, on an application for a rehearing of the appeal, the 
same court, this time by a majority265 quashed the conviction on the basis that the principal 
evidence against the spouses was a confession by Mrs Gros, made at a date when she was 
married266 so that there was no evidence to show the existence of the conspiracy prior to the 
marriage. In an application of Dawson v United States (also a decision of the Ninth Circuit) 
the court concluded that the conviction now could not now stand. 
 
 
MOMENTUM IN FAVOUR OF QUASHING THE RULE 
 
The United States Court of Appeals in 1943 in Ansley v United States267 by a majority268 
upheld a conviction of spouses to conspire to violate the internal revenue laws relating to 
intoxicating liquor.  Then in 1952 in People v Estep269 a husband and wife were found guilty 
of perpetrating a confidence trick contrary to the Medical Practice Act, rejecting their defence 
that they were practising faith healing. The court noted that no Illinois court had yet been 
called upon to decide whether a husband and wife could conspire in criminal law, although 
the court had in 1904270 and 1922271 reached the view that even in a civil case spouses could 
not conspire. In Johnson v United States272 the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia 
had said:  
 
No reason remains why the law should not recognise the obvious fact that the relation of 
husband and wife does not prevent two persons from conspiring to commit an offence. The 
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 (1943) 138 F 2d 261 (21 June 1943). 
265
 Denman and Stephens Cir JJ, Mathews Cir J dissenting. 
266
 The marriage having taken place on 8 October 1940. 
267
 (1943) 135 F 2d 207. 
268
 Hutcheson CJ dissenting, following Dawson v United States (1926) 10 F 2d 106 that spouses could not 
conspire together and also relying upon the existence of the doctrine of marital coercion. 
269
 (1952) 104 NE 2d 562 (Appellate Court of Illinois). 
270
 Merrill v Marshall (1904) 113 Ill App 447, 455-456. 
271
 Worthy v Birk (1922) 224 Ill App 574, 583 noting that only Jones v Monson (1909) 119 NW 179 had held to 
the contrary. 
272
 (1946) 157 F 2d 209. 
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interest of society in repressing crime requires that the fact be recognised, and our common-
law system does not require that its recognition await express legislative action. 
 
But on the facts in People v Estep no decision on the point was required because other 
persons unknown were referred to on the indictment and the conspirators must have agreed 
with one or more of them.273 The intrepid Mr and Mrs Estep then were arrested in Texas and 
their extradition was sought by the Governor of the State of Illinois. They applied for habeas 
corpus to the United States District Court274 on the repeated basis that husband and wife could 
not conspire together. Atwell J noted that a wife is no longer “hidden in the personality of the 
husband in America” and dismissed the application. The United States Court of Appeals, 
Fifth Circuit, in Thompson v United States275 involved a conspiracy by a husband and wife to 
violate the White Slave Traffic Act.276 The court noted that the Federal Courts, the District 
Courts as well as the State Courts were completely at odds as to the true legal position277 in 
spousal conspiracy. Rives Cir Judge (Tuttle and Jones Cir JJ concurring) noted that the 
offence of conspiracy proscribes the conduct of “two or more persons”.278 He added: 
 
The Roman or civil law, forming the basis of the marital law in some of the States, always 
recognised the separate existence of husband and wife. In most, if not all, of the strictly 
common law States the unity of the spouses has been severed by Married Women’s Acts. 
 
Rives Cir J added that there are no common law federal crimes and there was therefore no 
reason to import into the present federal statute the concept of the common law unity of 
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 Applying People v Mather (1839) 4 Wend [New York] 229; State v Slutz (1901) 30 So 298, 299 (Supreme 
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 (1955) 129 F Supp 557. 
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 (1955) 227 F 2d 671. 
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 18 USCA § 2421. 
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 Dawson v United States (1926) 10 F 2d 106; Gros v United States (1943) 138 F 2d 261 accepting the 
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husband and wife279 “now prevailing in few, if any, of the states.”280 However, in some of the 
American states the spousal conspiracy exemption was expressly provided for by statute.281   
 
 
CANADIAN CASELAW 
 
In R v Nerlich282 the court, Meredith CJO, Garrow, Maclaren, Magee and Hodgins JJA, had 
before them a case stated by Mulock CJ Ex. A husband and wife were indicted that they did 
“traitorously conspire, confederate, and agree with each other, and with others” to assist a 
German, Zirzow, to leave Canada and join the enemy’s forces in fighting the war. This was a 
landmark283 decision involving treachery during World War I. Maclaren JA delivered the 
judgment of the majority284  and noted that the trial judge had directed the jury to acquit Mrs 
Nerlich as there was no evidence against her. The court found that Zirzow was not an alleged 
co-conspirator himself because he was only the object individual to be incited in consequence 
of the spousal agreement. However, Maclaren JA added285 “if only Mr & Mrs Nerlich had 
been indicted for conspiracy, her discharge would necessarily have been followed by his”. 
The court ascribed the reason for that conclusion as being where only two persons were 
indicted for conspiracy both must be acquitted or both must be convicted, noting that the 
prosecution had accepted that there was no evidence that Mr Nerlich had conspired with any 
person other than Zirzow. In the circumstances Mr Nerlich could not be convicted of 
conspiracy as there was no other person with whom he could have agreed.   
 
                                              
279
 It was noted by the Court of Appeals that the foreman of the jury in the court below, was a married woman. 
280
 Thompson v United States was followed two years later in Wright v United States (1957) 243 F 2d 569 in 
which Hutcheson CJ reversed the earlier dissenting opinion he had expressed in Ansley v United States (1943) 
135 F 2d 207. 
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 (1915) 25 DLR 138 (Ont: SC: AD)  
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 Leading counsel for the prosecution was J R Cartwright K C, later to sit in Kowbel v The Queen in the 
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 Hodgins JA dissented but curiously no judgment in dissent was published.   
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R  v KOWBEL 
 
The spousal exemption issue arose much more directly in R v Kowbel,286 a decision of the 
Ontario Court of Appeal (Laidlaw and J K Mackay JJA; Hogg JA dissenting), which refused 
to follow the common law rule of spousal exemption.  A husband was charged with 
conspiracy to forge documents. His wife was the named co-accused. Only the husband stood 
trial.287  Laidlaw JA288 accepted that there was “no doubt”, (Hogg JA used the same language 
at p819), that at common law a pure spousal conspiracy was impossible.289 However, he 
argued that the common law theory now “requires careful examination” as in many cases a 
wife could be prosecuted and convicted as a separate person for offences against the criminal 
law. She was responsible for: crimes she committed alone, crimes she incited or procured her 
husband to commit290 and crimes committed in the presence of her husband where she acted 
voluntarily.  Laidlaw JA argued that the reason why a wife could not be guilty of conspiracy 
with her husband was that at common law a married woman “had no capacity to contract with 
another person. She was incapable of making an agreement with her husband.”291 Once the 
incapacity of a married woman to contract with her husband had been removed, by modern 
property law, and she was given the freedom to exercise her own will “she thereupon became 
subject to the criminal law respecting conspiracy”. He therefore concluded because of modern 
property law powers an agreement could exist between a husband and wife “as separate 
persons”292 so that there was no room for the application of the theory of the unity of person. 
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 [1953] 3 DLR 809 (Ont CA). In White v Proctor [1937] OR 647, 651 the Ontario Court of Appeal questioned 
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 In Pearce v Merriman [1904] 1 KB 80 it was held that a married woman could enter into a commercial 
contract with her husband. How then can she not enter into an agreement to commit a crime? This question 
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There was no continuing incapacity in a married woman to prevent her from entering into an 
agreement with her husband for an unlawful purpose. In keeping with the approach of both 
Stout CJ and Ostler J in R v McKechie293 he held that there was no exception which took a 
married woman out of the natural scope of the two introductory words to s573 Criminal Code 
[Can] or the phrase in it “any person”, which provided “Every one is guilty of an indictable 
offence who conspires with any person to commit any indictable offence”.294 He held that 
there was a consistency in the analysis because of the newer policy of the criminal law, which 
by s21 Criminal Code [Can] had now abolished the presumption of marital coercion. It would 
be an inconsistency indeed if Parliament intended by s21 to abolish the doctrine of coercion 
and at the same time permitted the common law theory of unity of married persons to be 
available in respect of the crime of conspiracy.295   
 
As a married woman now has “equal rights with her husband” to enter into agreements in the 
exercise of her own free will, to say that the law will not hold either of them responsible for 
conspiracy, which was only a type of agreement, would be inconsistent and an absurdity. If 
the law provides that spouses cannot conspire together, the husband, to whom the law has 
never attributed any favour or disability, is entirely discharged from criminal responsibility 
only by the serendipity of the fact of his marriage - the wife’s legal personality absolves him. 
The legal fiction of marital unity had no place in contemporary Canadian society296 and it was 
one “which creates a failure of justice by its application.”   
 
The dissenting judge, Hogg JA, accepted there was a “paucity of authority in decisions” and 
that text-book writers297 stated only “the bare proposition” but concluded that it had now 
become a venerable doctrine too late to change. He referred to the ruling of Darling J in R v 
                                                                                                                                             
showed the obscurity of the alleged common law: Midland Bank Trust Co Ltd v Green (No3) [1979] 1 Ch 
496,521 C. 
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 [1953] 3 DLR 809, 813 (Ont CA). 
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 ‘Harrison on Conspiracy’ (1924) Sweet & Maxwell, London, p76 merely restated the general proposition. 
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Peel.298 In addition he relied upon what Lush J had said, dissenting on another point, in 
Director of Public Prosecutions v Blady.299 
 
The foundation of the rule which prevented a wife from giving evidence against her husband 
was the fact that they were one person in the eye of the law. No doubt that rule was applied in 
every case where it was necessary either for the safety of the wife or for her wellbeing to relax 
it. The rule shewed itself in strange ways both in the criminal and in the civil law. Husband 
and wife being one person could not be indicted or convicted of conspiracy one with the other. 
A wife could not be convicted of being an accessory after the fact when her husband had 
committed a felony; but the rule was relaxed in the converse case, and a husband could be 
convicted of being an accessory after the fact in the case of his wife’s felony.   
 
The doctrine was an ineluctable consequence of the theory of conjugal unity. Hogg JA gave 
the additional reason for affirming the spousal exemption that the statutory law of Canada 
recognised “the intimate relationship of husband and wife”, as by Canada Evidence Act RSC 
1927 c59 which provided that neither spouse was compellable to disclose any communication 
made during their marriage. Further the fact that the doctrine of marital coercion had been 
abolished in Canada was insignificant, as it did not mean that the separate common law 
defence of conjugal unity had been impliedly abolished. He found the majority judgment in 
R v McKechie to be persuasive on that point. As the common law had not been “altered, 
abrogated or abolished”, Parliament would have to expressly take away “a defence” to a 
criminal charge. Whereas New Zealand by statute had expressly preserved defences not 
inconsistent with its Criminal Code, the Province of Ontario had by the different route of 
common law decision300 held that common law defences, not inconsistent with the Code, still 
existed.301   
 
The mere passage of time, and the changed conditions under which a husband and wife live, 
in relation to each other in these days, especially with respect to the extensive rights conferred 
upon married women with regard to property, are not, as I see the matter, a sufficient sanction 
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to deprive an accuse of a defence and to transfer to the Court a power that may be exercised 
only by Parliament.302   
 
 
KOWBEL V THE QUEEN 
 
The convicted husband appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada: Kowbel v The Queen,303 
which by a majority (Fauteux J dissenting), reversed the majority judgment of the Ontario 
Court of Appeal and the conviction of Mr Kowbel was thereby quashed, on the basis that as a 
matter of law, he was unable to conspire with his wife.   
 
Taschereau J (with whom Kerwin J concurred) held that at common law a husband and wife, 
judicially speaking, formed but one person and were therefore presumed to have but one will 
and could not therefore conspire between themselves.304 He rejected the basis (which had 
been advanced by Stout CJ in R v McKechie) that the theory of conjugal unity and the defence 
of compulsion were aspects of the same concept, relying on ‘Lush on Husband and Wife’,305 
to the contrary. He reasoned that the two matters were of entirely different origin, so that the 
statutory abrogation of marital coercion had no effect on spousal exemption from conspiracy. 
The fiction that spouses are one person in law was the underlying principle at the root of the 
law which stated that during cohabitation, one spouse could not steal the property of the other. 
From this Taschereau J concluded that the theory of unity between husbands and wives and 
the defence of marital coercion should not be confused as they were entirely different in 
concept.  He denied that the expressions “Every one” and “any person” included a married 
woman as her coverture was an indelible incapacity in law. Therefore, her status was 
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indistinguishable from that of “children under 7 years of age or insane persons”.306 This 
collation of married women with imbeciles was not new as it had featured as a standard 
analysis of criminal law in the leading published works throughout the nineteenth century. He 
held that a married woman had by common law a fundamental incapacity to conspire with her 
husband and that this defence was in harmony with “all the other dispositions of the Code 
dealing with incapacities resulting from marriage”. Taschereau J reasoned that he would not 
allow “the hesitations of a few modern writers” to “brush aside” six centuries of law,  
acknowledging that this position “may very well be amended by legislative intervention, but 
as long as it is not, it must be applied.” 
Reference was made to the decision307 in 1365 repeated uncritically by Hawkins.308 
Taschereau J noted that judgment was based on it being common ground that the spouses 
could not conspire and because a third party was allegedly involved the writ was abated 
because no conspiracy was actually revealed on the facts. In many ways, the ancient case was 
a non-decision though, with it having only the obiter value of demonstrating how the legal 
profession and judiciary understood the general criminal law at that time.   
 
Estey J added that a portion of the law of conspiracy must be found in the common law and in 
the absence of express words the defence had not been removed. The fact that certain statutes 
had given a married woman the right to contract with her husband had been in the main, 
“directed to her proprietary rights and have not interfered with her status”,309 nor had those 
laws dealt with the confidential and intimate relationship between husband and wife. 
Therefore it did not follow that the capacity to contract with her husband was an answer to the 
common law. A wife had new and additional rights but her status under the law was not that 
of unrelenting equality with her husband. Her disability by coverture provided her with the 
privilege of uxorial exemption which incidentally benefited her husband and her together. 
Cartwright J agreed with this approach and stated that plain words were needed if it were to 
be concluded that the intention in enacting the Criminal Code had been to abolish the 
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common law defence of marriage, in conspiracies. He accepted that marriage was a criminal 
defence310 to conspiracy. What would have been required was language as focused as that 
used in s21 Criminal Code [Can] when the presumption of marital coercion was abolished. 
The approach of the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada comported with the majority 
judgment of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in R v McKechie.   
 
 
FAUTEUX J DISSENTS IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 
 
Fauteux J noted that all text writers effectively traced the rule to what was said in Hawkins 
‘Pleas of the Crown’ on which the entire doctrine apparently rested as there seemed to have 
been no case in which the rule had been applied by an English court, referring to a comment 
to that effect by Glanville Williams.311 Hawkins had not referred to an earlier case312 in 1345 
in which the court held that conspiracy could not exist between spouses, because the act of the 
wife “would be accounted the act of the husband”. Fauteux J concluded that the rule 
“stemmed from the doctrine of conjugal unity and that text writers had merely repeated it, 
without having received judicial sanction”.313 The common law rule owed its existence to the 
doctrine of unity which was based on the wife’s subordination and had a biblical origin, but it 
was based on a misleading figurative expression.314 He preferred the analysis by Pollock and 
Maitland:315 
 
The main idea which governs the law of husband and wife is not that of ‘an unity of person,’ 
but that of the guardianship, the mund, the profitable guardianship, which the husband has 
over the wife and over her property.   
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Although some parts of the substantive criminal law did place a married woman in a special 
position those exceptions;  
 
stem from the very nature of domestic relations of those having marital status, but a marital 
status which, in so far at least as our criminal law is concerned, it is sufficient to say, no 
longer embodies the legal notion of conjugal unity or subordination as it is said to have had in 
a far distant past.316 
 
The assimilation of married women with the insane and infants, was a violation of 
fundamental principle as the latter were incapable of forming the mens rea, similarly nor 
could young children. With a married female the historical lack of legal capacity could not be 
combined with those other classes, because to do so was to deprive any wife of the ability to 
form a rational criminous judgment, which as a conclusion offended fact and reality. Fauteux 
J relied upon the abolition of marital coercion by federal statute in Canada as the proof that 
married women no longer were entitled to the notion of conjugal unity or subordination and 
that the status was one of equality. In keeping with the approach of the dissenting judges in R 
v McKechie, a judgment he referred to, Fauteux J concluded that the doctrine of conjugal 
unity was the ultimate substratum of Hawkins’ rule and, it having perished, it followed that 
the rule had perished. The rule perished with the disappearance of the reason that gave it life 
and support. As it had never been denied that a spouse could incite the other spouse to 
commit a crime317 there was therefore no good reason “for distinguishing between incitement 
and conspiracy; for in both of the cases, commission of the crime is inconceivable unless 
there are, at least, two persons”. 
 
A robust examination318 of this decision of the Supreme Court concluded that truth was now 
stranger than fiction as the court had affirmed a result that was ‘patently ridiculous’ to the 
layman, ‘very unreal’ to lawyers and generally absurd as it was incompatible with modern 
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realities applicable to transactions319 between spouses; the perpetuation of the common law 
exemption itself ‘creates a failure of justice by its application’.320 The addition of even their 
own child into the agreement removed the exemption from the criminal law, even if the 
agreement was a post-marriage agreement. The asserted basis of conjugal intimacy and 
confidence was necessarily destroyed by the augmentation of the scion into the wider 
agreement. If one of the rationales of conspiracy is for the law to intercept a criminal 
relationship at the earliest possible time, as a preventative measure, then it is difficult to see 
that the addition of a third person into the agreement (which as another of the rationales is to 
protect against injurious combinations) should make any difference at all as the spouses are 
‘just as dangerous as any other combination of persons’ so that the exemption built around 
them must have as its justification the special nature of their coexistence.  
 
 
MAWJI V THE QUEEN : POLYGAMY AND THE SPOUSAL CONSPIRACY EXEMPTION 
 
The unity rule was put to the test in a most unusual way in Mawji v The Queen an appeal from 
Tanganyika. The conspirators were husband and wife in, and were parties to a potentially 
polygamous marriage.321 The Privy Council concluded that the spousal conspiracy exemption 
“primarily contemplated” a monogamous union. But in Tanganyika polygamous marriage 
was “fully valid” and almost the norm under local law. This case ought to have strained 
beyond breaking point the fusion rule – with its acceptance that at least two women could be 
conjoined into the single union with their shared husband. However, for reasons that cannot 
be satisfactorily explained counsel for the Crown, in the Privy Council, conceded the validity 
of the underlying exemption. This concession renders the judgment very marginal as an 
authority as to whether the common law rule had really existed.  But it has been conveniently 
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followed by courts in other common law jurisdictions.  To assess its real value a close 
understanding of all four tiers of the various courts which considered the proceedings is 
required.   
 
The appellants were lawfully married in accordance with the rules of the Ismailia Khoja Sect 
of the Shia Muslims who owed their religious allegiance to the Aga Khan and were living 
together in a common matrimonial home, for all purposes appearing to be in a monogamous 
union. However, the husband was permitted by law to take additional wives and the issue was 
whether the English criminal law doctrine was applicable in those exotic circumstances. The 
position was made more complicated by the fact that s4 Penal Code [Tanganyika] provided 
that the Penal Code should be “interpreted in accordance with the principles of legal 
interpretation obtaining in England…with the meaning attaching to them in English criminal 
law…” To this end oddly the focus of the African appeal would then turn on the status of the 
common law of England. The actual offence which led to the relevant conviction was 
provided by s110 Penal Code [Tanganyika]: “Any person who (a) conspires with any other 
person to obstruct the course of justice” commits an offence. Was a wife of a potentially 
polygamous marriage “any other person” for the purposes of the law of conspiracy? The 
husband and wife were charged in the District Court of Dar-Es-Salaam, Tanganyika with: 
 
Statement of Offence 
Conspiring to obstruct, prevent, pervert or defeat the course of justice, contra. Section 110(a), 
Penal Code, Cap 16. 
 
Particulars of Offence:322 
 
The persons charged on 17.11.54 between the hours of 3:00pm and 4:30pm at No 37 
Mkunguni Street in the Municipality of Dar-Es-Salaam, conspired together to obstruct, 
prevent, pervert, or defeat the course of justice, in that the said persons did conceal a German 
made wall clock bearing the trade mark “Mouthe” which they well knew was required for the 
purposes of an enquiry into a criminal offence. 
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The couple was also charged with the offence of retaining property feloniously stolen or 
obtained.323 The essential facts were that between 3:00pm and 3:30pm two police officers 
enquired of the wife about a wall clock in the sitting room of their dwelling. She referred 
them to her husband, who worked in the Public Works Department, for an explanation. The 
police interviewed the husband who gave an unsatisfactory explanatory statement. The 
officers went back to the police station at 4:50pm. One of the officers returned to the 
matrimonial dwelling to seize the clock as an exhibit. He found the husband and wife both 
there – but, “the wall clock was no longer there. In its place was a photograph of the first 
accused.”324Later the wife explained that she had, after the initial enquiry by the police 
officers, thrown the wall clock over the wall of the yard at the back of the house because she 
“was angry with both Inspector Solanky and the clock.”325 At trial before the Resident 
Magistrate,326 the Liwali327 of Dar-Es-Salaam gave evidence328 as a prosecution expert on 
Muslim law. He gave evidence that under the Koran a man may have up to four concurrent 
wives. He stated that in the Koran there was no rule that a husband and wife were seen or 
treated as one person or in any way regarded as such, but pointed out that it was stipulated329 
“each of the married couple is like a garment to the other”.  In the course of his evidence the 
Liwali referred to an unreported Privy Council Appeal330 from Zanzibar, to illustrate that 
Ismailia Khoja married women have an indefeasible right to a life interest in their husband’s 
estate, even though that was not consonant with general Muslim law.  
 
Defence counsel submitted that the spouses had no case to answer as a matter of law as they 
were incapable in law of conspiring together. The Resident Magistrate gave a ruling rejecting 
a submission of no case to answer, on the conspiracy charge,331 noting that the evidence 
                                              
323
 Contrary to s311(1) Penal Code of Tanganyika, Cap 16, Laws of Tanganyika. 
324
 Ibid p49. 
325
 Ibid p49. 
326
 J A Scollin Esq. 
327
 J A Iliffe, ‘Tanganyika under German Rule 1905 – 1912’, Cambridge University Press (1969) p114, defines a 
Liwali as the “African Governor of a town or district headquarters.” 
328
 Ibid Page 27. 
329
 Holy Koran, Part XXVII ss3 and 38. 
330
 Jafferali Bhaloo Lakha v The Standard Bank of South Africa Limited, unreported, Privy Council Appeal No 
38 of 1927, 7 November 1927, Viscount Cave LC, Lord Buckmaster, Lord Carson, Lord Darling and Lord 
Warrington of Clyffe approving the first instance judgment of Tomlinson J of the High Court of Zanzibar that a 
Khoja widow was entitled by custom to maintenance out of her deceased husband’s estate. 
331
 Ibid p31. 
   
 337 
disclosed that the husband and wife are “Ismailia Khojas” a sect of the Mohammedan 
religion. It had been argued for the spouses that the offence was “incompetent: because of the 
common law of England332 and that by s4 Penal Code [Tanganyika] expressions333 used in it 
were to be construed in accordance with “English Criminal Law334” “so far as consistent with 
their context”. The magistrate rejected this argument stating: “the facts (sic) that they are 
Mohammedans of a particular sect and that by the religious laws of this sect marriage is 
polygamous does not matter for the purposes of the criminal law; the application of their 
personal law is limited to marriage and succession.”335 The prosecution had argued that as the 
Indian Penal Code had applied in Tanganyika until 1930, that Code should be considered as 
the proper source of law where there was sought to be “a deviation from English Law,”336 and 
that the Indian Penal Code337 had never recognised the spousal exception from the law of 
conspiracy. The prosecution additionally acknowledged that monogamous marriage was the 
exception in Tanganyika and that s155 (competence of witnesses) and s164 (bigamy)338 of the 
Penal Code [Tanganyika] confirmed that legal position.  It was argued that the intention of 
the spousal immunity conspiracy provision could not apply to Mohammedans, as “English 
criminal law assumes monogamy.”   
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The magistrate considered that the word “person” (in the offence provision) in the Penal Code 
possibly excluded any need for special consideration at all as the potentially polygamous 
nature of the marriage would be decisive as “husband and wife even in a monogamous 
marriage could properly be charged with conspiring with each other in Tanganyika”.339 In the 
Penal Code only marital coercion had been specifically addressed in relation to the uxorial 
privileges. “The only specific provision about a wife’s criminal responsibility, as 
distinguished from a joint responsibility, is s20 of the Penal Code following s47 of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1925 and dealing with coercion and not with unity of person which the 
[sic] accepted basis of the English Rule about the competency of a charge of conspiracy.”340 
The magistrate, was of the opinion that if the Penal Code required him to construe “person” 
and “conspire” in s110(a) in accordance with English341 criminal law, then applying the dicta 
of Lord Brougham in Warrender v Warrender;342 that  “Marriage is one and the same thing 
substantially all the Christian world over. Our whole law of marriage assumes monogamy”.343 
The Magistrate concluded: 
 
No authorities were cited and I have found none to show that in England law this unity of 
person is accredited to any other union, and in the absence of such authority I cannot assume 
that this specialised conception of unity extends in England jurisprudence to a potentially 
polygamous union which has none of the features which are involved in the legal unity.344 
 
In addition the resident magistrate found that the marriage of an Ismailia Khoja woman did 
not affect her legal personality,345 as was otherwise a consequence under common law: her 
marriage was not coverture as an Ismailia Khoja woman entered into no disabilities in respect 
of her property, upon the marriage, the relationship being “purely contracted and it is 
polygamous”. Under Tanganyikan law, spouses were competent witnesses for the prosecution 
                                              
339
 Ibid p32. 
340
 Ibid p32. 
341
 The magistrate noted s3 Divorce Ordinance Cap 110, Laws of Tanganyika applied the common law 
definition of marriage. 
342
 (1835) 2 Cl & F 532 (HL). 
343
 The passage in Hawkins confirmed this, so that the common law only envisaged a monogamous marriage. 1 
Hawk ‘Pleas of the Crown’ c72 s8. 
344
 Ibid p32. 
345
 Vesey – Fitzgerald, ‘Abridgement of Mohammedan Law’, p87. 
   
 339 
in all cases346 and it was not possible for a Mohammedan marriage to legally be made 
monogamous.347 The magistrate concluded that it followed the husband and wife in a 
potentially polygamous marriage could be charged “for an offence for which Christian 
spouses are not answerable.”348 He rejected a submission based on R v Esop349 the personal 
law of the parties should prevail as it was the law of the land where the marriage occurred that 
was vital. “Their personal or religious law is not being applied in this case either: it is relevant 
only in construing the meaning of the word “person” in English criminal law.”350 
 
The wife, Laila Jhina Mawji gave evidence,351 she was married to Kassamali Karim Mawani, 
the second accused, at HM Aga Khan Ismailia Jamat Khana in Dar-Es-Salaam six years 
earlier and produced a marriage certificate to verify that. She gave a defence352 denying any 
wrongful intent. For the spouses, the Honorary Secretary of His Highness Aga Khan Ismailia 
Provincial Council gave evidence that the defendants were subjects of the Shia Mohammedan 
sect and what that entailed.   
 
 
VERDICT OF RESIDENT MAGISTRATE 
 
On 3 January 1955, JA Scollin delivered his judgment.353 He recalled his ruling that there had 
been a case to answer, which was based on the proposition that the marriage, “did not possess 
certain features which I considered inseparable from the kind of marriage which English law 
has in mind.”354 He referred to the evidence of the Constitution, Rules and Regulations of the 
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Ismailia Council of Africa called to demonstrate that as members of that sect, the marriage 
was in fact monogamous. The magistrate, however, rejected that proposition as Rule 19(a) of 
chapter IX355 provided a list of grounds (“serious illness, insanity, cruelty, or non-bearing of 
children”) upon which, by application to the Ismailia Council of Africa, the husband could 
apply “to marry a second wife”. Included in such an application was a requirement stipulated 
in Rule 19(b), that the husband had to deposit with the Council “a minimum sum of 
Shs10,000/- or any greater sum as fixed by the Council.” That deposited sum would then be 
invested by the Council “on account and risk of the parties concerned, on sound securities, 
and its income shall be paid to the husband if the first wife is living with him.” It further 
provided that the income from that fund would be paid direct to the first wife if she actually 
leaves the husband. The magistrate found on the facts:356 “The taking of a second wife does 
not operate as a divorce of the first wife – if she wants to remarry she must apply for divorce 
and then wait four months – and she can chose to live with her husband. There is nothing to 
say that she can enforce full conjugal rights but equally there is nothing to say the husband 
cannot exercise them with impunity.” 
 
He concluded:357 
 
However close to monogamy the Ismailia Khoja sect are coming, I am satisfied that this 
situation of one wife and another optional or semi-wife is not monogamous and not the kind 
of union to which legal unity is accredited in English Criminal Law. 
 
Therefore a potentially polygamous marriage was before him, and he reasoned that the 
common law never intended to apply so that the wife was not entitled (or the husband to 
benefit from) the spousal conspiracy exemption. Although inter-spousal communications 
were privileged by s122 Indian Evidence Act (and that it would therefore be generally very 
difficult to “bring home a charge of conspiracy” between spouses), this did not matter as here, 
“the accused themselves put the communications made between them in evidence.”358 He 
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therefore, convicted both spouses and sentenced359 each spouse to two months hard labour for 
the conspiracy and four months hard labour (to run consecutively) for the offence of 
receiving. The wife was granted bail pending appeal.360 
 
 
APPEAL TO HIGH COURT OF TANGANYIKA 
 
The spouses appealed361 to the High Court of Tanganyika. Sir Herbert Cox CJ heard the 
appeal in which the principal ground was that the spouses were entitled to the common law 
immunity. After a brief consideration of the facts362 he considered the substantive argument 
advanced by the appellants that “it did not matter what was the form of the marriage, that it 
need not be monogamous, a marriage being a marriage so long as the marriage was 
subsisting”.363 For the respondent, it was argued that the phrase “any person” in the offence-
creating section of the Penal Code clearly meant in natural language terms, any individual; it 
did not mean any person (as understood more narrowly at common law). This point was 
reinforced by reference to ss384-386 Penal Code (relating to conspiracies) and ss388 and 389 
(relating to accessories), all of which also commenced with the same inclusive introductory 
formula “Any person”. By contrast, s387 of the Code (providing for the offence of being an 
accessory after the fact of another) only used the significantly constricted language “A 
person…” when it was intended that a section of the Penal Code made special protection for 
spouses, so that in that particular situation neither spouse could become liable as an accessory 
after the fact to the other. Cox CJ stated:364 
 
The need for special legislation in this instance [s387 Penal Code of Tanganyika] it is argued, 
clearly shows that where in the Penal Code effect is to be given to the fiction that husband and 
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wife are one it is made clear in the section in question and thus the words “Any person” used 
elsewhere in the Penal Code does not permit of any interpretation other than the word 
“person” so used means any individual. 
 
He ruled in agreement with the magistrate, that the marriage was not monogamous, but 
potentially polygamous but added that that finding did not fully dispose of the issue, because 
in  Mawji Damji v Ayalbai Damji Devraj and Dhanji Damji365 it had been held that it may be 
inequitable to strictly apply common law in Tanganyika, as the Tanganyika Order in Council 
1920, provided for local differentiating circumstances to prevail and led to an altered meaning 
of the common law, where required. In common with the magistrate, Cox CJ rejected the 
argument that the personal law of the appellants was decisive. He accepted that whether their 
personal law would permit a second wife to be taken was irrelevant as the question in issue on 
the appeal, is one between the two individuals and the Crown.  He concluded that the 
individuals were endeavouring to use the common law fiction of the unity of husband and 
wife exclusively available in a monogamous marriage, while their marriage is not in fact 
monogamous within the meaning of the common law stipulation.366 
 
The Chief Justice wryly concluded, in dismissing the appeals:367 
 
It is interesting to see an example of an eastern sect, namely, the Ismailia Khoja sect, a sub-
sect of the Shia sect of Mohammedans, moving towards western ideas and endeavouring to 
claim the benefit of an out-moded Common Law fiction. I say “out-moded” because while the 
Common Law fiction was doubt (sic) based on reasonably good grounds when in the old days 
a woman in marriage became in effect the property of her husband and all her property 
became his property, those days have gone as there has been much legislation relating to the 
independent status of women and to the reservation to wives of separate estates. 
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APPEAL TO THE EAST AFRICAN COURT OF APPEAL 
 
The spouses further appealed368 to the Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa.  The appeal was 
heard by Nihill P Worley V P and Lowe J on 1 August and the decision dismissing the appeal 
was pronounced by the President on 10 August 1955,369 who described the conspiracy charge 
between spouses as “somewhat exceptional”370 and involving “a very important” point of law. 
The judgment accepted that “If the doctrine of the English Common Law that husband and 
wife are one person is applicable to these two appellants there can be no doubt that count one 
was ill-founded”, but it ultimately affirmed the decisions of the Courts below.”371 Weight was 
placed on the dictum of Lord Penzance in Hyde v Hyde372 that “marriage as understood in 
Christendom may for this purpose be defined as the voluntary union for life of one man and 
one woman to the exclusion of all others,” and that as the Rules of the Ismailia Council 
permitted a husband a second concurrent wife, the court concluded “after much 
consideration”373 that potential polygamy ousted the common law fiction. The interesting 
issue therefore directly arose whether a conception of the common law based on a 
monogamous marriage system, had any relation to a lawful system of marriage which permits 
polygamy, even if only under stringent conditions.374 
 
In keeping with the two lower courts, the Court of Appeal rejected an argument that the 
phrase “any person” in the Penal Code should be construed other than in its ordinary literal 
meaning.375 But it did so, because of the wider criminal law implications that would follow of 
placing a potentially polygamous marriage in the same category as a Christian marriage.  The 
rules of competence and compellability and the uxorial privileges would all have to be 
extended. But East African courts for the proceeding half century had consistently refused to 
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find that non-Christian “marriages” were not valid for generating ordinary marital privileges 
and incompellability. 
 
In rejecting the Crown submission that the plain language of the phrase “any person” created 
“no exception or provision covering married spouses”376 thereby overruling the common law, 
the Court of Appeal noted that the prosecution argument was attractive “because if it could be 
accepted it would place the law as regards conspiracy between spouses in Tanganyika on the 
same footing no matter what the nature of the marital union”377 namely that the common law 
immunity would be abrogated. Unfortunately, the Court of Appeal never grappled with the 
fundamental issues as to whether the common law conception was sound. It asserted that the 
common law rule was irrefragable, “Nothing can be more certain than that in England a 
husband and wife cannot alone be found guilty of conspiracy.”378 Because s4 Penal Code, 
Tanganyika provided: 
 
 
“4. This Code shall be interpreted in accordance with the 
principles of legal interpretation obtaining in England, and 
expressions used in it shall be presumed, so far as is consistent 
with their context, and except as may be otherwise expressly 
provided, to be used with the meaning attaching to them in 
English Criminal Law and shall be construed in accordance 
therewith.” 
 
 
General rule of construction. 
 
 
the Court reasoned the expression “any other person: in s110 Penal Code, “could not be 
applied to either spouse of a union recognised as a marriage under the English common law, 
for both spouses are regarded as one person.”379 But, the essential reasoning was that, “where 
the union is polygamous [the reason for the spousal immunity] is not the same, because a 
union of this kind would not be recognisable as a marriage at all within the framework of the 
English Common Law”. The Court continued that, it is a different thing however to extend 
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the common law fiction that husband and wife are one person and possess one will, to a form 
of union where the female spouse is not limited to one.380The East African Court of Appeal, 
which was peripatetic, but sitting at Dar-Es-Salaam to hear the appeal, observed: 
 
We have not the library here at our disposal to enable us to trace the precise source from 
which the common law doctrine has sprung, but that it was Christian in character we have 
little doubt. To apply a doctrine based on the principle that the sacrament of marriage 
constitutes the parties “bone of one bone and flesh of one flesh” to form of marital union 
based solely on a contractual conception would to our mind be entirely wrong.381 
 
The Court was significantly influenced by the recent decision in Nyali Ltd v Attorney 
General382 where Denning LJ considering the proviso to Article 15 Kenya Order-In-Council 
1902, spoke of the great task entrusted to Judges in Africa, “to prune and cut away the 
offshoots of the common law uncongenial to the soil of the African Continent.”383 On the face 
of it the appeal presented a perfect opportunity to find the common law had to be adapted to 
the special circumstances of Tangyanika in which the great majority of people were Muslim 
and therefore, polygamy and potential polygamy was by far the usual matrimonial condition. 
However, the court dealt with Denning LJ’s statement of obligation, by distinguishing it, 
 
Fortunately here our task is not so onerous as that depicted in Nyali Ltd v Attorney General 
because we have not to consider the cutting away of a principle which would prima facie be 
applicable. We are merely refusing to extend a doctrine to a set of circumstances to which 
under the common law the doctrine could never have been applied.384 
 
The Court of Appeal dismissed the spouses’ appeal against the conspiracy charge. 
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WIFE’S CONVICTION FOR RECEIVING FROM HUSBAND QUASHED 
 
However, the wife’s conviction for receiving the stolen clock was quashed because, 
(inconsistently), she was entitled to an uxorial privilege.385 The Court concluded that both 
lower courts had overlooked the applicable law: 
 
Namely, whether a wife living with her husband in a matrimonial home can properly be 
convicted of receiving or retaining stolen property unless there is evidence that she acted 
independently of her husband. In English law it is clear that wife (sic) charged jointly with her 
husband for receiving may be convicted where there is evidence that she acted independently 
in receiving the stolen goods but it would seem not otherwise (R v Baines386 (1900) 69 LJQB 
681). This is because there is a natural presumption in the absence of evidence to the contrary, 
that the goods and chattels gathered together in the matrimonial home are the property of the 
husband and in his possession.387 
 
Nihill P concluded that to support the receiving charge against the wife evidence was needed 
establishing some independent act by her of retaining the clock, knowing or having reason to 
believe that it was stolen property. The wife’s reaction when first approached by the police 
could have been based on a natural “desire to shield her husband from embarrassing and 
inconvenient enquires; it does not, in our opinion, constitute proof that she had appropriated 
the clock to her own special use and possession independently of her husband’s 
possession”,388 so what might appear to have been an admission by her was held to be an 
equivocal statement and therefore an unsafe basis for her conviction on the substantive charge 
of receiving. 
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PRIVY COUNCIL HEARS APPEAL 
 
The Privy Council on 7 May 1956389 granted special leave to appeal to the spouses “limited to 
the Count of conspiracy”.390 On 3 and 4 December 1956 the Appeal391 was argued and Lord 
Oaksey presiding in the Privy Council392 announced that on the second day of the hearing, for 
reasons to be given later, that it would advise the quashing of the conspiracy convictions.393 
On 19 December 1956,394 before the reasons of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
were delivered on 15 January 1957 by Lord Somervell of Harrow, the Privy Council at 
Buckingham Palace formally ordered that the conspiracy convictions be quashed.395 Mrs 
Mawji had completed her sentence of imprisonment before then. 
 
 
THE WRITTEN CASE OF APPELLANTS BEFORE PRIVY COUNCIL 
 
The formal written case for the Appellants exclusively relied in argument on extracts from: 
Genesis396 in the Bible, and passages from Blackstone397 and Hawkins. Only a single and 
                                              
389
 Ibid p95: Order of Her Majesty in Council granting special leave to Appeal dated 1 June 1956. 
390
 Ibid p96. 
391
 The appeal was lodged as Appeal No 9 of 1956.   
392
 Lord Oaksey, Lord Tucker, Lord Cohen, Lord Keith of Avonholm, Lord Somervell of Harrow. The majority 
of the Law Lords (except Lord Tucker and Somervell) had judicial experience involving polygamy. Lord Oaksey 
delivered the advice in: Penhas v Tan See Eng [1953] AC 304 (PC) on appeal from Singapore/Lord Tucker later 
delivered the advice in: Coleman v Shang [1961] AC 481 (PC)/Lord Cohen had heard: Bamgbose v Daniel 
[1955] AC 107 (PC) (on appeal from Nigeria)/Lord Keith of Avonholm delivered the advice in: Bamgbose v 
Daniel [1955] AC 107 (PC)/Lord Somervell was appointed a Lord of Appeal in Ordinary (from the Court of 
Appeal) on 1 October 1954 (see: Judges, Law Officers Etc 1954 Memoranda: [1954] AC b(2), having been 
Solicitor-General from 1933 to 1936 and Attorney General from 1936 to 1945. 
393
 At the end of the hearing of the oral argument in the appeal. 
394
 Present: Her Majesty the Queen, Lord President, Earl of Home, Mr Secretary Lennox-Boyd and Sir Reginald 
Manningham-Buller (the Attorney General, later Viscount Dilhorne). 
395
 Mawji v The Queen was briefly considered in three casenotes. One observing, (1957) 78 LQR 140, 141 that 
the decision “leaves undecided the question whether the various wives of a polygamous marriage can conspire 
with each other. If each one must be regarded as one person with the husband it would seem to follow that all of 
the wives must be one person with each other, and therefore incapable of joining in a conspiracy”. A second, 
[1957] Crim LR 185 inquiring “Could two wives of the polygamous marriage be convicted for conspiring 
together?” The third, [1957] 1 Journal of African Law 116, notes that the identical provision to s4 Penal Code 
[Tanganyika] “[is] found in the other East African Penal Codes”, but not in other African criminal codes. 
396
 Ch 2, v21; C3 v16. 
397
 Blackstone’s, ‘Commentaries on the Laws of England’, vol 1 para 433, “Our Law considers marriage in no 
other light than as a civil contract, and until very recently the holiness of the matrimonial state was left entirely 
to the matrimonial law: the temporal courts not having jurisdiction to consider unlawful marriage as a sin, but 
merely as a civil inconvenience.”   
   
 348 
tangential reference to the decision of R v Sharp398 was made. No reference whatever to the 
relevant caselaw in the United States, Canada or New Zealand was made.  It was argued that 
the spouses were “living together in a common matrimonial home under conditions in all 
respects similar to a monogamous union.”399 In particular it was argued in the written case “as 
the origins of the doctrine are to be found in the Old Testament (Genesis II 21 and III 16) 
which was written against the general background of polygamy which presented at that 
time”,400 then the common law doctrine should give effect to its true biblical origins. It was 
also argued that Genesis provided two origins, firstly “mythological theory”401 as to the 
manner in which woman was first created from the body of Adam and secondly the “theory of 
subordination”402 as a result of the words “He shall rule over thee.”  
 
Because polygamy had an underlying contractual basis it was argued that Blackstone’s, 
‘Commentaries on the Laws of England’,403 was authority: 
 
Our Law considers marriage in no other light than as a civil contract, and until very recently 
the holiness of the matrimonial state was left entirely to the matrimonial law: the temporal 
courts not having jurisdiction to consider unlawful marriage as a sin, but merely as a civil 
inconvenience … 
 
The Appellant’s written argument404 was that the theory of subordination (which is applicable 
while the marriage is monogamous or polygamous) has been accepted as the origin and basis 
for the doctrine in English Law.   
 
By marriage, the husband and wife are for most purposes one person in law: that is the very 
being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is 
incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband: under whose wing, protection, and 
cover, she performs everything; and is therefore called in our Law French a feme-covert, 
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foemina viro co-operta; is said to be covert baron, or under the protection and influence of her 
husband, her baron, or lord; and her condition during her marriage is called her coverture. 
Upon this principle of a union of person in husband and wife, depend almost all the legal 
rights, duties, and disabilities that either of them acquires by the marriage. I speak not at 
present of the rights of property, but of such as are merely personal.405 
 
 
THE WRITTEN CASE OF RESPONDENT BEFORE PRIVY COUNCIL 
 
In the written Case for the Respondent it was flaccidly contended that the common law 
doctrine perhaps did not apply to the offence created by s110(a) Penal Code: 
 
The said English rule is not a rule of interpretation as provided in Section 4 of the said Code. 
The only effect of Section 4 was that the word “conspire” in Section 110(a) of the Code had 
the same meaning as in English Law. The English rule that two persons of a particular 
relationship to one another could not alone conspire with one another was not a matter of 
interpretation or meaning of word “conspire” but was based another principle of English Law 
namely the fiction that here two persons, namely a husband and wife, were in law one person. 
Section 4 of the Penal Code does not import that principle into the Code.406 
 
A separate submission was made that whereas s17(1) Tanganyika Order in Council 1920, 
established the High Court of Tanganyika, s17(2) of it provided the criminal jurisdiction of 
the High Court should be exercised in accordance with the Penal Code [India]; so that the 
English Rule of spousal exemption was not imported into the law of Tanganyika at all. If the 
common law (of England) applied, it was subject to the local laws of the Colony, so far as 
local laws did not extend or apply. It was instanced that s20 Penal Code, “provided that a 
married woman should not be free from criminal responsibility for doing an act merely 
because the act took place in the presence of her husband”407Therefore, it was argued that the 
general rule was that a wife was liable for her crimes, so there was no room for the common 
law exception to consistently apply with that statutory abrogation. However, the Respondent 
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never argued that the common law rule of spousal exemption did not exist in England even 
though no appellate court had ever decided the point. The basic issue went by default, the 
Crown never taking the opportunity in the Privy Council that it had tried to take in the East 
African Court of Appeal. Instead the strategy adopted by the prosecution was to show that the 
assumed Common Law rule did not become Tanganyikan law, because it was a fiction 
incompatible with the prevailing Indian law408 there and in any event, inapplicable in a 
potentially polygamous situation. It followed409 that s17(2) Tanganyika Order in Council 
1920 prevailed so that common law only existed if valid by local circumstances. 
 
The said English Rule being based on a Christian view of marriage, that is, the taking by a 
man of a wife to the exclusion of all others, should not apply to a territory where the 
inhabitants practised and were permitted to practise polygamy.410 
 
 
ORAL SUBMISSIONS BEFORE THE PRIVY COUNCIL 
 
Apart from the tiresome repetition of the Biblical origin and context for the sublimation of 
wives it was advanced that English law further acknowledged the principle of subordination 
of married women, relying on Manby v Scott.411 The argument followed that the element of 
subordination in an orthodox marriage was just as lively in polygamy: Phillips v Barnet412 
was cited as authority for the theory of conjugal unity and in oral argument (but not written) 
Kowbel v The Queen413 was relied upon as identifying the pedigree of the doctrine. The Privy 
Council had previously recognised polygamy was acceptable for purposes of: legitimacy, 
rights of property and testamentary succession. Two articles from the Law Quarterly Review 
were cited414 to show the law’s acceptance of potentially polygamous marriages in a wide 
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variety of circumstances.415 And in Srini Vasan (orse Clayton) v Srini Vasan416 Barnard J had 
also recognised the validity of a potentially polygamous marriage, a decision which was 
collaterally affirmed in Baindail (otherwise Lawson) v Baindail.417  
 
For the Respondent it was argued that the common law position did not apply at all to the 
Penal Code but it was conceded that the common law rule was “a substantive principle of 
English Law”.418 Authority from India419 was cited to show that the exemption did not apply 
there and although the courts in Canada420 and New Zealand421 had upheld the exemption 
“[t]he New Zealand and Canadian statutes are very different from this Penal Code.”422 It was 
argued that the English doctrine, “was based on the unity of the spouses and not on any 
principle of coercion or subordination and that the spousal exemption rule was an anomalous 
rule for which there was “no direct authority.” Because s47 Criminal Justice Act 1925 [UK] 
had abolished in England the  presumption of coercion, and as had been abolished 
subsequently in Tanganyika, it was not possible to rely on coercion as being a subsisting 
principle that could ground the spousal exemption for conspiracy. Therefore, the Respondent 
argued that the true principle could only be based upon the notion that spouses are presumed 
to have but one will. English423 and American424 academic writing all confirmed there was no 
decided case by a court of final appeal, other than the decision of the Supreme Court of 
Canada. Two English texts425 even doubted the existence of the basic underlying rule so in 
extension of it to polygamy should be countenanced as monogamy was the essential tenet of 
marriage as recognised hitherto by the common law.  
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The Respondent’s case was firmly based on the theory of unity and not of coercion, but it 
accepted after making reference426 to s25 (sic) Criminal Justice Act 1925 [UK] that the 
abolition there precluded further reliance upon any basis of coercion for grounding the 
spousal exemption. In reply for the Appellants it was argued that the legislature of 
Tanganyika must have had well in mind the notion of polygamous and monogamous 
marriages existing side by side and for the common law rule only to apply to monogamous 
marriages427 would operate oppressively against the great majority of the community who 
were polygamists. 
 
 
DECISION OF PRIVY COUNCIL 
 
The Privy Council concluded that the supposed rule “primarily contemplated” monogamous 
union. But in Tanganyika polygamous marriage was “fully valid” under local law. This case 
ought to have strained beyond breaking point the fusion rule – with its necessary acceptance 
that at least two women could be conjoined into the single union with their shared husband. 
However, for reasons that cannot be satisfactorily explained Counsel for the Crown accepted 
the validity of the underlying rule. This concession significantly devalues the judgment 
although the decision has been almost indiscriminately followed by courts in other countries. 
It is a convenient authority for that purpose. For the Crown it was conceded that the uxorial 
conspiracy exemption doctrine is a “substantive principle of English law”. The closest the 
Crown got to injuring the rule was to submit that to validate polygamy via the common law is 
“really anomalous” at p131.428 It was stated that monogamy remains in England “the essential 
tenet of a valid marriage”.429 Lord Somervell of Harrow delivered the judgment and noted 
that Hawkins’430 quoted the Statute Ordinacio de Conspiratoribus (33 or 21 ed 1) “that 
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conspirators be they that do confederate or bind themselves by oath, covenant” et cetera. 
Hawkins argued that it followed from the wording of the statute that one person alone could 
not be guilty of conspiracy and added: 
 
Also upon the same ground it hath been holden, that no such prosecution is maintainable 
against a husband and wife only, because they are esteemed but one person in law, and are 
presumed to have but one will. 
 
From this short and inadequate overview Lord Somervell added “It was not disputed that the 
rule is part of the English criminal law.” It is that assumption which has bedevilled this area 
of the law which led to the conclusion that a wife is not an “other person”. For the purposes of 
criminal conspiracies Lord Somervell reasoned that the exemption “is an example of the 
fiction that husband and wife are regarded for certain purposes, of which this is one, as in law 
one person.431” adding that in the criminal law of Tanganyika, the words ‘husband’ and ‘wife’ 
if unqualified are not restricted to monogamous unions. Express words had to be used to 
achieve the limit to monogamy.432 It was observed that s155(2) Criminal Procedure Code 
Tanganyika restricts the competence in the case of a wife or husband to those of a 
monogamous marriage. A reason for its decision was that certain sections of the criminal law 
appeared to recognise the “unity” of husband and wife in relation to criminal responsibility. In 
particular s387 Criminal Penal Code provided that a wife who assists her husband to escape 
punishment does not become an accessory after the fact. Further s264 Criminal Penal Code 
assumed the general common law principle that a wife could not steal from her husband. In 
addition s161(d) Criminal Penal Code provides that neither husband nor wife can be made to 
disclose communications made by one to the other during marriage. Lord Somervell added “It 
is clear, of course, that the marriages primarily contemplated by the rule in England were 
monogamous marriages…” In relation to England the Privy Council expressed no opinion but 
added “It may be that such a [polygamous] marriage would be recognised for the purpose of 
this rule”.433  
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It is apparent that the Privy Council was essentially of the view that so much of the corpus of 
Tanganyikan criminal law expressly or impliedly operated on the premise of marital unity, 
that it could not carve an exception so that the anomalous medieval rule was terminated for 
monogamous marriages – so it had to be extended to polygamous ones. The reasons for 
allowing the appeal are short and superficial. It stated that “the point is not an easy one”. Only 
Kowbel v The Queen434 in the Supreme Court of Canada and a limited reference to the 
matrimonial decision of the English Court of Appeal in Baindail v Baindail435 are noted. 
There is a brief historical survey of the institutional writers, but the objective of that survey 
appears to have been limited to showing the provenance of the common law, rather than 
wrestling with its validity. It demonstrated that the common law existed in the fourteenth 
century436 was reiterated uncritically by Hawkins437 and the incipient law of conspiracy is 
traced to the Statute Ordinacio de Conspiratoribus.438 
 
Lord Somervell accepted that the common law rule is an example of a fiction that husband 
and wife “are regarded for certain purposes”439 as in law one person. There was no analysis of 
what the limited purposes were or why those purposes, whatever they may be, should subsist. 
Lord Somervell noted that some of the consequences of the fiction “have been removed or 
modified by statute.”440 The next reason advanced was that in Tanganyikan criminal law the 
words “husband” and “wife” are not, if unqualified, restricted to monogamous unions. The 
legislature by s155(1) Criminal Procedure Code, Tanganyika provided that the wife or 
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husband of a person charged is a competent witness for the prosecution; yet s155(2)441 
specifically restricts the competence in the case of a wife or husband of a monogamous 
marriage. Other provisions also made specific reference to exempting wives from criminal 
liability.442 Lord Somervell accepted that the marriages primarily contemplated by the 
common law were monogamous marriages.443 He therefore concluded that potentially 
polygamous marriages have been recognised for various purposes. He added in relation to the 
position in England and a polygamous marriage involving the common law, “It may be that 
such a marriage would be recognised for the purpose of this rule”.444 He however, added that 
the prosecution had conceded that the spousal exemption rule existed: “It was not disputed 
that the rule is part of the English common law.” It is that assumption which has bedevilled 
this area of the law which led to the conclusion that a wife is not an “other person”.   
 
 
IMPLICATIONS OF MODERN SPOUSAL CONSPIRACY EXEMPTION 
 
Where a husband and wife are charged with another, the spouses445 alone may literally face 
trial alone for that conspiracy and they may be convicted of it. If the other person is not tried 
with them or does not appear at the trial, that provides no legal impediment to their conviction 
for that conspiracy. The very fiction that spouses cannot conspire together is at breaking point 
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in terms of public perception, when the spouses are the only remaining representatives of a 
wider conspiracy physically before the court.446 In that circumstance, the prosecution has to 
prove beyond reasonable doubt that there had in fact been some other party, other than the 
spouses, with whom they had conspired. If guilt is only established against the husband and 
wife because their alleged co-conspirator is acquitted then they obtain the windfall of an 
automatic acquittal. This scenario does occur in practice.447 A spouse may also be tried for a 
conspiracy involving others (including the other spouse), where none of the other co-accused 
appear at trial.448 These presentational aspects of the law are likely to reinforce a conclusion 
by members of the public that the wider spousal exemption is anachronistic and asinine.   
   
Glanville L Williams449 concluded the unity principle was a very imperfect representation of 
judge-made law, as in criminal matters the wife was wholly capable of acting both 
independently of and in concert with her husband. The law had been shaped by jurists and 
was not synchronised with evolving modern conditions. The English Court of Appeal in 
Broom v Morgan450 stated that public policy was the basis for the original principle of unity 
which was adopted by the common law. As early as the time of Coke the rationale for spousal 
incompetence in evidentiary matters had moved towards a consideration of the public policy 
which ought to guide the law away from the rigid formalistic imperatives of yore. In the 
extent to which there could be intrusion into the marital relationship, in ‘Coke upon 
Littleton’,451 it was recorded: 
 
Note, it hath been resolved by the justices, that a wife cannot be produced either against or for 
her husband, quia sunt duae animae in carne unâ; and it might be a cause of implacable 
                                              
446
 R v Chambers (1973) 111 CCC (2d) 282. 
447
 R v Lovick (Sylvia) [1993] Crim LR 890; HKSAR v Luk Shu Keung [2004] 1 HKC 568, where upon the 
acquittal of the wife’s sister, both spouses as the only remaining alleged conspirators were reluctantly acquitted 
by the judge.   
448
 In R v Nichols (1742) 2 Stra 1227 the other co-accused had died; R v Plummer [1902] 2 KB 339.   
449
 Glanville L Williams, ‘The Legal Unity of Husband and Wife’, (1947) 10 Modern Law Review 16, 19. In R v 
McKechie [1926] NZLR 1, 6 (CA) Stout CJ expressed the view that the basis of the common law rule was that 
the husband was supposed to dominate and control the acts of his wife. But in Kowbel v R [1954] 4 DLR 337 
(SCC) Tachereau J pointed out the theory of unity and the defence of martial coercion were different concepts.    
450
 [1953] 1 QB 597, 611 per Hodson LJ. But at p609 Denning LJ said the theory “has no longer any place in our 
law.” 
451
 18 ed (1823) vol 1 chapter 1 at p6b.   
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discord and dissention between the husband and the wife, and a meane of great 
inconvenience.452       
 
The prescient observation of Oliver J was that public policy was the basis for the exemption, 
not the doctrine of unity, although it had generated the public interest in the preservation of 
the marital relationship.  
  
[T]he continued existence of the rule, in relation to the crime of conspiracy rests, as the more 
modern cases suggest, not upon a supposed inability to agree as a result of some fictional 
unity, but upon a public policy which, for the preservation of the sanctity of marriage, accords 
an immunity from prosecution to spouses who have done no more than agree between 
themselves in circumstances which would lay them open, if unmarried, to a charge of 
conspiracy.453 
 
By the time of Mawji, the inarticulate premise of the common law providing for the spousal 
exemption could have been based upon a view of public policy and less upon marital unity, 
yet still the fictional conjugal unity dominated the judicial approach. With marital unity being 
identified as the core principle understandably, there could be no inhibition to a conspiracy 
between a parent and child. But that policy does not extend to a parent and child.454 But it 
does not survive close scrutiny at other than the level of rhetoric. Its continuance is 
awkwardly inconsistent as it is confined to the bare agreement. It grants no protection beyond 
the radius of the marital communication completing the agreement. The logic for its survival 
                                              
452
 But that rationale may have applied only to the admissibility of inter-spousal evidence, because in ‘Coke 
Upon Littleton’, vol 1 c10 p112 it is stated, without qualification, that a man cannot grant tenements to his wife 
during coverture “for that his wife and he be but one person in the law.” Oliver J in Midland Bank Trust Co Ltd v 
Green (No 3) [1979] 1 Ch 496, 519H stated, “I doubt in fact whether it is possible to trace or to state any single 
and consistent rationale for the application of the fiction of marital unity in its various contexts. For instance, as 
regards the competence of spouses as witnesses, that has been said recently to have rested upon a combination of 
various considerations: the doctrine of unity, the privilege against self-incrimination, a policy which embraces 
the danger of perjury and public repugnance at seeing spouses testify against one another, see the speech of Lord 
Wilberforce in Hoskyn v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1979] AC 474, 483, 484, 488.” 
453
 Midland Bank Trust Co Ltd v Green (No3) [1979] 1 Ch 496, 521C. 
454
 R v Adams (1883) 1 NZCA 311, Johnston J said in his judgment “With respect to the question regarding the 
effect of the relation between the parties charged with the conspiracy – namely, that of father and child – I think 
that, although in point of law there could be no presumption of coercion, of the child by her father, and although it 
is found by the case that there was no evidence of actual coercion, yet the circumstance that the one alleged 
conspirator is the father and the other his child between seven and eight years of age, is of most material 
importance with respect to the amount of evidence which ought to be required to rebut the prima facie 
presumption of the innocence of the girl. It seems, indeed, repulsive to common sense to believe that a girl 
between seven and eight years of age, “conspired, combined, confederated, and agreed” with her father to commit 
a crime.” Gillies J observed that as the daughter and father were alleged co-conspirators this raised the distinct 
issue “whether the child was not acting under, if not the coercion, at least the direction of her father.” Williams J 
concurred. 
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is more bounded in emotion than on demonstrable need in the criminal law once it is 
accepted, as it must be, that every other mode of criminal conduct provides no similar 
privilege; save for the accessory after the fact position, in some jurisdictions. But if the 
rationale for the spousal exemption is the same as that for the accessory after the fact privilege 
then the inconsistency has no principled basis. 
 
So after almost six decades of the twentieth century the common law exemption was well 
embedded in the case law. This work now turns to examine the responses in different 
common law jurisdictions in which the somewhat hesitant position of the common law has 
been in some of those jurisdictions, upgraded to a statutory rule. 
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5 
 
INTRASPOUSAL CONSPIRACY POST-1957 
 
 
 
That one Person alone cannot be guilty of Conspiracy…it follows…that no such Prosecution 
is maintainable against a Husband and Wife only, because they are esteemed but as one 
Person in law, and are presumed to have but one will.1 
 
Almost 300 years later, that encomium by William Hawkins remains true as the substantive 
criminal law of England and Wales,2 Canada3 and other4 common law jurisdictions. The 
medieval fiction has become the modern fact. In other jurisdictions it survived until well into 
the twentieth century5 and indeed the twenty-first6 until it was terminated by statutory 
intervention. Johnston J, a single puisne judge of the New Zealand Supreme Court, had ruled 
in 1886 in the unreported case of R v Howard7 that at common law a conspiracy between a 
                                              
1
 P R Glazebrook (ed), William Hawkins, ‘Pleas of the Crown’, 1716 – 1721, vol 1 c 72 s8, Professional Books 
Limited, 1973. Midland Bank Trust Co Limited v Green (No. 3) [1979] 1 Ch 496, 527E Oliver J said: “I do not 
think that it can be against the policy of the law to recognise as an historical truth that the female of the species is 
not markedly inferior to the male when it comes to the matter of hatching plots – the contrary notion would have 
seemed a little less than convincing to John the Baptist and would have surprised the Thane of Cawdor.” A 
colourful example is R v Sargeant (1826) 1 Ryan & Moody 352 where a married woman was indicted and 
convicted with others for conspiring to procure her husband to marry her. 
2
 s2(2)(a) Criminal Law Act 1977 [UK]. The subsection is not even noted in the major work: Peter Murphy ed, 
‘Blackstone’s Criminal Practice 1999’, Blackstone Press Ltd, London. 
3
 Kowbel v The Queen [1954] 4 DLR 337 (SCC), R v Robotham (1988) 63 CR (3d) 113 (Ont: CA), R v Kam 
Hong Kwan (1992) 10 BCAC 274 (BC: CA). 
4
 Hong Kong: R v Cheung Ka Fai [1995] 3 HKC 214 (CA);  s159 A (1) Crimes Ord, Cap 200 [HK] 
5
 The 3:2 majority decision in favour of the historical orthodoxy in R v McKechie [1926] NZLR 1 (CA) was only 
reversed 35 years later by s67 Crimes Act 1961 [NZ]. 
6
 s33 Criminal Code [Qld], s33 Criminal Code [WA].  But reversed in Queensland and Western Australia by 
1997 by s120 Criminal Law Amendment Act 1977, Act 3 of 1997 [Qld] and s6 Criminal Code Amendment Act 
(No 2) 1987 [WA] respectively.  For example, until the enactment of the Criminal Code Act 1893 [NZ] the 
common law controlled the parameters of substantive criminal law in New Zealand. 
7
 Summarised in The Lyttelton Times, 12 April 1886, p6, col 3 (an irregular shipboard marriage). Mr and Mrs 
Howard and others were indicted for conspiracy to defraud the Mutual Life Association of Australia of £1,000, 
by the husband feigning his death, “with considerable skill and consummate effrontery” per Johnston J in 
sentencing the husband. (For a conspiracy with some factual similarities see R v Mackenzie & Higginson (1910) 
6 Cr App R 64 (CCA).) Mrs Howard identified a severed hand as her husband’s. She was acquitted by the jury. 
They were both Scottish and relied upon the Marriage Law (Scotland) Amending Act 1856 [UK], to provide 
them with their defence to the conspiracy charges. That Act validated an “irregular Marriage contracted in 
Scotland” as long as the parties had lived in Scotland for 21 days preceding such marriage. The defendants 
argued that they entered into, on board a Scottish registered vessel en route for New Zealand, an irregular but 
lawful marriage by cohabitation with habit and repute, fully in accordance with Scots Law. The argument was 
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husband and wife alone was impossible. It is a striking oddity that that point of far-reaching 
substantive criminal law appears never to have been decided anywhere else in the common 
law, for at least 500 years. Hawkins himself had only referred to a single decision in the 
fourteenth century8 as the decisional basis for his proposition. It was supported by the views 
of all other text-writers but on close analysis that accord appears to have essentially been but 
an uncritical repetition of the prevailing wisdom. Later text-writers9 were also, until much 
closer to the end part of the twentieth century,10 unanimous in their acceptance of the 
principle of conjugal fusion necessarily preventing the spousal entities from unlawfully 
confederating. The institutional writers had always accepted that a pre-marriage11 conspiracy, 
between eventual spouses, was not precluded in law or fact by their subsequent matrimony.12 
The immunity was coextensive with the duration of the marriage. Although divorce was 
extremely difficult to procure before the twentieth century,13 the exemption from criminality 
only related to what had occurred during the period of matrimony when the law recognised 
enforceable correlative rights, obligations and expectations deriving from marriage law. 
 
                                                                                                                                             
that the vessel which was registered in Glasgow, was by law of their domicile a floating island.  Johnston J ruled 
after considering Dysart Peerage Case (1881) 6 App Cas 489. There Lord Watson held that the law of Scotland 
accepts the continued cohabitation of a man and woman as spouses, coupled with the general repute of their 
being married persons, as complete evidence of their having deliberately consented to marry, but in order to 
sustain that inference their cohabitation must be within the realm of Scotland. Prior to the Marriage (Scotland) 
Act 1939 [UK] an irregular but lawful Scottish marriage could be entered into by a number of different means: 
marriage de presenti (marriage by present consent), marriage prome subsequente copula (marriage by promise 
followed by intercourse) and marriage by cohabitation with habit and repute. (Only the first two forms of 
marriage were abolished and then prospectively by Marriage (Scotland) Act 1939 [UK]). The third form of 
common law marriage, unsuccessfully relied upon by Mr and Mrs Howard, was only abolished in 2006 in the 
wake of the decisions in Ackerman v Logan’s Executors  2002 SLT 37 and Wetherhill v Sheikh [2005] Scot CS 
CSOH 25, 10 February 2005, Lord Philip.  
8
 (1365) 3 Edw 3. 
9
 ‘Halsbury’s Law of England’, Criminal Law vol 9, p264 para 544 (1909); Horace Smith and A P Perceval 
Kemp (eds) ‘Russell on Crimes’ (1896) 6 ed, vol 1, p152, note(f);  Roome, H D and Ross, R E (eds) ‘Archbold’s 
Criminal Pleading’ (1922) 26 ed Sweet & Maxwell (Publisher) Ltd, p1417; ‘Lush on Husband and Wife’, 3 ed, 
p17; A A Gordon Clarke and Alan Garfitt (eds) Roscoe ‘On Criminal Evidence’ (1952) 16 ed, Stevens, London 
10
 R S Wright ‘The Law of Criminal Conspiracies and Agreements’ (1873) Butterworths, London; William 
Pinder Eversley, ‘Eversley on Domestic Relations’, 3 ed (1906) Stevens and Haynes, London, p29 doubted the 
universal proposition. 
11
 If an indictment describes an accused as a single woman, she must establish the marriage to avail herself of the 
exemption unless it is otherwise proved on the whole of the prosecution evidence. R v Jones (1664) Kel (J) 37. 
The actual marriage should be proved: R v Hassall (1826) 2 Car & P 434 although evidence of cohabitation and 
reputation will be sufficient: Morris v Miller (1767)  4 Burr 2057. 
12
 R v Robinson (1746) 1 Leach 37, noted in Boots v Grundy (1900) 82 LT 769, 773. 
13
 ‘Punishment of a Bigamist’, [1926] Butterworths Fortnightly Notes, 538-539, referring to the remarks of 
Maule J prior to the passing of the Divorce Act 1857 [UK]. 
   
 361 
The common law delimited the immunity to the combination of husband and wife only. 14 
Those two, alone,15 enjoyed a special exempt status under the criminal law. A conspiracy 
between a husband and wife and one or more others16 were always justifiable. No other 
relationship was in such an elevated position of security from the inchoate criminal law. The 
exemption was not available to a single parent and child combination,17 a master and servant 
combination, or otherwise; but it did apply to a polygamous union. 
 
The common law was immalleable , despite the advancement the quest by women for equality 
in political and civil rights. It had re-affirmed the orthodoxy in a number of different common 
law jurisdictions. In R v McKechie18 the New Zealand Court of Appeal, by a majority, held 
that the Crimes Act 1908 [NZ] perpetuated the common law position, by its omission to deal 
with it at all, a position not finally reversed until the general package of criminal law 
legislation culminating in s67 Crimes Act [NZ] 1961.19 The Supreme Court of Canada in 
Kowbel v The Queen20 also by a majority, and after a consideration of R v McKechie also 
maintained the long-standing rule. Shortly thereafter the Privy Council, on appeal from 
Tanganyika in Mawji v The Queen21 reached the same conclusion. Yet for practical reasons it 
is generally very difficult for the prosecution to have evidence of a pure spousal conspiracy; 
very few such cases are ever prosecuted.22  
                                              
14
 See Smith v State (1904) 46 Tex Crim 267; (1905) 48 Tex Crim 233. Glanville Williams at 675-6 n1 states: 
“There is no legal protection for partners, or for parent and child, man and mistress, or lovers, notwithstanding 
that de facto the relationship in any of these cases may in particular circumstances be closer than the relationship 
between an individual husband and wife”.   
15
 In R v Cope (1719) 1 Stra 144 a husband, wife and servants put “grease into the paste” to ruin the business of 
the King’s card-maker. 
16
 R v Duncan (1849) 13 JP 220 (husband, wife and other, wife acquitted of the conspiracy on the basis of 
marital coercion); R v Whitehouse (1852) 6 Cox CC 38 (husband, wife and daughter). 
17
 R v Adams (1883) 1 NZCA 311 (between conspiring father and eight year old daughter, to give false evidence 
implicating one Longhurst of raping that daughter). 
18
 [1926] NZLR 1 (CA). 
19
 Despite the legislation providing for the removal of the cloak of cosy immunity only one example of a pure 
intraspousal conspiracy appears ever to have been charged in New Zealand since the 1961 Act, and that was a 
private prosecution, see fn 22. 
20
 [1954] 4 DLR 337 (SCC). 
21
 [1957] AC 126 (PC). 
22
 But in a private prosecution, a woman (X) and her husband (Y) were indicted with seven counts of conspiracy 
to have a man (Mr Hartley) prosecuted for false allegations of sexual violation by rape, sexual connection, 
indecent assault and stupefaction, X was found guilty on two counts. Y did not stand trial. In that jury trial, 
Hartley v X (X and Y having been granted permanent name suppression), unreported Blenheim District Court, 
T011186, 26 November 2002, Judge DC McKegg presiding; written communication from Deputy Registrar, 
Blenheim, District Court to author dated 4 November 2006. The trial was additionally noted in The Press, 27 
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AMERICAN SUPREME COURT DESTROYS THE EXEMPTION 
 
However, it was the United States Supreme Court in 1960 in United States v Dege (1960) 364 
US 51 which by a majority, extirpated the common law rule as being unnourished by 
common sense and an indignity to all concepts of equality before the law. This remains the 
only occasion in which the highest court of any common law country has repudiated the 
doctrine. A contemporary writer23noted that the decision of the Court of Appeal in R v 
McKechie upholding the marital exemption had “been placed beyond doubt by the Privy 
Council decision” in Mawji v The Queen, which must have been taken as approving it.  That 
outcome was correct on the basis of precedent then24 prevailing. It is clear25 that prior to 1959, 
ie two years after Mawji v The Queen, that no intention had been manifested26 to alter the 
New Zealand statutory law to remove the intraspousal immunity. It is very likely that the 
American decision caused an urgent re-evaluation of the policy considerations driving the 
Crimes Bill 1959 [NZ].  The destructive analysis of the spousal exemption by the American 
Supreme Court, must have impelled an epiphanous conversion for its removal. 
 
It may be remarked that no court has ever decided whether the common law exemption also 
applied to variants of the crime of conspiracy such as an attempt to commit conspiracy,27 
                                                                                                                                             
November 2002, A7. In some jurisdictions on a charge of conspiracy a wife is an incompetent prosecution 
witness against her husband and against his alleged co-conspirators. R v Singh and Amar (1970) 1 CCC (3d) 299 
(BC: CA) following R v Thompson, Danzey and Hide (1872) LR 1 CCCR 377. At p303 Bull JA added “in a 
charge of conspiracy of which the gist is a conspirational agreement between the two accused, evidence against 
one must of necessity be evidence against the other, albeit in some instances, indirect.” R v Yung Kit Mei 
unreported, Cr App 1025/1981, Hong Kong Court of Appeal. McMullin VP, Li and Silke JJA, 2 July 1982 is to 
the same effect. This is a practical prosecution reason why there are so few pure spousal conspiracies charged. 
23
 BD Inglis ‘Family Law’ Sweet & Maxwell (NZ) Limited, Wellington (1960) p527. 
24
 And still now: Owens v Chief Executive of the Ministry of Social Development [2007] NZAR 185, 190 (CA). 
25
 BD Inglis ‘Family Law’ Sweet & Maxwell (NZ) Limited, Wellington (1960) p527 “The relevant sections of 
the Crimes Act 1908 relating to conspiracy must accordingly be read in this light. Perusal of the recently 
introduced Crimes Bill in its present form reveals no indication that the position is likely to be altered in the 
foreseeable future.” But then United States v Dege  intervened and the Bill was redrawn. 
26
 Clauses 320 and 321, Crimes Bill 1959 [NZ] (No 61-1). 
27
 In R v Harris [1927] NPD 330, a South African decision, one party approached another who feigned 
agreement to carrying out an unlawful object, it was held this amounted to the offence of attempting to conspire 
to commit an offence. To the same effect is R v Kotyszyn (1949) 95 CCC 261 (Qué: KB). 
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counselling or procuring a conspiracy28 or incitement to commit conspiracy.29 (The very 
existence of these double inchoate or accessorial inchoate offences is problematic in the law.) 
Other relationships in law, which involve an agreement between a person and an entity (of 
which the person is the mind and will of it) throw up issues of split legal personality, which 
undermine the jurisdiction of the intraspousal immunity. A corporation may conspire with its 
managing director,30 this combination is a justiciable conspiracy,31 even where the conspiracy 
is between a corporate person and its own members.32 The closeness of the relationships in 
those instances identify that unless there is a compelling necessity for exempting any person 
(corporate or otherwise) from the general purview of the criminal law, the law should apply 
without distinction to all before it. It follows that the justification for concluding that a 
marriage licence is also a licence to be exempted from certain criminal conspiracies, must be 
able to withstand close analysis and scrutiny, as justifiable differential treatment.33 Otherwise 
                                              
28
 R v Lanteri (1985) 4 NSWLR 359, 360 (CCA) Street CJ (Priestley JA and Maxwell J concurring) queried 
whether the offence of counselling or procuring a conspiracy existed at all. Under such a law it follows that a 
wife could incite her husband to commit an offence: R v Annie Brown (1896) 15 NZLR 18, 32 per Prendergast 
CJ “wife may be accessory to her husband by procuring or inciting him to commit an offence, and a husband in 
the same way be accessory to the wife’s crime”. They could also jointly incite another person to commit an 
offence including a conspiracy: Glanville Williams (1966-1967) 9 Journal of the Society of Professional 
Teachers of Law (NS) 169 169, 170. But they still could not conspire themselves. An attempt to incite is also an 
offence too: R v Rainsford, (1874) 13 Cox CC 9, 16 per Kelly CB (Lush, Brett, Quain JJ and Pollock B 
concurring); R v Chelmsford Justices ex parte JJ Amos [1973] Crim LR 437 (DC).   
29
 It was accepted in R v De Kromme (1892) 17 Cox CC 492 (CCCR) that it is possible to incite another person 
to commit a conspiracy. But that judgment, which is very short and equally superficial has been cogently 
criticised in R v Dungney (1979) 51 CCC (2d) 87, 91.  However, s5(7) Criminal Law Act 1977 [UK] abolished 
the offence of incitement to conspire. No such legislation has been enacted in Hong Kong. Clive Grossman ed, 
‘Archbold Hong Kong 2005’, Sweet and Maxwell, Hong Kong (2005) p1829 para 36-77. In Mak Sun Kwong v 
The Queen [1980] HKLR 466 (CA) an incitement to commit a conspiracy was held to be an offence known to 
the law. A conspiracy to attempt to commit an offence however, must exist where the substantive offence is 
itself framed in terms of an attempt to achieve an unlawful object: R v Westcott, The Guardian, 1 October 1975, 
The Times, 11 December 1975. 
30
 R v ICR Haulage Ltd [1944] KB 551. (It is only in the report at [1944] 1 All ER 691, 692 that the fact is set 
out that a co-conspirator was the managing director.) The same outcome was reached in Australia: O’Brien v 
Dawson (1942) 66 CLR 18, 32; Canada: R v Electrical Contractors Association of Ontario (1961) 27 DLR (2d) 
193, 201 and England: R v Blamires Transport Services Ltd [1964] 1 QB 278. 
31
 Belmont Finance Corp. v Williams Furniture Ltd (No 2) [1980] 1 All ER 393: Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v 
Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1981] Ch 257.  
32
 Indeed a conspiracy to fix prices such as R v British Columbia Professional Pharmacists Society (1970) 17 
DLR (3d) 285 demonstrates that there can be a conspiracy between the professional body of a group of people 
and its individual members and it matters not that the later are members of the former. 
33
 See the note by R E Megarry ‘Notes’ (1966) 82 LQR 151, 153 that if X is in sole control of three separate 
companies which are charged with taking part in a conspiracy to raise prices illegally, X is acting in three 
different capacities and his mens rea will be different in each case, so that conspiracy will lie. cf Livingston Hall 
“The Substantive Law of Crimes” (1937) 50 Harvard Law Review 616, 648 “there can be no conviction for 
conspiracy where a plurality of parties is logically necessary for the crime, since the corporation could not be 
held for any affirmative crime unless one of its agents acted on its behalf”: R v McDonnell [1966] 1 QB 233, 245 
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it is marriage which is really being protected, at the expense of the general criminal law. The 
ethos of the criminal law in the nineteenth century, in relation to the needs and status of 
wives, is poignantly demonstrated by an 1869 American text.34 Married women were still a 
separate class under the substantive criminal law. Almost a hundred years later American law 
would give the common law position its quietus.35  
 
 
AMERICAN STATE COURTS GIVE THE IMMUNITY ITS QUIETUS 
 
In United States v Dege36 in 1960 the United States Supreme Court decided by a majority 6-3 
that the common law privilege could not be sustained. From 1889, when the issue arose for 
the first time in any American court, the general view was that a husband and wife could not 
be convicted of conspiring to commit an offence alone.37 The basis of the spousal exemption 
was an ill-fitting justification that the wife had been presumptively coerced by her husband 
and in any event, that as one person in law, they could not conspire.38 Entry of a third party 
into the conspiracy terminated the exemption and both husband and wife could in that 
circumstance be convicted, even when the third person was not tried at the same time39. There 
had been conflicting decisions in the United States at the intermediate Court of Appeal level. 
In Dawson v United States40 and in Gros v United States41 the Court of Appeal for the Ninth 
                                                                                                                                             
per Nield J (no two minds between a one-man company and the man for the law of conspiracy); In 
Massachusetts, the same result was reached: Goulart v Trans-Atlantic Marine Inc. [1970] 2 Ll LR 389. But the 
one-man company may contract with the man and vice versa: Lee v Lee’s Air Farming Ltd [1961] AC 12 (PC) 
reversing [1959] NZLR 393 (CA).   
34
 Edmund H Bennett and Franklyn Fiske Heard, ‘A Selection of Leading Cases in Criminal Law with Notes’, 
(1869) Little Brown & Co, Boston vol 1 p83. In Commonwealth v Lewis (1840) 1 Metcalf 151 Dewey J said: 
“The humanity of the criminal law does, indeed, in some instances, consider the acts of the wife as venial, 
although she has in fact participated with her husband in certain acts, which, on the part of her husband, would 
constitute an offence, as against him; upon the ground that much consideration is due to the great principle of 
confidence which a feme coverte may properly place in her husband, as well as the duty of obedience to the 
commands of the husband, by which some femes coverte may be reasonably supposed to be influenced in such 
cases.” 
35
 Only for federal offences. The common law position in the various states took years to unravel. 
36
 (1960) 364 US 51.   
37
 People v Miller (1889) 22 Pac 934; Gros v United States (1943) 138 F 2d 261; and Dawson v United States 
(1926) 10 F 2d 106.   
38
 See People v Gilbert (1938) 78 P2d 770. 
39
 Canadian law is to the same effect: R v Chambers (1973) 11 CCC (2d) 282 so the spouses could alone stand 
trial for a wider conspiracy. 
40
 (1926) 10 F 2d 106. 
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Circuit, on appeal from Idaho and California respectively, had affirmed the common law rule. 
By contrast the Fifth Circuit in Thompson v United States42 and Wright v United States,43 both 
cases on appeal from Georgia, had rejected the common law rule as had the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia Circuit in Johnson v United States.44 
 
Frankfurter J, delivering the majority opinion of the Supreme Court, trenchantly rejected the 
continuation of the common law rule, because legitimate business enterprises between 
husband and wife had long been commonplace and “it would enthrone an unreality into a rule 
of law”45 to suggest that husband and wife were legally incapable of agreeing to carry out an 
unlawful act. None of the policy considerations based on “domestic felicities” which were the 
basis for the restrictive rules pertaining to testimonial compulsion, were relevant to this issue 
of providing an immunity to the spouses. The two assumptions which founded the original 
rule were identified, namely that responsibility of husband and wife for joint participation in a 
criminal enterprise would promote marital disharmony and the second basis being the 
presumed coercive influence of her husband. Frankfurter J roundly dispatched the first 
assumption by stating it was “unnourished by sense”46 and the second, the doctrine of marital 
coercion, implied a view of womanhood “offensive to the ethos of our society”. (Yet 40 years 
later it still exists in some American states.)  He declined to find surviving in the law a 
doctrine that had been hitherto uncritically examined. Frankfurter J placed weight on the 
criticism of the doctrine by Glanville Williams47 and earlier Winfield.48 He concluded that to 
adopt the English common law position for the United States would be only “blind imitation 
of the past”, repeating the phrase of Holmes J in ‘The Path of the Law’.49 The common law 
rule disregarded the vast changes in the status of women, particularly “the extension of her 
                                                                                                                                             
41
 (1943)138 F 2d 261. In People v Pierce (1964) 395 P 2d 893, following United States v Dege the Supreme 
Court of California formally overruled all inconsistent previous jurisprudence.    
42
 (1955) 227 F 2d 671. 
43
 (1957) 243 F 2d 569. 
44
 (1946) 157 F 2d 209. 
45
 (1960) 364 US 51, 52. 
46
 Midland Bank Trust Co Limited v Green (No 3) [1979] 1 Ch 496, 526G Oliver J declined “to contribute to the 
domestic contentment” of marital conspirators. He said that the notion that civil responsibility for the infliction 
of jointly planned injuries would generate marital disharmony was “unnourished by sense” adopting the phrase 
of Frankfurter J in United States v Dege. (1960) 364 US 51, 53. 
47
 (1947)10 MLR 16. 
48
 Winfield, P ‘The History of Conspiracy and Abuse of Legal Procedure’ (1921) Cambridge University Press 
p64 and p88. 
49
 Oliver W Holmes ‘The Path of the Law’ (1897) 10 Harv L Rev 457, 469. 
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rights and correlative duties”.50 American law would not slavishly follow such an 
unprincipled theory and upgrade it to a valid doctrinal norm. 
 
Warren CJ (with whom Black and Whittaker JJ concurred) dissented. He noted that the Privy 
Council in Mawji, the Supreme Court of Canada in Kowbel and the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal in McKechie had all maintained the rule at common law. This “tenacious adherence of 
the judiciary to the husband-wife conspiracy doctrine,” was itself evidence that the impugned 
rule might be predicated upon underlying policies unconnected with women’s suffrage or her 
capacity to sue. Warren CJ reasoned that a wife, by virtue of matrimony, “might easily 
perform acts that would technically be sufficient to involve her in a criminal conspiracy” with 
her husband but which were quite different acts from the arms-length agreement typical of 
conspiracy.51 Warren CJ concluded that to allow a conspiracy between husband and wife 
could “endanger the confidentiality of the marriage relationship.” But as a result of the 
decision of the majority the ancient common law position disappeared for all federal offences 
(only) and at the resumed trial Mr and Mrs Dege were eventually convicted.52 
 
The Supreme Court of Illinois had 6 years in advance of the decision of the United States 
Supreme Court settled the question for that State by holding that the common law rule no 
longer existed, in People v Martin53 where a husband and wife who entered into a criminal 
conspiracy to sell heroin in violation of the Uniform Narcotic Drug Act were not immune 
from prosecution, by the surviving radiations from the common law fiction of the unity of 
husband and wife. The fiction was based upon the disability of the wife to own separate 
property at common law and her lack of capacity to maintain a legal action independently of 
her husband. Much of its vitality of the former view had gone in view of legislation 
abolishing the presumption of coercion of the wife, and often legislation permitting a married 
woman to: own her separate property, to sue and be sued in her own right, and to testify 
                                              
50
  Just after the critical decision in United States v Dege, Lord Denning MR was able to state that the unity rule 
“has now been swept away in nearly all branches of the law.”: Gray v Formosa [1963] P 259, 267. 
51
 This remark might have been directed at intraspousal buggery, for which Canadian law specifically exempted 
spouses: s158(1)(a) Criminal Code [Can]; Patrick J Knoll ‘Criminal Law Defences’ (1987) Carswell, Toronto, 
p69.  Warren CJ had no plausible reason for considering arms-length distance to be typical for conspirators. 
What about other close family members? 
52
 Dege v United States (1962) 308 F 2d 534. 
53
 (1954) 122 NE 2d 245. 
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against her husband. No relevant reason was considered to exist any longer which might 
support the asserted common-law rule. 
 
After United States v Dege the Supreme Court of California54 finally reversed its decision of 
1889,55 saying “The fictional unity of husband and wife has been substantially vitiated by the 
overwhelming evidence that one plus one adds up to two, even in twogetherness.”56 The 
inevitability of this result, it reasoned, flowed from the fact that either spouse could be 
convicted of a crime against the physical person of the other and since as early as 1926 the 
same court had decided that either spouse could be convicted of a crime against the property 
of the other.57 The spouses could be convicted of conspiracy when a third party was involved: 
and most decisively against the fiction was that a spouse could be convicted of a conspiracy 
with another person, to criminally injure the absent spouse.58 As a wife or husband could also 
be an accessory before the fact to the offence of the other, no persuasive justification for not 
including an anterior mode of criminality existed.59 It therefore serenely followed that: 
 
The law, however, poses no threat to their domestic harmony in lawful pursuits. It would be 
ironic indeed if the law could operate to grant them absolution from criminal behavior on the 
ground that it was attended by close harmony.60 
 
The Supreme Court of California also reasoned that if the argument for spousal exemption 
was applied in terms of the extent of the influence between individuals, it would or might 
absolve married people, yet it could be as readily invoked to absolve people linked in any 
other close association, instancing a secret society.61 But the court accepted that because a 
                                              
54
 People v Pierce (1964) 395 P 2d 893. 
55
 People v Miller (1889) 22 P 934. Some three years after People v Pierce, the Court of Appeal of California 
quashed the conviction of a husband and wife for a conspiracy to ostensibly distribute Bibles, when the acts 
involved occurred before that decision was pronounced. See People v Reeves (1967) 250 Cal App 2d 490 (8 
persons indicted, 6 acquitted, leaving only husband and wife, who could not, at the time of the offence, conspire 
together). In People v Lockett (1977) 25 Cal App 3d 433 People v Pierce was applied.   
56
 People v Pierce (1964) 395 P 2d 893, 894 per Traynor CJ enjoying a pun. 
57
 People v Graff (1926) 211 P 829. 
58
 People v Brown (1955) 281 P 2d 319. 
59
 People v Eppstein (1930) 290 P 1054. 
60
 People v Pierce (1964) 395 P 2d 893, 895 per Traynor CJ. 
61
 Ibid p895 “Spousehood may afford a cover for criminal conspiracy. It should not also afford automatically a 
blanket of immunity from criminal responsibility.” The court added that there should be no automatic immunity 
based on the assumption that a wife invariably acts under the compulsion of her husband “…particularly in view 
of the advances status of married women in this State.” At p891 it added: “There is nothing in the contemporary 
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wife was aware of her husband’s illegal activity and even passively helpful to him in the 
everyday acts incidental to marriage, caution was needed from reaching the inferential  
conclusion that the wife (or husband) had agreed with the other spouse. Their acts, to 
constitute an agreement, had to amount to active participation by informed acquiescence, 
incapable of any other explanation, in transcending acts that were otherwise explicable as 
being ordinary in furtherance of the marital union. That caution though only goes to the 
weight of the evidence, not to whether the offence should be justiciable.  
 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided the issue of the spousal exemption for the first 
time ever in 1973,62 finding the non-binding decision of the Supreme Court in United States v 
Dege63 compelling. The court emphasised that there was no express statutory provision 
prohibiting a conviction of two spouses conspiring alone together, so from that premise the 
role of the common law exemption needed to be evaluated against present-day conditions.64 
The “immunity”65 originated from the doctrine of unity with the fictional consequence that 
there was but one shared will between the spouses, reinforced by the common law’s belief in 
“the natural state of a wife’s submissiveness to her husband.”66 This led in linear fashion to 
the conclusion that the wife could not possibly formulate the necessary criminal intent to be 
guilty of a conspiracy with her husband. In a forceful declamation of the common law, 
Manderino J delivering the judgment of the court stated: 
 
There is no reason to perpetuate the fiction that husband and wife are one person with one will 
in the eyes of the law. They are not. They are separate individuals. Each has a distinct 
personality and a will which is not destroyed by any process of spousal fusion. Each acts 
                                                                                                                                             
mores of married life in this State to indicate that either a husband or a wife is more subject to losing himself or 
herself in the criminal schemes of his or her spouse than a bachelor or a spinster is to losing himself or herself in 
the criminal schemes of fellow conspirators.” 
62
 Commonwealth v Lawson (1973) 309 A 2d 391, 395 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania) per Manderino J. The 
Court oddly did not note two earlier decisions from the state, of the County Court and District Court, to the 
contrary: Commonwealth v Allen (1900) 24 Pa Co Ct R; Commonwealth v Kendig (1908) 18 Pa Dist 659. 
63
 (1960) 364 US 51. 
64
 “Initially, it must be noted that in reality a husband and wife can conspire to commit a crime just as any other 
two persons might do.” Commonwealth v Lawson (1973) 309 A 2d 391,395. 
65
 Ibid p396. 
66
 Ibid p396. 
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separately and should be separately responsible for their conduct. We have so recognized in 
other areas of the law.67 
 
Eight years before United States v Dege, the Supreme Court of New Jersey in State v 
Carbone68 had delivered a comprehensive judgment on the law of criminal conspiracy. New 
Jersey is a common law state and the great bulk of the caselaw referred to in the judgment of 
Heher J for the court, is English caselaw. In an introductory part69 it was affirmed that a 
husband and wife could not conspire together. Five years later, a State trial Judge70 applied 
this conclusion and upheld the spousal exemption, noting that New Jersey had enacted in 
182971 its first statute proscribing conspiracy and had re-enacted penal laws against 
conspiracy on several occasions. Waugh JSC concluded that to accede to a submission that 
the exemption did not exist would be “to lightly cast aside one of the most longstanding 
common law rules.”72 It was reasoned that the Legislature had deliberately made only piece-
meal intrusions into the fiction and that no general abolition of the doctrine of marital unity 
had been made.73 Handler JSC in the Esssex County Court of New Jersey in 197274 applied 
State v Struck where a husband and wife were indicted alone for a conspiracy to obtain money 
by false pretences, such acts existing, both prior to and after their wedding. The judge directed 
that while the spouses were liable for the pre-marriage phase the intra-marriage overt acts in 
furtherance of the conspiracy, by contrast, were exempt from the orbit of the criminal law.   
 
But the next year an opposite result obtained.75 McCowan AJSC reviewed the earlier New 
Jersey decisional law and declined to follow it on the basis that earlier decisions of trial courts 
were only persuasive and the binding decision of the Supreme Court of New Jersey in State v 
                                              
67
 Commonwealth v Lawson (1973) 309 A 2d 391, 396. Manderino J then added, “Women should not lose their 
identity – or their responsibility – when they become wives. The status of wife or husband should not relieve any 
person of one’s obligation to obey the law.” 
68
 (1952) 91 A 2d 571. 
69
 Ibid at p574 “a conspiracy consists not merely in the intention but in the agreement of two or more persons 
(not being husband and wife) to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means.” 
70
 State v Struck (1957) 129 A 2d 910 (Essex County Court of New Jersey, Law Division). 
71
 s53, An Act for the Punishment of Crimes, 1829, New Jersey. 
72
 State v Struck (1957) 129 A 2d 910, 912. 
73
 Noting that in 1934 the New Jersey Legislature abolished the presumption of marital coercion by Revised 
Statutes 2:103-3, re-titled and renumbered by 1957 as NJJ 2A:85-3 and adding at p912 “It is axiomatic that such 
deep-rooted philosophies are not to be altered unless in the most explicit terms”, consistently, with (at p913) “the 
doctrine of the strict construction of penal statutes”. 
74
 State v Thyfault (1972) 297 A 2d 873, 883. 
75
 State v Pittman (1973) 306 A 2d 500 (Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division (Criminal)). 
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Carbone was only an obiter pronouncement in relation to spousal exemption. The judge 
emphasised that the language of conspiracy involves “Any two or more persons76” and there 
was no legislative indicator that spouses were not included in that open-ended formula. That 
conclusion was fortified by the fact that the Legislature had in the same Act creating the 
general offence of criminal conspiracy, expressly provided that either spouse was exempt 
from the general crime of being an accessory after the fact, where the principal was the other 
spouse.77 “Thus, it could be inferred that if the Legislature had intended to immunise married 
couples from the proscription of NJSA 2A:98-1, it would have included an appropriate 
provision in the statute”.78 
 
This conclusion was consonant with “the recent happenings in our society” so that it followed 
that the common law concept of spousal oneness had been vitiated in New Jersey.79 United 
States v Dege was a compelling authority to demonstrate it was unrealistic to apply the 
anachronism to conclude spouses are incapable of engaging or agreeing to engage in a 
criminal enterprise. No reason existed to infuse into the statute the common law concept of 
repressing crime means a common law rule should be undone by the judiciary – legislative 
action was not necessary. The Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey in 
State v Infinito80 decided that sociolegal81 changes required that New Jersey law be adapted to 
conform, with the view in State v Pittman. So within 15 years of the decision in Dege the last 
residuum of the uxorial conspiracy exemption had finally disappeared from the United States 
legal landscape; whereas the rule continues to flourish in contiguous Canada. 
 
 
                                              
76
 NJSA 2A: 98-1. 
77
 NJSA 2A:85-2. 
78
 State v Pittman (1973) 306 A 2d 500, 501. 
79
 Noting that the Supreme Court of New Jersey had abolished the common law rule of inter-spousal immunity 
for personal torts arising out of the negligent operation of a motor vehicle: Immer v Risko (1970) 65 NJ 482. 
80
 (1981) 433 A 2d 816. 
81
 Based on Romeo v Romeo (1980) 84 NJ 289 which marked the attrition of the spousal unity concept, otherwise 
“a procedural rule intended solely to promote marital harmony becomes, if not a suit of armor against the 
weapons of truth ascertainment in a criminal prosecution, at least a bullet-proof vest.”  State v Infinito (1981) 
433 A 2d 816, 819 Joelson JAD remarked that the public policy supporting the marital union is considered more 
important than the evidence or crime excluded, ruling that in a joint trial of husband and wife, severance may be 
necessary otherwise the spouses are “faced with the Hobson’s choice of deciding to testify in their individual 
defenses or testify adversely to the interests of the spouse”. 
   
 371 
RE-EXAMINATION OF THE IMMUNITY UNDER ENGLISH LAW 
 
The English Law Reform Commission82 in their Report No 76 ‘Conspiracy and Criminal Law 
Reform’, (1976) assumed83 that the common law position84 endured. It then considered85 
whether the common law position86 should be maintained. It identified five aspects of public 
policy in favour of maintaining the rule:87 
 
                                              
82
 Don Stuart, ‘Canadian Criminal Law: A Treatise’ (1982) Carswell Company Limited, Toronto, p566, after 
reviewing ‘Report No 76: Conspiracy and Criminal Law Reform’, of the Criminal Law Commission at pp20-21 
concluded that on balance the immunity was justifiable. The Commissioners had stated: “A change in the law to 
permit a spouse to be charged with conspiracy with his or her spouse might offer excessive scope for improper 
pressure to be applied to spouses in particular cases; where, for example, a husband refuses to confess to the 
commission of a crime, he would be open to the threat that his wife should be charged with conspiracy with him. 
Such a change in the law in this respect could, therefore bring practical disadvantages which might outweigh its 
possible advantages.” He opined at p566 that “the present immunity should be broadened to cover some notion 
of common law marriages.” The same suggestion was adopted judicially in Thompson v Canada (Attorney 
General) (1998) 23 CR (5th) 347, 351 “the common-law exception should include partners of the opposite sex 
living together as husband and wife without having gone through the formality of a marriage, be it religious or 
civil.” 
83
 It is not until the early twentieth century that the courts next appear to have considered the issue since 1365. In 
Director of Public Prosecutions v Blady [1912] 2 KB 89, 92 (DC), Lush J dissenting accepted with ill-disguised 
disdain the “strange” rule. In R v Peel, The Times, 15 March 1922.  Sir Charles Gill KC in his opening of the 
prosecution advised Darling J there was no charge of conspiracy on the indictment because of the “quaint” rule 
enunciated in Hawkins that spouses being “one person in law were presumed to have but one will” which was 
met with the rejoinder recorded in The Times “Mr Justice Darling – It is more likely to have been true in the time 
of Hawkins than it is today (laughter).” No English decision has directly reached the conclusion that is the 
essence of the suggested doctrine. Both New Zealand and Canadian Courts had by a majority concluded that the 
doctrine was well-founded or alternatively was so well embedded in the common law that it could only be 
extirpated by a purpose-built repeal by specific legislation. In his judgment discharging Mrs Peel, Darling J 
actually stated that the “pre-arrangement”, between the husband and wife to defraud the bookmakers, was a 
“conspiracy”.   
84
 It is astonishing to note that the authority for the rule rests on arguments found in three cases in the Year 
Books: Anon (1345) YB (RS ed Pike) 19 Edw III, Mich 24; Anonymous (1365) YB (Fitzherbert) 38 Edw III, Hil 
3a and Anonymous (1366) YB (Fitzherbert) 40 Edw III, Pasch 10. The doubtful basis for the rule was earlier 
noted by Professor Winfield in ‘History of Conspiracy and Abuse of Legal Procedure’ (1921) Cambridge 
University Press p48. 
85
 (Law Com No 76) (HMSO, London, 1976). 
86
 The Commission noted that “there is, however, no direct English authority on the point” as to whether spouses 
could conspire alone.  But Mawji v The Queen was seen as supporting the supposed rule.  Most of the modern 
textbook writers86 had equally assumed this to be the case: But not in Canada. The spousal immunity rule for 
conspiracy has been widely condemned as “anachronistic and foolish” see M R Goode, ‘Criminal Conspiracy in 
Canada’, (1978) Carswell, Toronto at p99-100. Don Stuart, ‘Canadian Criminal Law, A Treatise’, 1982, 
Carswell Company Ltd, Toronto, p565: “The rules seem inconsistent in themselves and with the lack of 
immunity given husbands and wives elsewhere in the criminal law. It is difficult to see why marriage should be a 
haven exempt from the criminal law. It has, however, been argued that there are countervailing social policy 
considerations such as the desire not to jeopardise the stability of marriage.”   
87
 That Report adopted a similar conclusion reached by the Law Reform Commissioner (Victoria), Report No 3 
‘Criminal Liability of Married Persons’, (1975) at p27. 
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(a) Making a husband and wife liable would represent a factor tending to undermine the 
stability of the marriage;88 
(b) A change in the law might offer excessive scope for improper pressure to be applied to 
spouses in particular cases; 
(c) Public trials on charges of conspiracy in respect of communications between spouses only 
might be likely to have a significant effect in discouraging marital confidences.89 
(d) Faced with an apparent conflict between their duty to each other and their duty to society 
the making of an agreement between spouses might be much less reprehensible than one 
between persons owing no duties to each other. 
(e) The agreement of one spouse to the project of the other is less likely to bring in additional 
resources or make the agreement a formidable one than the agreement of a stranger would 
be.90 
 
The English Law Commission volunteered the pragmatic consideration that: 
 
A change in the law to permit a spouse to be charged with conspiracy with his or her spouse 
might offer excessive scope for improper pressure to be applied to spouses in particular cases; 
where, for example, a husband refuses to confess to the commission of a crime, he would be 
open to the threat that his wife would be charged with conspiracy with him. Such a change in 
the law in this respect could, therefore, bring practical disadvantages which might outweigh its 
possible advantages.91 
 
The Working Party of the Law Commission92 was divided as to whether the supposed rule 
should be given statutory recognition and the Law Commission itself was also divided on the 
issue. In the end it decided to “recommend no change in the law which exempts from the 
                                              
88
 The notion that criminal responsibility for the infliction of jointly planned injuries would generate marital 
disharmony was “unnourished by sense”, adopting the phrase of Frankfurter J in United States v Dege. 
Connubial confidences are not going to be inhibited in the absence of a “cloak of cosy immunity”. 
89
 The Criminal Law Revision Committee in 1972 proposed the abolition of the spousal communication 
privilege. The Criminal Law Revision Committee proposed in its Eleventh Report, Evidence (General) Cmnd 
4991 (1972) para 173 that the abolition of the privilege against the disclosure of marital communications 
provided by s1(d) Criminal Evidence Act 1898 [UK] should be effected. Yet the Criminal Law Act 1977 
preserves the exculpatory fiction of the legal unity of spouses in relation to the crime of conspiracy. The Law 
Commission was of the opinion that to abolish the marital unity fiction would tend “to undermine the stability of 
the marriage”; Law Commission Working Paper No. 50 ‘Inchoate Offences, Conspiracy, Attempt and 
Incitement’ para 36. Of the sanctity of communications during marriage, there never was at common law any 
privilege protecting disclosure: Shenton v Tyler [1939] Ch 620 (CA). Rumping v Director of Public Prosecutions 
[1964] AC 814, 835, 861, 865 no rule of public policy precluded the reception in evidence of communications 
between spouses. 
90
 Ibid p 20 para 1.47-1.48. 
91
 But if there was evidence of unlawful agreement no harm is done; if there was no evidence, malicious 
prosecution would avail: A v State of New South Wales [2007] HCA 11, 21 March 2007, High Court of 
Ausatralia. The objection is invalid and the police technique an abuse of process. 
92
 The Law Commission, Criminal Law, Report on Conspiracy and Criminal Law Reform, Working Paper No  
50 para 36. 
   
 373 
crime of conspiracy agreements between spouses”.93 The majority view of the Law 
Commission, which led to s2(2)(a) Criminal Law Act 197794 (which declares the assumed 
common law rule) was that public policy required the rule to be preserved in order to maintain 
the stability of marriage95 and also to avoid the danger of improper pressure being applied by 
the investigative agencies of the state. It also adopted the Victorian view that the retention of 
the common law rule would preserve the sanctity of marital communications. It was 
additionally argued that the making of an agreement between husband and wife might be less 
reprehensible than a similar agreement between strangers; because the inclusion of a third 
party tended to make an agreement more formidable or provide additional resources for 
carrying out the agreed conduct. 
 
Richard Card appositely stated:96  
 
It seems odd that if a husband and wife agree between themselves to commit an offence they 
cannot be convicted of conspiracy, whereas if the substantive offence is committed by one of 
them pursuant to the agreement they can both be convicted of that offence, as perpetrator and 
                                              
93
 (Law Com No 76) (HMSO, London, 1976) Ibid 1.49 and 1.120.  The Commission annexed a draft of a Bill 
which it called the Conspiracy and Criminal Law Reform Bill 1976, p156. 
94
 Section 2(2)(a) Criminal Law Act 1977 [UK]94 provides that: “A person shall not...be guilty of conspiracy to 
commit any offence…if the only other person or persons with whom he agrees are…(a) his spouse.”94 
‘Halsbury’s Laws of England’, 4 ed Reissue, vol 11 (1) para 66. In a single sentence the text boldly states “a 
person is not guilty of conspiracy at common law where the only parties to the agreement are husband and wife; 
but husband and wife may be guilty as co-conspirators where others are involved”.  It follows that where a 
husband and wife are charged with conspiring with another, the jury should be directed to acquit the spouses 
unless they are satisfied that there was another party to the conspiracy. See R v Lovick [1993] Crim LR 890 
(CA). PJ Richardson (ed) ‘Archbold 2001’, Sweet & Maxwell (2001), London, para 33-25 says in terms that a 
husband and wife cannot be guilty of conspiracy, which reflects the common law. J C Smith and Brian Hogan, 
‘Criminal Law’, 10 ed, 2002, London Butterworths at p322-323 the authors stated that the application of the 
exemption is based “upon a social policy of preserving the stability of marriage” noting Law Comm No 76 para 
1.46-1.49. But a wife is guilty if she agrees only with her husband, if she knows that there are other parties to the 
conspiracy, even though she has never met or communicated with them. See R v Chrastny [1991] 1 WLR 1381 
(CA). 
95
 Midland Bank Trust Co Ltd v Green (No. 3) [1979] 1 Ch 496, 511H Oliver J noted: “The proposition that 
husband and wife are one has been asserted by many ancient and respected authorities and no doubt the biblical 
notion of the origins of man lies at the root of many of the privileges and immunities, and indeed of the 
disabilities, attendant upon the married state, such as, for instance, the common law rule that a wife was not a 
competent witness against her husband and the fiscal approach to the sinful possession of the fruits of thrift.” 
96
 Richard Card, ‘Card, Cross & Jones, Criminal Law’ (2001) 15 ed, Butterworths, London at p549. This 1977 
statutory provision was considered by the English Court of Appeal in R v Chrastny (No.1). [1992] 1 All ER 189, 
192a (CA) Glidewell LJ stated the sub-section restates the position at common law. “A wife, knowing that her 
husband is involved with others in a particular conspiracy, agrees with her husband that she will join the 
conspiracy and play her part she is thereby agreeing with all those whom she knows are the other parties to the 
conspiracy”. The Appeal Committee of the House of Lords (Lord Keith of Kinkel, Lord Templeman and Lord 
Lowry) refused leave to appeal: [1992] 1 All ER 189, 192g. 
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accomplice respectively. Given the existence of the rule, it also seems odd that there is no bar 
to a conviction for conspiracy in relation to an agreement between a man and a woman who 
are living together in an extra-marital relationship, however stable. 
 
 
CONCUBINAGE, POLYGAMY AND CRIMINAL LAW DEVELOPMENTS  
 
But while English common law reached a conclusion, it did so without ever contemplating the 
over-extending complexities engendered by polygamous marriages and lawful customary 
concubinage97. 
 
                                              
97
 Under Chinese customary law a concubine had a distinct status and was to be wholly differentiated from any 
notion of a paramour, mistress or occasional lover.  A male was entitled to take an additional ‘wife’, who, if 
certain irreducible requirements were met, occupied a formal position within the household: Vermier Y Chiu, 
‘Marriage Laws and Customs of China’, Institute of Advanced Chinese Studies and Research, New Asia 
College, The Chinese University of Hong Kong (1966) p26-27.  In Anonymous Appeal No 1534 of 1916 
Supreme Court of China a concubine was: “one who, with intention to live permanently and continuously and to 
become a member of his family, has had or intends to have a relationship that is akin to that of husband and wife 
with the pater familias, shall acquire the status of concubine.” Leonard Pegg, ‘Chinese Marriage, Concubinage 
and Divorce in Contemporary Hong Kong’, (1975) 5 Hong Kong Law Journal 4, 29-32, noting that this 
definition remains authoritative. “The conditions requisite for the establishment of a relationship between that 
concubine and the pater familias are not expressly provided for by the law. According to juristic principles based 
on custom, however, it may be properly interpreted thus; there must be intention on the part of the pater familias 
to acknowledge the woman as his life long companion, with a place in the family second only to that of his wife; 
on the part of the concubine, there must be intention to enter the family of the pater familias to become a 
member of the pater familias’s family, with a position subordinate to that of the wife. (This is ‘Ju Kung’) these 
conditions must be present before the woman can become a legitimate concubine of the pater familias. If a man 
and a woman merely have planned this clandestine relationship of cohabitation, it can hardly be recognised as a 
relationship between pater familias and concubine and the woman is (sic) such cases will not acquire the status 
of a concubine.”: Anonymous Appeal No 186 of 1918, Supreme Court of China. By the operation of s3 Article 
1123 of the Nationalist Civil Code of the Republic of China, concubines are regarded as members of the family 
and not as the pater familias’ secondary wives as they had been so regarded prior to the promulgation of the 
Nationalist Civil Code on 26 December 1930.Re Tsang Kwok Lit [2007] 1 HKLRD 472 (CFI) – the consent of 
the first wife was not a requirement for taking a concubine. Some legislation expressly provides in the criminal 
law that a “wife” includes a concubine: s2 Prevention of Bribery Ordinance Chapter 210 Laws of Hong Kong. 
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In Chan Hing Cheung v The Queen98 three men who had been sentenced to death for arson 
and double murder had their convictions quashed because the principal prosecution witness 
was the tsip or concubine of a co-accused (who was acquitted by the jury). The effect of the 
decision was that a secondary wife under Chinese customary law, was indistinguishable in 
status from a wife in a Christian marriage99 for the purposes of uxorial rights and she was 
therefore not a competent witness against her spouse or indeed any of the other co-accused in 
a joint trial.100 The common law incompetence of a “wife” to give evidence against her 
“husband” was extended to encompass a Chinese customary concubine.101 Concubinage 
required an intention to take as a concubine and a public holding out of the woman as a 
                                              
98
 [1974] HKLR 196 (FC) Huggins, McMullin and Pickering JJ. Concubinage was prospectively outlawed in 
China by s3 Article 1123 of the Nationalist Civil Code of the Republic of China 1931, noted in Re Leong Ba Chi 
[1953] 2 DLR 766 (BC: CA). Anonymous Supreme Court of China, Appeal 2518 of 1934 provided that upon the 
outlawing of concubinage it became an offence punishable with penal servitude of not more than one year for 
both participants as “repeated and continuous adultery.” It remained lawful in Hong Kong until 7 October 1971 
when the Marriage Reform Ordinance Cap 178 prospectively abrogated its status. In Hong Kong a concubine 
has rights to maintenance: s2 Separation and Maintenance Ordinance Cap 16 [HK]. By s19 Affiliation 
Proceedings Ordinance Cap 183 [HK] a wife was defined as including a concubine. As the custom had been 
prevalent a significant number of concubines still feature in a variety of litigious matters: Kwan Chui Kwok v 
Tao Wai Chun  [1995] 1 HKC 374 Patrick Chan J held that when the principal wife died but the concubine was 
still living, the husband could not enter into a Christian marriage or its civil equivalent with a third woman 
because he was already party to a polygamous marriage. Re Y (Infants) [1946–1972] HKC 378 involved a child 
whose mother was a concubine under Burmese customary law. The Privy Council had held that a tsip or 
concubine was entitled to share as a widow in her husband’s estate: Cheang Thye Phin v Tan Ah Loy [1920] AC 
369, followed In the Estate of Chan Yan (1925) 20 HKLR 35. In both Yew v Attorney General [1924] 1 DLR 
1166 (BC CA) and Estate of Bir (1948) 188 P 2d 499 (Cal App) it was held that both polygamous wives were 
surviving spouses for the purposes of succession duty.   
99
 The New South Wales Supreme Court decided that a Christian marriage did not connote that the parties were 
Christians or that the rites observed were Christian rites; rather it meant a marriage in the sense in which that 
relationship is understood in Christendom: Ng Ping On v Ng Choy Fung Kam (1963) 63 SR (NSW) 782, 783 per 
Sugerman J, Collins J concurring at p793. 
100
 The prosecution case was that the four had combined and executed a pre-concerted design to set fire to a 
dwelling house in which two victims resided, by pouring petrol under the door and setting it a light. The 
principal witness for the prosecution was Madam Wong Shuk Han and it was her status on which the appeal 
turned. She had lived for some years with the first defendant and from the very outset of the trial, objection was 
taken by the defence, on the basis that as it was a joint trial, she was not a compellable witness for the Crown 
against him or indeed against any of the other accused, relying upon R v Mount and Metcalfe (1934) 24 Cr App 
R 135. R v Payne (1872) LR 1 CCCR 349. A husband or wife could not be a witness for or against any other 
person indicted jointly with the other spouse: Thomas Lefroy, ‘An Analysis of the Criminal Law of Ireland’, 
(1865) 3 ed, Hodges, Smith and Co, Dublin, pXVII, citing R v Smith (1826) 1 Mood CC 289. A wife of an 
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incompetent witness against the husband’s co-accused unless the complainant spouse alleges an offence 
affecting her person, health or liberty: R v Singh and Amar (1970) 1 CCC 299 (BC: CA).  
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 In Hong Kong the Strickland Committee ‘Chinese Law and Custom in Hong Kong’, (1953), Hong Kong 
Government Printer, p25 had reported: “the tsip is in law considered a wife, a secondary or inferior wife it is 
true, both in law and in practice to the tsai, but nevertheless a wife and not a kept mistress.” By s54 Criminal 
Procedure Ordinance Cap 221 a wife was not competent as a witness for the prosecution against the defence.   
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concubine, combined with an acceptance (or recognition) by both the principal wife and 
family or public.102 
  
We see no reason to think that whatever may have been originally the practical reason or 
reasons for the rule rendering spouses not competent as witnesses against each other (reasons 
conveniently enshrined in the Christian concept of the marriage union) those reasons which 
have been suggested are not equally applicable to a Chinese customary marriage. The fact that 
in some respects a tsip is of a lower status than a tsai and, therefore, of the wife of a 
monogamous union does not affect the basic similarity arising from the fact that she is a wife. 
 
The implications for uxorial privileges were awakened by these novel circumstances beyond 
the original contemplation of the common law. On appeal the Full Court had reviewed a 
number of authorities from different corners of the former British Empire which had been 
required to evaluate the exotica of polygamy and concubinage under the criminal law. But 
none of these dealt with conspiracy apart from Mawji; the others being decisions on 
competence and compellability. The appellate court reasoned that in determining the nature of 
the special status of a concubine in criminal law, it was appropriate to consider what was 
considered to be the analogous criminal law scenarios in relation to polygamous wives103. 
Where Muslim law104 strongly influences the criminal law, such as in much of East Africa, 
the Court of Appeal of Zanzibar has stated that the approach in Mawji105 was wholly 
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 [1974] HKLR 196, 212.  
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 In Abdulrahman Bin Mohamed & Anor v R [1963] EACA 188 the Court of Appeal at Zanzibar (Sinclair P, 
Gould AVP, and Newbold JA) held that a wife married according to native law or custom which permits 
potentially polygamous marriages, is a competent witness against her husband upon a charge of murder, even if 
the marriage is in fact monogamous. In R v Anderea Edoru s/o Okomera (1941) 8 EALR 87 the Court of Appeal 
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 Wilson’s ‘Anglo-Muhammadan Law’, 6 ed at p 113 para 39(2). In Abdulrahman Bin Mohamed & Anor v R 
[1963] EACA 188 the Court of Appeal noted the first appellant was a Muslim but his “wife” was not. Under the 
common law of England which applied to Zanzibar by Art 24 Zanzibar Order in Council 1924 [UK] subject to 
certain exceptions, the husband or wife of a person charged was not a competent witness for the prosecution. 
Section 147 Criminal Procedure Decree [Zanzibar] Cap 8 was to the same effect.   
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 Morris ‘The Recognition of Polygamous Marriage in English Law’  (1953) 66 Harvard Law Review 961, 
1001, in 1953 (three years before Mawji), states based on Dicey, ‘Conflict of Laws’, (1949) 6 ed, p227. that a 
husband and wife cannot be guilty of a criminal conspiracy and that a polygamous marriage would yield a 
different result “for the rule that one man and one woman are one person in law would be extended to the 
breaking point if it were held that one man and four women were one person”. 
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distinguishable as Zanzibar law “does not distinguish between monogamous and polygamous 
marriages.” The same broad approach was adopted by the earliest decisions of the courts 
constituting the present nation of South Africa106 and continues in modern England.107 It has 
been inaccurately observed108 that “the criminal courts have not been squarely faced with the 
problem of [the vicissitudes of polygamous marriages and] the judicial significance”. The 
common law had thrown up the examples, but they had not been systematically marshalled 
from the far-flung and disparate jurisdictions.  
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 In Nalana v R [1907] TS 407 it was held that a second native marriage, the first marriage being still in force, 
was not legal, so the newer wife was a competent witness for the prosecution against her husband, 
notwithstanding s2 Law 4 of 1885 Transvaal provided: “The law, habits and customs hitherto observed by the 
natives shall continue to remain in force in this Republic as long as they have not appeared to be inconsistent 
with the general principles of civilisation recognised in the civilised world” and even though law recognised a 
native’s second wife as his wife “because natives are taxed for each wife”. At p409 Innes CJ commented that 
“no legislative expression in which the term “wife” is loosely used for taxation purposes can alter the legal 
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 In R v Junaid Khan (1987) 84 Cr App R 44 (CA). In R v Yacoob (1981) 72 Cr App R 313 (CA). the 
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evidence about her marriages. The Court of Appeal concluded that it was well-settled that if either party lacked 
capacity to contract a marriage, the ‘marriage’ will be void. But she had no entitlement to polyandry under her 
personal law and the law of her domicile. So the decision while correct, is of little moment. It was held that a 
second wife married in accordance with Muslim rites, but not in accordance with English law, was a competent 
and compellable witness. This is undoubtedly correct but had the marriage taken place in accordance with her lex 
domicilii the second wife would not have been a competent witness. In Hoskyn v Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner [1979] AC 474, 484 C Lord Wilberforce concluded that the doctrinal basis for the incompetence 
of a spouse was: “the unity of husband and wife, coupled with the privilege against self-incrimination. The 
danger of perjury is also involved.” Much earlier it had been said that the rationale for spousal evidential 
incompetence is the wish to promote harmony within the family: Stapleton v Croft (1852) LJ QB 367. 
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 JA Andrews, ‘A Licence for Bigamy?’ [1963] Crim LR 261. But this is to overlook both R v Caroubi and 
Mawji. The article exposed the fragility of R v Sarwan Singh [1962] 3 All ER 612, which held that a prior 
polygamous or potentially polygamous marriage was not a valid first marriage, for the law of bigamy. G W 
Bartholomew, ‘Polygamous Marriages and English Criminal Law’, (1954) 17 Modern Law Review 344, the 
article is betrayed by the title, as it is confined to an analysis of bigamy and does not venture into the general 
criminal law significance of polygamy at all or in relation to the position of polygamous wives. At p359 though 
Bartholomew in his summary correctly anticipates R v Sagoo,[1975] 1 QB 885 [CA] 21 years later. Michael 
Plonsky, ‘Polygamous Marriage: A Bigamists Charter?’ [1971] Crim LR 401 concluded that it was untenable 
that only a monogamous marriage could be the foundation for a bigamy prosecution. The opposite view 
resonates with what Lush JA had said in Harvey v Farnie (1880) 6 PD 35, 53: “If one of the numerous wives of 
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 378 
The only previous (and inadequate) consideration of polygamy in the criminal law in England 
had been R v Caroubi109 and the trial ruling of Avory J considered on appeal in R v Naguib110 
that a first marriage which was either polygamous or potentially polygamous could not 
constitute a marriage for the purposes of subsequent bigamy. In Baindail v Baindail111 Lord 
Greene MR expressly declined to make any ruling on the criminal law in relation to 
polygamy.  He accepted that the Privy Council in Mawji must be taken as having generally 
assimilated the reluctant acceptance by the civil law of the concept of intraspousal immunity 
to the general corpus of the criminal law.  In a pluralistic society it is a reality that the 
common law had to confront. 
 
Subsequent to Mawji polygamous marriages or potential examples have been constantly 
recognised112 as valid according to the rules of English private international law. Would it 
follow that the two wives could conspire amongst themselves and therefore be liable, but the 
two wives and the husband were to be exempt? The out of court admission by one spouse 
against the other is inadmissible.113 But the evidence could be of a fourth party. So Hong 
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 (1912) 7 Cr App R 149 
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 [1917] 1 KB 359, 361 per Viscount Reading CJ who described the issue as “an interesting question, but we 
need not deal with it”. 
111
 [1946] P 122, 130 (CA) At p129 recosnising that polygamy “is necessarily of very great practical importance 
in the everyday running of our Commonwealth and Empire”. In R v Sagoo [1975] 1 QB 885 (Lord Widgery CJ, 
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marriage. Although the offence of bigamy can be committed under New Zealand law whenever the offence takes 
place, that only applies to “a New Zealand citizen” s205(1)(c)(d) Crimes Act 1961 [NZ] so a non-NZ citizen may 
by their lex domicilii marry an additional wife, but not in New Zealand, if that law permits it. But the critical 
analysis is completely missing as to why a spouse who was lawfully and polygamously married in his lex 
domicilii, cannot upon changing his domicile be convicted of bigamy if he goes through another form of 
marriage. In Yew v AttorneyGeneral of British Columbia [1924] 1 DLR 1166 (BC: CA) a specially constituted 
court of five members of the British Columbia Court of Appeal held that where the lex loci contractus and the 
law of the domicile both concur, then Canadian courts will recognise as lawful wives, women who have the legal 
status of secondary wives in a country where polygamy is not illegal. There is no reason why in those 
circumstances only a monogamous marriage can be the foundation for a bigamy prosecution. 
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 See Harley, ‘Polygamy and Social Policy’, (1969) 32 MLR 155, 169.  The central difficulty with Mawji is 
that it is based on a concession by the Crown. The conspirators were parties to a potentially polygamous 
marriage and the Privy Council accepted that the defence of marriage was “fully valid” in Tanganyika. The rule 
immunising a husband and wife from the law of conspiracy was not a judge-made rule but a jurist-made rule.  
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 Mawaz Khan v The Queen [1967] 1 AC 454 (PC). 
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Kong developed its own jurisprudential approach in relation to concubines, but it fell into 
orthodoxy when it came to intraspousal conspiracy. But the conspiracy may not even be at an 
end upon the arrest of the spouses.114 Anthony Allott115 considers Mawji raised two separate 
issues; one, whether the rule of English criminal law forms part of the law of Tanganyika, 
namely that a husband and wife could not conspire together; and two, whether it applied to a 
husband and wife of a potentially polygamous marriage. The magistrate, the High Court and 
the Court of Appeal for East Africa all held that this rule of English law was applicable in 
Tanganyika, but that it could not apply to anyone other than the spouses of a Christian or 
monogamous marriage.  
 
 
REAFFIRMATION OF THE IMMUNITY 
 
In R v Cheung Ka Fai116 the Hong Kong Court of Appeal confirmed that under Hong Kong 
common law a husband and wife were legally incapable of conspiring together, “the old 
common law rule” continued unabated. Although based “upon the doctrine of conjugal unity, 
they are considered as constituting but one juridic person. And being one person in law, they 
are presumed to have but one will: see Mawji.” The court added that although this common 
law rule was “anachronistic” it remained the law. By curious coincidence the appellant 
Cheung Ka Fai was convicted in Hong Kong of conspiring with his wife and others. His wife 
was Kam Hong Kwan who was separately convicted in British Columbia of conspiring with 
her husband for the identical crime.117 Both spouses’ convictions were affirmed on different 
sides of the Pacific and in both jurisdictions the Courts of Appeal affirmed the existence of 
the common law rule, but distinguished it in the event, on the basis that the spouses had, as a 
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 Wong Wai Man v HKSAR [2003] HKC 735 (CFA). 
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 Anthony Allott, ‘New Essays in African Law’, (1960), Butterworths, London, p39. “The great interest of 
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 [1995] 3 HKC 214 (CA). (Litton VP, Mortimer and Ching JJA). 
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 R v Kwan Kam Hong (1992) 10 BCAC 274, 288 – 9. 
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matter of fact, additionally conspired with others. But if spouse A had been in country X (that 
did not recognise the immunity) and the other spouse B in country Y (which did) then the 
results would be extraordinary; particularly as the acquittal in Y (for impossibility) would 
generates autrefois acquit implications that ought to protect the other spouse A in country X. 
Different jurisdictions do not agree as to whether a conviction or an acquittal in another 
jurisdiction generate double jeopardy so as to preclude a further prosecution for the same or 
substantially similar offence already adjudicated upon.118 
 
The acceptance of the common law position is open in R v Cheun Ka Fai to criticism, and the 
value of the finding is limited, because it was obiter and based on a concession of law by the 
prosecution119 (as the appeal did not depend on it).120 The court accepted the notion that the 
couple were “but one juridic person” and therefore presumed to have but one will. However, 
there was no close consideration of whether the supposed rationale for spousal exemption 
could be conceptually sustained. The ability of a wife or a husband or both, to be able to 
commit a crime by any other criminous modality exists. Nothing precludes a wife being an 
accessory before the fact of her husband’s act; or of being an accessory after that act. The 
spouses can carry out as a joint enterprise every substantive offence. They can jointly or 
severally attempt to commit any offence; so the rationale for spousal conspiratorial exemption 
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 English common law has always accepted the position: R v Thomas (1664) 1 Keb 677, 83 ER 1180 (Welsh 
law; Beak v Thyrwhit (1678) 3 Mod 194, 87 ER 124;  R v Hutchinson (1677) 3 Keb 785, 84 ER 1011 
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2005 per Clarke, LJ at paras 10 and 11. 
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cannot lie in the inchoate nature of the crime. The court never confronted the fundamental 
proposition that as the alleged exemption was judge-made law it could be unmade; contenting 
itself with a rapidly uncritical acceptance of the sole juridic person status theory – which 
inexorably leads in the law of conspiracy to the exclusion. The Court of Appeal may have 
considered themselves constrained, as a matter of precedent, by Mawj. Lord Diplock in de 
Lasala v de Lasala121 had delivered a speech that required Hong Kong courts to consider 
themselves bound by decisions of the Privy Council as well as of the House of Lords122 
having had as an optimal object in uniform maintenance of the common law in the 
jurisdictions from which appeals to it could be brought.123 It is only in much more recent 
times that the Privy Council has explicitly acknowledged the individuality of the common law 
in existence124 in different common law jurisdictions.  It thereby repudiated its earlier 
conception of a monolithic, homogenous common law.125 
 
A short time later the Hong Kong legislature put the decision of the Court of Appeal beyond 
doubt by legislation rendering non-justiciable a pure intraspousal criminal conspiracy. Now 
by s159B(2)(a) Crimes Ordinance (Cap 200) [HK]126 a husband and wife127 are exempted 
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200, added by s2 Crimes (Amendment) Ordinance [HK] No 49 of 1996. Existing statutory offences of 
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 Of course, the requirement that the man and woman actually be husband and wife implies a valid marriage. 
Accordingly, in People v Little (1941) 107 P 2d 634, 108 P 2d 63, where a man and woman went through a 
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from what is otherwise a general provision of the criminal law, as they are deemed, 
conclusively, at law incapable of conspiring to commit alone any offence. This statutory 
position in Hong Kong is identical to the statutory position in England. There are since 1996 
(when the provision was first introduced) already at least two examples128 in Hong Kong of a 
married couple being acquitted of serious conspiracies, because the other co-accused with 
whom they had originally been indicted, was or were found not guilty, leaving the spouses in 
the wholly serendipitous position of being forcibly acquitted. In England, the same outcome 
has necessarily followed.129 It is very likely to be an abuse of process for the prosecution, 
having elected to prosecute the spouses (and others) with a conspiracy, to later seek in light of 
the verdict on the conspiracy charge, to prosecute the spouses for substantive offences130 
available at the time of the prosecution election.   
 
The court in Cheung Ka Fai had missed a rare opportunity to rationalise the uxorial 
relationship in a common law setting. Although its passive adoption of the old law made no 
difference to the result of the appeal, its effects of the fundamental position it found still 
                                                                                                                                             
qualified to be married to each other go through a marriage ceremony did not make them husband and wife 
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existed would continue. The judgment was a terse confirmation of what it believed the 
common law position to be. No cavil or reservation was made to it. When the Legislative 
Council of Hong Kong came shortly, to consider the need for a statutory form of conspiracy, 
the precedent of Cheung Ka Fai for the spousal exemption was there.131 It now meant that if 
the Legislative Council wanted to alter the law, it could only do so by wholly removing an 
existing uxorial right that had explicitly and recently been validated by a strong Court of 
Appeal. There was no political advantage for any legislator to agitate for a diminution of 
settled legal rights; especially in the knowledge of the application of the Basic Law of the 
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region132 which affirmed and continued the common law 
of Hong Kong, across the transition of British Colony to Special Administrative Region of the 
People’s Republic of China. There was, in addition, the exact precedent that the Westminster 
Parliament had enacted s2(2)(a) Criminal Law Act 1977 [Eng]. Hong Kong had often 
eclectically and in a wholesale way borrowed legislation from England – as a function of its 
legal heritage. The political will was not to engage in unnecessary in-fighting, so with both 
the Hong Kong Court of Appeal and the English Parliament ad idem, the spousal exemption 
was duly enacted, without a whimper of dissent. 
 
If the rationale for the conspiracy exemption (which of course is not an exemption of either 
spouse, but concurrently both of them) is that in historical times, the male was usually the 
initiator or protagonist in the crime, so the law generated the exemption really for the benefit 
of the wife only. Yet both are its beneficiaries. If there is duress between the spouses, then the 
defence applies. It is available for conspiracy133 or any mode of criminality. If there is no 
duress then the existing rationale must turn on the ‘sanctity of marriage’ and the notions of 
privacy and confidentiality. The exemption does not apply if at some time “during the 
currency of the agreement” another person joins the conspiracy (in this case, all three may be 
convicted of conspiracy).134 This rule applies only to conspiracy. It also does not protect 
spouses from liability as parties, in the event one of them actually commits the offence of 
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which they conspired. Retention of the spousal conspiracy exemption rule has been 
criticised135 on the basis that other traditional rules ostensibly protecting the sanctity of 
marriage, such as the husband’s immunity from rape, have been abolished at common law. 
But rules of evidence still underline the importance of the sanctity of marriage.136 Further, it 
applies only to spouses; two persons in a long-term but non-marital relationship would not 
attract the protection of this exemption.137 A wife can aid and abet her husband138 and is 
otherwise guilty of all other modalities of committing a crime other than an accessory after 
the fact.  
 
 
CANADA MAINTAINS THE IMMUNITY 
 
The obverse of the very marriage considered in R v Cheung Ka Fai was the focus in R v Kam 
Hong Kwan.139 The British Columbia Court of Appeal140 was confronted with the intraspousal 
conspiracy rule. It had been held by the Ontario Court of Appeal a few years earlier in R v 
Rowbotham141 that Kowbel v The Queen142 still prevailed as the definitive law of Canada, 
notwithstanding the prominence of the dissent of Fauteux J and other cognate developments 
in the law.  
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 Philip Asterley Jones and Richard Card, ‘Cross and Jones’ Introduction to Criminal Law’, (1976) 8 ed, 
Butterworths, London. At p336 in relation to the conspiracy immunity states: “This fiction has been eroded 
elsewhere in our law and the present rule should be abolished. It remains undecided whether the rule applies to a 
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conspiracy, whereas if the substantive offence is committed, they can both be convicted of that offence. 
Moreover, the fact that a husband and wife can be convicted of conspiring together with a third party is 
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agreement, how can they be a party to one agreement?   
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 In R v Yung Kit-Mei unreported Cr App 1025/81 2 July 1982, McMullin VP, Li and Silke, JJA, on a charge of 
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prosecution. This was a material irregularity. 
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See 1 Hawk PC c27 s8; Mawji v The Queen [1957] AC 126 (PC); R v Cheung Ka Fai [1995] 3 HKC 214 (CA). 
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 (1992) 10 BCAC 274, 288-289 (BC: CA).    
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 McEachern CJBC Legg and Holinrake JJA.    
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However, an argument was advanced that because the Supreme Court of Canada in R v 
Salituro143 had decided that where a spouse was separated and without reasonable possibility 
of reconciliation with the other, such a spouse was henceforth to be declared a competent 
witness for the prosecution. Iacobucci J in R v Salituro stated that there was a duty to see that 
the common law developed in accordance with the values in the Canadian Charter. On an 
examination of the history of the rule which declared a spouse incompetent for the 
prosecution, and the policy justifications, the Court concluded “Where spouses are 
irreconcilably separated, there is no marriage bond to protect and we are faced only with a 
rule which limits the capacity of the individual to testify”. Despite the temptation to adopt 
such a radical approach (sanctioned by the highest court in Canada) the Court of Appeal 
concluded that there was nothing in R v Salituro which enabled the it to depart from Kowbel 
which was directly in point. It was, in a sense, serendipity that both jurisdictions, Canada and 
Hong Kong, provided that by common law the spousal exemption existed. If it had been the 
United States and Hong Kong, with the wife in the former (instead of Canada) and the 
husband in Hong Kong, and there were no other conspirators or third parties, then the 
husband would be acquitted under Hong Kong common law (and now by statute) and the wife 
in America would have no defence. The two different systems of law would have produced 
different results. Indeed the impact theory144 of international conspiracy law might well 
provide the necessary jurisdiction for the spouse to be tried as the place identifiable as an 
intended conspiratorial objective. 
 
 
Salituro did not consider Kowbel, which reformulated for Canada a novel exception to the 
spousal incompetence rule. In Canada now where a spouse is separated from the other, 
without reasonable possibility of reconciliation, that spouse is now a competent witness for 
the prosecution; significantly invading the common law position. The British Columbia Court 
of Appeal commended that the dissenting view of Fauteux J in Kowbel: 
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 386 
The common law rule that a husband and wife cannot be guilty of conspiring alone stems 
from the doctrine of conjugal unity and that doctrine had disappeared because husbands and 
wives each had an independent entity in both civil and criminal matters 
 
The Court of Appeal in Kam Hong Kwan distinguished the approach in Salituro remarking: 
 
We also wish to mention that in Salituro the Court was dealing with a rule of evidence. We 
are concerned with a substantive defence which has been a part of the criminal law both of 
England and Canada for a very long time. We think, with respect, that if that defence is to be 
abolished, and on that question we offer no opinion, it should be abolished not by judges by 
rather by Parliament.145 
 
In the Ontario Court of Appeal earlier in R v Rowbotham,146 after reference to Kowbel and the 
fact that it had been severely criticised by modern criminal law texts147 and noting in 
particular the repeated views of Glanville Williams, in 1961148  and in 1983149 who had 
observed “the rule have changed, the rule has been preserved in England for other reasons of 
social policy”.    
 
In R v Barbeau,150 the Québec Court of Appeal accepted that Kowbel still prevailed in 
Canada, in an appeal in which the trial judge had strongly criticised that decision. 
Rothman JA stated:151 
 
The reason for the difference in the elements is that there is an old rule of law, which might be 
outmoded but which still exists all the same, a rule of law which states that there can be no 
conspiracy between two spouses. In fact, spouses were traditionally considered to form one 
person only. It was the absolute union. That was probably before the emergence of divorces, 
of common-law relationships and what have you. But traditionally spouses formed one person 
only. However, a plot or a conspiracy necessarily involves at least two people. The court held 
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 This had been the same reasoning which appealed to the majority of the Court of Appeal in R v McKechie 
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there was considerable evidence to justify a conspiracy with others and it was a non-point. 
[translation] 
 
In a subsequent decision of the Superior Court of Québec in Thompson v Canada (Attorney 
General)152 Boilard JCS, in an obiter statement,153 favoured an extension of the spousal 
immunity rule in relation to conspiracy to include partners of the opposite sex living together 
in a conjugal quasi marital relationship. In that case, the prosecution had argued that Kowbel 
should no longer be followed as the doctrine it approbated “was created at a time when 
women had no juridical personality and were totally subservient to their husbands” noting that 
the common law should be the servant of society.154 But Kowbel was faithfully followed and 
Canada remains the only jurisdiction in the common law where the highest court of the 
jurisdiction has ruled that the spousal conspiracy exemption is upheld. 
 
 
AUSTRALIA ELIMINATES THE IMMUNITY 
 
In Australia, the position varies between States, Territories,155 and the Commonwealth. The 
State Legislatures of Queensland,156 Western Australia157 and Tasmania,158 had codified the 
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criminal law, unlike the other States, which maintained it. Those three Australian states 
originally provided in their legislation that there could be no conspiracy between a husband 
and a wife. For nearly a century, it was not possible for spouses alone to conspire, until those 
statutes were recently amended. In the common law States, the point had never arisen in 
practice in criminal law, but it has in tortious conspiracy where it was decided that at least the 
fiction did not survive in that context.159 The textbook writers160 remain unanimous that the 
common law fiction is maintained for criminal conspiracies with the stability of marriage 
having been adverted to as the justification for the exemption.161   
  
As a result of a commissioned study162 in 1983 into deficiencies in the West Australian 
Criminal Code, it was recommended that sweeping changes be made in relation to the law 
pertaining to uxorial privileges. The recommendations made were “in fact parallel, although 
they do not precisely follow the statutory offence of conspiracy introduced in the United 
Kingdom by the Criminal Law Act 1977, ss 1-5”.163 That detailed report164 had been made by 
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 In Carlton & United Breweries Ltd v Tooth & Co Ltd,159 unreported Supreme Court of NSW, Equity 
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auditing every provision in the Criminal Code for compliance with contemporary 
jurisprudence and it recommended the complete abrogation of the defence of marital coercion 
But this was not adopted by the legislature for 20 years, until 2003 and then only as part of a 
broad batch of laws enforcing equality. A further principal recommendation was to repeal the 
spousal conspiracy exemption in the Criminal Code, which did occur four years later in 1987. 
 
In Queensland ss32, 33 and 35 were all repealed by Criminal Law Amendment Act (No 3 of 
1997) [Qld] in operation from 1 July 1997. Section 32 was marital compulsion of husband, 
s33 was no conspiracy between husband and wife alone165 and s35166 was liability of husband 
and wife for offences committed by either with respect to the other’s property. The 
significance was that in Queensland, the legislature comprehensively abrogated all uxorial 
privileges in the criminal law at one time, whereas, in Western Australia, the legislature there 
decided to only remove a portion167 of those privileges. By s291 Criminal Code Act 1983 
[NT] spouses may criminally conspire in the Northern Territory of Australia. In Victoria, the 
position was more complicated because that state had enacted a revived version of the defence 
of marital coercion in 1977, which, however, expressly did not apply to treason or murder and 
to a conspiracy to commit treason or murder.168 The Victorian position was the outcome of a 
                                                                                                                                             
couple had over a lengthy period of time engaged in a determined conspiracy which had netted them a 
considerable financial advantage, but because of the operation of Section 33 and for no other reason it proved 
impossible legally to lay any charge against them at all. If precedent is needed for this recommendation it may be 
found in the Vic Crimes (Married Persons Liability) Act 1977”.  
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specific law reform task in which it was concluded that the special position of married women 
ought to be recognised as generating a limited privilege from the criminal law.169      
 
In the Victorian Law Reform Report170 the Commissioner noted that two principal 
justifications were advanced for the existence of the crime of conspiracy. One that the very 
fact of the agreement, being one for concerted action by two or more persons, renders it a 
dangerous thing in itself or gives it a “formidable or aggravated character”.171 The spousal 
exemption really fails the test of numeracy as it is difficult to conceive that the conjunction of 
one mind with another, without more done to carry the agreement into effect, adds, to the 
gravity of the conduct. Where the other mind is the spouse of the first, that other may be less 
able to bring in resources and supporters not available to the first. The second general 
justification for conspiracy to be criminalised is that the criminal law, by penalising initial 
agreements, might thwart or deter the actual commission of the planned crimes. With 
conspiracy often being a mutual incitement, the extension of the immunity to spousal 
incitement would be at least consistent with the conspiracy exemption. Such an extension to 
incitement though would be flatly contrary to the common law.172 
 
ANALYTICAL OVERVIEW 
 
The spousal exemption is unsustainable. The Supreme Court of the United States dealt with 
the ancient justification for the rule in uncompromising terms. Frankfurter J said: “For this 
court now to act on Hawkins’ formulation of the medieval view that husband and wife “are 
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esteemed but as one Person in Law and are presumed to have but one Will” would indeed be 
“blind imitation of the past”. It would require us to disregard the various changes in the status 
of woman – the extension of her rights and correlative duties – whereby a wife’s legal 
submission to her husband has been wholly wiped out, not only in the English-speaking world 
generally, but emphatically so in this country.” The exemption has been based on a legal 
fiction that husband and wife are one person and because of that fiction they could not 
constitute two persons, whose participation was necessary, to form a conspiracy. Even if the 
legal fiction were justifiable in days of yore, to compensate for the wife’s lesser role and 
position in decision-making, it is dissonant with modern notions of equality and 
independence.173 There is no plausible basis for removing this one relationship from outside 
the scope of the criminal law, as it is to overvalue the concept of marriage, above all other 
legal relationships and all other family commitments. Wives were never above the law in 
relation to general criminal responsibility. The law has consistently remained that husband 
and wife are each separately liable for their crimes, whether committed separately or jointly 
with each other. The fiction became the reality once their joint effort moved beyond an 
agreement. The proposition that husband and wife were a single juristic person was always 
applied only in a very artificial and selective way. The conjugal unity formula was designed 
to achieve in law a result seen to accord with fact – it validated typical experience as a policy 
to be encouraged by the law. So the exemption was not based on womanhood, but on the 
marriage pact, and conveniently relied upon to explain as rules of law what was in fact 
reasonable practices derived from uxorial subjugation. 
 
The force of the policy underlying the spousal conspiratorial exemption174 has been radically 
altered by the attainment of full civil, political and economic and economic status for married 
women;175 though a significant proportion of married women are still likely to be dependent 
on their husbands’ earnings, with a possible consequence of that dependency being their 
practical inability to refuse their assent to a criminal agreement inspired by him. The very 
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intimacy and interdependence between spouses may generate an irreproducible set of special 
circumstances outside matrimony, that justifies the exemption.  
 
 “Whether the exception arose from a legal fiction or not is not relevant to a decision as to the 
desirability of the exception. Legal fictions were invented to further the interests of justice. 
The fiction of legal unity “has subserved public policy, or at least humanitarianism”.”176 This 
quotation declaims the quiddity of the spouses’ criminal defence. The common law maxim is 
as “ill-adapted to the society in which we live as it is repugnant to common sense”.177   
 
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the 
time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have 
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past.  
 
Glanville Williams178 objected to the statutory exemption as being based on false reasoning 
and doubtful policy. Richard Card179 criticises the rule as being incapable of a safe 
rationalisation and argues if the rule has to exist for some reason based on the stability of 
relationships, it has to logically be available to relationships in the nature of marriage that 
have existed for sufficient time to identify their own stability.180  
 
In issue is whether there can be any jurisprudential justification for the maintenance of the 
common law rule. Further, if the rule cannot be rationalised, does there need to be other 
coherent changes made to the substantive criminal law so that there is a coherent homogenous 
principle which states that the fact of marriage, per se, provides no exemption or privilege in 
the substantive criminal law. The law of conspiracy certainly contains anomalous features and 
one of them is the facet that a husband and wife cannot agree to commit a crime. Any two 
other people may do so. In fact a person who agrees to commit a crime with someone who is 
insane is still guilty of the conspiracy even though the insane person is unable to commit, by 
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law, a crime. An unhappy consequence of the modern exemption is the taxonomy that wives 
are once again classified by law as properly grouped with infants and lunatics.  
 
In particular the immunity is not granted to people who stand in a relationship of 
consanguinity such as children or parents or siblings. It does not stand in a relationship of 
propinquity. 
 
If we look for any one thought which governs the whole of this province of law, we shall 
hardly find it. In particular we must be on our guard against the common belief that the ruling 
principle is that which sees an “unity of person” between husband and wife. This is a principle 
which suggests itself from time to time; it has the warrant of holy writ; it will serve to round a 
paragraph, and may now and again lead us out of or into a difficulty; but a consistently 
operative principle it can not be.181  
 
It is inconsistent182 with other branches of the criminal law, as “most cases of conspiracy can 
be treated as mutual incitements”.183 Both spouses could be treated as conspirators if an 
offence has been committed where the liability of the other depends on what they had 
previously agreed. In addition, the doctrine is imploded when a husband and wife are charged 
in a joint enterprise. Ever since the powerful judgment of the High Court of Australia in 
Tripodi v The Queen184 there has been an assimilation between joint enterprise and conspiracy 
in terms of evidentiary requirements. The so-called ‘co-conspirators rule’ applies to a joint 
enterprise as an exception to the hearsay rule. It was emphasised in Ahern v R185 by the High 
Court of Australia that the rule is available “when two or more persons are bound together in 
the pursuit of an unlawful object, anything said, done or written by one in furtherance of the 
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common purpose is admissible in evidence against the others” for the purpose of proving an 
assertion or implied assertion contained in the act or declaration in question. In R v Duguid186 
the admission of a co-conspirator was permitted even though that person was immune from 
prosecution.   
 
A hallowed view of the innate nature of marriage must be the basis for the exemption, 
because once a third party is admitted to the confederacy then the nature of the relationship 
between the three is conceptually different from the nature of the relationship shared only by 
the married couple. The substratum for the exemption cannot be maintained as a principle, 
when one spouse may incite or be an accessory to the crime of the other. What magic occurs 
in the moment when an incitement ends and a conspiracy starts; or between the act before an 
offence and the substantive offence itself? A concentration on the teleological aspect 
identifies the poverty of the suggested principle. To be valid the fiction would have to exist in 
all these possibilities, but it does not. The fiction has been inconsistently modified by statute 
in different ways in different jurisdictions.  
 
The evidence of a spouse is capable of amounting to corroboration of the evidence of the 
other spouse.187 The marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its 
own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional 
makeup.”188 The fact that husband and wife commit an offence together does not, without 
more permit the inference that those two had agreed189 to commit the offence. The fact of 
agreement does not rationally flow as the only reasonable inference from the fact of them 
being spouses.190 
 
The Married Women’s Property Act 1882 [UK] conferred contractual capacity on wives. It 
became from that time illogical that a married woman could enter into a commercial contract 
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 (1906) 94 LT 887. 
187
 R v Allen and Evans [1964] Crim LR 716 overruling R v Neal and Taylor (1835) 7 Carr & P 168, and 
following Tripodi v The Queen (1961) 104 CLR 1 (HCA). 
188
 Eisenstadt v Baird (1972) 405 US 438, 453. 
189
 Cotter v Commonwealth (1994) 452 SE 2d 20, 23 (Court of Appeals of Virginia) per Burrow J. Equally the 
fact that the couple are “paramours and living together does not eliminate the necessity to prove an agreement 
between them in order to establish a conspiracy.”; Jones v Commonwealth (1990) 396 SE 2d 844. 
190
 Henry v Commonwealth (1986) 342 SE 2d 655, 656; Stumpt v Commonwealth (1989) 379 SE 2d 480, 484. 
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with her husband,191 but to deny that she was capable of agreeing with him to commit a crime. 
The spousal exemption is the “law’s vision of married women gripped by marital 
obedience”.192 “The continued existence of the rule, in relation to the crime of conspiracy 
rests, as the more modern cases suggest, not upon a supposed inability to agree as a result of 
some fictional unity, but upon a public policy which, for the preservation of the sanctity of 
marriage, accords an immunity from prosecution to spouses who have done no more than 
agree between themselves in circumstances which would lay them open, if unmarried, to a 
charge of conspiracy”. The crime of conspiracy is the agreement193 and there was no 
immunity for actually carrying it out. That is only the inchoate offence was immune not the 
substantive crime. Secondly, there was no immunity if another person was a party so that both 
husband and wife became individually liable for a tripartite agreement. Thirdly, either spouse 
could be convicted of inciting the other to commit a crime. Fourthly, either spouse could be 
convicted of being an accessory before the fact to a crime. But public policy absolved a wife, 
but not a husband, from a charge of being accessory after the fact by harbouring her husband. 
 
Early American courts blandly followed the English common law position that spouses could 
not agree amongst themselves alone for a criminal purpose. While that process was 
unquestioning of the suggested underlying principle, it also meant that between spouses it was 
thought that there was insufficient increased risk of harm to society resulting from the spousal 
combination to justify the intervention of the criminal law. This was so, and even when a 
husband acted alone, the wife was often likely to be aware of the act and to tacitly support it, 
so that the margin of increased risk to society did not merit the special vigilance of the 
criminal law. But there is no evidence to support the theory that the marriage combination 
presents any less risk to society as compared to any other combination of persons not doli 
incapax.194 No analysis to justify the exemption can go beyond a fond assertion that the 
nature of the confidence between spouses is such that it deserves protection by exemption 
while other combinations of equal confidence and intimacy are unrewarded. This puts an 
                                              
191
 See Pearce v Merriman [1904] 1 KB 80. In Pearce the husband was a tenant of his wife.   
192
 Lois Bibbings, ‘Groups, Girls and Fears’, p128 in Donald Nicolson and Lois Bibbings (eds) ‘Feminist 
Perspectives on Criminal Law’  (2000) Cavendish Publishing Ltd.  
193
 The Poulterer’s Case (1611) 9 Co Rep 55b. 
194
 ‘Developments in the Law: Criminal Conspiracy’ (1958-59) 72 Harvard Law Review 920, 950, written prior 
to the decision in United States v Dege (1960) 364 US 51. 
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identifiable premium on the formalism of marriage over all other relationships. The danger to 
society is just as real and poignant here as otherwise. In fact, if there is to be any special 
recognition of the nature of marriage in contrast with other civil union relationships or 
partnerships it may be the very fact that the law provides additional recognition to the status 
of marriage, that actually permits it to become a cloak for criminal activity. Once the law 
specifically elevates the relationship to the altar of criminal exemption it is not unreal to 
expect that spouses will alter their communications to fall within its protection. This way the 
law actually provides a platform for crime. The vestigial remnant of the formal attributes of 
marriage provides an undeserved exemption that is unjustifiable on a specific-object or 
general-object rationale. It is a partnership in crime and carries therefore the same potential 
for risk to society as any other combination. It is only pandering to whimsical notions of 
romance and chivalry to conclude that there is something so indefinably special about the 
relationship that it should be placed above and beyond the criminal law in contrast to an 
identical agreement between two persons of whatever combination of gender who have 
entered into a recognisably civil union, predicated upon commitment. 
 
As the rule of the fiction of unity has been eroded by exceptions or abrogated by statute, it is 
odd that the common law continued to maintain it unabridged in relation to the crime of 
conspiracy. “A search for a wholly logical rationale in the field of ancient judge-made, or in 
this case, jurist-made, law is unlikely to be fruitful.” It is probable that the axiomatic biblical 
truth was superseded by a subsequent search for a more compelling analysis which resulted in 
the premise that because the wife had no independent will of her own (her will being 
overborne by that of her husband, under whose potestas she was) she was incapable of 
concluding with him the agreement which was the essence of the crime of conspiracy. But 
developments in the law recognised the retention by a married woman of a distinct legal 
capacity and the earlier rationale could not have survived the contractual capacity conferred on 
the wife by the Married Women’s Property Act 1882 [UK].   
 
Therefore the continued existence of the rule must rest not as a result of some fictional unity, 
but upon a public policy which, for the preservation of the sanctity of marriage, accords an 
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immunity from prosecution to spouses who have done no more than agree between themselves 
in circumstances which would lay them open, if unmarried, to a charge of conspiracy.   
 
McKechie and Kowbel can be explained by the reluctance of common law jurisdictions to 
erode accepted immunities from prosecution, except where express and unequivocal legislative 
enactment so compels. But the criminal law never conferred any immunity on spouses who 
actually carried out, whether individually or in concert, the criminal design. Further there was 
no immunity in respect of conspiracies to which a stranger was a party and in such a case both 
husband and wife were individually liable and properly charged with a single tripartite 
agreement.  
 
The fact of the great change in the status of married women, would not be a reason to remove 
the exemption, if the real reason for it was not uxorial inequality, but was instead an informed 
response to their mutual, confidential trust and reliance.  The participants in a marriage, a 
relationship recognised by law, owed duties to each other as well as to the state. It can be 
argued that the invidious choice between the competing duties to spouse or state in a 
conspiracy, needs the overriding protection of the law. An intraspousal conspiracy may well 
be less blameworthy than others and as long as it goes no further than an agreement and an 
unconsummated intention to carry the agreement into effect, a line drawn there in favour of 
the spouses is a fair balance to protect the stability of marriage. Marital relationships could be 
impaired if the freedom to agree upon joint-conduct could become justiciable, thereby 
inhibiting frank communications. The intrinsic nature of intraspousal agreements may reduce 
the capacity for effecting the agreement, so that such conspiracies should be seen as less 
likely than others to be truly potent.  The English Law Commission also gave weight to the 
idea that if such a conspiracy was justiciable, it may provide injurious scope for improper 
pressure being placed on a spouse to confess an offence of which the spouse was innocent to 
prevent a false prosecution being initiated against the other.  
 
However, the exemption is awkwardly inconsistent with the substantive rules for joint-
responsibility, complicity and of general criminal responsibility. A spouse can be an 
accessory before the fact of a crime committed by the other spouse and may also be guilty of 
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an attempt or an incitement to commit the very crime the subject matter or objective of the 
conspiracy. The incitement analogy demonstrates the present anomaly perpetuated by so 
many different common law jurisdictions. It destroys the validity of the conceptual basis for 
the conspiratorial exemption, as both modes of crime (incitement and conspiracy) require by 
definition two or more persons to effect it. So a conspiracy will often be capable of being 
analysed as concurrent mutual incitements, for which the law offers no protection. Both 
spouses could be treated as conspirators in a scenario where an offence occurs that is the 
product of, or intention of, what the spouses had previously assented to do.  
 
There is no plausible reason to place marital confidences above those in any other legal 
relationship, and more importantly, there is no marital communication privilege in such a 
situation to rely upon to exempt the spouses from what would be for any other persons a 
crime. Once a third person is involved, the exemption from the criminal law fails, yet the 
same marital confidence would be the very basis for that offence as much as it would have 
been if it were but the two spouses involved.   
 
A marriage certificate should not provide an immunity to insulate from the criminal law an 
agreement coupled with an intention to commit a crime. The artificiality of the position is 
demonstrated by a case where fiancées conspire, become married and throughout continue 
with the unlawful agreement. A conspiracy that straddles a wedding ceremony195 makes a 
nonsense of the law which protects the joint unlawful agreement in the afternoon but not 
earlier in the morning. A further consequence that undermines the immunity is that if a child 
of the union agrees with his or her parents to effect their unlawful conspiracy, the child’s 
participation in the agreement makes them all liable under the criminal law for the conspiracy.       
 
If a wife has become involved in a conspiracy because of the relationship it is possible that 
this could be seen as a feature of mitigation in any sentencing exercise, but it cannot justify 
elevation to an immunity. It is understandable that the motivation for the crime may arise out 
of the relationship, but that does not affect the requisite intention for the commission of the 
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 State v Struck (1957) 129 A 2d 910, 912 held as fiancées guilty of the conspiracy but criminal liability 
terminated upon their marriage although the same conspiracy extended throughout. 
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crime. Matters of motivation can be properly taken into account in assessing penalty but are 
irrelevant to the issue of liability for crime.  
 
One other uxorial privilege in the substantive law remains to be considered: the privilege of a 
wife from not being convicted as an accessory after the fact to her husband’s crime. This 
privilege has a formidable pedigree. In some jurisdictions it is the sole survivor of the special 
position of married women in the substantive criminal law. The approach of the courts and 
legislatures is now investigated to inquire into the reasons for its apparent imperishablility. 
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6 
 
UXORIAL ACCESSORIAL IMMUNITY 
 
 
 
 
The wife who provides refuge to her husband from the criminal law may be an accessory after 
the fact of his offence, defined as a person who in the knowledge that a felony has been 
committed by another “receives, maintains, comforts, or assists the felon in any way, either to 
aid in the disposing of the proceeds of the crime or to hinder his being apprehended or tried or 
suffering punishment”.1 The law in England has however specifically provided since before 
the common law: 
 
A wife cannot be an accessory after the fact to a felony committed by her husband, as she is 
not bound to discover the crime of her husband. Except in this one case, relationship of the 
parties can be no excuse, and a husband may be an accessory to his wife’s felony by assisting 
her.2 
 
The common law privilege was though uni-directional, not working to absolve the equally 
motivated husband. This concept of privileged accessoryship was defined by gender and 
marital status to protect a wife who “knowing a felony to have been committed, receives, 
relieves, comforts, or assists “her spouse to avoid suffering punishment under the criminal 
                                              
1
 Viscount Simonds (ed), ‘Halsbury’s Laws of England’ (1955) 3ed, Butterworth and Co (Publishers) Ltd, 
London, vol 10 para 561 p302. The assistance must tend to prevent the principal form being brought to justice: R 
v Lee (1834) 6 Carr & P 536. The traditional formula at common law involved having knowingly received, 
comforted, harboured, assisted and maintained: see R v McKenna [1960] 1 QB 411. The act includes one of 
harbouring while the police are seeking the principal: see R v Richards (1877) 2 QBD 311. 
2
 Viscount Simonds (ed), ‘Halsbury’s Laws of England’ (1955), 3 ed, Butterworth and Co (Publishers) Ltd, 
London, vol 10 para 561 p303, citing only 2 Hawkins ‘Pleas of the Crown’ c 29 s 34 and 1 Hale ‘Pleas of the 
Crown’ 47, 621 as authority. In R v Hughes (1813) 2 Lew CC 229 Thomson B said: “But when the crime has 
been completed in his absence, no subsequent act of his (although it might possibly make him an accessory to 
the felony of the wife) can be referred to what was done in his absence.” In R v Woodward (1862) L&C 122 and 
R v M’Athey (1862) Le & Ca 250 (CCCR) husbands were convicted of receiving goods stolen by their wives. 
The special privilege only operated in favour of half of the matrimonial combination. In R v Walters The Times 6 
November 1953 a husband was convicted as an accessory after the fact to his wife’s crime of manslaughter. But 
a wife could not be convicted of receiving property stolen by her husband: R v Brooks (1853) 6 Cox CC 148 
(CCCR). 
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law.”3 An accessory after the fact is not a principal in the substantive offence; such 
accessoryship being a separate and subsequent phase of criminality, distinguishable by 
existing only upon the completion of the substantive crime.4 It is therefore a derivative 
offence. Its protean nature has as its central objective to make the substantive offence 
successfully undetected, including the obstruction of the course of justice in relation to the 
principal. A wife was only immune however for her post-substantive role in his offence, 
shielding her husband was a veritable wifely duty.5 So a wife had no exemption in relation to 
being an accessory before the fact6 of her husband’s crime, nor for aiding and abetting him7 in 
the substantive offence nor for the offence of inciting8 him to commit the offence, or to 
conspiring with another person to commit it.9 A wife could be both an accessory to a theft and 
                                              
3
 Blackstone, ‘Commentaries on the Laws of England’, (1769) vol 4 p37. This definition has been approved: see 
R v Ready [1942] VLR 85, 92; Sykes v DPP [1962] AC 528, 561. The position in South Africa has been 
expressed as “a person who, with a view to defeating the ends of justice, receives, comforts or assists anyone 
who, to his knowledge, has committed an offence, is indictable and punishable as an accessory after the fact to 
that offence. Those who knowingly do any act with the object of promoting the attainment of the ends of an 
offence already committed, may, in some cases, be indictable and punishable as principals in that offence”: 
Gardiner & Lansdown, ‘South African Criminal Law and Procedure’ (1957) p153 6 ed Charles W H 
Landsdown, William G Hoal and Alfred V Landsdown (eds), Juta & Co Ltd, Capetown. The writers note that 
the term “accessory after the fact” is one derived from English law but one which has been adopted in South 
African practice although quite unknown to the Roman-Dutch criminologists: R v Mlooi 1925 AD 131. In Nkau 
Majara v R [1954] AC 235 (PC) on appeal from Basutoland, it was held under Roman-Dutch law that impassive 
conduct assisting escape may make a person accessory after the fact.   
4
 R v Bubb (1906) 70 JP 143; R v Beuth [1937] NZLR 282. 
5
 In R v Brooks (1853) 22 LJ 121 Jervis CJ said: “A wife cannot be an accessory after the fact in receiving her 
husband bodily when he has committed a felony, nor can she, in my opinion be guilty as a receiver of stolen 
goods if she receives them from him”. This dictum is not found in the report at 6 Cox CC 148.  
6
 Serjeant Hawkins said: “Yet if she be in any way guilty of procuring her husband to commit it, it seems to 
make her an accessory before the fact in the same manner as if she had been sole”: 2 Hawkins’ ‘Pleas of the 
Crown’, cap29, c.34. There is no rule of law preventing a husband and wife from becoming accomplices in a 
given crime, whether as joint principals R v Conroy and Conroy  [1954] Crim LR 141 or as principal and 
accessory: R v Payne [1965] Crim LR 543.  
7
 In Browning v Floyd [1946] 1 KB 597 a wife was held guilty of aiding and abetting her husband. The wife 
bought a return train ticket but used only the second half of it as she was unexpectedly given a ride. She gave her 
husband the unused forward half ticket. The overall inconsistency of the law can be identified in that a husband 
and wife in New Zealand may be convicted of conspiring to obstruct the course of justice by doing a certain act 
yet the wife would have a complete defence to a charge of being an accessory after the fact to the same act if it 
involved her husband: s67 and s71(2) Crimes Act 1961 [NZ], whereas in England the spouses could not be 
convicted of conspiracy and the wife may well have no defence to being an accessory: s2(2)(a) Criminal Law 
Act 1977 [UK] and s4(1) Criminal Law Act 1967 [UK] respectively. 
8
 R v Annie Brown (1896) 15 NZLR 18, 32 per Prendergast CJ. 
9
 Edmund H Bennett and Franklyn Fiske Heard, ‘A Selection of Leading Cases in Criminal Law with Notes’, vol 
1 Edmund H Bennett, (1869) Little Brown & Co, Boston at p83 noting R v Serjeant (1826) 1 Ryan & Moody 
352 a married woman was indicted and convicted with others for conspiring to procure her husband to marry 
her. R v Crastny (No 1) [1992] 1 All ER 189. A wife can conspire with any other person other than her husband 
alone, or the intended victim of the conspiracy: R v Duguid (1906) 75 LJKB 470; s2(2)(c) Criminal Law Act 
1977 [UK]. 
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later, depending on the circumstances, also a receiver of the stolen goods.10 She could be 
convicted of both conspiracy to steal and also of receiving;11 so the uxorial position was 
particularly illogical, turning on the sometimes overlapping classification of the modality of 
the offence. As every harbouring by a wife almost certainly encompassed an agreement by the 
spouses for that objective, where spouses have no immunity for intraspousal conspiracy it 
would follow the wife may still have exemption from the criminal law by reason of her 
accessorial immunity.  
 
“The desire to shield her husband from detection is hardly a fault in a wife”12 That dictum of 
Parke B, in the mid-nineteenth century, was a precursor step in identifying the special 
position of every married woman under the criminal law, privileged by it to be exempt from 
the offence of being an accessory after the fact to the felony of her husband. Unlike all other 
persons, a wife was acknowledged by the law, indeed expected, to harbour her husband (and 
even his confederates) so as to protect him from detection. The wife’s immunity, though 
originally narrowly drawn to only exempt passive acts of receiving, was gradually widened to 
include more affirmative and extensive acts of assistance. This meant, apart from providing 
nourishment and accommodation (in his house) the wife was required as part of her uxorial 
compact with her husband, to suspend her civic duty to the State to apprehend any felon, by 
actively shielding him from capture. This could involve her in receiving stolen goods13 and in 
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 Wessel v Carter Pattisons & Pickfords Carriers Ltd (1947) 63 TLR 517, noted (1948) 21 Australian Law 
Journal 388. Brent Fisse, ‘Howard’s Criminal Law’, (1990) 5 ed, The Law Book Company Ltd, p274. 
11
 R v Froggett [1966] 1 QB 152; R v Whitehouse (1852) 6 Cox CC 38; R v Nerlich (1915) 24 CCC 256 (CA). 
See also R v Kam Hong Kwan (1992) 10 BCAC 274, 288-9 where the old common law rule is considered. 
12
 R v Brooks (1853) 6 Cox CC 148, 149 (CCCR). In R v Manning (1849) 2 Car&K 887, 903n it was held that 
the mere fact of harbouring and comforting her husband after the commission of a crime by him would not 
render the wife liable as an accessory after the fact to his felony. In the same year in R v M’Clarens (1849) 3 Cox 
CC 425 it was decided that where a husband and wife were jointly indicted for receiving stolen property, if the 
motive for the act of the wife was merely to conceal her husband’s guilt, or screen him from the consequences, 
she ought to be acquitted, but not him. R v Good (1842) 1 C&K 185 Alderson B (after conferring with Coltman 
J) stated: “persons charged with such an offence ought to know that it is a very serious offence to afford any 
assistance to a criminal, so as to obstruct the course of public justice. But a wife is in a peculiar situation: she 
cannot be found guilty of comforting and assisting her husband.”  
13
 In R v Matthews (1850) 1 Denison CC 549 (CCCR) a man and wife were indicted for jointly receiving stolen 
goods first found in their dwelling house. On both being found guilty the conviction of the wife was quashed. 
Patterson J stating: “If the husband and wife received jointly, how do you convict the wife?” Because of the legal 
unity of the parties a wife could not be indicted for stealing her husband’s goods; R v Tollette (1841) 1 
Carrington & Marshman 112 and also R v Willis (1833) 1 Moody CC 375. 
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obstructing all his pursuers, including the destruction of incriminating evidence.14 She was 
encouraged by an immunity from the criminal law to actively engage in the obstruction of 
criminal justice in relation to her husband15. 
 
A wife shall not be held answerable for harbouring, concealing or comforting, her husband, 
even after the commission of the greatest crimes; and if any crime with which she is charged 
appears to have flowed from such a motive, she shall be absolved for its commission. By the 
first principles of nature, a wife is bound to protect, defend and cherish her husband in all 
circumstances, and not the less so because he has been involved in crime and has no refuge 
but in her affection and fidelity. She cannot, therefore, be involved in any prosecution for any 
act done by her from such motives, even though it should, in itself, savour of a criminal 
nature.16 
 
This approach was consonant with that in Scotland which similarly immunised a wife for any 
acts done by her motivated by an attempt to protect her husband from detection; but Scotland 
by contrast, had never countenanced the English common law defence of marital coercion17 
and robustly rejected the notion of the coerced wife, leaving her to exercise the ordinary 
defence of duress, available to all under Scottish law. It also did not recognise the intraspousal 
conspiracy exemption. But Scottish law had for centuries provided: 
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 In R v M’Clarens (1849) 3 Cox CC 425 Coltman J said “A wife cannot be convicted of harbouring her 
husband when he has committed a felony; and the mere circumstance of her attempting to conceal what may lead 
to his detection, appears to come within the same principle.”   
15
 Marriage is an institution which not only creates the status of husband and wife, but also, without further or 
specific agreement, creates certain mutual rights and obligations owed to and by the respective spouses: 
Stranger-Jones, L I, Eversley’s Law of Domestic Relations (1951) 6 ed, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, London, p2-3. 
 
16
 Criminal Law Commissioners, Parliamentary Papers (1846) vol xxiv p12. “No woman shall be liable to 
conviction in respect of any act of receiving her husband; or of receiving any other person in his presence and by 
his authority, or of harbouring or concealing her husband, or any other person in his presence and by his 
authority, or of aiding the escape of her husband from justice.” This proposal, like so many of the structural 
reforms to the substantive criminal law in the nineteenth century, was never adopted. 
17
 Archibald Alison, ‘Principles of the Criminal Law of Scotland’ (1832) William Blackwood, Edinburgh at 
p668 under a heading ‘Of Subjection to Others’: “Nothing is better established in our practice, than that the 
authority or coercion of the husband is no palliation for the commission of crimes by the wife, who is presumed 
to have at least such freedom of action left as to be capable of resisting the temptations to crime, of whatever sort 
they may be [Hume i. 47, 48]. And this holds not only in regard to the more atrocious crimes, such as murder 
robbery, or fire-raising, but the smaller, such as theft, assault, reset, forgery, or the like, which are not so perilous 
by the danger and alarm with which they are attended. [Hume i. 48]. Nothing is more common, accordingly, than 
to have a husband and wife put to the bar and tried together on the same libel forth same offence.” Gerald H 
Gordon, ‘The Criminal Law of Scotland’, (1978) W Green & Son Ltd, Edinburgh, at p433 fn 72 refers to private 
compulsion very fleetingly and certainly does not state that the wife is under any special position under Scot’s 
Law. The earliest Scottish reference to reset is made in a text of 1609 ‘Regiam Majestatem ad Quoniam 
Attachiamenta’, (1609 ed) where reference is made to a statute of King William c19 that “the wife is nocht 
oblisched to accuse hir husband; nor to disclose his thift or felonie; because sho hes na power of hir selfe”.    
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(1) A wife is not excusable in the commission of any crime by the influence or power of her 
husband, if she has taken any part in its commission along with him. 
 
(2) A wife shall not be held answerable for harbouring, concealing, or comforting, her 
husband, even after the commission of the greatest crimes; and if any crime appears to have 
flowed from a motive, she shall be absolved for its commission.18 
 
The Scottish legal system recognises this analogous defence of reset.19 The basis of reset, 
which compares with uxorial accessoryship after the fact, is described in terms of the 
emotional covalent bond between spouses – a jurisprudential version of blood being thicker 
than water. 
 
But what shall be said of cases such as reset of theft, where the act of the wife, in harbouring 
or concealing her husband, or the goods he has stolen, is not only yielding to the natural and 
excusable feelings which she must entertain towards him in every situation.20 
 
But like the common law of England, the Scottish defence was also only available to the 
female spouse:21 
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 Archibold Alison, ‘Principles of the Criminal Law of Scotland’ (1832) William Blackwood, Edinburgh, p 668. 
19
 Christopher H W Gane, Charles N Stoddart and James Chalmers, ‘A Casebook on Scottish Criminal Law’ 
(2001) 3 ed, W Green, Edinburgh. At p519 “the receiving and keeping of stolen goods, knowing them to be 
such, and with an intention to conceal and withhold them from the owner”. The authors note that the traditional 
approach of Scots law was to exempt a wife from criminal responsibility for resetting goods stolen by her 
husband, unless she took an active part in the disposal of the goods as being: Hume (i,113). ‘Hume on Crimes’, 
vol I, 49 noted that, unlike the law of England, there was no presumption that a Scottish wife committed crimes 
out of dread of her husband and said: “Last of all, it is not to be imagined, that the wife shall in any case be held 
guilty, or be implicated as art and part of her husband’s crime, by affording him that harbourage or concealment 
and comfort after the fact, which the feelings of nature and duty require of her at that season of terror and 
distress, when her fidelity has become his only refuge. And indeed, it is not to be presumed that she has it in her 
power, if she were so disposed, to refuse him this assistance”. Reset is a process in the disposition of the primary 
evidence of the original theft, originally limited to the reset of theft but by s51 Criminal Law (Consolidation) 
(Scotland) Act 1995 it was extended to cover appropriations by breach of trust and commercial fraud. 
20
 Archibald Alison, ‘Principles of the Criminal Law of Scotland’ (1832) p 670. In HM Advocate v Camerons 
(1911) 6 Adam 456, 487-488 Lord Dunedin on the question of concert (joint enterprise) said: “If what he [the 
husband] really did was that at a late period – that is to say, after the simulated theft – he only learned of the 
scheme then and did what he did do after that time to screen his wife, then no doubt he has been guilty of an 
offence against the law, for it is an offence against law to screen the guilty.”   
21
 Gerald H Gordon, ‘The Criminal Law of Scotland’, (1978) W Green & Son Ltd, Edinburgh, at p520. In Miln v 
Stirton (1982) SLT (Sh Ct) 11 the accused was charged that she harboured and concealed her husband at the 
matrimonial home “knowing that there was an extract conviction warrant outstanding for his apprehension and 
this she did to defeat the ends of justice”. The wife argued that the libel (the charge) did not disclose an offence 
known to Scottish law. The procurator fiscal argued that since the days of Hume and Alison the status of a wife 
had changed. The court noted that under Scottish law “being a married woman in itself did not alter the capacity 
of a person to commit a crime, but in certain cases the law recognised that, in relation to a husband, a married 
woman’s responsibility was different from that of other persons” instancing harbouring her husband, reset, 
competence and compellability in the law of evidence. Archibald Alison, ‘Principles of the Criminal Law of 
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it is to be noted that a husband does not enjoy the privilege of avoiding prosecution for reset in 
respect of his wife’s thefts, and presumably cohabitees (of both sexes) are struck at with the 
full vigour of the criminal law. Whether the discriminatory nature of the privilege would 
withstand a challenge under the European Convention on Human Rights is uncertain. Could a 
man, charged with resetting property stolen by his wife, or a female cohabitee charged with 
resetting property stolen by her male partner claim that they were the victims of 
discrimination? 
 
In Smith v Watson22 the respondent was the wife of a man currently serving a lengthy 
sentence of imprisonment for robbery. A few months after his sentence had begun, money 
being proceeds from the robbery was delivered to her letterbox and she retained it with the 
intention of keeping it until it could be made available to her husband. At trial the sheriff 
acquitted her of reset. However, an appeal by the prosecution was successful from that ruling 
by holding that a wife’s exemption from liability for reset should not be extended beyond its 
established scope, and was limited to a case in which the stolen property was brought into the 
home by the husband, and was concealed by the wife with the purpose of protecting him from 
detection or punishment. Lord Hunter23 noted the appeal concerned a doctrine which 
developed under a social and legal order substantially different from that prevailing in 
contemporary life. Reference to Alison24 demonstrated that the privilege never extended in 
similar circumstances to a husband, which is internal evidence that the doctrine is a relic of an 
age when wives were expected as a matter of course to submit to their husbands and could 
therefore be presumed to have done wrong ex reverential mariti [out of matrimonial 
reverence]: 
 
that the wife is considered as bound, by the humanity of the law, to cherish and protect her 
husband, and, so far from informing against him, to conceal his delinquencies, and protect him 
from punishment. 
 
                                                                                                                                             
Scotland’, (1832) p669: “On this point the law of England is more favourable than that of Scotland to the wife of 
a prisoner.” 
22
 (1982) SCCR 15 p15. The Laws of Scotland, ‘Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia’, (1995), The Law Society of 
Scotland, Butterworths, Edinburgh, vol 7 para 392 Criminal Law: “A wife cannot be convicted of resetting 
goods from her husband, if all she does is conceal them to screen or protect him, and provided she takes no 
active part in his crimes. But this exemption from criminal liability will be strictly construed.” 
23
 At p17. In Clark v Mone (1950) SLT (Sh: Ct) 69 a wife was acquitted where her husband had brought home 
stolen goods, had been convicted of that offence and imprisoned and whilst imprisoned his wife was found 
wearing some of the stolen items. 
24
 Archibald Alison, ‘Principles of the Criminal Law of Scotland’, (1832) p 669. 
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The court concluded that this uxorial privilege, which is intended to be a narrow merciful 
release from criminal liability, only applies when the stolen property was brought into the 
matrimonial home by the husband and not by a third party acting in his interests. No 
legislation has intervened to either widen the privilege to husbands or to remove the ancient 
uxorial defence to substantive criminal law. In this regard only Scottish criminal law is more 
liberal than English law in continuing to acknowledge marriage as a defence in its own right 
to allegations of certain criminal conduct. 
 
 
ORIGINS OF THE UXORIAL ACCESSORIAL IMMUNITY 
 
This uxorial-only25 immunity under the criminal law can be traced26 back to the laws of the 
Anglo-Saxon kings. In ‘Essays in Anglo-Saxon Law’27 law 57 of King Ine,28 the West Saxon 
king living in England AD 712 provided:  
                                              
25
 P R Glazebrook (ed), ‘Sir Matthew Hale Historia Placitorum Coronae’ vol 1 621 “But the husband may be an 
accessory for the receipt of his wife.” An early example of a husband not being liable as an accessory after the 
fact of his wife’s felony is found in the Year Book Pasch 15 E.2, fol 463 (Maynard’s ed) itself cited in 
Fitzherbert’s Abridgement Corone 383: A man and his wife and their son were arrested in possession of eight 
sheep skins feloniously stolen. The wife and their son were guilty, the husband was acquitted as it was found he 
had given up their company and his own house and lived elsewhere. The mere fact that the stolen items were 
located in his house was insufficient as he had separated from his wife because of his disapproval of her ways; 
so he did not receive, relieve or comfort her. 
26
 P J Pace ‘“Impeding Arrest”-A Wife’s Right as a Spouse?’ [1978] Crim LR 82, 84 fn 14 erroneously states 
that the common law rule could only be traced to 1557, referring to ‘Les Plees del Coron’, Lib 1 c19 fol 26a; Sir 
James Fitzjames Stephen, ‘A Digest of the Criminal Law (Crimes and Punishments)’, (1877) Macmillan & Co, 
London at p333; “The first authority on the subject is Bracton, in whose time the more recent doctrine appears to 
have been unknown.” This too is contrary to the evidence as the accessorial exemption can be traced to the laws 
of King Ine AD 712 and the laws of King Cnut AD 1020: H Adams, H C Lodge, J L Laughlin and E Young, 
‘Essays in Anglo-Saxon Law’ (1876), Little Brown and Co, Boston p175, reprinted 1972, Hackensack, New 
Jersey, Rothman Reprints p175-176; A J Robertson, ‘The Laws of the Kings of England from Edmund to Henry 
I’, (1925) University Press, Cambridge, §76.  
27
 H Adams, H C Lodge, J L Laughlin and E Young, ‘Essays in Anglo-Saxon Law’ (1876), Little Brown and Co, 
Boston p175, reprinted 1972, Hackensack, New Jersey, Rothman Reprints p175-176. 
28
 Edmund H Bennett and Franklyn Fiske Heard, ‘A Selection of Leading Cases in Criminal Law with Notes’, vol 
1 Edmund H Bennett, (1869) Little Brown & Co, Boston at p86: “At the present day (1869), indeed the 
presumption that a wife is compelled by her husband to commit a crime, must be very weak, and it is not easy to 
see how any one’s orders, even a husband’s, should be a shield for criminal violations of law. It is certain that a 
father’s commands to a child, or a master’s to a servant, will not exonerate him from the consequences of his 
acts, even of a trespass; and on principle it seems difficult to discover a satisfactory reason for the difference in 
the two cases”. [See Commonwealth v Butler 1 Allen E4].” Edmund H Bennett and Franklyn Fiske Heard, ‘A 
Selection of Leading Cases in Criminal Law with Notes’, vol 1 Edmund H Bennett, (1869) Little Brown & Co, 
Boston at p86: “The distinction, however, seems well-established and recognised in both ancient and modern 
   
 407 
 
Ine, 57: “If a ceorl29 steal a chattel and bear it to his dwelling, and it be intertiated therein, then 
shall he be guilty for his part without his wife; for she must obey her lord. If she dare to 
declare by oath that she tasted not of the stolen property, let her take her third party”.  
 
The laws of King Cnut, another English king, promulgated between AD 1020 and 1034,30 
were very similar in this regard: 
 
76 Concerning stolen goods. 
If anyone carried stolen goods home to his cottage, and is detected, the law is that he (the 
owner) shall have what he has tracked. 
And unless the goods had been put under the wife’s lock and key, she shall be clear [of any 
charge of complicity].   
But it is her duty to guard the keys of the following – her storeroom and her chest and her 
cupboard. If the goods have been put in any of these, she shall be held guilty. 
But no wife can forbid her husband to deposit anything that he desires in his cottage. 
 
Bracton31 could authoritatively state that a married woman does not become an accessory 
after the fact to a felony committed by her husband by harbouring him, even though she may 
know that he has committed the felony; nor, in such circumstances, does she become a 
principal even when his offence is treason. He stated that: 
 
A wife, however, who is the spouse of thief shall not be liable for the act of the man, because 
she ought not to accuse her husband, nor to disclose his theft or felony since she has not any 
power over herself, but her husband has. 
 
                                                                                                                                             
times. And in the laws of Ina, King of the West Saxons, who reigned in the year 712 see Wilkins’s ‘Leges 
Anglo-Saxons’ p24 Art 57 the same principle was adopted.”   
29
 Lesley Brown (ed) The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford 1993 vol 1 p400 defines “ceorl”, alternatively churl, as “A man, esp. as correlative to ‘wife’”. 
30
 A J Robertson, ‘The Laws of the Kings of England from Edmund to Henry I’ (1925) University Press, 
Cambridge, p212. King Cnut also issued an edict that the defence of infancy would henceforth be available so 
that persons of nonnage would be also exempt from the criminal law: “It has been the custom up till now for 
grasping persons to treat a child which lay in the cradle, even thought it had never tasted food, as being as guilty 
as though it were fully intelligent. But I strictly forbid such a thing henceforth, and likewise very many things 
which are hateful to God”:  Laws of King Cnut II, 76.   
31
 Bracton, ‘De Carona’, c32 ss8-10; Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, ‘A Digest of the Criminal Law (Crimes and 
Punishments)’, (1877) Macmillan & Co, London at p334; “the wife is not bound to accuse her husband, nor is 
she to be regarded as accessory after the fact to a theft committed by him merely because she receives the stolen 
goods, though she may be so regarded if she so conducts herself as to show actual consent to the theft. The 
passage [in Bracton] does not contain a word about her right to steal with impunity in his presence.” Bracton fo 
413b refers to the case of Roger de Fanborne and his wife Agnes who were charged with uttering a forged writ. 
The husband was executed but the wife was freed irrespective of whether or not she had been a party to the 
offence since she was under the control and domination of her husband.   
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The same sources, King Ine and King Cnut, had provided the laws prescribing the earliest 
forms of the defence of marital coercion. However, the accessorial immunity32 never 
depended on any presumption (unlike marital coercion), nor did it require the presence of the 
husband at the time of the commission of the offence (as it did with marital coercion). In 
addition the accessory immunity applied to all offences, unlike marital coercion.33 During the 
Anglo-Saxon period in England, AD 580-1066, women had greater control over their 
destinies than under the Norman regime which succeeded it. Their capacity for self-
determination was generally comparable with that of men34 but inside and outside the home a 
wife was provisioned with special privileges from the criminal law.  
 
This significant exemption of wives from a major substantive part of the criminal law, by 
being immune from accessoryship after the crime of their husbands, was uncritically35 recited 
by the early institutional writers36 as a natural corollary to matrimony, which inspired 
obligations of indomitable loyalty based on the desiderata of divine law.37 The same 
                                              
32
 In R v Holley [1963] 1 All ER 106, 108 (CCA) Lord Parker CJ in delivering the judgment there concluded that 
the common law privilege of a wife to assist her husband after his felony had disappeared upon the passage of 
s47 Criminal Justice Act 1925 [UK] which abolished the presumption of marital coercion. This approach is 
unsustainable. Apart from an unsupported reference it was never a rationale for the accessorial immunity that the 
wife was acting under coercion. cf Wayne Morrison (ed), ‘Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England’ 
vol IV [39], Cavendish Publishing Limited, London, 2001, p30. “But a feme covert cannot become an accessory 
by the receipt and concealment of her husband; for she is presumed to act under his coercion, and therefore she 
is not bound, neither ought she, to discover her lord.” P R Glazebrook (ed) ‘Sir Matthew Hale Historia 
Placitorum Coronae’ vol 1 p621 simply stated “A feme covert cannot be an accessary for the receipt of her 
husband, for she ought not discover him.” But if she knowingly received any other felon, without her husband’s 
knowledge, she alone was an accessory after the fact in relation to that felon.   
33
 Edward Jenks (ed.), ‘Stephens Commentaries on the Laws of England’ (1922), 17 ed, Butterworth & Co, 
London vol iv p29: “The rule, moreover, was never applicable to such offences as murder, manslaughter and the 
like; these being of too deep a dye to be thus excused. In treason, also, no plea of coverture can excuse the wife, 
no presumption of her husband’s coercion extenuate her guilt; as well because of the odiousness and dangerous 
consequence of the crime of treason itself, as because the husband, having broken through the most sacred tie of 
social community by rebellion against the State, has no right to that obedience from his wife, which he himself, 
as a subject, has forgotten to pay”. 
34
 Christine Fell, ‘Women in Anglo-Saxon England’, (1984) 13 n3 “the evidence which has survived…indicates 
that women were then more nearly the equal companions of their husbands’ and brothers’ than at any other 
period before the modern age”.   
35
 Anon, ‘Can a Husband be Accessory after the Wife’s Crime?’ (1900) 64 JP 129, 131 “Their names too carried 
such weight of themselves as to make lawyers of many succeeding generations willing to accept what they said 
without inquiring into the grounds of it.” 
36
 Staunford ‘Les Plees del Coron’, 1, 26; Hale 1 PC 621. 
37
 Coke 3 ‘Institutes’ 108 “A feme covert committeth not larceny if it be done by the coercion of her husband, 
but a feme covert may commit larceny if she doth it without the coercion of her husband; and there it appeareth 
that a man may be accessory to his wife, but the wife cannot be accessory to her husband, though she knows that 
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obligations were conceived as requiring a wife agreeing with her husband to be incapable of 
committing a conspiracy, as in ecclesiastical terms as reflected by the common law, they had 
but a unity of purpose, namely that decided by the husband. The privileges of the accessorial 
immunity and the intraspousal conspiracy immunity could overlap where there was an 
agreement between the spouses as to how he would be protected from the criminal law, yet 
the substantive offence of being an accessory after the fact did not need to rely on any derived 
assistance from the conspiracy immunity, as it was a free-standing defence. 
 
It was Bracton38 who outlined a detailed formulation of the responsibility and duty of a wife  
where her husband had criminously acted. Fleta39 puts the position in substantially similar 
terms. Their conclusion reinforcing her innocently-deemed, uxorial acquiescence emphasised 
the rationale that she could not be required by law to accuse her husband or prove his felony – 
thus separating her position and duty from that of all others. By the general law all were 
required by the offence of misprision of felony, to be proactive in reporting any such serious 
crime. A subsequent writer, Britton40, wrote that “the felon’s wife may plead, that although 
she was privy to the crime of her husband, yet she neither could nor ought to accuse him”. Sir 
William Staunford41 added that “a wife cannot be accessory to her husband because by the 
law divine she ought not to discover him”. Lord Coke42 emphasised “the wife cannot be 
accessory to her husband…for the Law Divine, she is not bound to discover the defence of her 
husband”. With God on her side a wife ought to feel no compunction in elevating her 
matrimonial interests above those of the State. These early institutional writers on English law 
acknowledged the parallel existence of martial coercion as being a necessary complement to 
                                                                                                                                             
he committed larceny, and relieve him, and discover it not; for by the law divine she is not bound to discover the 
offence of her husband.”  
38
 Bracton, ‘De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae’, (c1250-1259) as translated in Samuel E Thorne, ‘Bracton 
on the Laws and Customs of England’ (1968) Bellknap Press, Harvard University Press, vol 2 p428-9 “A wife 
ought not to accuse her husband nor disclose his theft or felony, but neither ought she assent to it or act as his 
confederate;…But a concubine or housemaid will not be in the same case as a wife, for such persons are bound 
to accuse the man or to withdraw from his service; otherwise they are taken to consent”.  
39
 Fleta, ‘Fleta seu Comnentarius Luris Anglicicani’, (c1290) translated in Henry G Richardson and George O 
Sayles, ‘Fleta’, (1955) B Quaritch, London, p92.  
40
 Translated in Frances M Nichols, ‘Britton’ (1983) Seldon Soc, Oxford, p120. 
41
 Sir William Staunford, ‘Les Plees Del Coron’, (1557) Aedibus Richardi Tottelli, London  (reprinted 2006) The 
LawBook Exchange Ltd ,26b. A similar viewpoint is expressed by Ferdinando Pulton, ‘De Pace Regis et Regni’, 
(1609) Printed [by Adam Islip] for the Companie of Stationers., An. Dom, p130. 
42
 Sir Edward Coke, ‘Third Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England’, (1628) p108. To the same effect Sir 
Matthew Hale ‘History of the Pleas of the Crown’, (c1676) vol 2, p279. 
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the accessoryship privilege. A wife was always going to succeed by saying “he made me let 
him into his house” when her husband returned home from a crime spree. The power 
imbalance was overwhelming. She was in a position of obliging docility. Bracton43 refers to 
the case of Agnes de Fanborne who was set free “irrespective of whether or not she had been 
a party to the offence since she was under the control and domination of her husband”. 
Fitzherbert44 in 1565, Staunford45 in 1583, and Coke46 later all accepted that some core rule 
existed for the accessoryship exemption but were generally content to merely repeat the 
inconclusive references of the earlier writers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
43
 Bracton fo 413b. Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, ‘A Digest of the Criminal Law (Crimes and Punishments)’, 
(1877) Macmillan & Co, London at p332 note II in reference to Art.30. At p333: “The first authority on the 
subject is Bracton, in whose time the more recent doctrine appears to have been unknown”. William F Walsh, ‘A 
History of Anglo-American Law’ (1932) 2 ed (Reprint 1993) Wm W Gaunts & Sons Inc. at p389: “The common 
law of the thirteenth century definitely rejected the principle of community property between husband and wife 
which prevailed throughout a considerable part of the continent” quoting Pollock and Maitland, ‘History of 
English Law’, II, 397-399; Holdsworth, ‘History of English Law III’, 523-524. Theodore F T Plucknett, ‘A 
Concise History of the Common Law’, (1956) 5 ed. Butterworth & Co, London at p313 noted that “local customs 
frequently kept the woman’s property free from her husband’s control, accord her liberty of contract (which was 
denied at common law), and even allowed her to trade separately upon her own account”. The author noted 
[Plucknett YB 13 Richard II (Ames Foundation) 80, and Introduction, xlvi] that a decision of the Court of 
Common Pleas in 1389 showed that the common law, even at so late a stage, did not extend to all persons and 
places and that there was an incalculably large mass of customary law involving very different principles in 
numerous different communities …”. Bracton, in giving reasons for the rule that husband and wife were required 
to join in an action to recover the wife’s land after stating that ‘they are quasi one person’, added ‘for the thing is 
the wife’s own, and the husband is guardian as being the head of the wife.’ Bracton f 429b, Pollock and Maitland 
‘History of English Law’, II II 403. 
44
 Fitzherbert's Abridgment (AD 1565), Corone, 199. 
45
 Sir William Staunford, ‘Les Plees del Coron’, Aedibus Richardi Tottelli, 1557, London, reprinted The Law 
Book Exchange, Ltd. 2006. c19; In Gottliffe v Edelston [1930] 2 KB 378, 383 McCardie J said “It is not easy to 
discover the original basis of the doctrine as a common law principle.” He said at p384: “I find it difficult to see 
how the old and conventional doctrine of unity can be said to operate at the present day. There is no mental unity 
in any just meaning of the word. Husbands and wives have their individual outlooks. Each has a separate 
intellectual life and activities.” 
46
 3 Institutes 47. In ‘Coke upon Littleton’, (1823) 18 ed, vol 1, ch 1 at p6b: “Note, it hath been resolved by the 
justices, that a wife cannot be produced either against or for her husband, quia sunt duae animae in carne unâ; and 
it might be a cause of implacable discord and dissention between the husband and the wife, and a meane of great 
inconvenience;…” 
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RATIONALES FOR THE ACCESSORIAL PRIVILEGE 
 
Other than the incidental benefits conferred by the coincidence of divine47 and common law, 
early commentators saw the impelling reason for the privilege as lying in the duty a wife 
owed to her husband, as it was a superior bond that even the law itself should not require to 
be broken by the opposing pull of the public interest in the detection and prosecution of 
serious crime. Clive & Wilson48 in concluding that for the comparable exemption of reset 
under Scottish law, it was strictly applicable too only to wives that: 
 
the essence of the rule is simply that in a conflict between conjugal and public obligations the 
law in this case, as in certain of the rules on evidence, allows the conjugal obligations to 
prevail. The family is pro tanto preferred to the state.   
 
Indeed the law had a separate interest in preserving the efficacy of uxorial duties owing to the 
husband as the doctrine of feme covert was built upon the unseparateness of the will of 
married women from that of their husband; a conjugal unity.49 Hale writing in 1736 stated: 
 
If the husband commit a felony or treason,50 and the wife knowingly receive him, she shall 
neither be accessory as to the felony, nor principal to the treason, for such bare reception of 
her husband; for she is sub potestate viri, and she is bound to receive her husband; but 
otherwise it is, of the husband’s receiving the wife knowingly after an offence of this nature 
committed by her husband.51 
 
The husband had no equivalent protection as he was most assuredly in law not the weaker 
vessel. He could not claim an exemption based on marriage. He was undone by his own 
                                              
47
 Staundford, ‘Pleas of the crown’  fol 26 a. c.10; “But if the husband commits felony and the wife well 
knowing of it, receives him and keeps his company, she is not, therefore, accessory to the felony, for the wife 
cannot be accessory to her husband because that by the divine law she ought not to discover him, &c.” 
48
 Clive & Wilson, ‘Husband and Wife’, (1974) p376-377. 
49
 At common law a wife was exempt from prosecution for arson of her husband’s dwelling even after they lived 
apart, because the theory of the legal unity of spouses was stronger than their actual separation in fact. R v 
Marsh, (1828) 1 Moody 182. This metaphor of unity in the face of formal separation did not provide exemption 
in America: Kopcyznski v State, (1908) 118 NW 863. 
50
 The Roman-Dutch jurist, Matthaeus (48.2.2.20) stated that even in the crime of high treason an immunity 
should be extended to anyone who acted out of humane motives and impelled by the force of a natural 
obligation, gave necessaries to a person aiding the enemy: cited in Gardiner & Lansdown, ‘South African 
Criminal Law and Procedure’, (1957) 6 ed, Charles W H Landsdown, William G Hoal and Alfred V Landsdown 
(eds), Juta & Co Ltd, Capetown p155. 
51
 P R Glazebrook (ed) ‘Sir Matthew Hale Historia Placitorum Coronae’, vol 1 47, referring to Coke 3 Institutes 
108. 
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proven inadequacy and was not to be rewarded for his own failure within the marriage to 
control his wife, if circumstances obtained in which she had, without his participation, 
committed a crime. Such conduct by her was inimical to sustaining the ideology of male 
dominance and therefore he had failed in his responsibility. 
 
 
WIVES ONLY – PROOF OF MARRIAGE 
 
In R v Good52 the allegation was that Mrs Good was an accessory after the fact to a murder 
committed by her husband. (No crime is outside the privilege.) Her defence was that she was 
married to him. She could produce no documentary evidence of the celebration of the 
marriage which reputedly took place in Ireland, because of the unreliable nature of the 
contemporary keeping of marriage registers in that country. The judge acceded to the position 
that the prosecution could properly take the view that she was married, notwithstanding the 
absence of any formal documentation to support her claim. The court endorsed the 
prosecution offering no evidence against Mrs Good. It was said by Alderson B that: 
 
if the prisoner in this case went through the ceremony of marriage, and it should have turned 
out that there was some irregularity in the marriage, nevertheless, if it appeared that she had 
acted under the supposition that she was the wife of [the accused Mr Good] and according to 
the duty which she considered cast upon her, the Court would have inflicted a very slight 
punishment upon her. 
 
This decision is generally cited for the proposition that a putative wife need not strictly prove 
her marriage as a basis for claiming the accessorial exemption. The kindly view of the judge 
was to the effect that a presumption of marriage53 applied because of the circumstances in 
                                              
52
 (1842) 1 Car&K 185; R v Boober, Boober & Boober (1850) 4 Cox CC 272 Talford J said the fact that the man 
and woman were living together was itself evidence from which it should be inferred that they were man and 
wife. So, recognition of a common law marriage simply by their relationship.   
 
53
 In R v Hassall (1826) 2 Car & P 434 a man and woman were jointly indicted for larceny. The indictment 
described the woman as being single. It was held insufficient for her to prove that she had lived with the man for 
two years and was his reputed wife.  What was necessary was evidence that she was in fact the lawful wife 
although it was not necessary to prove the actual marriage. See R v Good (1842) 1 Car Kir 185, R v Atkinson 
(1814) 1 Russell on Crimes and Misdemeanours 8 ed, 96, 103.  In Berthiaume v Dastous (1929) 47 Banc du Roi 
533 PC, the Privy Council (on appeal from Quebec) had held that a valid religious marriage was not necessarily 
a valid legal marriage. Where it is proved that a couple went through a ceremony of marriage and subsequently 
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which the wife was reputed to be married and declared herself to be married.54 However, the 
general proposition cannot be sustained on close analysis. In that judgment Alderson B also 
decided that if prosecution counsel had reason to believe that the woman had been married to 
the principal at the time of the alleged accessoryship and it appeared that she considered 
herself as his wife and had lived with him as such the prosecutor will be justified in not 
offering any evidence against her. That conclusion, the judge added, would apply apparently 
even though there was reason to believe that the marriage was in some respects irregular and 
probably invalid. This gallant approach is probably explicable by the fact that in the mid-
nineteenth century it would have been a very onerous requirement for a person remanded in 
custody to be able to obtain the necessary formal documents. If it was a common law 
marriage this would have required even greater demands as there may have been no 
documentary evidence at all.  Where here it was asserted that the marriage had taken place in 
a different country, Ireland, the difficulties would have been virtually insuperable.55 The 
requirement to establish a valid marriage56 is a condition precedent to employment of any of 
the cognate special defences available only to married women. For marital coercion, the Court 
of Appeal would not countenance any diminution in the necessary proof that a valid, 
subsisting marriage was in place at the material time.57 
 
                                                                                                                                             
lived together, it is presumed that the marriage between them is valid. Where it is the prosecution, rather than the 
defence, seeking to rely on the existence of a marriage, it must be strictly proved; R v Birtles (1911) 6 Cr App R 
177, and R v Umanski [1961] VR 242. In turn, the onus and therefore the standard of proving death of a person 
as at any particular date lies on the party to whom proof of that fact is essential: Lal Chand Marwari v Mahant 
Ramrup Gir (1925) 42 TLR 159 (PC).  It has long been established that if a man and woman cohabit and hold 
themselves out as husband and wife this itself raises a presumption that they are legally married, Doe d Fleming 
v Fleming (1827) 4 Bing 266; Sastry Velaider Aronegary v Sembecutty Vaigalie (1881) 6 App Cas 364 (PC); and 
Re Taplin, Watson v Tate [1937] 3 All ER 105 but in a prosecution for bigamy the marriage must be strictly 
proved by the prosecution. R v Ford (1913) 32 NZLR 1219 (CA) cf R v Riddehough (1919) GLR 143.   
54
 This is in accord with Au Hung Fat v Lam Lai Ha [1959] HKLR 527, Ng Ping On v Choy Fung Lam (1963) 
SR (NSW) 782. A marriage proved by the prosecution to be void could not be relied upon: De Reneville v De 
Reneville [1948] 1 All ER 56, 60.  
55
 The judge may also have been subliminally influenced by the fact that Mr Good had already been sentenced to 
death by an earlier jury for the substantive offence. 
56
 In Mohamed v Knott [1968] 2 All ER 563, 567 Lord Parker CJ appeared to accept the validity of polygamous 
marriage and said they are “recognised…unless there is some strong reason to the contrary”. This is preferable to 
but incompatible with the seminal Christian concept identified by Lord Penzance in Hyde v Hyde (1866) LR 
1P&D 130, 133: “marriage, as understood in Christendom, may…be defined as the voluntary union for life of 
one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others”. The common law of marriage knew only Christian 
marriage.  
57
 R v Ditta, Hussain and Kara (1988) Crim LR 42 CA. 
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The critical fact of the existence of a valid marriage permeated the uxorial privileges in the 
criminal law. It translated into an essentiality from which protections flowed. Its status was 
elemental. Therefore, for the purposes of the rules of admissibility a mistress was always a 
competent witness for the prosecution; whereas a wife was not.58 It also followed that under 
the substantive general criminal law a man owes no duty to aid his “weekend mistress”;59 she 
was in terms of the law a stranger whose position in relation to him, generated no 
corresponding obligation to her imposed by law. So although the outer limits of the duty of 
responsibility to preserve life imposed by the criminal law are undetermined, relationships by 
blood or marriage create a legal duty. It was a structural requirement of all the special 
criminal rules applying to married women that the woman be the lawful wife to be able to 
claim the relevant benefit from the criminal law.60  
 
 
WIDTH OF THE ACCESSORIAL EXEMPTION 
 
In compliance with her pre-ordained responsibility to be faithful to her husband’s intent, a 
wife would have to act to protect him from successful apprehension in many different ways, 
all of them being animated by an intention to impede his arrest. In R v M’Clarens, Middleton, 
Draddy and Draddy61 M’Clarens and Middleton were indicted for stealing sugar and Mr and 
                                              
58
 Batthews v Galindo (1828) 4 Bing 610, R v Young (1847) 2 Cox CC 291; Comyns Digest Justices T.2. at 
p593: “The only natural relation, however, which the law regards as destroying competency, is that of husband 
and wife; for no other tie, however intimate, can render testimony inadmissible.”  
59
 In R v Instan [1893] 1 QB 450 (CCCR) it was held if the defendant assumes responsibility toward another or 
voluntarily assumes a duty towards another then he or she also comes under a legal duty to act (73 year old 
immobile aunt); People v Beardsley (1907) 113 NW 1128; CMV Clarkson and H M Keating, ‘Criminal Law: 
Text and Materials’, (1994) 3 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, p113.  
60
 R v Levy [1912] 1 KB 158. AM Wilshere, ‘A Selection of Criminal Cases Illustrating the Criminal Law’, 
(1935) 3 ed Sweet & Maxwell London p78. In State v Carpenter (1947) 176 P 2d 919 (Supreme Court of Idaho) 
Mrs Carpenter was charged with “carrying hacksaw blades to prisoners to aid their escape” of her husband. At 
p921 the court approved the trial judge’s direction that the defence needed to produce a marriage licence or proof 
of having entered “into a formal marriage ceremony”, to meet the requirements of the Idaho Penal Code s17-
201, subd 7, ICA; “All persons are capable of committing crimes except those belonging to the following 
cases…(7) Married women (unless the crime to be punishable with death) acting under the threat, command or 
coercion of their husbands.” 
61
 (1849) 3 Cox CC 423. Mrs Draddy was acquitted by the jury. In R v Archer (1826) 1 Moody CC 143 the judge 
held that the law does not impute to the wife those offences which she might be supposed to have concurred in 
by the coercion or influence of her husband, especially where his house is made the receptacle of stolen goods. 
She had been more active than her husband. To the same effect is R v Banks (1845) 1 Cox CC 238 where it was 
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Mrs Draddy for receiving it. The husband received the sugar without his wife being present. 
But a witness later found the wife flushing the remains of the sugar down a sink in the 
kitchen. Coltman J stated that the wife prima facie might be acting under the coercion of her 
husband but that could be rebutted “by the active part she took in the matter”. But if the jury 
concluded that the act of flushing the sugar was “merely for the purpose of concealing her 
husband’s guilt, and of screening him from the consequences” then she should be acquitted as 
she could not be convicted of harbouring her husband where he has committed a felony. And 
equally, although she could not be convicted of harbouring her husband when he has 
committed a felony, the circumstances of her attempting to conceal what may have lead to his 
detection appeared to have come within the same principle.  
 
In R v Boober, Boober & Boober62 a husband, wife and their 10 year old son were indicted at 
the Central Criminal Court for possession of moulds on which was impressed the obverse side 
of a shilling. Talford J directed the jury to acquit the boy as “he is acting under the control of 
his parents, they are living in the house where the coin implements are found”. Counsel for 
the wife submitted that if the husband was found guilty she must be acquitted on the basis that 
possession by her was in law and fact possession by the husband. When the police entered the 
home the wife was seen quickly breaking the coin mould. But counsel argued that this was 
done to screen her husband so therefore she could not be liable, although such an act done by 
another person might well make him or her an accessory after the fact. The judge also found 
that the wife could not in law be said to have any possession separate from her husband. But 
the judge said if the criminality was on her part alone and he was entirely guiltless, she could 
be convicted. He directed the jury that if the wife was trying to break the mould when the 
police officers went to the house, that would not affect the case if they considered that her 
object was to screen the husband from detection. 
 
                                                                                                                                             
held that stolen goods found in the house of a married man could not be considered to be in the possession of his 
wife. 
62
 (1850) 4 Cox CC 272. 
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In R v Brooks63 five judges pondered the consequences of a husband who as a salesman had 
stolen from his shopkeeper employer “dressing-cases, bell-corals, pencil-cases”. He handed 
these items to his wife who promptly pawned them. On the first suspicion of his dishonesty he 
absconded “and was not subsequently taken into custody”. However, upon a search of the 
matrimonial dwelling a box was found which the wife struggled to prevent being opened. 
Inside was a quantity of pawn-tickets which led to the eventual discovery of the stolen 
property. It was established that the wife had herself pledged the items to the pawn-broker. 
She was indicted for receiving the stolen articles. The Recorder of Liverpool directed the jury 
(at p149) that  
 
as her husband had delivered the stolen articles to the prisoner, the law presumed she acted 
under his control in receiving them, but that this presumption might be rebutted. 
 
He instanced that if Elizabeth Brooks had acted “not by reason of any control or coercion of 
her husband, but voluntarily and with a dishonest and fraudulent intention” the jury could 
convict her; which it did. The Recorder reserved the case which was considered by Jervis CJ, 
Parke and Alderson B, Wightman and Cresswell JJ. Counsel for the prosecution relied upon 
her “violent attempt at concealment” of the box containing the pawn-tickets but Parke B 
instantly rejoined “I do not see how, under any circumstances, a wife can be convicted of 
receiving from her husband”. In R v Wardroper64 it was held that where a husband and wife 
are jointly indicted as receivers of stolen property, and it is consistent with the facts that he 
may have received the stolen property at his house, and that it might have come into the 
possession of the wife knowing that it had been wrongfully acquired, the issue for the jury 
was whether she received the property from her husband, which would lead to an acquittal or 
whether she received it in his absence. The mid-nineteenth century English cases demonstrate 
that while the matrimonial dwelling was a sanctum, the wife was in peril if she acted beyond 
passive reception of her husband. The fine line which divided furthering the husband’s crime 
from acquiescing in the uxorial obligation to shelter him was wholly unpredictable. The law 
                                              
63
 (1853) 6 Cox CC 148. Where a husband and wife are jointly indicted for receiving, the wife may be convicted 
if there is evidence of a receiving by her separate and apart from the husband: R v Baines (1900), 69 LJQB 681, 
(CCCR). The Law Reform Commission, Ireland, Report No 23 December 1987 ‘Receiving Stolen Property’ para 
33: “Husband and wife “stand in no special position” [Smith & Hogan, ‘Criminal Law’ (1965) p459] with regard 
to the offence of receiving; either may receive property stolen or received by the other.” 
64
 (1861) 29 LJMC 116 (CCCR) 
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was anxious that a wife did not re-energise the original crime and its consequences by her 
own participation in furtherance of it – albeit her obstruction of her husband’s apprehension 
indirectly achieved the same end. But that was seen as ordained by the marriage compact and 
not the escalation of the original offence or illegitimate activity in relation to it.65 
 
Sir James Fitzjames Stephen was of the opinion that the rationales for marital coercion and 
for accessorial exemption partially, if not completely, overlapped. The severity of the criminal 
law he concluded had been tempered by the ameliorating provisions66 which removed to a 
considerable extent the ordinary processes of the criminal law from married women, when 
they acted in relation to or were physically proximate to their husbands while engaging in 
criminal conduct. But he decried this doctrine which placed married women beyond the 
criminal law67 for being “uncertain in its extent and irrational as far as it goes”.68 There had 
been virtually no discussion of the reason for the broad exemption in the case law, as the 
judges saw it as not necessary for them to rationalise the law, only to apply it. Gratuitous 
comments on law reform of the criminal law in the nineteenth century were almost non-
                                              
65
 Where a wife receives stolen property from her husband and intended to enjoy the benefit of it, as coercion 
had been negatived, she was held properly convicted. People v Hartwell (1900) 55 NY App Div 234 noted 
‘Recent Cases’ (1914) 14 Harvard Law Review 544 noting that the New York statute expressly provided that 
both spouses may be jointly convicted of this offence. The rule is otherwise at common law, R v Matthews 
(1850) 4 Cox CC 214, 217 where Platt B stated the wife would be “sub potestate viri”. The writer asserted that 
the wife’s inability to be an accessory after the fact to her husband’s crime rest on totally independent 
considerations of policy from that which provides that spouses may jointly commit a crime. 
66
 Sir James Fitzjames Stephen ‘A Digest of the Criminal Law (Crimes and Punishments)’, (1877) Macmillan & 
Co, London at p332 Note II in reference to Art.30. “Hardly any legal doctrine is less satisfactory than the one 
embodied in this Article. The rule has been too long settled to be disputed; but on examining the authorities in 
their historical order, it appears to me to have originated, like some other doctrines, in the anxiety of Judges to 
devise means by which the excessive severity of the old criminal law might be evaded.”   
67
 Thomson B in R v Hughes (1813) 2 Lew CC 229 attributed the special position of wives in the criminal law to 
be justified “out of tenderness to the wife”. Special rules of the criminal law operated humanely when the 
penalty for treason and felony was savage and the reality that wives were still far from emancipation and 
equality. It is probable that judges in a soft chivalric way took the realities into account in their overall approach 
to any direction to the jury. But it may be doubted whether they are necessary in the present administration of the 
law. In R v Mtetwa (1921) TPD 227, 229 Wessels JP said: “Our law takes into consideration our ordinary human 
experience that a woman who lives with a man as his wife and who is supported by him as such, and is entirely 
dependent on him, is in most cases bound, even against her wish to carry out his behests in the ordinary domestic 
relationship which results from their common life.” Irene Geffen ‘The Laws of South Africa Affecting Women 
and Children’, R L Esson & Co Ltd, Johannesburg 1928, states that it was an invariable “custom” not to 
prosecute a wife who merely harboured her husband; but if she acted other than neutrally receiving him such as 
by furthering the crime by disposing of property, it was otherwise: R v Brett and Levy 1915 TPD 53.  
68
 Sir James Fitzjames Stephen, ‘A Digest of the Criminal Law (Crimes and Punishments)’, (1877) Macmillan & 
Co, London at p333, adding “It is, besides, rendered nearly unmeaning by the rule that the presumption is liable 
to be rebutted by circumstances”.  
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existent. It was not until after the passage of the Married Women’s Property Act 1882 [UK] 
that murmurs for any change were stirred. No Court of Appeal for criminal cases existed in 
England until 1907 and prior to its creation the decisions of the Court for Crown Cases 
Reserved very often tended to be short assertions of the law, without any wider discussion of 
its anatomy. Many of the judgments of that court consist of only a few sentences and often 
counsel did not appear for either the convicted person or the prosecution. So the consideration 
was of the nature of a limited collegiate discussion with the trial judge often a member of the 
reviewing court. The general outcome was that other than in a few exceptional cases, the 
decisions of the Court for Crown Cases Reserved did little to establish a principled corpus of 
substantive criminal law as opposed to generating a miscellany of individual narrow points. In 
addition the court did not conceive it as being either its duty or within its power to pass on the 
desirability of statutory and common law, leaving its decisions and their implications to speak 
for themselves. In the twentieth century Glanville Williams saw this uxorial privilege, which 
had by then existed for over a thousand years, as a “concession to inevitable human 
feeling”.69 For centuries it had been treated as a given and its continuance never endangered.  
 
 
CAN A HUSBAND BE AN ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT AT COMMON LAW? 
 
The privilege was bypassed, usually in a line, in the standard legal texts. Modern writers have 
very infrequently paused to comment on the accessorial privilege70 or its justification, but in 
1900 a trial ruling of Ridley J at the Central Criminal Court prompted some introspection as 
to whether a husband was also protected at common law. In R v Williams and Williams71 a 
husband and wife were charged with child murder. The jury convicted the wife who was 
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 Glanville Williams, ‘Legal Unity of Husband and Wife’, (1947) 10 Modern Law Review 16, 26. J W Cecil 
Turner, ‘Russell on Crime’, 12 ed (1964) Stevens & Sons London vol 1 p94 “it is not clear whether these 
exemptions rest on the theory of identity of person created by marriage, or upon the theory that the wife’s acts in 
receiving her husband or conspiring with him, are done in obedience to his will.” 
70
 Anon, ‘Can a Husband be Accessory after the Wife’s Crime?’ (1900) 64 Justice of the Peace 129 said of even 
the position of the wife “the authorities, though by no means numerous, are not very clear”.  
71
 The Times 17 and 19 February 1900, a trial at the Central Criminal Court before Ridley J. The Central 
Criminal Court Session Papers, Fourth Session, (1899-1900) 225, 240 records that after his wife had been 
sentenced to death the husband was indicted as an accessory after the fact “for assisting and harbouring Ada 
Chard Williams, who had committed the crime of wilful murder.  On the suggestion of the learned judge, Mr 
Matthews, for the prosecution, offered no evidence, and the jury returned a verdict of not guilty.” 
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sentenced to death, but acquitted the husband. The prosecution then proposed to proceed 
against the husband upon an indictment charging him with being an accessory after the fact to 
his wife’s felony. Ridley J advised the prosecution that in his opinion there were serious 
obstacles in law to a prospective conviction. Ultimately the Crown offered no evidence and 
the husband was discharged. This outcome generated two contemporary articles which 
doubted the proposition whether a husband could be convicted as an accessory after the fact 
of his wife’s felony, by leveraging off the uxorial privilege.72 These articles, remarkable for 
both their obscurity and breadth of vision in the year 1900, concluded that if the principle 
underlying this rule of law was that a wife owes to her husband a duty of love and tenderness, 
then in terms of equality the same principle should apply in the case of a husband; although 
there was no case law to this effect and the opposite conclusion had been directly reached.73   
 
The anonymous author of the casenote at (1900) 44 Solicitors’ Journal 254 refers to the 
general rule that everyone can be an accessory after the fact, except a married woman “who 
receives, comforts, or relieves her husband, knowing him to have committed a felony, does 
not thereby become an accessory after the fact”. The note describes it as “strange” that the 
law was silent on the issue of whether a husband can be so exempted. Equal rights in this 
regard were advocated74 for all husbands – but not for a wider category of family members. 
But such an observation completely overlooks the historical exegesis leading to the slow 
equalisation and emancipation of married women, a sub-class specifically disabled from 
breaching a class of the general criminal law. The duty of love and obedience was reposed 
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 Anon, ‘Can a Husband be Accessory after the Wife’s Crime?’ (1900) 64 JP 129; Anon, (1900) 44 Solicitors’ 
Journal 254. 
73
 R v M’Athey (1862) 32 LJMC 35 (CCCR). In R v Jones [1949] 1 KB 194 the appellant was acquitted of 
charges of receiving stolen goods but was found by the jury to be an accessory after the fact to those felonies 
which the jury found had been committed by the wife. Peter Gillies, ‘Criminal Law’ (1990) 2 ed Law Book 
Company, Sydney p767: “At common law a wife cannot be an accessory after the fact to her husband’s felony. 
The converse is, however, possible. But notwithstanding the protection afforded to the wife, if by virtue of an act 
of assistance to her husband, she also assists his accomplice, she becomes an accessory after the fact to the 
accomplice’s felony at common law.”  
74
 (1900) 44 SJ 254, 255 “Can, then, anyone give any good reason why a wife may shield her guilty husband 
from justice, while a husband commits a crime if he shields his guilty wife?” The author contends that on a 
principle of parity the same result should apply when the positions of the spouses are reversed and adds “there 
would be something almost indecent in a man turning his wife out of doors and giving information to the Police 
if he discovered she had committed some felony”. This casenote was prescient as most modern jurisdictions, a 
century later, had altered their law accordingly.  
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only in wives75 under the common law and for a husband to have been given the same 
exemption would have been to seriously weaken the edifice of marriage and the legal 
implications of it, particularly the authority and control of the husband over the wife. To have 
provided such a defence to the husband would have been seen as destructive of the vestigial 
remnants of his assured dominance, seen in the continuing sporadic effects of the doctrine of 
the unity of marriage. 
 
 
EARLY STATUTORY REFORM OF CRIMINAL LAWS SPECIAL TO WIVES 
 
John R Wunder noted that it has been thought that in nineteenth century America “marital 
matters in farming communities tend[ed] to be conservative, with little room for women to 
escape”76 but the reality was “a mixture of morality and economic expediency…crafting the 
law in instrumental ways so as to protect the integrity and earning power of the family”. 
Texas in 1845 and Kansas in 1859 gave some early degree of protection for married women’s 
property rights in their State Constitutions.   
 
The development of civil and political rights was often a function of the intraregional or 
interregional societies, with the agrarian sector seeing women as closer worthy equals, out of 
practical working necessity. “In the case of suffrage, the motives behind the legal and 
constitutional reforms were more varied. In the East, entrenched political structures prevented 
broader social change; in lonely Wyoming there were no established political machines and 
accordingly there was no established opposition to the idea of women’s suffrage.”77 To grant 
new legal rights to wives and women would invariably involve a desultory process, but to 
declare the recognition of existing rights involved no political disquiet. So, Massachusetts had 
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 Lord Coke was the first to declare definitely that there was a vital difference between the position of the 
husband and that of the wife in terms of the accessorial immunity: 1 Hale PC 621; Joseph Chitty, ‘A Practical 
Treatise on the Criminal Law’,  2 ed, (1826) Samuel Brooke, Pater-Noster Row, London, vol 1 p265 “The only 
relation which excuses the harbouring a felon is that of a wife to her husband, because she is considered as 
subject to his controul, as well as bound to him by affection. But no other ties, however near, will excuse…” 
76
 John R Wunder (ed), ‘Law and the Great Plains, Essays on the Legal History of the Heartland’ (1996) 
Greenwood Press, Westport, Connecticut, p18. 
77
 Mari J Matsuda, ‘The West and the Legal Status of Women: Explanations of Frontier Feminism’ (1985) 24 
Journal of the West 50, 54. 
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by 1862 a statute that expressly provided that a wife could not be an accessory after the fact to 
her husband’s crime.78 Even in more emancipated times than its medieval roots ever 
envisaged, the role of a wife to receive her husband was specifically protected by law.   
 
In an early nineteenth century79 American decision, Dewey J could say: 
 
The humanity of the criminal law does, indeed, in some instances, consider the acts of the 
wife as venial, although she has in fact participated with her husband in certain acts, which, on 
the part of her husband, would constitute an offence, as against him; upon the ground that 
much consideration is due to the great principle of confidence which a feme coverte may 
properly place in her husband, as well as the duty of obedience to the commands of the 
husband, by which some femes coverte may be reasonable supposed to be influenced in such 
cases.80 
 
Canada and New Zealand as pioneering societies codified their respective criminal law within 
a few months of each other in 1893 and both had thereby abrogated the doctrine of marital 
coercion. The first Canadian Criminal Code81 introduced a bold original82 provision defining 
the accessory after the fact offence and its exceptions. Full marital equality was granted so 
that in Canada at least the husband had finally caught up with the wife in terms of securing 
access to a specific criminal defence. This development left behind over one thousand years83 
of common law as by s63(2) of the 1892 Code it provided: 
                                              
78
 Charles Almy, Jr, and Horace W Fuller ‘The Law of Married Women in Massachusetts’ (1878), George B 
Reed, Boston, p63 referring to Gen. St. c. 168 §6. 
79
 In the same era the English Criminal Law Commissioners in their Second Report in 1845 Parliamentary 
Papers (1846), Vol 24 p12 (Alison’s Principles of the Criminal Law of Scotland, p669 was quoted), sought the 
enactment of a provision reflective of the common law, whereby a wife would not be criminally liable for 
receiving, harbouring, concealing or aiding the escape from justice of her husband. Ibid p84. 
80
 Commonwealth v Lewis (1831) 1 Metcalf 151. 
81
 s63(1) Criminal Code 1892 [Can]. 
82
 Don Stuart, ‘Canadian Criminal Law: A Treatise’ (1982), The Carswell Co Ltd, Toronto at p507. In Paskazia 
d/o Kabaikye v Reginam (1954) 21 EACA 359 Court of Appeal for Eastern Africa (Worley AP, Jenkins AVP, 
Briggs JA), the appellant was convicted of being an accessory after the fact to murder on the basis that she gave 
a false account to hinder the proper investigation and allowed the murderer to escape. The appellant was 
originally charged with the murder of her co-wife. Section 387 Penal Code [Tanganyika] defined an accessory 
after the fact as “a person who receives or assists another who is, to his knowledge, guilty of an offence in order 
to enable him to escape punishment. Section 387(2) prescribed an exception relating to husbands and wives. But 
at p360 the court said, “It is sufficient to say that in the instant case the exception for a wife is not relevant, since 
the murder of the woman Aurelia (if she was murdered) was almost certainly committed at a time when the 
appellant’s husband was in prison and could not have taken a hand in it or been privy to it.”   
83
 J H Baker, ‘The Common Law Tradition Lawyers, Books and the Law’, (2000), The Hambledon Press, 
London, at p177: “A married woman has some kind of defence if accused with her husband, though the 
explanation is not here stated (in reviewing some Early Newgate Reports from the 14th century) [compare 97 
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No married person whose husband or wife has been a party to an offence shall become an 
accessory after the fact thereto by receiving, comforting or assisting the other of them, and no 
married woman whose husband has been a party to an offence shall become an accessory after 
the fact thereto, by receiving, comforting or assisting in his presence and by his authority any 
other person who has been a party to such an offence in order to enable her husband or such 
other person to escape.84 
 
But the original 1892 provision while providing equality to the husband did not give him full 
unrelenting equality in the scenario where “any other person” had been involved. A wife was 
immunised in a husband plus other situation, whereas a husband was only immunised in 
relation to his wife. This asymmetry was rectified in 1976,85 by wholly removing the third 
party exception in favour of the wife, rather than granting it too to the husband.86 
 
New Zealand by contrast granted the protection against accessorial liability to only a wife in 
1893. It was further reproduced in s92(2) Crimes Act 1908 [NZ]:87  
                                                                                                                                             
Selden Soc. 179 (1329)]. The reporter in one case wonders whether the rule is confined to receiving her husband 
after the fact (D6)”.   
84
 The operative phrase, “receives, comforts or assists” is obviously wide and applies to anyone who helps in any 
way. See R v Young (1950) 98 CCC 195 (Qué: CA). An ambitious attempt to immunise drug trafficking by this 
provision was stopped in R v O’Connor (1975) 23 CCC 2d 110 (BC: CA) McFarlane J delivering the judgment 
in which a husband transported to his home for the use of his wife and himself drugs which had been purchased 
out of their joint funds, transporting drugs to a second person, his wife, constituted trafficking. At p112, after 
reference to R v Kowbel in the Supreme Court, it was said “that the effect of that judgment should not be 
extended to mean that one spouse cannot, as a matter of law, transport drugs to the other.”   
85
 In 1976 the Canadian Parliament repealed by SC (1974-1976) s7 c66 the original s23(3) Criminal Code Act 
1892. It introduced a section which removed the immunity given to a wife only in respect of helping a person 
other than her husband. The spousal immunity contained in s23(2) now reads: “No married person whose spouse 
has been a party to an offence is an accessory after the fact to that offence by receiving, comforting or assisting 
the spouse for the purpose of enabling the spouse to escape.” 
86
 V Gordon Rose, ‘Parties to an Offence’, (1982) Carswell Press, Toronto at p176 “Spouses occupy a special 
position in the law of accessories; presumably in the interests of preserving marital accord.” See R v Pedderson 
(1979) 47 CCC (2d) 375 (Alta: CA). 
87
 Jas M E Garrow, ‘The Crimes Act (Annotated)’, (1914) The Law Book Company of New Zealand Ltd, 
Wellington at p53 noted that s92(2) Crimes Act 1908 [NZ] provided “no corresponding privilege in the case of a 
husband who assists his wife to escape after she has committed a crime”. The Court of Appeal concluded in R v 
McKechie [1926] NZLR 1, 6 that the abolition of the rule that a wife cannot be an accessory after the fact to her 
husband’s offence “is unquestionably a matter for the legislature”, as the common law was very clear it applied 
only to a wife. The common law privilege applied only to a wife, who did not need to strictly prove her marriage 
to gain this privilege. In Australia it was suggested that legislation should provide immunity similar to that 
provided by the common law based, not upon marriage, but upon “the existence of a working relationship 
between a man and a woman living together as husband and wife”. This view was rejected because of the 
difficulty of providing such a relationship and the fact that the State was less concerned with preserving the 
stability of de facto relationships than with preserving the stability of marriages: see Law Reform Commissioner 
(Victoria) Report No 3, Criminal Liability of Married Persons (Special Rules), (Melbourne, June 1975), para 81-
84. 
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(2) No married woman whose husband has been a party to an offence shall become an 
accessory after the fact thereto by receiving, comforting, or assisting her husband, or by 
receiving, comforting or assisting in his presence and by his authority any other person who 
has been a party to such offence, in order to enable her husband or such other person to 
escape.  
 
But s71(2) Crimes Act 1961 [NZ] finally introduced spousal equality by introducing the 
privilege to a “married person” rather than one or both nominated spouses.88 But no offence 
has been exempted from the defence, so that in New Zealand spouses are protected even in 
relation to being an accessory after the fact to murder.89 Since 26 April 200590 in New 
Zealand the privilege or immunity has been recontoured to accommodate the existence of 
civil union partnerships91 but not de facto arrangements.92 Thus the current New Zealand 
position is: 
 
No person whose spouse or civil union partner has been a party to an offence becomes an 
accessory after the fact to that offence by doing any act to which this section applies in order 
to enable the spouse or civil union partner, or the spouse, civil union partner, and any other 
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 “(2) No married person whose spouse has been a party to an offence shall become an accessory after the fact 
to the offence by doing any act to which this section applies in order to enable the spouse, or the spouse and any 
other person who has been a party to the offence, to escape after arrest or to avoid arrest or conviction.” Peter 
Burns, ‘A Casebook in the Law of Crimes’, (1972) 2 ed Sweet & Maxwell (NZ) Ltd, Wellington p290 notes that 
“the protection afforded by s71(2) Crimes Act 1961 [NZ] extends to either spouse whereas formerly it was 
granted only to the wife of a party to an offence” [This is incorrect. It always applied to the wife in relation to the 
husband and in relation to the husband’s co-principal, but it was now extended in gender-neutral terms to all 
variants, for the first time]. JB Garrow and R Caldwell, ‘Garrow & Caldwell’s, Criminal Law in New Zealand’, 
(1981), 6ed, Butterworths, Wellington, p75 refers to s67 Crimes Act 1961 as a new section which also applies to 
proceedings under the Summary Proceedings Act 1957. P R H Webb, ‘Family Law’, New Zealand Ed. (1974) 
Butterworths, Wellington p157 states that s71(2) Crimes Act 1961 [NZ] clearly “overrules” the English Court of 
Criminal Appeal decision in R v Holley as far as New Zealand is concerned.   
89
 S176 Crimes Act 1961 is the offence of accessory after the fact to murder. Because of s71(2) a married person 
is exempt from prosecution under this offence. 
90
 s7 Relationships (Statutory References) Act 2005 (2005 No 3) substituted subsection (2). 
91
 It now provides: “(2) No person whose spouse or civil union partner has been party to an offence becomes an 
accessory after the fact to that offence by doing any act to which this section applies in order to enable the 
spouse or civil union partner, or the spouse, civil union partner, and any other person who has been party to the 
offence, to escape after arrest or to avoid arrest or conviction.” A civil union is defined in ss4 and 5 Civil Union 
Act 2004 [NZ]. J Bruce Robertson ed, ‘Adams on Criminal Law’, Thomson, Wellington (2003) p1-546. 
92
 Leaman v The Queen [1986] Tas R 223. In R v Elisha Barbara Brett, unreported, High Court Auckland, CRI-
2006-44-7302, 8 August 2007, Priestley J, the accused “could be termed a de facto partner” and although “she 
comes close to the policy of s71(2)” was outside it. At [14] “It seems, with respect, anomalous that although 
s71(2) has recently been amended … to include a civil union partner, that there has been no extension to de facto 
partners, despite legislative initiatives in recent years extending the substantive law which applies to husbands 
and wives to de facto couples, such as the Property (Relationships) Act and other family law legislation.”  
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person who had been a party to the offence, to escape after arrest or to avoid arrest or 
conviction.93 
 
This exceptional law only protects couples, a gender-neutral expression, who have attained 
the necessary legal and formal commitment.94 But other jurisdictions have widened the 
privilege beyond the spouses so that it applies to the extended family.95 This was achieved in 
parts of the United States in the middle of the twentieth century. The House of Commons in 
1966 learned that under Greek criminal law96, a very wide list of people is automatically 
immune from accessorial liability after the fact. An attempt to replicate that Hellenic model as 
statutory English law foundered when the Criminal Law Bill 1966 [UK] was debated. 
 
But in ‘Archbold’s Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice’97 in 1962, (immediately before 
the decision of the Court of Criminal Appeal in R v Holley) the privilege was synthesised in 
these terms: 
 
If a married woman incites her husband to the commission of a felony, she is an accessory 
before the fact; but she cannot be treated as an accessory after the fact for receiving her 
husband, knowing that he has committed treason or felony. 
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 s71(2) Crimes Act 1961 [NZ], amended from 26 April 2005, by s7 Relationships (Statutory References) Act 
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This is a striking result. A married woman can induce her husband to commit an offence and 
she is liable for that act under the criminal law and so is he if he carries the offence out. But if 
the husband commits an offence, to the knowledge of his wife, she alone commits no offence 
if she harbours him after his crime, including actively secreting any stolen property; whereas 
if the roles are reversed the husband has no protection under the criminal law. The focus 
therefore appears to be on the need for the husband to be able to rely on receiving safe 
accommodation; but if the wife inside that very home had incited her husband to steal from 
another home, which he later did, and then he returned with the loot to that home, the law 
immunises her for the second phase of the crime but not the first – unless the first phase is 
depicted as an intra-spousal conspiracy, which would provide for the immunity of both 
spouses, as they cannot conspire alone together. Any prosecutor in that simple scenario would 
be perplexed98 why the law allows the husband to be charged with the actual theft which 
would not have occurred save for the incitement of the wife, yet she can only be charged with 
incitement if there is a witness other than her husband to the incitement – as he is not a 
compellable witness against his own wife in this regard.  
 
In the accessory after the fact mode there will often be an agreement between the wife and 
husband to harbour him. This could not be charged as a conspiracy, and it also provides an 
immunity under the accessory after the fact rule. But it is inconsistent with the position under 
conspiracy where a marital agreement involving a third party is itself no objection. Under 
accessory after the fact the wife’s action in respect of a third party is protected. The policy 
between conspiracy and accessory after the fact appears to be indistinguishable. Why there 
has not been a systematic and coherent approach to uxorial immunity is unclear. The 
consequence of ad hoc legislation, the unavailability of time slots in busy legislatures and the 
misplaced belief that this is, in the criminal law terms, an issue of little consequence are all 
implicated. Yet the privilege actually constitutes a significant invasion of the principle of 
responsibility. 
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The common law exemption of wives as accessories after the fact was directly considered in 
1963 by the Court of Criminal Appeal.99 In R v Holley100 a wife had been convicted of being 
an accessory after the fact to a felony committed by her husband and his associate. The two 
males had broken into a home and burgled items from it. The wife was the getaway driver and 
drove them back to the Holley home where the items were divided up. The wife was charged 
with the joint enterprise of the burglary and she was also charged with being an accessory 
after the fact to the burglary of the husband’s associate. There was no charge against Mrs 
Holley of being an accessory after the fact to her husband’s burglary. At the trial the jury was 
directed that “for reasons which you may think are common sense as well as merciful”101 a 
wife could not be an accessory after the fact to her husband (explaining the absence of the 
charge against her, in that regard). 
 
We expect our wives to help us and if wives, owing the duty that they do to their husbands, 
help when husbands have broken the law, the law mercifully says that wives are in an 
impossible position. They have got a duty to their husbands on the one hand and a duty to 
society on the other. If a wife puts the duty to her husband first, she has not broken the law. 
That is a merciful view.102 
 
The trial judge then directed that a particular complexity arose in the case. Although Mrs 
Holley could not be charged with being an accessory after the fact to what her husband had 
done, she certainly could be charged with being an accessory after the fact to her husband’s 
associate’s offence, who with him had been intimately involved in the actual burglary. But the 
complication was that whatever Mrs Holley did for her husband, was equally applicable to 
helping the associate. The judge ruled that because of the abolition of the presumption of 
marital coercion in 1925, the proposition that a wife could not in law be guilty of concealing a 
felon jointly with her husband no longer existed in English law: 
 
I direct you that in law if a wife does something for two people, one of whom is her husband, 
to assist in escaping apprehension, knowing that they had committed a crime, then she is 
accessory after the fact to that crime in respect of the man to whom she is not married.103 
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He postulated that the alternative view of the law would have required him to direct the jury 
to dismiss that particular count as “there is no evidence against her for being an accessory 
after the fact to [the associate] which is not also evidence of performing precisely the same 
service for her husband”. The jury acquitted Mrs Holley of the joint enterprise, but convicted 
her of being an accessory to the associate, for which she was fined £10 or to one month’s 
imprisonment in default. The case was certified104 by the trial judge as raising a pure point of 
law being fit for appeal. On appeal Lord Parker CJ delivered a terse judgment on behalf of the 
Court of Criminal Appeal, to dismiss Mrs Holley’s appeal. That court accepted that prior to 
the alteration of the marital coercion law in 1925 upon the passage of s47 Criminal Justice 
Act 1925 [UK], “a wife could not be guilty of being an accessory after the fact for receiving 
her husband knowing that he had committed a felony”.105 Lord Parker conflated common law 
of accessorial immunity with common law marital coercion and in one sweeping sentence 
gave them a joint requiem.  
 
The basis of [accessorial immunity] is that there was, under the old common law, a 
presumption, albeit a rebuttable presumption, that an act done by a wife in the presence of her 
husband was deemed to have been done under his coercion.106 
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The court further asserted that no authority existed107 to demonstrate that the accessorial 
immunity also applied if the person being assisted was not her husband but a third party who 
had acted in the same offence with him.108 To this was added the confusing statement 
“Logically, there is no reason why the presumption of coercion should not apply in that case 
also”. Lord Parker then reasoned that as there was no evidence that Mr Holley had coerced his 
wife, so it followed that the trial judge’s ruling was correct, that accessorial immunity was not 
available. 
 
This judgment is seriously awry.109 No authority at all was cited in the judgment for the 
interdependability of martial coercion and accessorial liability. While they probably had a 
common origin in the control of the husband and the converse duty of the wife to protect the 
head of the household, the two special positions of married women under the criminal law 
had considerably divaricated. The coercion doctrine was significantly more onerous in 
requiring as a minimum the presence of the husband at the time of the offence and also it 
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applied to all offences except murder and treason. The accessorial liability only applied to 
felonies and was never extended to misdemeanours110 and certainly not to purely summary 
offences. “The presumption of marital coercion also applied in relation to a wife acting as an 
accessory after the fact to a felony committed by the husband.”111  
 
Further, coercion was never a component of the uxorial accessorial immunity. Rather than 
being a product of fear, it was a response out of love, loyalty and affection. Lord Parker’s 
decision meant that the United Kingdom Parliament in 1925 had unwittingly abrogated a 
criminal defence (the substantive uxorial privilege against post-felony accessoryship) which 
had existed for a thousand years.112 At no stage in the almost four year period spanning the 
successive versions of the Criminal Justice Bill that occupied Parliament from 1922 did any 
person inferentially or expressly refer to this consequence as even a possibility. Nothing could 
have been further from what was actually intended in 1925, as it was the plain outcome of the 
legislative landscape to preserve and upgrade the law of uxorial substantive privileges, save 
for the limited abolition of the presumption from the marital coercion doctrine. To conclude 
that as a sidewind this ancient defence of accessorial immunity had perished upon the 
strengthening of the defence of marital coercion by its statutory format is not only an 
unintended consequence, but one flatly contrary to its intendment.  
 
The error of Lord Parker CJ was exacerbated in that there was no requirement that the act of 
the accessory be done in the presence of the husband. So in 1849 Coltman J had said: “But if 
the part she took was merely for the purpose of concealing her husband’s guilt, and of 
screening him from the consequences, then I think she ought to be acquitted. A wife cannot be 
convicted of harbouring her husband, where he has committed a felony; in the mere 
circumstance of her attempting to conceal what may lead to his detection appears to come 
within the same principle.”113 Further, marital coercion was rebuttable where the wife acted 
independently or of her own initiative114 (which was evidence of her non-coerced state), yet if 
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a wife acted in these ways it did not prevent her from the accessorial immunity. Indeed the 
immunity was strongly redolent of a basic duty in a wife to spontaneously act in these ways, 
as a function of her matrimonial responsibility. 115  
 
Lord Parker may have been influenced by the fact that since giving asylum to her husband is 
likely to be the most common form of wifely assistance, the husband’s physical presence 
would give rise to the presumption of coercion. But this overlooks the reality that a wife may 
assist her husband in his absence in which case the marital coercion requirement would also 
be absent. It is, however, possible that the common law only intended that the immunity be 
available while the husband was present, thereby putting the accessory after the fact immunity 
into a double helix with the doctrine of marital coercion. This would mean that direct physical 
personal assistance was outside the purview of the criminal law, but other more indirect forms 
of assistance or help to the husband, distant in time and place, would be outside her immunity. 
It is also possible that over time there was severance from the original conjoined position and 
whereas the defence of marital coercion remained steadfastly pivotal on personal presence of 
the husband the immunity by accessory after the fact may have independently developed to 
protect actions of the wife to assist the absent husband.  
 
In R v Holley it was counsel for Mrs Holley who raised the conjunction of marital coercion 
and accessorial immunity. It can be argued that the original common law defence was 
intended to deal only with the case where the wife was herself a principal in the offence. This 
does not appear to have ever been specifically discussed as a conceptual requirement of the 
defence at common law, but it may have been implicit. Against the background that an 
accessory after the fact at common law meant only an accessory who assisted someone who 
had committed a felony (but not a misdemeanour),116 it is possible then, as some of the 
authorities suggested, that the marital coercion defence also only applied to felonies. The 
decision of R v Holley in October 1962 did not eliminate the accessoryship immunity but it 
had delivered a heavy body blow to it.   
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The Criminal Law Revision Committee within two years of the decision directed themselves 
that R v Holley had badly wounded the immunity. They proceeded on this assumption and 
said in their Seventh Report117 that the common law defence should now disappear upon the 
passage of legislation that would remove the distinction between felonies and 
misdemeanours. As the common law defence was based on a post-felony role then that 
defence also fell. But it recommended the creation of a new offence to replace the common 
law offence. The uxorial defence, however, proved to be very contentious: 
 
We are at first inclined to recommend that the offence should not apply to things done for a 
criminal by his or her spouse, parent or child. There is a case for such an exemption on 
compassionate grounds. On the other hand, it is difficult to devise a satisfactory exemption. 
Other family relationships, or perhaps professional or other relationships, might equally 
deserve protection, while there seems no strong reason for giving the exemption where, for 
example, a father and his grown-up son are both engaged in crime.  
 
It is not at all obvious why the Committee decided that compassion was the operative 
normative factor. Tenderness of the law towards the wife was predicated on an understanding 
of her dilemma in terms of subjective decision-making, itself a function of spousal 
responsibility. The common law had directly inculcated that responsibility by imposing a duty 
on a wife to assist her husband.118 The dilemma was obvious: “They have got a duty to their 
husbands on the one hand and a duty to society on the other. If a wife puts the duty to her 
husband first, she has not broken the law.”119 The analysis did not turn on compassion at all 
but on her correlative duty from her matrimonial pact.  
 
But the final recommendation was that the new offence should carry no class exception so no 
particular relationship would be exempted from the law. However, it commended as a 
safeguard against borderline prosecutions that the fiat of the Director of Public Prosecutions 
should be required as a condition precedent for any prosecution under the new offence. 
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Only four years later the common law position was abrogated by statutory intervention for 
England and Wales by s4(1) Criminal Law Act 1967 [UK], when misdemeanours and felonies 
were finally assimilated for all purposes. A consequence of expunging felonies from the 
lexicon of the law was the understanding that the marital exemption necessarily fell too, as it 
was a product of the law of felonies. However, many other jurisdictions, including non-
common law ones,120 continue to provide for a version of the common law exemption, even 
though the former law distinguishing felonies from misdemeanours has long since perished in 
those jurisdictions.  
 
 
PARLIAMENTARY CONSIDERATION OF THE ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT 
IMMUNITY 
 
After the Criminal Law Revision Committee121 had wrongly reached the conclusion that as a 
result of R v Holley the common law exemption in favour of wives had been destroyed, it 
took little to lead to the conclusion that the defence should be expressly terminated by 
Parliament. It followed that the Parliamentary debates were all predicated on the false view 
that the common law position had already been set at naught.122 To argue that the new 
statutory offence of assisting offenders (which was to replace and widen the common law 
offence of accessory after the fact) should also maintain a specific exemption for wives, was a 
forlorn hope.  
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STATUTORY REFORM OF THE COMMON LAW IMMUNITY 
 
On 28 July 1966 the  Joint Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Home Office, Lord 
Stonham, introduced the Criminal Law Bill 1966 [UK] which would have the effect of 
abolishing the division of crimes into felonies and misdemeanours.123 At that juncture little 
other information was provided. The Bill was read the first time. At the second reading the 
Under-Secretary stated that the intention of the Bill included replacing  
 
the present Common Law offence of being an accessory after the fact to felony – which will 
disappear with the abolition of felony. First, there will be a new general offence of doing acts 
intended to impede the apprehension or prosecution of offenders for arrestable offences. This 
will be generally similar to the present offence of being an accessory after the fact to felony.  
It will cover such conduct as driving a criminal away after a crime, providing a car for the 
purpose, hiding him from the police or destroying finger-prints or other traces of the crime.124    
 
The House of Commons resolved that a Standing Committee should consider the Bill from 
the Lords. At the third sitting of Standing Committee F consideration was given to the 
position of wives if the proposed abrogation of the offence of accessory after the fact became 
law.125 Clause 4 of the Bill was expressly stated to replace the common law offence of being 
accessory after the fact to felony, it being noted that no offence of being an accessory after the 
fact to misdemeanour existed.126 In the House of Commons, during the Second Reading in 
Committee, one Member of Parliament argued that “the sacredness of the very special 
relationship of husband and wife”127 necessitated the common law exemption be available to 
both spouses in the special legal relationship of marriage and be incorporated into the new 
offence as a specific defence. Mr Daniel Awdry MP moved an amendment to the wording of 
clause 4 which would exempt both spouses from the criminal law if they had harboured the 
other. 
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Provided that it shall not be an offence for the husband or wife of a person who has committed 
an arrestable offence to harbour such person or to do any act to impede his apprehension or 
prosecution. 128 
 
He observed that the Criminal Law Revision Committee had initially been inclined to 
recommend that the new offence should not apply to things done for a criminal by his or her 
spouse, parent or child. The Committee had based its initial recommendation for the 
exemption “on compassionate grounds”129 but had also been concerned about the difficulty of 
devising a satisfactory exemption, as other family relationships might equally deserve 
protection, yet there seemed no reason for exempting a father and his adult son when they had 
engaged in joint crime. It was argued that exempting parents and children was “in a totally 
different position” from that of spouses who are “regarded by the law as one person”. During 
the debate parliamentarians were concerned that an open-ended exemption would even 
prevent the prosecution of a wife who shot a policeman pursuing her husband.130 Lawmakers 
were not prepared to sanction even in the name of marriage such appalling conduct. Any 
derogation from the generality of the offence (by an uxorial defence) would have to be very 
narrowly drawn to meet public policy concerns. The solution advocated was to propose a 
variation of the government amendment, so that only more neutral or passive conduct 
involved in harbouring the other spouse would become exempt under the new statute. This 
opposition amendment was countered by an undertaking from the Under-Secretary of State to 
consider whether the underlying policy of the proposal and its wording met the expectations 
of the government. Later another attempt to provide a thematic spousal defence was proposed. 
This amendment would have exempted “the husband or wife or parent or child natural or 
adopted of the person who has committed the arrestable offence.”131 For this reason the 
original amendment (above) was acknowledged as being unnecessarily wide and it was 
proposed to delete the words “or to do any act to impede his apprehension or prosecution”.132 
The government saw the issue as raising “a difficult question” as the intention was to ensure 
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that even a spouse could not destroy evidence which might lead to the arrest of the other 
spouse.  
  
A further difficulty is the extension of the various relationships. What has been said about the 
husband and wife can, to some extent, apply to the mother and son. It might seem hard if a 
mother were not allowed to harbour her son, whereas a wife could harbour her husband.  
These questions of relationships are not simple and it is not satisfactory to put it on the basis 
that, in law, the husband and wife are one. This is a rule which applies for some purposes 
only. It derives from two ancient principles, that for certain purposes they were one person 
and that the wife was also regarded as subordinate to the husband.  Invoking that ancient rule 
is not satisfactory for drawing a distinction between husband and wife on the one hand and 
parent and child on the other.133 
 
In response, Mr W R Rees-Davies MP emphasised that the state of matrimonial law compels 
spouses to live together as the marital relationship realistically requires spouses to live in the 
same dwelling, so an inordinate burden is placed upon any spouse by a law which would 
prevent one giving passive assistance to the other.134 Mr Bell MP was concerned that the 
proposed law would be extremely harsh where a parent could be convicted of harbouring a 
child as there was a moral obligation to do so and it would go against human nature for 
spouses not to harbour each other also.  “These are basic relationships. The family is older 
and more fundamental than the State, and the obligations between spouses, parents and 
children are more fundamental and ought to have precedence and priority over the duties 
which someone has to the State, which is a very much more superficial element in human 
affairs.”135 The response from the government was an undertaking to consider the points 
raised further. Mr Taverne MP emphasised that the offence would not occur where a wife 
merely allowed her husband to stay in the matrimonial home as the clause provided for the 
defence of lawful authority or reasonable excuse. 
  
Mr Taverne:  The simple case of the husband staying at home with his wife would not be a 
case where an offence was committed – 
Mr Rees-Davies:  If a constable came to the door and asked, “Is your husband there?” and she 
said, “No”, she would be committing an offence. 
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Mr Taverne:  Yes, but simply allowing her husband to stay at home would not be an offence.  
However, that is one of the points which we shall look at, and we hope to be able to draft a 
suitable amendment.136 
 
The issue returned to the House of Commons when the clause was read a second time. The 
tension was to create a practicable formula which avoided a collision between the rationality 
of the law and the special nature of family life.137 A number of speakers stated that the 
common law rule was profoundly sensible in taking the attitude that a spouse would not be 
criminally liable for harbouring the other. The clause would remove that long-standing 
protection. It would have the effect of separating the unity of spouses. Mr Grieve MP noted 
that a second reason for the exemption was the concept of marital coercion, a rule which 
“might be regarded as a little out of date in 1967”, but apart from these two reasons the 
wholly special relationship of husband and wife should be protected by the law, he argued. 
“The mere fact of the marriage is, I suggest, justification in itself, provided that no positive 
act of wrongdoing is done.” In due course, the Under-Secretary reported to the Commons that 
any variant exempting spouses from the criminal law in the new offence, would fall beneath 
the position in principle that was driving the reform. Mr Taverne MP stated that no formula 
had been devised which would protect a spouse from simply remaining in the matrimonial 
home, yet would not protect that spouse from serious acts such as the provision of false 
information or the destruction of evidence.   
 
It would seem impossible by Statute to draw a line which would distinguish the circumstances 
in which the public interest might require a prosecution and those where clearly it would not.  
One would not wish to see a wife prosecuted simply because, on being asked by a policeman 
if her husband was in the house, she replied, “No”, although she knew that he was in the 
house.138 However, he specifically acknowledged139 that the proposed law which expressly 
contained the defences of “lawful authority” or “reasonable excuse,” would cater for and thus 
protect from criminal liability, either spouse who simply gave comfort to the other, by 
permitting that spouse to enter the matrimonial dwelling, after having committed the 
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qualifying offence. In this way some form of the common law, diluted as to its content but 
doubled in terms of its subject of exemption, would persist. By s4(1) Criminal Law Act 1967 
[UK] the ancient common law defence was terminated and a more insipid gender-neutral 
substitute was created.  
 
The House of Commons in 1966 wrongly concluded that no statutory formula could be found 
to absolve the wife from passive conduct yet leave her to be liable for active furtherance of 
the husband’s crime, eg selling or pawning the goods he had freshly burgled. The House of 
Commons was distractedly concerned too that a wife who shot a police officer in pursuit of 
her husband might somehow be able to claim immunity for the killing. 
 
Because it was not possible to anticipate those cases where the circumstances may not be in 
the public interest for a prosecution under the new offence, the solution finally decided upon 
was to require the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions as a condition precedent to 
any prosecution, who would thereby apply an overall measure of consistency in decision-
making and who would factor in the plight of a spouse, in real terms.  The Under-Secretary 
noted that prosecutions of any spouse for being an accessory after the fact to the other spouse 
“have been extremely rare”. With that, proposed amendments to alter the government clause 
lapsed and the Bill was enacted.140 
 
Apart from equalising the immunity between spouses, the other significant development was 
the abolition of the distinction between felonies and misdemeanours. By s1 Criminal Law Act 
1967 [UK] the common law offence of accessory after the fact, which was felony-dependent, 
no longer existed. It was, however, partially revived by s4 Criminal Law Act 1967 [UK] 
which created a new statutory offence generally referred to as the offence of ‘assisting 
offenders’. It provides:141 
 
Where a person has committed an arrestable offence, any other person who, knowing or 
believing him to be guilty of the offence or of some other arrestable offence, does without 
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lawful authority or reasonable excuse any act with intent to impede his apprehension or 
prosecution shall be guilty of an offence. 
 
   
Since that enactment in 1967, the appellate courts in two common law jurisdictions, New 
South Wales and Hong Kong, have closely examined the uxorial accessorial defence, since its 
abolition in England and Wales. 
 
 
NEW SOUTH WALES COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL UPHOLDS THE EXISTENCE 
OF THE IMMUNITY 
 
In an important but unreported decision from the New South Wales Court of Criminal 
Appeal142 the issue was whether there a wife could, as a matter of law, be convicted as an 
accessory after the fact of a felony, committed by her husband. That jurisdiction had very 
rarely encountered this issue. In 1932 the same court in R v Williams had held that exemption 
for accessorial liability, protected wives143 only. In that case a husband was found guilty of 
being an accessory after the fact to the murder of a child by his wife. In a separate and 
subsequent trial the wife was charged with that murder and acquitted. The Court of Criminal 
Appeal affirmed the conviction of the husband on the basis that because the principal had 
been acquitted it did not preclude another being convicted for aiding and abetting or being an 
accessory after the fact.144  
 
The appeal in 1996 turned on the common law. The facts disclosed that a husband had stolen 
a large sum of money from a woman. With the assistance of his wife the husband used some 
of this money to purchase travel tickets on an overseas flight and converted the balance into 
travellers’ cheques. The husband, wife and their child decamped to the United States. The 
wife had, together with her husband, purchased foreign currency and travellers’ cheques from 
various banks at different locations. She signed travellers’ cheques and secreted them inside 
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magazines which were sent to her sister in England to mind for her. At their trial a certificate 
of marriage was adduced in evidence.145 The judge proposed to direct the jury as a matter of 
law to return verdicts of acquittal of the wife on the six charges of being an accessory after the 
fact of her husband’s larceny. The material part of each charge she faced was: 
 
and it is further charged that (the wife) knowing the said (husband) to have committed the said 
felony in the manner aforesaid, afterwards, to wit, between (specified dates) at Sydney in the 
State of New South Wales did receive, harbour, maintain and assist (her husband).146 
 
The jury acquitted the wife in accordance with a direction in law of the judge, that she was 
entitled to rely upon her marriage as a complete defence; the Director of Public Prosecutions 
appealed by way of a question of law147 to the Court of Criminal Appeal asking “whether or 
not a wife can be convicted as an accessory after the fact of a felony committed by her 
husband?” The approach of the prosecutor on appeal was to adopt the judgment of Lord 
Parker CJ in R v Holley. It was argued that because s407A Crimes Act 1900 [NSW] enacted 
in 1924, had abolished the marital coercion defence in that state and because of the partially 
parallel restriction in England and Wales which maintained the marital coercion defence but 
abrogated the presumption, it followed that the common law position, which had hitherto 
recognised uxorial accessorial immunity, had now disappeared. In the alternative, the 
prosecutor argued that the maintenance of the immunity “flies in the face of modern human 
rights and anti-discrimination legislation” and was no longer valid at law as being necessarily 
inconsistent. 
 
Ireland J delivering the judgment of the Court of Criminal Appeal referred to the “long 
established tenet that at common law a wife cannot be convicted on a charge of accessory 
after the fact to the felony of her husband”148 and then undertook a comparative exercise to 
determine the state of cognate laws throughout the States and Territories of Australia and also 
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of New Zealand, noting that such change as there had been “has been other than 
consistent”.149 
The court concluded that the overall Australasian legislative landscape in relation to the 
privilege was as follows: 
 
 Queensland150 and Western Australia151 retained marital coercion as a defence for a 
wife only for an offence committed in her husband’s presence (with some exception 
due to the nature and gravity of the crime). 
 Tasmania abolished marital coercion as a defence in 1924,152 but it retained the 
protection to a husband and wife of conspiring alone,153 it also protected both husband 
and wife from prosecution for accessorial liability of the offence of the other.154 
 Northern Territory had abolished the rule relating to the protection against accessorial 
liability,155 it also abolished the protection against conspiracy.156  
 New Zealand had abolished marital coercion as a defence157 and had abolished the 
rule that a wife and husband are unable to conspire alone.158 But it had retained the 
protection against accessorial liability for both spouses.159  
 
But this was a significantly incomplete overview, as it did not deal at all with the position in 
Victoria160 and South Australia161 both of which still now maintain the defence of marital 
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coercion, as did the Australian Capital Territory162 (at the time of that judgment). In addition a 
wife was at that time incapable of conspiring alone with her husband in Tasmania163 
Queensland164 and Western Australia165 and in Victoria166 a wife at that time could not be 
convicted of inciting167 her husband to commit an offence either. In Western Australia the 
accessorial immunity also applies to a husband. 
 
The court then closely examined the decision in R v Holley168 where Lord Parker CJ had said 
“it is true that at any rate up to 1925 that a wife could not be guilty of being an accessory after 
the fact for receiving her husband knowing that he has committed a felony”. But the accessory 
immunity was an absolute immunity.169 No presumption, rebuttable or otherwise, was 
involved. The critical and decisive fact was the existence of a valid marriage which authorised 
the wife to protect her husband from the State. There was no requirement for the husband to 
be in the physical presence of his wife when she was acting to protect him.170   
 
The Court of Criminal Appeal noted that Lord Parker in Holley appeared to have overlooked 
the fact that a wife may assist her husband in his absence, which would not have permitted her 
to invoke the doctrine of marital coercion.171 Holley was both obiter and unsound in its 
reasoning, to the extent it purported to decide the common law rule of immunity of a married 
woman – Mrs Holley was not charged in relation to her husband, only in relation to a third 
party, his associate. On the facts, in Holley there was no question of coercion.172 The Court 
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also accepted that Holley was distinguishable as it dealt with the position of a wife as an 
accessory after the fact of a felony committed by a person other than the wife’s husband. The 
principal holding of the New South Wales Court is that the common law rule granting 
immunity to a wife against prosecution as an accessory after the fact of a felony committed by 
her husband remains unaffected by s407A Crimes Act 1900 [NSW], which had abrogated the 
defence of marital coercion. The decision was the exact opposite conclusion to that reached in 
Holley. It follows from the persuasive Australian judgment that whatever the initial origin of 
the common law rule in relation to those two strands, they had bifurcated over time, so that 
they were capable of a separate and independent existence.173 Another decision of the same 
court only a few years later would closely examine the existence of a related  special uxorial 
defence in the criminal law, in relation to the offence of misprision of felony. 
 
 
NEW SOUTH WALES IMMUNITY OF WIFE FOR MISPRISION OF FELONY 
 
In this important and unreported decision, the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal in 
1998174 considered the unusual offence of misprision of felony175 in circumstances where a 
woman concealed the fact that a man had induced a young female, a minor, the appellant’s 
daughter, to indecently assault him, while the appellant sat next to him and knowingly did not 
intervene. The man and the appellant lived in a de facto relationship. It was argued that as 
under New South Wales law a married woman is immune from prosecution as an accessory 
after the fact to her husband’s felony,176 the principle extended analogously to de facto wives 
and misprision of felony was both conceptually and pragmatically comparable to the offence 
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of accessory after the fact. The court noted that the disparate justifications or historical basis 
for the immunity for a wife include, divine law,177 the assertion that a wife is “sub potestate 
viri and she is bound to receive her husband”,178 “questions of social policy rather than of 
unity of person”179 and agreed that the existing law was described as a “concession to 
inevitable human feeling.”180 
 
Hulme J, delivering the judgment of the court stated: 
 
Although the exception may be justified on the basis either that it was a consequence of the 
somewhat sporadic effect of the common law unity of husband and wife, so that one could not 
be an accessory to one’s own felony, or that it was a concession to human feeling, these 
reasons would require that a husband should enjoy a similar immunity, which he does not.181 
 
The one-sided nature of the rule was explicable by its historical origin, when a husband’s 
power over his wife was considerable. Because the “de facto” arrangement covers a myriad of 
situations, and although it may involve the “same degree of permanence, commitment, 
support, and merit of the other attributes of marriage”,182 the court held that a de facto 
relationship was outside the scope of any substantive uxorial privilege. This was because, 
while the law might recognise such unions for certain purposes, when it did, those rights were 
circumscribed or attended with further variations or conditions,183 not found in matrimony. 
The New South Wales Court specifically endorsed the view of the Victorian Law Reform 
Commissioner,184 in which it was asserted that: 
 
in the first place the State does not have the same concern to preserve the stability of ‘de 
facto’ relationships as it has to preserve the stability of marriages, and it is the State’s concern 
to stability in the relationship that is the main justification for special rules directed to 
supporting loyalty, co-operation and confidentiality between the parties. 
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A second reason advanced by the Victorian Law Reform Commissioner is prosaic and 
formalistic. His view that “[a wife’s] recollection of the ceremony of marriage” and the 
significance of a public exchange of undertakings justifies a special defence, has romantic, 
chocolate-box appeal only. There is nothing to differentiate the significance to the parties to a 
civil union as having any less or more meaning. Marriage automatically confers immediate, 
special, uxorial privileges. For a de facto union there may be some deferment of the 
prospective legal effect and consequences, and this was the express position under the New 
South Wales legislation recognising de facto unions. That delay, however, does not exist 
under the Civil Union Act 2005 [NZ] which now includes civil unions within the accessorial 
exemption and provides instantaneous exemption from the criminal law. The court reasoned 
that a de facto arrangement was held not to be a common law marriage and was in fact a non-
marriage. This was so even though other cognate unions, involving the solemn exchange of 
vows of public commitment and intended permanence between persons of different or the 
same gender, have all the essential attributes of marriage.185 Misprision of felony was not to 
be trumped by a de facto union; only by a hallowed connubial relationship. 
 
 
EXPRESS STATUTORY EXCLUSION OF THE COMMON LAW IMMUNITY 
 
The common law accessorial privilege was capable of being excluded by an express statutory 
provision although such provisions were extremely rare. One example was the offence 
contrary to s153(3) Army Act 1881 [UK] forbidding any person to conceal any soldier 
knowing that soldier to be a deserter or absentee without leave. In R v Davis186 a husband was 
found by Military Police hiding in a cupboard in the matrimonial house, after the wife had 
informed them that she had not seen him for months and did not know where he was. 
Reference was made to R v Good187 to argue that the wife by her bare reception of her 
husband had not done enough to warrant her conviction, on the basis that as an accessory after 
the fact she was excused by the criminal law. It was also argued that the wife was entitled to 
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the defence of marital coercion188 which raised the interesting issue of whether the husband 
was ‘present’ for the purposes of influencing her, while he was hiding in the cupboard. The 
wife however, after some initial sparring, pleaded guilty.189 But the issue of the defence being 
exempted did directly arise in Wong Ching Chu v The Queen.190 A provision in an 
immigration statute191 created the express offence of harbouring a person in Hong Kong who 
was the subject of a deportation order – more usually this meant that the person had 
unlawfully re-entered the territory after having been deported from it. Hogan CJ for the Full 
Court stated that if a wife had committed that offence of harbouring her husband she 
necessarily lost the uxorial accessorial privilege by the statute, but she would still have had 
available to her the defence of marital coercion.192  
 
 
HONG KONG COURT OF APPEAL 
 
When England and Wales abrogated the common law defence in 1967, Hong Kong as a 
colony dutifully followed suit in 1971193 by enacting virtually identical legislation. However, 
unlike the Anglo counterpart which also finally removed the distinction between felonies and 
misdemeanours this was not achieved in Hong Kong until 1991.194 For the 20 years between 
the two sets of Hong Kong legislation, there existed the very curious position that the offence 
of being an accessory after the fact remained at common law while the statutory offence of 
assisting offenders was also in force.195 The former had carried the uxorial defence but 
whether that defence had been impliedly repealed by the creation of the parallel statutory 
offence, was a conundrum that was never tested. But in 1986 the Hong Kong Court of Appeal 
had to decide whether the new statutory offence (virtually identical to the English position) 
                                              
188
 Under s47 Criminal Justice Act 1925 [UK]. 
189
 By an anomaly under s25 Naval Discipline Act 1865 [UK] the maximum penalty for concealing a deserter 
was a fine of £30, whereas under s153(3) Army Act 1881 [UK] provision was made for imprisonment. Mrs Davis 
was sentenced to one month imprisonment. 
190
 [1957] HKLR 61 (FC) at p69. 
191
 s14 Deportation Ordinance Cap 240 [HK]. 
192
 This was provided in terms identical to s47 Criminal Justice Act 1925 [UK], by s101 Criminal Procedure 
Ordinance [HK] (now renumbered as s100 Criminal Procedure Ordinance Cap 221 [HK]).   
193
 s90 Criminal Procedure Ord Cap 221 [HK] 
194
 Administration of Justice (Felonies and Misdemeanours) Ord Cap 328 [HK] 
195
 R v Ly Cam Sang unreported Cr App 751/82, Sir Alan Huggins ACJ, McMullin VP and Yang JA, at p5-6. 
   
 446 
still potentially permitted the uxorial defence, via the two specific statutory defences which 
obviated criminal liability if there was “lawful authority” or “reasonable excuse”.   It has been 
suggested196 that the common law immunity of wives remains unscathed by the statutory 
version, on an argument that a married woman still has, in the circumstances, either “lawful 
authority” or “reasonable excuse”197 if she harbours her husband to shield him from 
apprehension. This analysis was tentatively confirmed by the Hong Kong Court of Appeal,198 
which had to consider a very unusual set of circumstances.  
 
A husband was charged with murder and his wife was charged, contrary to s90(1) Criminal 
Procedure Ordinance, with doing an act without “lawful authority” or “reasonable excuse”199 
with the intent to impede his apprehension or prosecution. Both were tried together, the 
husband having applied unsuccessfully for a separate trial. The wife gave evidence in her own 
defence. It was very damaging to her husband who was convicted of murder whereas she was 
acquitted of the statutory offence. The prosecution could not have made the wife a 
compellable witness for them and it was only because the wife chose to give evidence in her 
own behalf that it became available in the joint trial. On appeal the court had to examine the 
common law immunity and the basis for the general statement that a wife could not be an 
accessory after the fact to a crime committed by her husband. The Hong Kong Court of 
Appeal200 discerned two different and conflicting rationales for the exemption, “that it would 
be repugnant to her common law obligation to give help and comfort to her husband and to 
respect his confidences” and alternatively “that it derives from the presumption that any act 
                                              
196
 Bromley, Peter Mann ‘Bromley’s Family Law’ (1976) 5 ed Butterworths, London, p155; Halsbury’s ‘Statutes 
of England’ (1968) 2 ed vol 47 p341 states that the phrase “any other person” in s4(1) of the Act includes the 
wife of the offender and cites R v Holley as authority for its proposition. 
197
 s4(1) Criminal Law Act 1967 [UK]. 
198
 R v Lee Shek Ching [1986] HKLR 636. 
199
 There was some flaccid discussion of the content of these exceptions when the equivalent English provision 
was being debated, Official Report 1966-67, Standing Committee F, HC Debates, vol 750 col 129 (June 1 1967). 
The concept of “lawful authority” is considered: P J Pace, ‘Impeding Arrest – A Wife’s Right as a Spouse?’, 
[1978] Crim LR 82 p88 and to Richard Card, ‘Authority and Excuse as Defences to Crime’ [1969] Crim LR 359, 
415 where it is said that lawful authority connotes “some authority from a public source (such as a Court or a 
government department) given in pursuance of some statutory power”. In Bryan v Mott (1976) 62 Cr App R 71, 
73 it was stated that the phrase “reasonable excuse” confers a wider discretion than that of “lawful authority”. It 
seems unlikely that the phrase connotes an excuse in law that is a general defence to a crime since such defence 
does not exist unless expressly made otherwise. In R v Brindley & Long [1971] 2 All ER 698 the question of 
motive was held to be relevant and if it were in fulfilment of the obligations of married life it may qualify.   
200
 R v Lee Shek Ching [1986] HKLR 636 (CA) (Huggins ACJ, Cons and Kempster JJA). 
   
 447 
done by a wife in the presence of her husband is deemed to have been done under his 
coercion”.  
 
Cons JA delivering the judgment of the court accepted that it was “well settled” that a wife 
was immune at common law for being an accessory after the fact to the felony of her husband. 
However, s1 Criminal Law Act 1967 was not enacted in Hong Kong until 1991 and during 
that period (at least) the common law offence of accessory after the fact continued to exist,201 
but  in relation to the enduring common law offence the Court of Appeal said it “cannot be 
gainsaid” that the wife’s common law immunity continued. 
 
The immunity given by the common law is in respect of an offence created by the common 
law. It is not to be presumed to follow that it extends to a statutory offence which, although 
similar, casts a wider net. Arrestable offences, with which s90(1) is concerned may be 
misdemeanours as well as felonies and the subsection may capture circumstances which 
would not be sufficient to constitute the common law offence. There is nothing in its language 
which indicates an immunity for wives.202 
 
But the Court then considered whether despite the conclusion that wives were not excluded as 
a class from the new offence, whether the wife could have “lawful authority” or “reasonable 
excuse”203 for her act. The charge particularised that she acted with the appropriate intent as 
having “departed from Hong Kong for Macau to offer financial assistance to” her husband 
who had absconded while on bail. The argument adopted was that although the common law 
immunity may have fallen with the abolition of felonies, the reasons behind the immunity 
remained and should continue to afford similar protection to the modern wife, via the 
defences of “lawful authority” or “reasonable excuse”.204 The Court of Appeal did not accept 
that reasoning stating “the wife’s immunity at common law rested either on duty or coercion 
or perhaps on a combination of the two.” Presumption of coercion was no longer a valid basis 
for sustaining the exemption as the presumption had been abrogated in Hong Kong in 1930, 
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not based on the fact that the husband has committed a felony but on the position that her conduct was a function 
of the husband’s power over her.   
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so that coercion now had to be positively proved. Duty of a wife to her husband therefore 
alone remained. While a wife in modern Hong Kong is not required to behave as she would 
have been centuries ago the Court of Appeal concluded: 
 
Even so, we think it may be that on occasion her marital obligations, at least in so far as they 
apply within the matrimonial home, would afford sufficient excuse for what would otherwise 
be a breach of s90(1).  
 
Cons JA held that this possible excuse had not been established on the facts to provide the 
wife with the immunity, where she had assisted her husband to extra-territorially maintain his 
life on the run.205 The reasoning permits continuing scope for a wife or a husband (the words 
being gender-neutral in the offence-creating section) to rely on an insulated duty to harbour 
the other, particularly in the matrimonial dwelling. But why the exception should be confined 
to the spouse acting within the matrimonial home, as opposed to anywhere, is quite uncertain 
and is redolent of a reincarnation of the former duty of compliance that the common law 
believed a wife owed to her husband. But any such duty of either spouse must be a general 
one and not one artificially linked to the home. If the statutory excuse is based on a public 
policy belief in the bonds of human nature and dilemma of loyalty it is equally obscure why 
this should end at the doorstep.   
 
 
VICTORIA, OTHER AUSTRALIAN JURISDICTIONS AND PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
 
In 1977 upon the recommendation of the Victorian Law Commissioner206 a statutory 
defence207 was introduced relieving spouses from criminal liability for harbouring the other 
                                              
205
 However, the court quashed the murder conviction of the husband and ordered a retrial on the basis that the 
trial judge had not carried out a satisfactory balancing exercise involving the prejudice to the husband of the wife 
exercising her right to give evidence in the joint trial. The mere fact that the wife was a competent witness in her 
own defence without the consent of the husband, in terms of s54(1)(c) Criminal Procedure Ordinance Cap 221 
[HK] was an inadequate basis for decision-making. The court took into account the long-established opposition 
of the common law to the calling of the evidence of one spouse against another and concluded there has been a 
miscarriage of justice. It noted that the general proposition where a husband and wife are jointly charged would 
not be affected.   
206
 Law Reform Commissioner of Victoria, Report No 3; Criminal Liability of Married Persons (Special Rules), 
Melbourne June 1975. 
207
 s338 Crimes (Married Persons’ Liability) Act 1977 [Vic]. 
A married person shall not become an accessory after the fact to any indictable offences or guilty of –  
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and for impeding that person’s apprehension. But it still remained an offence for a spouse to 
handle stolen goods from the other spouse.208 Other legislation was also amended to insert an 
immunity from prosecution where the spouse harboured or employed the other spouse, 
whether or not that married person knew the spouse to be illegally at large.209 Even the hyper-
modern Northern Territory legislation did not remove all substantive uxorial privileges. While 
explicitly abrogating intraspousal conspiracy (s291) and the uxorial accessorial exemption 
(s13(2)), it still protects spouses from intraspousal theft, unless they were leaving or deserting 
the other spouse or attempting to do so: s42 Criminal Code Act 1983 [NT].  In Queensland, 
there is no longer any protection for a wife as an accessory after the fact (s10 Criminal Code 
[Qld], but both spouses are protected in Western Australia (s10 Criminal Code [WA]). In 
Papua New Guinea, the uxorial immunity is maintained. She is not guilty as an accessory 
after the fact, “(a) by receiving or assisting him in order to enable him to escape punishment; 
or (b) by receiving or assisting in her husband’s presence and by his authority, another person 
who is guilty of an offence in the commission of which her husband has taken part in order to 
enable that other person to escape punishment”: s10(2) Criminal Code Act 1974 [PNG]. But 
most unequally, by s10(3) Criminal Code Act 1974 [PNG] “a married man does not become 
an accessory after the fact to an offence of which his wife is guilty by receiving or assisting 
her in order to enable her to escape punishment”. His right is only to protect his wife; her 
right extends to his confederates as well.  
 
Although a wife who harbours her husband, unquestionably but for the accessory exemption, 
commits an offence “in his presence”, and would where the defence of marital coercion exists 
have that possible additional protection, that defence was intended to apply only to principals 
                                                                                                                                             
(a) an offence under section 40 of this Act; 
(b) an offence under section 52 of the Summary Offences Act 1966 ; or 
(c) the offence at common law of obstructing an officer of justice in the execution of his duty –  
By receiving, relieving, comforting or assisting his or her spouse, or the spouse and another person or persons, 
though with knowledge that the spouse, whether alone or with the other person or persons, has committed an 
offence and though the purpose of what is done is to enable the spouse, or the spouse and the other person or 
persons, to escape being apprehended, tried or punished. 
208
 s88(3) Crimes Act 1958 was inserted by s2 Crimes (Married Persons’ Liability) Act 1977 [Vic].  A provision, 
such as this, was beyond English Under-Secretary for State who had informed Parliament that now law could be 
drafted that exempted the offence of handling stolen goods, yet protected a spouse from harbouring or impeding 
the arrest of the other. 
209
 s134(1A) Social Welfare Act 1970 [Vic] was so amended. 
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and not an accessory after the fact.210 The reasoning for that conclusion, advanced by Prof J C 
Smith, turns on the lack of cocentricity between the different but cognate exemptions from the 
criminal law. However, his analysis overlooks a crucial, additional difference. Marital 
coercion applied to felonies and misdemeanours, whereas the accessorial exemption only 
applied to felonies.211  An essential requirement of marital coercion was that the husband was 
present so as to demonstrate the continuous and immediate nature of his presumed or actual 
coercion over the wife. In the accessorial scenario the wife was able to operate quite 
independently of the actual or constructive presence of her husband. Indeed in many 
situations she would need to act in places removed from where her husband was to 
accomplish their joint objective of preventing his detection. The marital coercion defence at 
common law always excluded the offences of murder and some forms of treason. There was 
considerable uncertainty as to whether other particularly serious offences were outside its 
scope. But the accessorial exemption applies to all indictable crimes that were felonies.212 The 
former presumption of marital coercion was rebuttable by demonstrating that the wife was a 
free agent in the offence. This was shown by the prosecution proving that she acted 
independently or on her own initiative. If the presumption was rebutted a conviction would 
ensue. For accessorial exemption it was completely irrelevant why the wife acted as she did as 
her motivation was based on the fulfilment of a duty perceived to be owed to her husband.  
 
The proper analysis is that there were two separate but related rules at common law. The 
institutional texts always, apart from Blackstone,213 saw the rules as being different and 
serving different purposes. But the wording of s47 Criminal Justice Act 1925 expressly 
applies to any offence, although throughout the Parliamentary Debates leading to its 
enactment, there was never any consideration of the fact that it also applies to the position of a 
wife as an accessory after the fact to her husband’s offence.214 
                                              
210
 J C Smith ‘Case and Commentary’ [1962] Crim LR 829 considered it “very doubtful” whether the statutory 
defence in s47 was ever intended to extend to accessories. 
211
 R v Field (1943) 29 Cr App R 151 
212
 In New Zealand s176 Crimes Act 1961 [NZ] separately provides for the offence of accessory after the fact to 
murder; although the marital exemption in s71(2) Crimes Act applies to it.  
213
 4 Commentaries 39 “But a feme covert cannot become an accessory by the receipt and concealment of her 
husband; for she is presumed to act under his coercion, and therefore she is not bound, neither ought she, to 
discover her lord.” 
214
 A mismatch of intention and history. 
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MODERN APPROACHES TO THE IMMUNITY 
 
But so strict is the law, where a felony has been actually committed, that even the merest 
relations of the offender are not suffered to aid or to receive him. And therefore if the parent 
assists his child, or the child the parent, if the brother receives the brother, the master the 
servant, or the servant the master, or if the husband receives the wife – in every case they 
become accessory after the fact. But the wife receiving or concealing her husband is presumed 
to act under his coercion; and she is not bound in law, neither ought she, to discover her Lord. 
She is therefore not liable as an accessory after the fact.215  
 
Many of the complexities flowing from the privilege have been resolved in some common 
law jurisdictions by equalising the privilege between spouses. In some cases it has been 
extended to others – such development amerliorating a long-standing anomoly.216 The 
intriguing aspect is that rather than perpetuate a privilege only for married women, the option 
of abrogating the entire privilege was forsaken in place of widening it beyond the spouses. To 
understand why the law has reacted so unevenly in this regard in different jurisdictions, 
involves analysing why the defence of marital coercion and the spousal conspiracy have also 
remained in certain jurisdictions. The uneven nature of the position is best illustrated by 
English law which retains the defence of marital coercion and the intra-spousal conspiracy 
immunity and maintains a variant217 of the former accessory after the fact immunity. By 
contrast in New Zealand the marital coercion defence and the intra-spousal conspiracy 
immunity have long been abrogated by statute and only the accessorial immunity now exists, 
in a form that encompasses now both spouses and civil union partners.  
 
                                              
215
 Edward Jenks (ed) ‘Stephens Commentaries on the Laws of England’ (1922), 17 ed, Butterworth & Co, 
London vol iv, p35. At p36 the author refers to Russell, ‘Crimes and Misdemeanours’, 7 ed, p106-128 and H D 
Roome and R E Ross (eds) ‘Archbold, Criminal Pleading’ (1918) 25 ed, p1367-1387, all to the same effect. 
216
 2 Hawkins’ ‘Pleas of the Crown’, cap 29, c.34. “Also it seems agreed that no other relation beside that of a 
wife to her husband will exempt the receiver of a felon from being an accessory to the felony. From whence it 
follows that if a master receive a servant, or a servant a master, or brother a brother, or even a husband a wife, 
they are accessories in the same manner as if they had been mere strangers to one another”. 
217
 The specific offence of accessory after the fact has been abrogated in England by s1 Criminal Law Act 1967 
[UK] upon the abolition of the distinction between felonies and misdemeanours, but a new offence of assisting 
offenders has been instituted, which provides for the defence of reasonable excuse. Whether that defence entitles 
a spouse per se to assist the other spouse with immunity has only been decided in Hong Kong: R v Lee Shek 
Ching [1986] HKLR 304 (CA) where the almost identical offence to that in England also exists. 
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The tendency218 in some legislatures219 has been to extend protection of this character to 
persons other than the wife.220 Some legislatures even-handedly deny the exemption to both 
spouses;221 in some the common law position protecting wives is replicated222 and in some a 
wife is austerely defined only in terms of Christian marriage.223 In South Africa there was 
never an express immunity in favour of a wife, “who does no more than discharge towards 
her husband such duties as he may reasonably demand, and she may reasonably render him”, 
but a general practice became so well established in her favour, not to prosecute such wives, 
that it was held to amounted to a custom having the force of law.224  
                                              
218
 Rollin M Perkins, ‘Criminal Law’, (1957) The Foundation Press Inc, Brooklyn at p580: “The exception has 
been extended somewhat liberally by some of the modern statutes [E.g., 9 Mass.Laws Ann. C.274 § 4 
(Supp.1955)].” The Florida Penal Code exempts a “husband or wife, parent or grandparent, child or grandchild, 
brother or sister, by consanguinity or affinity to the offender”: 4 Fla Stats Ann § 776.03. 
219
 David Harter, ‘Criminal Law in Yugoslavia’, (1962) 5 The Lawyer 33, 35. noting that the former law of 
Yugoslavia provided that an accessory after the fact was immune from prosecution if that accessory was “the 
offender’s spouse, whether husband or wife, relatives by blood in direct lineage, brother or sister, adopter or 
adoptee”. 
220
 Glanville Williams, ‘The Criminal Law: The General Part’: “If the full immunity of the wife is thought to be 
required as a matter of policy, the same policy would seem to require immunity for the husband in the converse 
situation; and this conclusion is accepted in the Canadian Code s23(2).” Kenneth C Sears and Henry Y 
Weihofen ‘May’s Law of Crimes’, (1938) 4 ed, Little Brown & Co, Boston. At p91 “According to the older 
authorities at least, a wife could not be an accessory after the fact to her husband’s felony…no other relationship, 
except that of wife, carried with it any exemption. Blackstone stated the reason to be that the husband was 
presumed to have coerced the wife [4 Blackstone Commentaries 28] but Hawkins stated that the indulgence was 
granted the wife in consideration of the duty and love she owes her husband [2 Hawkins ‘Pleas of the Crown’ 
c29 s34]. Some modern statutes extend the immunity to other relations that the wife. For example Callaghan’s 
Illinois Statutes Annotated ch.38 §613. Either spouse may be an accessory before the fact to the other as a 
principal, R v Morris R&R 270 and R v Manning 2 C&K 903.” 
221
 s388 Penal Code, Cap 17 [Fiji]. “A person who receives or assists another who is, to his knowledge, guilty of 
an offence, in order to enable him to escape punishment, is said to become an accessory after the fact to the 
offence.” 
222
 s387 Penal Code [Tanganyika] provided that a wife (only) who assists her husband to escape punishment 
does not become an accessory after the fact. 
223
 In the Criminal Code Act Cap.77, ‘Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990’ the Schedule to the Act sets out 
the Code of Criminal Law and Part I Ch.1 defines “Christian marriage” as meaning “a marriage which is 
recognised by the law of the place where it is contracted as the voluntary union for life of one man and one 
woman to the exclusion of all others”. Ch.2 s10 provides for the crime of an accessory after the fact and then 
adds an exemption in these terms: “A wife does not become an accessory after the fact to an offence of which 
her husband is guilty by receiving or, assisting him in order to enable him to escape punishment; nor by 
receiving or assisting, in her husband’s presence and by his authority, another person who is guilty of an offence 
in the commission of which her husband has taken part, in order to enable that other person to escape 
punishment; nor does a husband become accessory after the fact to an offence of which his wife is guilty by 
receiving or assisting her in order to enable her to escape punishment.” The section expressly states that the term 
“wife” and “husband” mean respectively the wife and husband of a Christian marriage.   
224
 Gardiner & Lansdown, ‘South African Criminal Law and Procedure’, (1957) 6 ed Charles W H Landsdown, 
William G Hoal and Alfred V Landsdown (eds), Juta & Co Ltd, Capetown, p155. See R v Mtetwa 1921 TPD 
227. Anon, ‘Can a Husband be Accessory after the Wife’s Crime?’ (1900) 64 JP 129, 131: “None have since 
disputed the position of the wife, and there have been notable instances where wives might have been prosecuted 
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MODERN JUSTIFICATION FOR THE EXEMPTION 
 
Wives are no longer subject to the thraldom of their husbands. The issue involves striking a 
balance between the preservation of the stability of marriage and the duty of individuals to 
society.225 Any special exemption in favour of any class of person must be scrupulously 
justified and not infringe the permeating principle of equality, if the legislation is to be 
constitutional.226 The constitutional right to family life should not be interpreted as a 
sanctuary from the criminal law. 
 
The Law Reform Commissioner of Victoria stated: 
 
the relationship of husband and wife involves, for the wife, a deep obligation to give help and 
comfort to her husband and to respect his confidences and…if, being faced with a conflict of 
duties, she gives precedence to that personal obligation, over her general duty as a citizen not 
to obstruct the administration of justice, her conduct is at least so far excusable, or extenuated, 
that it should not be regarded as criminal. The special rule, resting upon this foundation, 
ought, it is considered, to be accepted and maintained, not only as being supported by the 
clearest authority, but also because personal loyalty between husband and wife may properly 
be regarded as of fundamental importance to the stability of the family as the basic unity in 
our society.227  
 
But the issue could equally be seen that it is not whether husband and wife are the basic unit 
in society, but whether the family is the basic unit in society.228 
                                                                                                                                             
if there had been any idea that the law could be otherwise. No doubt it is good enough sense as well, as law, but 
if that argument be once admitted it applies equally to the case of the husband.”      
225
 In Peter Gillies, ‘The Law of Criminal Complicity’ (1980), Law Book Company, p277: “The distinction 
between the respective positions of the spouses is a curious one, it being envisaged that while it is forgivable that 
the wife should take positive steps to prevent her husband from being incriminated, it is not forgivable that the 
husband should take such steps on behalf of his wife.” 
226
 R H Graveson and F R Crane (eds), ‘A Century of Family Law 1857-1957’, D Mendes Da Costa, ‘Criminal 
Law’ (1957), Sweet & Maxwell, London, p191, the marital coercion presumption “was incongruous to the claim 
for equality by the married woman”. 
227
 Victorian Law Reform Commissioner, Report No 3 ‘Criminal Liability of Married Persons (Special Rules)’ 
(June 1975), Melbourne, cf The Law Reform Commission, Ireland, Report No 23 December 1987 ‘Receiving 
Stolen Property’ Para 33: “As regards the position relating to receiving goods stolen by one spouse from 
another, it may happen that by reason of the restrictions contained in section 9(3) of the Married Women’s Status 
Act 1957 the receiver of what would be stolen goods, save for this provision, will be exempt from 
responsibility.”  
228
 See Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa (2002) 13 BHRC 108 (SA: Const Ct). So where a 
witness is called to give evidence on some matter which is privileged on the part of a minor, the minor’s parent 
is entitled on the minor’s behalf either to object to the admission of that evidence on the ground that it is 
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CONCLUSION 
 
It is possible to differentiate between merely harbouring a spouse as a form of asylum, from 
actively concealing229 say stolen goods230 brought by the spouse. The interest in protecting the 
spouse by offering a place of refuge is founded on the marital obligation to support each 
other.231 There is a competing interest in the state being able to detect and apprehend the 
spouse but it can be seen as an interest which to a certain point (passive asylum) can be over-
valued measured against the intraspousal or family232 commitment. Where, however, goods 
have been stolen the state has a strong interest in the recaption of the goods and the spouse 
has no special interest in harbouring them, other than the fact that they may be evidence of the 
whereabouts of the other spouse. In relation to the goods the state has a stronger claim and its 
rights of recapture of the goods belonging to a third party can be seen separately from the 
claim of the wife to protect the husband or vice versa. In that situation the third party interests 
is only that of the state.  
 
Wives did not uniformly act from the motivation of fear or victimisation but also by a desire 
to protect the husband from arrest. This motive was seen in contemporary culture, by the 
judges233 and possibly by the woman herself, as displaying appropriate affection for the 
                                                                                                                                             
privileged, or to waive privilege. In R v McNally [1958] NZLR 1075 a father objected to a question asked of his 
son on the basis that it was privileged in terms of self-incrimination.   
229
 In R v M’Clarens (1849) 3 Cox CC 425 Coltman J said summing up to the jury “that if a wife took part 
merely for the purpose of concealing her husband’s guilt and of screening him from the consequences, then I 
think she ought to be acquitted.”  
230
 In New Zealand s246 Crimes Act 1961 [NZ] defines the offence of receiving stolen goods. It makes no 
provision for any exemption based on spousal duty. The difference between receiving stolen goods and being an 
accessory after the fact to the offence of theft or burglary by sheltering the principal and storing the stolen goods 
may be difficult to make.  
231
 In Leaman v The Queen [1986] Tas R 223, 225 (CCA) noted that in an accessory after the fact situation it had 
“sympathy with the call which a husband’s predicament may make on a wife’s application and sense of uxorial 
duty.” 
232
 Rollin M Perkins, ‘Criminal Law’, (1957) The Foundation Press Inc, Brooklyn at p581: “it is asking too 
much of a jury to expect a conviction of one who has merely opened his door or given some similar aid to a 
parent, child or other intimate relation.” CMV Clarkson and H M Keating, ‘Criminal Law: Text and Materials’ 
(1994) 3 ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London at p113: “However, such a rationale can no longer be accepted. The true 
reason for the existence of a duty in such cases must be the inter-dependence that springs from shared family life 
or close communal living. [G Fletcher, ‘Rethinking Criminal Law’ (1978) p613]. In such a situation one comes 
to rely on the other members of the family and it is this reliance and expectation of assistance if necessary that 
generates the duty to act, rather than any blood tie”.   
233
 R v Brooks (1853) 6 Cox CC 148, 149 (CCCR): per Parke B (later Lord Wensleydale). In this case the 
husband received stolen goods from her husband at their home.  Alderson B refuted the idea that she could be an 
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husband and fidelity to his interests. Therefore the focus on the material and psychological 
circumstances that bound a wife to her husband was a sensitive judgment, that a woman that 
joined him in facilitating crime was distinguishably less culpable than other persons, as her 
fate was inevitably determined by his. The doctrine was a logical and humane recognition of 
the consequences of the wife’s legal disabilities. Yet the doctrine did not confront the 
question why a crime motivated by uxorial love should be excused when that of her husband 
was not. The defence did not deal with other subordinated persons such as children, servants, 
and apprentices. They as a group were legally bound to obey the commands of the head of the 
household. The reason for the differential treatment of the wife lies much more deeply in the 
history of the common law and also in the religious brocade that influenced it.   
Any attempt to extract a single rationale for the uxorial immunity is however frustrated by the 
same factors militating against identifying a single rationale for the defence of marital 
coercion. As these two uxorial notions were generated about the same time it was probable 
that originally each was but a facet of a wider notion of general uxorial duty. But with the 
transition from robust Anglo-Saxon law which recognised the independence of women, to the 
genteel and chivalric Norman law, the emphasis on wifely duties to the husband appears to 
have altered. So that by the latter time, married women were now ensconced with additional 
protections all emanating from the central concept of the relative helplessness and 
vulnerability of a feme covert. The quest for a single rationale for uxorial exemptions is 
ultimately unproductive. Over time the very significant impacts of the different systems of 
law and how they regarded married women produced varying developments in their rights 
and duties. This choreography over time was a reflection of societal perceptions of the proper 
status of wives and more importantly, what the law should expect from them. Attitudes meant 
that the law accommodated the contemporary view of the uxorial relationship and the 
responsibilities of wives to their husbands. In short the law had been infused with several 
complementary justifications for the privilege of married women, all borne out of the 
implications of the concept of unity of spouses. Upon the slow dissipation by the common 
                                                                                                                                             
accessory after the fact of her husband’s offence. In R v Boober, Boober & Boober (1850) 4 Cox CC 272, 273 
Talfourd J directed a jury that a wife “cannot in law be said to have any possession separate from her husband” 
adding that if a wife took steps to destroy the evidence against her husband this was no offence if “her object 
was to screen him from detection”. In R v M’Clarens, Middleton, Draddy and Draddy (1849) 3 Cox CC 425, 
426 Coltman J directed that if a wife acted for the purposes of “screening [her husband] from the consequences” 
of the law her attempt “to conceal what may lead to his detection” was no offence. See also R v Holley [1963] 1 
All ER 106 F which notes ‘Halsbury’s Laws of England’, (1955) 3 ed, vol 10  p303 para 561. 
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law fiction of marital unity as a valid marker, modern jurisprudence now regards the shape of 
the criminal law in relation to wives as a matter of social policy234 or of constitutional 
imperative. To treat a class of sui juris individuals differently from all others requires a 
correspondingly powerful justification if that law is to survive the scrutiny of a constitutional 
challenge based on inequality. 
 
 
 
                                              
234
 S N Grant Bailey ‘Lush on Husband and Wife’, (1933) 4 ed, Stevenson & Sons, p597 noting that the 
immunity now turned “upon questions of social policy and not of unity of person”. 
   
 457 
7 
 
DENOUEMENT AND CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
It is a quiddity for substantive uxorial privileges based on historical rationales about the 
inferiority and vulnerabilities of wives, to subsist on the back of a legal fiction traceable over 
1000 years. Those historical rationales supply no reason for its endurance. For centuries, the 
prevailing wisdom had been that wives were understandably dependent on their husbands. 
Courts and legislatures alike exercised a “humane paternalism over marriage”1 to redress the 
natural imbalance consequent upon wives being considered incapable of informed, 
autonomous decision-making. Wives were by cultural conditioning and subliminal religious 
dictates perceived as being too helpless to be left unaided amidst the sordid real world. Legal 
rules emerged as a function of society’s concern for the welfare of wives; rules animated by a 
laudable desire to protect wives and superintend their best interest. These rules had a pedigree 
before the origin of coverture and were premised upon the inferiority of women and of wives 
in particular.  
 
It is striking that the defence of marital coercion is unknown in Continental law (from which 
it first originated) and the legal systems in other continents such as South America which it 
profoundly influenced. The defence does not exist in other major legal systems either such as 
under Chinese law or in those countries strongly influenced by Muslim tenets. The 
intramarital conspiracy exemption cannot be located outside the common law legal system. 
The accessory after the fact exemption is, however, recognised in a very few jurisdictions 
under Continental law such as Greece2. These uxorial privileges display a transcendent 
Christian heritage value increasingly out of step with modern pluralistic societies.   
 
                                              
1
 Richard Morris, ‘Studies in the History of American Law’ (1959) J M Mitchell Company, Philadelphia, p71. 
2
 See fn 120 Chp 6 infra. 
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To gratuitously exempt a class of person from the reach of the general criminal law requires a 
formidable rationalisation, “an exceedingly persuasive justification”.3 To perpetuate the 
special exemption of married women from the criminal law without cogent, objective 
justification, is to subvert the centripetal notion of ordinary, individual responsibility.4 The 
principle of individual autonomy has normative elements, emphasising that individuals are 
presumptively free agents in determining their own conduct.5 Yet, the common law 
jurisdictions have not engaged in that necessary dialectic, contenting themselves with 
sporadic minor adjustments of the law leaving the macro-issue untouched. To validate the 
continuation of these gender-differentiating exemptions would require a wistful belief in the 
pusillanimity of modern wives. The historically benign distinctions in favour of wives, 
reflected a belief that the law needed to show them special solicitude. Such distinctions now 
resonate with a demeaning assumption about the relative status of married women.6 Such 
distinctions in law reinforce the notion of uxorial inequality and inferiority, generating 
anomalous outcomes too when measured against the fact of the liability of wives for all other 
modalities of criminal conduct. The present exemptions are on an analysis arbitrary and 
illogical once it is accepted that wives and husbands who commit all other joint or derivative 
crimes are not exonerated by their marital or gender status.  
 
A fundamental principled recontouring of the criminal law is required to deny any exemption 
based on gender or status-differentiating characteristics, unless grounded on a demonstrably 
                                              
3
 An “exceedingly persuasive justification” is needed to show that a gender-based law is substantially related to 
an important governmental objective and that it is a proportionate response to it: Mississippi University for 
Women v Hogan (1982) 458 US 718, 724 per O’Connor J. “Care must be taken in ascertaining whether the 
statutory objective itself reflects archaic and stereotypic notions. Thus if the statutory objective is to exclude or 
‘protect’ members of one gender because they are presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be innately 
inferior, the objective itself is illegitimate”. 
4
 Herbert Fingarette and Ann Fingarette Hasse, ‘Mental Disabilities and Criminal Responsibilities’ (1979) 
University of California Press, Berkeley, p11 “The criminal law must be liberated from the inherited pseudo-
solutions that have generated past and present confusion – and, in the end, therefore, injustice. The problems are 
ripe for a return to the basic common law principles centering around the notion of responsibility, which lies at 
the heart of the criminal law in all common law lands.”   
5
 Andrew Ashworth ‘Principles of Criminal Law’ 2 ed (1995) Clarendon Press, Oxford pp25-26. 
6
 Celia Wells, ‘Groups, Girls and Fears’ in Donald Nicolson and Lois Bibbings (eds) ‘Feminist Perspectives on 
Criminal Law’ (2000) Cavendish Publishing Limited, London, p128, “Criminal laws have tended to see women 
as unstable, as in submission to men, or as unable to make rational decisions. Some of the more egregious 
examples have now gone, such as the marital rape immunity [R v R [1992] 1 AC 599 HL; and s142 Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act 1994] and rules about the need for corroboration warnings in relation to women’s 
evidence”. [s32 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994].”   
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valid jurisprudential underpinning. Special uxorial defences should be debunked in the quest 
for equality, as the underlying premise of the subjugation of women is not borne out under 
contemporary conditions – at least in developed jurisdictions.7 The obvious reason why the 
existing exemptions are unsatisfactory is that they exonerate persons who are deserving of 
incrimination yet who are devoid of any excusatory or justificatory basis for being beyond the 
law, other than possessing a fortuitous qualifying marital status. American literature, based on 
a seminal article8 has developed the theory that the battered woman syndrome defence is the 
modern successor-in-title to marital coercion,9 so as to retrogressively reclaim in that 
jurisdiction, a special modern exemption from the criminal law, available only to all women.  
 
Any taxonomy of the general criminal law, excluding from incrimination a sub-class of the 
female gender involves an aberration of principle, unless distinctly justifiable (on 
physiological or empirical medical evidence) such as in the defence of infanticide. The early 
motivation for special rules for wives was avuncular. Rules governing the conduct of women 
were adopted in what was honestly seen as women’s best interest,10 obliging women to 
                                              
7
 The Commission for Women’s Rights in Fiji has expressly sought to maintain the marital coercion defence 
because of the realities of life in rural village conditions, where the dominance/subjugation factors still exist. Ms 
Emele Duituturaga, Chef Executive Officer for Women, Ministry of Women’s Affairs, Suva, Fiji 19 May 2005 
“The presumption of marital coercion in s19 Penal Code unfortunately should still remain as in the rural sector of 
Fiji this issue of coercion is very much a live matter.” In Jaulim v Director of Public Prosecutions [1976] MR 96 
Latour-Adrien CJ concluded that the exclusion of Mauritian women from juries was justified as “the Mauritian 
woman’s status, her place and role in the home and family, and social conditions prevailing in this country are 
incompatible with a service which, as our law has stood and still stands, may require that they be kept away from 
home for sometimes long periods, sleeping in hotels, and unable to move about except under the vigilant eyes of 
court ushers. It seems unquestionable to us that such as obligation would cause much distress to many Mauritian 
women and arouse deep resentment among many of their male relatives.” This decision was followed by a 
majority in Peerbocus v The Queen unreported Mauritius Court of Criminal Appeal, 25 June 1991, cf the comment 
of Justice Elizabeth Evatt in forward to R Graycar and J Morgan (eds) ‘The Hidden Gender of Law’ (1990) 
Federation Press, Sydney, p vii, “while the idea of a gender-neutral law has its attractions, there are important 
aspects of life, such as conception, childbirth, sex and sexual violence, in which women’s experience is quite 
different from that of men. The law can not readily be gender-neutral in areas where the specific experience of 
women needs recognition, or where there is continuing disadvantage”.   
8
 Anne M Coughlin, ‘Excusing Women’ (1994) 82 California Law Review 1. 
9
 See further: Rebecca D Cornia, ‘Current Use of Battered Women Syndrome: Institutionalization of Negative 
Stereotypes About Women’, (1998) 8 UCLA Women’s Law Journal 99, 105 where battered woman syndrome is 
described as the “Doctrinal Heir To The ‘Marital Coercion Doctrine’ ” – under both the syndrome and the 
doctrine the fundamental premise is that women lack the psychological capacity to choose lawful means to 
extricate themselves from abusive males – “learned helplessness”. This defence has been accepted as part of the 
law of South Australia:  R v Runjanjic and Kontinnen (1991) 56 SASR 114 
10
 Sail’er Inn v Kirby (1971) 485 P 2d 529, 540. “Laws which disable women from full participation in the 
political, business and economic arenas are often characterised as ‘protective’ and beneficial. Those same laws 
applied to social or ethnic minorities would readily be recognised as invidious and impermissible. The pedestal 
upon which women have been placed has all too often, upon close inspection, been revealed as a cage.” 
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behave just as they would have if they had been able to fully appreciate what was best for 
them.11  
 
“[M]any facets of women’s inequality are justified, explained, and thereby perpetuated by 
presenting a picture of women as something different and special, something different and 
debilitated…In law women have been, or so lawmakers proclaim, protected because of these 
differences, or excluded and exempted.”12  
 
In common law jurisdictions the modern constitutional law approach to the right not to be 
discriminated against (as well as to the right to equality before the law) has been significantly 
shaped by international instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.13 The Human Rights Committee has by its General Comment 18 on Non-
Discrimination14 emphasised the plenitude of the right. The insidious nature of inequality is 
often camouflaged by the subtlety of stereotyping,15 so unlawful discrimination is a matter of 
impact and consequences rather than engaging any enquiry as to its motivation. There have 
been inequality challenges in common law jurisdictions, almost invariably brought by those 
historically disadvantaged or discriminated against, such as females, wives and 
homosexuals.16 A challenge to the unconstitutionality of uxorial substantive privileges in the 
criminal law, by irony, could be initiated by any person including a male. A court too is 
always entitled to act on its own motion if it considered that common law or legislation, 
materially engaged in a dispute before it, was susceptible of harbouring illicit discriminatory 
beliefs. 
 
                                              
11
 D L Kirp, M G Yudof and M Strong Franks, ‘Gender Justice’ (1986) The University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, p31. 
12
 Susan Edwards (ed), ‘Gender Sex and the Law’, (1985) Croom Helm, London, p1. 
13
 (1966) 999 UNTS 171. 
14
 Human Rights Committee, General Comment 18 on Non-Discrimination, 37th Session, 9 November 1989 
“Non-discrimination, together with equality before the law and equal protection of the law without any 
discrimination, constitutes a basic and general principle relating to the protection of human rights.” 
15
 Quilter v Attorney General [1998] 1 NZLR 523, 532 (CA) “Laws which treat individuals unfairly simply on 
the basis of personal characteristics which bear no relation to their merit, capacity or need are inherently 
discriminatory” per Thomas J. 
16
 National Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice (1998) 6 BHRC 127 (SA: CC); L v 
Austria (2003) 36 EHRR 55; Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza  [2004] 2 AC 557 (HL); Leung v Secretary for Justice; 
[2006] 4 HKLRD 211 (CA); Secretary for Justice v Yau Yuk Lung Zigo [2006] 4 HKLRD 196 (CA). (Challenges 
to laws discriminating against certain homosexual inequalities.) 
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In Reed v Reed17 legislation in Idaho governing the administration of intestate estates 
preferred males over females who otherwise stood in the same relation to the deceased. The 
United States Supreme Court held that the preference was not rationally based and was a 
legislative distinction based on gender which failed to comply with the equality provision of 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the American Constitution. In JEB v Alabama ex rel TB,18 the 
Supreme Court affirmed that discrimination as to the composition of a jury on the basis of 
gender, violated the constitutional right to equality particularly where it “serves to ratify and 
perpetuate invidious, archaic and overbroad stereotypes about the relative abilities of men and 
women”. The Privy Council has held that statutory law and practice in Gibraltar, which 
virtually precluded any woman becoming a juror there, was unconstitutional as being contrary 
to the right of equality.19 “In the absence of cogent objective justification, there is an 
unacceptable discriminatory practice undermining confidence in any system of law which still 
maintains it.”20 
 
The American state constitutions invariably provide for gender equality. The statutory 
formulation of duress in Pennsylvania21 for example applies to any “actor engaged in the 
conduct”.22 In rebuffing recourse to the old uxorial doctrines the Supreme Court of that state 
has held “The law must not be reluctant to remain abreast with the developments of society 
and should unhesitatingly discard former doctrines that embody concepts that have since been 
discredited”.23 The separate position of wives under the law was repudiated as being violative 
of fundamental constitutional norms.  
 
Experience has shown that challenges to the criminal law on the basis of inequality have most 
usually been directed to evidential and procedural issues, rather than to substantive offences 
                                              
17
 (1971) 404 US 71; Barbara A Brown, ‘The Equal Rights Amendment: Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights 
for Women’ (1971) 80 Yale LJ 871. In Craig v Boren (1976) 429 US 190, 210, an Oklahoma statute prescribed 
different ages for female teenagers and male teenagers to be able to drink alcohol – unconstitutional.   
18
 (1994) 511 US 127 per Blackmun J 
19
 Rojas v Berllaque (Attorney General Intervening) unreported Privy Council Appeal No 100 of 2002, 10 
November 2003. 
20
 Ibid para [15] per Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead. 
21
 Pa Const art 1 §27. 
22
 Pennsylvania Crimes Code 1972, 18 Pa CS §309 (a). The court in Conway v Dana reasoned that to allow the 
common law defence to coexist would “be to abort truth and to subvert the basic purposes of the adjudicative 
process”. 
23
 See Conway v Dana (1974) 318 A 2d 324, 326. 
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or defences.24 In any constitutional challenge the burden is on the state to prove the 
importance of its asserted objective and the substantial relationship between the classification 
and that objective as well as the proportionality of the nexus between them; which means that 
the state cannot meet the burden of demonstrating constitutionality without showing that a 
gender-neutral25 or marital status-neutral law would be a demonstrably less effective means of 
achieving that goal.26  The law will fail unless the departure from equality is necessary, 
proportionate to that need and is rational in a free-standing way. In relation to the substantive 
law, Michael M v Superior Court of Sonoma County27 was an audacious challenge to the 
constitutionality of the offence of rape in California, which defined that offence so that men 
alone could be criminally liable as principals in the first degree. The unsuccessful challenge 
was that the statute was impermissibly under-inclusive as it did not criminalise the identical 
activities of females. Inequality may in fact be reasonable, depending upon whether there is a 
sufficient underlying interest that justifies the derogation from equality. Identical treatment is 
not in itself a constitutional norm as such rigidity would subvert rather than promote even-
handedness.28 
                                              
24
 But as to provocation see Stingel v The Queen (1990) 65 ALJR 141, 147. “Indeed, it may be that the average 
power of self-control of the members of one sex is higher or lower than the average power of self-control of the 
other sex. The principle of equality before the law requires, however, that the differences between different 
classes or groups be reflected only in the limits within which a particular of self-control can be characterised as 
ordinary.” 
25
 s21 Human Rights Act 1993 [NZ] includes “marital status”, “sex” and “family status” as prohibited grounds 
for discrimination; the linkage is to s19 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 which grants freedom from 
discrimination on at least the enumerated grounds in the Human Rights Act 1993. 
26
 M J Murray, ‘The Criminal Code A General Review’ (June 1983) Attorney General’s Chambers, Western 
Australia vol 1, p53 “In my view, unless good reason can be seen for retaining special rules with respect to 
criminal responsibility of spouses they should generally be abolished. Husbands and wives should with respect 
to offences committed by them with respect to each other or persons outside the marriage be in the same position 
as ordinary persons from the point of view of criminal responsibility. I would propose generally to remove 
distinctions drawn by the law with respect to married persons in connection with their criminal responsibility. 
Only in specific areas, such as with respect to accessories after the fact under Section 10, would I propose to 
remain any differential as to criminal responsibility based solely on the fact that the accused has a status as a 
married person.” This last sentence does not fit the protocol of the others. Why is marriage a valid differentiating 
factor?  
27
 (1981) 450 US 464. The United States Supreme Court has held the offence of rape to be constitutional 
notwithstanding that it is not drafted in gender-neutral language. A gender-based classification will be upheld if 
it bears a “fair and substantial relationship” to legitimate state ends”. In People v Liberta (1984) 64 NY 2d 152, 
cert denied (1985) 471 US 1020 the unsuccessful constitutional challenge was to the rape and sodomy laws of 
New York which exempted married persons. The defendant had been ordered by a Court to leave apart from his 
wife, at the material time. “[W]here a statute draws a distinction based upon marital status, the classification 
must be reasonable and must be based upon some ground of difference that rationally explains the different 
treatment”: Eisenstadt v Baird (1972) 405 US 438, 447. In R v Hess [1990] 2 SCR 906 (SCC) statutory rape law 
did not discriminate against men because the offence was defined in terms of penile penetration. 
28
 R v Man Wai Keung (No 2) [1992] 2 HKCLR 207, 217 (CA) per Bokhary J.  
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A direct challenge to the unconstitutionality of the marital coercion doctrine emerged before 
the Supreme Court of Ireland in State (DPP) v Walsh and Conneely29 which easily concluded 
that the doctrine could not co-exist with the right to equality. A Special Criminal Court had 
found spouses guilty of the capital murder of a police officer and both had been sentenced to 
death. They sought leave to appeal against conviction in the Court of Criminal Appeal.30 
While their applications for leave to appeal were pending, The Irish Times newspaper 
published a report as to whether the Irish Cabinet would intervene in commuting the death 
sentences passed on them. The Director of Public Prosecutions applied for orders of 
attachment or committal and sequestration for a criminal contempt against the journalist, 
editor and publisher of the newspaper.  The High Court found them all in contempt and they 
appealed to the Supreme Court.  One argument advanced to that court31 was that the female 
respondent who had drafted the published statement said to be a criminal contempt, did so in 
the presence of and with the extensive assistance of her husband. She relied on the defence of 
marital coercion as a complete excusatory defence to the contempt.32 Henchy J described the 
submission as “strange” and “lacking in persuasiveness”.  The offence of criminal contempt 
was not the composition of the statement when the husband was present, but in causing it to 
be published. The husband had taken no part in its dissemination although he was beside her 
when she telephoned it to the newspaper.  But the court then dealt with the issue on its merits, 
accepting that there had been undoubtedly a common law defence of coercion available in 
Ireland although the last reported case in which it had been considered there was R v Hallett 
in 191133. The defence was in an effort “to compensate the wife for her inferior status, and in 
particular to make up for her inability to plead benefit of clergy, as her husband could, the law 
concocted the fiction of a prima facie presumption that the act done by her in the presence of 
husband was done under his coercion”. Evidence of initiative by the wife would rebut the 
                                              
29
 [1981] IR 412 (SC). In R v Ruzic (2001) 153 CCC (3d) 1, 30 (SCC) a constitutional challenge to the 
lawfulness of both the presence and immediacy requirements in s17 Criminal Code, which defined the defence 
of duress/compulsion, was upheld. 
30
 The People v Murray [1977] IR 360. 
31
 Henchy, Griffin and Kenny JJ. 
32
 Reference was made to R v Green (1913) 9 Cr App R 228; R v Stapelton (1828) 1 Cr & D 163; R v Hallett 
(1911) 45 ILTR 54; Lynch v Director of Public Prosecutions [1975] NI 25 and T C Purcell ‘Purcell’s Criminal 
Law’ (1848) Law Times, London, p15. 
33
 (1911) 45 ILTR 54. 
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presumption. The court found that the wife had been the prime mover as it was she, “and she 
alone” who telephoned the statement to the newspaper, while her husband merely happened to 
be present. “His mere physical presence in the room could no more provide a defence for her 
than it could form the basis of a conviction of him”. But, although the court found that no 
factual matrix existed to properly generate the defence, it carried on to consider whether the 
defence remained part of Irish law or whether it had been rendered unconstitutional as an 
impermissible derogation from the right of equality before the law.   
 
The Supreme Court ruled that as a matter of constitutional law the marital coercion doctrine 
“was no longer extant”.  Henchy J said: 
 
 The idea that, where a wife performs a criminal act, there should be a prima facie presumption 
that the mere physical presence of her husband when she did it overbore her will, stultified her 
volitional powers, and drove her into criminal conduct which she would have avoided but for 
his presence, pre-supposes a disparity in status and capacity between husband and wife which 
runs counter to the normal relations between a married couple in modern times.34 
 
An uxorial privilege unavailable to any other person of equally deserving character similarly 
conditioned jarred by its stark inequality, particularly as it deprived other persons of a 
concession or criminal defence provided by law. 
 
 The conditions of legal inferiority which attached at common law to the status of a married 
woman and which gave rise to this presumption have been swept away by legislation and by 
judicial decisions. Nowadays, to exculpate a wife for an actus reus because it was done when 
her husband was present is no more justifiable than if she were granted immunity from guilt 
because the act was done in the presence of her father, her brother or any other relative or 
friend. Any other conclusion would be repugnant to the degree of freedom and equality to 
which a wife is entitled in modern society and which has been extensively recognised in the 
statutes and judicial decisions of this State. 
 
 A legal rule that presumes, even on a prima facie and rebuttable basis, that a wife has been 
coerced by the physical presence of her husband into committing an act prohibited by the 
criminal law, particularly when a similar presumption does not operate in favour of a husband 
for acts committed in the presence of his wife, is repugnant to the concept of equality before 
the law guaranteed by the first sentence of Article 40, s1, and could not, under the second 
sentence of that Article, be justified as a discrimination based on any difference of capacity or 
                                              
34
 [1981] IR 412, 449 (SC). 
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of social function as between husband and wife. Therefore the presumption contended for 
must be rejected as being a form of unconstitutional discrimination.35 
 
The whole substratum of the doctrine was based upon the outmoded notion of the inferior 
position of the wife in temporal affairs. The abolition of the doctrine underlined the married 
woman’s present responsibility as being one of equality and therefore co-extensive with her 
present economic status;36  there could be no jurisprudential or even sociological justification 
for the maintenance of the ancient common law rule.37  
 
A second constitutional challenge to a substantive uxorial privilege occurred in United States 
v Hill.38 There an issue arose as to whether it was constitutional to prosecute a wife for 
harbouring her fugitive husband or for being an accessory after the fact to his crime. A wife 
had been convicted of both offences39 in relation to her spouse who was sheltering in Mexico 
for failure to pay child support in the United States. That failure constituted a criminal offence 
in America but not in Mexico, and Mexico was unwilling to extradite the husband.40 On 
appeal, Mrs Hill argued that the two statutory offences were unconstitutional on the basis that 
they impermissibly infringed her constitutional rights of association and marriage. Laws that 
                                              
35
 The Law Reform Commission of Ireland ‘Report on Landlaw and Conveyancing Law: (6) Further General 
Proposals Including the Execution of Deeds’ (May 1998). para 1.30 fn 6: “Some [provisions] involved rules 
which were inherently objectionable on policy grounds, such as The State (Director of Public Prosecutions) v 
Walsh [1981] IR 412. There, the defence of marital coercion, which provided a defence to a wife who committed 
an offence in the presence of her husband, was abolished. In other cases, a gender-neutral extension of the rule 
would have been meaningless: in the case of In re Tilson Infants [1951] IR 1, the rule giving fathers a permanent 
right to custody and control of children was abolished; so too in CM v TM (No.2) [1992] 2 IR 52, where 
extension of the rule on dependent domicile would have been no solution in that a wife’s domicile would have 
been dependent on that of her husband, and the husband’s on that of his wife.” 
36
 In Gottliffe v Edelston  [1930] 2 KB 378, 385  “But in spite of all this the fact remains that marriage creates a 
most important status and one which should create also a substantial identity of social and other interests 
between husband and wife. Hence there seems to be a sound sociological basis for the view of the law that in 
certain respects there should be a presumption of modified unity between husband and wife.” In Conyer v United 
States (1935) 80 F 2d 202, 204 it was said of married women, “their independence…in political, social and 
economic matters rightly places upon them an increased responsibility”.  cf  R v Annie Brown (1896) 15 NZLR 
18,38 per Conolly J “Indeed, it may be fairly argued that a wife is in a less favourable position than a child or a 
servant, since the tendency of modern legislation is to place husbands and wives in a position of absolute 
equality, in which coercion or control is no more to be presumed on one side than on the other.”   
37
 It is improbable that prosecution counsel in England and Wales would take the initiative to have the defence 
declared to be unconstitutional under the Human Rights Act 1999 [UK] but it cannot be beyond the realm of 
possibility that a trial or appellate court in England would, of its own motion, find that any uxorial defence was 
unconstitutional and could not prospectively avail anyone from the time of that decision. 
38
 Unreported United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, No 00-30023, DC No CR-99-60010-1-HO, 27 July 
2001, Nelson, Graber and Rawlinson JJ. 
39
 Contrary to 18 USC § 1071 and 18 USC § 3. 
40
 United States v Hill ibid fn 4 judgment. 
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“slice deeply into the family”41 do not logically infringe the status of marriage, particularly if 
there is a compelling state interest that justifies the intrusion. The United States Court of 
Appeals Ninth Circuit, rejected the wife’s argument that the offences were unconstitutional. A 
wife when so acting in relation to a husband42 had no protection from the criminal law. The 
court reasoned that to exclude a wife by providing her with an immunity “is tantamount to a 
suggestion that spouses may relieve, comfort, or assist each other in violating any and all 
federal criminal laws”43 which was inconsistent with the reasoning of the decision of the 
Supreme Court in United States v Dege44 that spouses could conspire alone together under 
modern American Law. The Court of Appeals determined that the old common law immunity 
of wives had now exhausted itself as being irreconcilable with constitutional imperatives. 
Each of the three exemplars investigated in this work fail the demand of constitutional law 
that the law not be unequal without proportionate substantiation. The ideology of the current 
law to ‘protect’ a wife via marriage (within the criminal law) is itself an illegitimate objective. 
 
Uxorial defences could be fundamentally remodelled to include a husband and also to cover 
wider relationships beyond that of marriage.45 That institution confers a status that is now 
rivalled in numbers and by alternative modes of intimate personal partnership46 – heterosexual 
and homosexual. Other equally close personal relationships47 are generally not provided with 
the protection given to married couples. Intimacy and confidentiality have always been the 
special features of that legal relationship, but it is not rational to suggest that these hallmarks 
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 Moore v City of East Cleveland (1977) 431 US 494, 499. 
42
 In Michael v United States (1968) 393 F 2d 22, the United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit rejected an 
argument that a wife was immune by law for harbouring her wanted husband. It was not unconstitutional to 
remove the old common law immunity; it was unconstitutional to retain it. 
43
 United States v Hill per Nelson J. 
44
 (1960) 364 US 51. 
45
 Stanley Yeo, ‘Coercing Wives Into Crime’, (1992) 6 Australian Journal of Family Law 214. (The most 
comprehensive treatment of the Victorian legislation). 
46
 Mary Glendon, ‘Withering Away of Marriage’ (1976) 62 Virginia LR 663, 686 “Motivations to enter informal 
rather than legal marriage include economic advantages as in the case of many elderly people, inability to enter a 
legal marriage, unwillingness to be subject to the legal effects of marriage, desire for a ‘trial marriage’, and lack 
of concern with the legal institution.”   
47
 R H Graveson and F R Crane eds ‘A Century of Family Law 1857-1957’, (1957) Sweet & Maxwell, London p1. 
“There appears to be no single underlying principle which, by itself, accounts for the special position of husband 
and wife in the criminal law. At least three concepts play an important part. The doctrine of conjugal unity, the 
doctrine of conjugal subjection and the duty, love and tenderness recognised by the law as being owed by a wife 
to her husband.” In Holmes v DPP [1946] AC 588, 600 Viscount Simon said “we have left behind us the age 
when the wife’s subjection to her husband was regarded by the law as the basis of the marital relation”. 
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are only found in marriage48 and that any other arrangement is unable to provide approximate 
or greater fulfilment of those criteria. A contemporary restatement of the marital coercion 
defence “would have to recognise the frequency of unhallowed unions, and perhaps of 
coerced men”.49 The hen-pecked male is an anthropomorphic extrapolation known to the law. 
A reason commonly advanced for confining the defence to actual marriage, as opposed to 
similar relationships, is the difficulty in proving the existence of the latter.50 This objection is 
over-rated, the burden of proving the existence of that relationship is on the proponent of it. It 
is a matter of fact and degree, fitting exactly within the usual fact-finding function of courts, 
to be determined in all the circumstances. It is not a plausible structural reason for inequality. 
Difficulties of proof can attend actual marriage, particularly when it involves polygamous 
circumstances or concubinage, lawful in the jurisdiction of the parties. Common law marriage 
(as opposed to de facto unions) is still available51 and valid in 10 American states as well as in 
the District of Columbia.52 Proof of such marriage requires evidence of cohabitation and 
repute as the marriage is not formally registered. Unless there is a justification on a logical, 
reasonable and sustained basis for separate treatment between spouses, turning on either the 
recent experience of the law or as a remedy for an avowed inequality, the law should provide 
a gender-neutral response in the design of defences to criminal conduct. 
 
Wives are no longer as a generality subject to the thraldom of their spouse so the essential 
policy of the uxorial immunities is decidedly fallacious. In its time those immunities 
represented a pragmatic balance between preserving the stability of the union and the 
competing duty of wives to society. The marital conspiracy exemption is the outcome of a 
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 It is understandable that the motivation for the crime may arise out of the relationship, but that does not affect 
the requisite intention for the commission of the crime. Matters of motivation can be properly taken into account 
in assessing penalty but are irrelevant to the issue of liability for crime. 
49
 Nigel Walker ‘Aggravation, Mitigation and Mercy in English Criminal Justice’ (1999) Blackstone Press Ltd 
London p200 noting that any combination of sexual partnership can involve domination of one participant. 
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 Victorian Law Commissioner, Report No 3, ‘Criminal Liability of Married Persons’ (1975) para 82 noting it 
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 In Meisher v Moore (1877) 96 US 76 the Supreme Court affirmed the lawfulness of common law marriage, 
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23 – 101.  
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particular reductionist policy that sublimates the individuality of the spouses.53 But it also 
undeservedly reinforces marriage as a special attainment that bestrides other similar 
relationships in that it alone exempts from the criminal law. Yet where a wife is irreconcilably 
separated from her husband, she is still entitled to the disparate uxorial privileges. This is 
notwithstanding that the fact of that marriage has become a fiction,54 whereas the uxorial 
privileges have ossified a fiction into a fact.  
 
The common law did not contemplate the vicissitudes of marriage thrown up by polygamy 
and customary law concubinage, seeing marriage only in terms of the orthodox Christian 
model. These other marital configurations are no longer irksome exotica but are practical 
complexities in modern pluralistic jurisdictions.55 Their existence further militates against the 
perpetuation of special rules in the substantive criminal law for married women. When the 
criminal law places a particular premium on the single institution of marriage, it is significant 
that in practice the freedom to marry may itself not be a valid assumption.56 The common law 
has never, even now, equipped itself to deal with the twilight zone of persons of reassigned 
gender, whose rights under the law to claim uxorial privileges are as yet undefined. The 
complete removal of uxorial privileges would eliminate the need for such classification. 
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 Eisenstadt v Baird (1972) 405 US 438, 453 per Brennan J “The marital couple is not an independent entity 
with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and 
emotional makeup.” 
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 See R v Salituro (1991) 68 CCC (3d) 289 (SCC). In Canada, the factually dead but legally existing marriage 
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 Dame Brenda Hale, Judge David Pearl, Elizabeth J Cooke, Philip D Bates (eds)‘The Family, Law and Society 
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 Miron v Trudel [1995] 2 SCR 418; Reference Re Same-Sex Marriage [2004] 3 SCR 698, 725 “The decision to 
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considerations by the individual. In theory, the individual is free to choose whether to marry, or not to marry. In 
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unit from formally marrying. In short, marital status often lies beyond the individual’s effective control.”  
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On a time-line basis, the history of the change in marital status in criminal law exemplifies the 
adhocracy which has characterised significant parts of criminal law reform in common law 
jurisdictions. All too often the priority has been significant single issue reforms, which have 
deflected the possibility of attention and the finesse required for meso-level evaluations and 
overviews. In addition, the relative importance in the law of marriage has palpably diminished, 
as it has been statistically overtaken by alternative modes of special partnerships of personal 
and intimate commitment. The introductory formalities of marriage are generally settled and 
no longer represent matters of serious legal consideration; the emphasis now is not on the entry 
process but on the responsiveness of the law to the consequences57 flowing from the 
arrangement or ones like it. 
 
The erratic nature of uxorial law reform is evidence that individualised reaction to a specific 
litigation outcome, rather than a principled review of the underlying basis for the collection of 
disparate rules, has shaped legislative approaches. In New Zealand, for example, the first 
significant incision was made in 1893 followed in the next century by other modifications; yet 
still in the twenty-first century marital status still constitutes a defence in law in one 
circumstance. To compare the development between the pioneering criminal code jurisdictions 
and other common law countries is truly instructive as most of the uxorial privileges rejected 
almost 120 years ago in Canada and New Zealand still subsist in England and Wales, not just 
in the open-textured nature of the common law, but engrossed by legislative enactment. 
 
It is the lack of consistency that is the design-fault in criminal law in this area. To have 
removed marital coercion, yet to have left intact the exemption for marital conspiracy, makes 
the current Canadian position truly anomalous. It was the English Law Commission that 
concluded to remove the conspiracy exemption58 would undermine marital stability,59 so it 
proposed its retention; yet in almost the same breath it recommended the abrogation of the 
marital coercion doctrine. But the abolition of the privilege against the disclosure of marital 
                                              
57
 If a wife or a husband has become involved in a conspiracy because of the relationship this could be 
legitimately seen as a substantial feature of mitigation in any sentencing exercise, but it cannot justify elevation to 
an absolute immunity. 
58
 Law Commission No76, ‘Criminal Law: Report on Conspiracy and Criminal Law Reform’, (March 1976) 
para 1.46. 
59
 Law Commission, Working Paper No 50: Inchoate Offences, Conspiracy, Attempt and Incitement, para 36. 
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communications,60 it supported.61 A hallmark of law reform in this sector has been adhocracy 
and unevenness.  
 
Apart from the omission of the law reform bodies, common law judges have not generally 
dealt with the uxorial privilege issue in terms of gender-equality, but to date have seen it in a 
reliquary as a stubborn remnant of coverture. While the English common law of crime 
progressed62 it had not become an homogenous development because of its inconsistency and 
intrinsic contradictions.63 The advent of statutory intervention has not been accompanied by a 
general reappraisal of the fundamental issue, but is a piecemeal response that ultimately has 
only served to exacerbate the dissymmetry between the uxorial privileges and the general 
criminal law. The present status of the relative positions between wives under English and 
New Zealand criminal law demonstrates that there is no coherent approach. In the former the 
two common law rulings of Darling J in R v Peel in 1922 as to marital coercion and 
intraspousal conspiracy remain, 85 years later, entrenched in English law; now consecrated by 
statute. In the latter neither uxorial privilege remains. In the former the accessorial uxorial 
privilege has been diluted by statute to a generic anodyne provision, making no gender-
specific distinction at all, whereas in the latter, that privilege remains available to wives, has 
been extended to husbands and has been recast to include homosexual unions. 
 
Sometimes an omnibus enactment may mean that the precise implications of all the 
consequential amendments flowing from the new legislation, may have been overlooked. The 
New Zealand Parliament enacted the Relationships (Statutory References) Act 2005 in which 
some 113 other Acts were consequentially amended, including the provision dealing with 
                                              
60
 Provided by s1(d) Criminal Evidence Act 1898. 
61
 Law Commissioner, Eleventh Report, Evidence (General), 1972, Cmnd 4991, para 173. Where a statute draws 
a distinction based upon marital status, the classification must be reasonable and must be based upon “some 
ground of difference that rationally explains the different treatment”; People v Liberta (1984) 474 NE 2d 567, 
573 (NY: CA). 
62
 Haseldine v CA Daw and Son Ltd [1941] 2 KB 343, 362 (CA) per Scott LJ. “The common law of England has 
throughout its long history developed as an organic growth…and in the last hundred years at an ever increasing 
rate of progress, as new cases arising under new conditions of society, of applied science, and of public opinion, 
have presented themselves for solution by the courts.”  
63
 Best v Samuel Fox & Co [1952] AC 716, 727 per Lord Porter. “The common law is a historical development 
rather than a logical whole, and the fact that a particular doctrine does not logically accord with another or others 
is no grounds for its rejection.” While the first clause is accurate, the second clause is no longer accurate as, if a 
legal doctrine is not syncopated with constitutional minima, then it is exactly grounds for its rejection. 
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marital coercion. It is now provided by the amended s24(3) Crimes Act 1961, that the 
presumption of marital coercion also does not exist for persons in a civil union. At the same 
time, the accessorial immunity was extended to persons in a civil union. The very limited 
opportunity to debate whether that accessorial immunity, which had been by some variant in 
the statute since 1893, should be maintained in any form at all, was lost. The issue was simply 
never raised as the systematic quest to substitute for “wife” the phrase “wife or civil union 
partner” monopolised the parliamentary attention span. By default the underlying substantive 
criminal law issue went unnoticed having been overlooked in the quest to equalise marriage 
and civil unions. 
 
Since 1843, the marital coercion defence has been ear-tagged for destruction but has survived 
in England and other jurisdictions where it has become fortified in statute. It is entirely 
possible that it will survive for many years on the basis that it is relatively harmless and 
hardly a grotesque interference with the equanimity of the criminal law. Further, 
parliamentary time and resources may not be devoted to it or the other uxorial remnants 
because of other priorities.  
 
A number of reasons explain the chaotic state of the relevant law. The general ennui64 of courts 
and legislatures to extinguish the uxorial privilege doctrine is significantly due to nonchalance. 
There has been no comprehensive single issue study since the Victorian Law Reform 
Commissioner in 1975 successfully recommended the introduction of a package of 
amendments to introduce wife-specific protections in the criminal law. Some of the inertia is 
also attributable to the ineradicable belief that some soft compensatory advantage in favour of 
married women remains a harmless gesture. There still continues in some common law 
jurisdictions a demonstrated need for protection in the criminal law for wives, because of the 
quantum and nature of physical and psychological spousal dominance still a reality of cultural 
diversity. The lack of economic independence of wives in those societies correlates with a lack 
of genuine choice. In Canada, despite its pioneering removal of the marital coercion defence in 
1892, it has sustained the spousal conspiratorial exemption for the last 50 years, relying on the 
                                              
64
 Re Xerox of Canada Limited and Regional Assessment Commissioner Region No 10 (1980) 30 OR 2d 90, 95 
per Jessup JA: “Perhaps we can all be forgiven; we were nurtured uncritically on the good old English common 
law principles and over the years they have become our security blanket that we are loathe to part with.”   
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theory of stare decisis.  In other jurisdictions the uxorial laws have provoked little in the way 
of legal literature or other interest, resulting in virtually no caselaw. The somnolence is 
explicable by the perception of the comparative unimportance of the wider issue and the 
possible political risks in raising it. For a significant number of jurisdictions, like the former 
colonies which acquired the Anglo-prototype of uxorial privileges, the necessity to deal with 
the modern implications is unlikely to arise in the absence of a change or reform in England or 
without an innovative constitutional challenge. It is remarkable that the very issue which 
divided the New Zealand Court of Appeal in 1926 in R v McKechie, whether criminal 
legislation by its implication intended to remove the ‘defence of marriage’ from the law, is still 
likely to identify the separation point in any constitutional challenge to primary legislation, in 
those jurisdictions which permit it. The primary issue still is whether the statutory objective is 
itself defensible and consequentially whether a special exemption from the general criminal 
law is a legitimate response. The modern linking language of proportionality was not envoked 
by either Stout CJ or Ostler J in their dissenting judgments, but their methodology in reasoning 
that an intraspousal conspiracy ought to be justiciable, is a prescient example of it. 
 
If one such privilege ought no longer to exist, other changes become inevitable to produce an 
overall principle, in which the fact and consequences of marriage provide no exemption from 
the substantive criminal law. The conclusion is that changes to the law have accrued without 
any logical coherence, with only limited individual aspects of the greater issue having ever 
been considered. There has been occasional progression but no systematic development. In 
seeking to find a single sustainable principle for the uxorial privileges in the substantive 
criminal law there is found nothing but confusion, obscurity and inconsistency. These 
defences, radiations of conjugal unity, have been useful instruments for the furtherance of the 
policy of the law to protect the institution of marriage and especially to compensate for the 
supposed vulnerabilities of wives, but they are unreal as expositions in themselves of the 
living law.  The doctrine of marital unity was always a gnomic but misleading perception of 
the law. Even from the time of King Ine matrimony had never constituted a general defence to 
criminal law, as a wife was always recognised as thoroughly capable of independent or 
complicit criminal conduct. 
 
   
 473 
One of the aims of the rule of law is to render law intelligible, as far as possible, to those who 
are subject to it.65 Despite its pedigree of over 1000 years, and indeed because of it, the 
special position of married women under the substantive criminal law remains a serious 
doctrinal anomaly, divorced from the truth of the exultation that: 
 
 Happily, in our day, the law, if not exactly “the perfection of reason”, will generally warrant 
the conclusions of an accurate thinker. 66 
 
 
                                              
65
 R S Mackay ‘Case and Comment’ (1955) 33 Can Bar Review 75 n9 “To the layman such a result is patently 
ridiculous” – the notion that spouses could not in law conspire together. 
66
 Pearson v Clark (1864) Mac 136, 144 (CA). Sir James Fitzjames Stephen ‘Edinburgh Review’ (1861) cxiv 
481: “History without analysis is at best a mere curiosity; and analysis without history is blind, though it may not 
be barren.” 
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APPENDIX 
 
SUBSTANTIVE UXORIAL PRIVILEGES IN COMMON LAW JURISDICTIONS 
 
Anguilla,67 Australian Capital Territory,68 Belize,69 Canada,70 Canal Zone (of Panama, 
administered by the United States of America),71 Cayman Islands,72 Cook Islands,73 Cyprus,74 
                                              
67
 In Anguilla a conspiracy between two spouses is not possible; Section 32(b)(i) Criminal Code, Revised 
Statutes of Anguilla, Chapter c140, 2000, Attorney General’s Chambers, Anguilla marital coercion exists under 
the English model Section 19 ibid. The accessory immunity exists for a wife and is the extended husband plus 
cohort exemption; the husband has the immunity only in relation to his wife s28 ibid. Revised Statutes of 
Anguilla, ch C140, Criminal Code, 15 December 2000. There can  be no intraspousal conspiracy in Anguilla. 
Exceptions to section 31: Revised Statutes of Anguilla, ch C140, Criminal Code, 15 December 2000.  “32. A 
person shall not, by virtue of section 31, be convicted of conspiracy to commit an offence, if - (a) he is the sole 
intended victim of the offence; or (b) the only other person with whom he agrees is (both initially and at all times 
during the currency of the agreement) a person of any one or more of the following descriptions - his spouse …” 
68
 s407 Crimes Act 1990 [ACT], notified in ACT Gazette No 50: 15 December 1999. 
69
 The law of Belize does not exempt intramarital conspiracy: s24 Belize Criminal Code, ch 101, Revised Edition 
2000 and only the presumption of marital coercion but not the defence is actually abolished: s29 Belize Criminal 
Code. 
70
 Section 13 Criminal Code 1892 [Can]. Don Stuart, ‘Canadian Criminal Law A Treatise’, (1982) Carswell Co 
Ltd, Toronto, p384, says of that section that it abolished “an arbitrary and socially dated notion that a wife could 
rely on the defence of duress merely on account of the marital bond. Our abolition as early as 1892 was in terms 
more forthright than the later abolishing statutory provision in England, which still presents difficulties”. R v 
Warren et Ux (1888) 16 OR 590 (QBD) MacMahon J followed R v Williams (1795) 10 Mod R 63 and R v Dixon 
and his wife (1795) 10 Mod R 335 and held that there may be a joint conviction against husband and wife for 
keeping a house of ill-fame. At 592: “the criminal management of the house (in which the wife may probably 
have as great, nay a greater share than the husband”. R v McGregor (1895) 26 OR 115 (CPD) Meredith CJ and 
Rose J referred to R v Williams (1878) 42 UCR 462 but found that if the presumption had existed it would have 
been rebutted as “the wife was the more active party” but the presumption had been “now entirely swept away” 
by s13 Criminal Code 1892 [Can] so reliance upon it was misconceived. R v Mrs Philip Williams (1878) 42 
UCR 462 the appellant had been convicted of unlawfully selling liquor without a licence. Gwynne J noted that as 
early as R v Crofts (1795) 2 Str 1120 that a married woman had been convicted of this offence and that there was 
no evidence that the husband had been present at the sale, as, at p465, at the material time “the husband was in 
gaol for a similar offence”, so no presumption arose.  In R v Robins (1982) 66 CCC (2d) 550, 562 the Québec 
Court of Appeal (Crête CJQ, Mayrand and Malouf JJA) stated that the 1892 Criminal Code abolished the 
antiquated defence of marital coercion “to place the woman on a equal footing with all other citizens.” There can  
be no intraspousal conspiracy in Canada: Kowbel v The Queen [1954] 4 DLR 337 (SCC). 
71
 Canal Zone Code 1963 title 6 § 45(a)(9). 
72
 s30 Criminal Code [Cayman Islands] Title 8, Item 31, 1971 Revised, excuses the wife in relation to the 
husband and where in his presence and by his authority another who committed the offence is involved. No 
provision for her as the principal and him as an immune accessory after the fact exists. The spouses cannot 
conspire alone Section 50 ibid but marital coercion s49 operates where the wife “is actually compelled by her 
husband” and “in his presence”, with capital offences excepted. 
73
 Crimes Act 1969 [Cook Is] [1994 Revised Edition] s27(3) provides “where a married woman commits an 
offence, the fact that her husband was present at the commission of it shall not of itself raise the presumption of 
compulsion”. 
74
 Section 19 Cyprus Criminal Code Order in Council 1928, Government Printing Office, Nicosia, 1928, 
reprinted 1939. The same section appears later as s18 Criminal Code 1959 (Revised Edition) Cap 154 provided 
“A married woman is not free from criminal responsibility for doing or omitting to do an act merely because the 
act or omission takes place in the presence of her husband”. But s24 provides “A wife does not become an 
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England,75 Fiji,76 Gibraltar,77 Guyana,78 Hong Kong,79 India,80 Ireland,81 Isle of Man,82 
Kenya,83 Kiribati,84 New South Wales,85 New Zealand,86 Nigeria,87 Niue,88 North Carolina89 
                                                                                                                                             
accessory after the fact to the offence of which her husband is guilty by receiving or assisting him in order to 
enable him to escape punishment; not by receiving or assisting, in her husband’s presence and by his authority, 
another person who is guilty of an offence in the commission of which her husband has taken part, in order to 
enable that other person to escape punishment; nor does a husband become accessory after the fact to an offence 
of which his wife is guilty by receiving or assisting her in order to enable her to escape punishment”. No 
exemption from conspiracy exists though.  
75
 s47 Criminal Justice Act 1925 [UK].  There can be no intraspousal conspiracy in England and Wales: s2(2)(a) 
Criminal Law Act 1977 [UK].  
76
 s19 Penal Code Cap 17 (1985 Edition) [Fiji] provides “A married woman is not free from criminal 
responsibility of doing or omitting to do an act merely because the act or omission takes place in the presence of 
her husband; but, on a charge against a wife for any offence other than treason or murder, it shall be a good 
defence to prove that the offence was committed in the presence of, and under the coercion of the husband”: 
Mark Findlay, ‘Criminal Laws of the South Pacific’ (2000) 2 ed, Institute of Justice for Applied Legal Studies, 
p191, states “Thus the presumption is removed but the defence remains if the defendant can discharge the 
nominated evidentiary requirements.” ‘Conspiracies’ ss385-387 does not exempt a wife from conspiring with 
her husband. P Imrana Jalal, ‘Law for Pacific Women, a Legal Rights Handbook’, (1998) Fiji Women’s Rights 
Movement, Suva, Fiji at p82: “Marital rape is not seen as a crime in our region; if a man is legally married to the 
women he rapes, he may not be found guilty of rape”. Intraspousal conspiracy is possible: ss385-387 Penal 
Code[Fiji].  
77
 In Gibraltar marital coercion is treated differently again. Section 5 Criminal Offences Ordinance 
[Gibraltar](1984). “5. Where a married woman is charged with an offence other than treason or murder, it is a 
good defence to prove that the offence was committed in the presence of, and under the coercion of, her 
husband.” By s12 (2) (a) intraspousal conspiracy is impossible. There can  be no intraspousal conspiracy in 
Gibraltar: Criminal Offences Ordinance [Gibraltar] 1984 edition: 5. Where a married woman is charged with an 
offence other than treason or murder, it is a good defence to prove that the offence was committed in the 
presence of, and under the coercion of, her husband.” “11(1) Subject to the following provisions of this Part, a 
person who agrees with any other person or persons that a course of conduct shall be pursued which, if the 
agreement is carried out in accordance with their intentions, either … (5) This Part shall not apply to any 
conspiracy under the common law of England.” Exemptions from liability. “12.(1) A person all not by virtue of 
section 11 be guilty of conspiracy to commit any offence if he is an intended victim of that offence. (2) A person 
shall not by virtue of section 11 be guilty of conspiracy to commit any offence or offences if the other person or 
persons with whom he agrees are (both initially and at all times during the currency of the agreement) persons of 
any one or more of the following descriptions, that is to say – his spouse;”    
78
 In Guyana, if the marital coercion was rebutted conviction followed and the formal order of conviction did not 
have to recite that the defendant was the wife of the husband: Govia v King unreported, 29 August 1874, 
Supreme Court of British Guiana, noted by BEJC Belmonte, ‘An Alphabetical Digest and Index Appended of 
about 1,800 Reprinted written Judgments of Decisions of the Several Courts of Justice in British Guiana from 
1856 to 31st December 1906’ (1907) Sweet & Maxwell, LW, London, p133. “Married woman may be convicted 
for offence committed by her without coercion of her husband; not necessary to join husband in the conviction. 
[Govia v King, 29.8.74]” “Wife convicted together with husband on charge of making use of distillery apparatus 
while not having a licence. Evidence that she acted under control and coercion of her husband. [Bassie v Kerr, 
18.6.04]” Where spouses were convicted of using an unlicensed still, the presumption of marital coercion 
applied and was not rebutted. Bassie v Kerr unreported 18 June 1904 Supreme Court of British Guiana noted by 
O E Sharples, ‘A Digest of Cases Decided in the Supreme Court of British Guiana During the Years 1901-1905’, 
(1906) Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, London, p35-36. 
79
 s9 Criminal Procedure Amendment Ord 1930 [HK] now renumbered as s100 Criminal Procedure Ord Cap 
221 [HK] provides for marital coercion. There can be no intraspousal conspiracy in Hong Kong: s159B(2)(a) 
Crimes Ordinance Cap 200 [HK]. Accessorial immunity follows the English model: s90 Criminal Procedure 
Ord. 
80
 The Indian Penal Code gave no special privilege to the wife: The law of India never recognised marital 
coercion. John D Mayne, ‘Commentaries on the Indian Penal Code’, 14 ed (1890) Higginbotham and Co, 
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Madras, p64. “follow[ing] the Scotch law in this respect with the single exception of “harbouring” which is no 
offence when a wife harbours her husband.” Citing: “Mad HC Rul, 12th April 1870”, to this effect s136 Penal 
Code [India], dealing with harbouring of military deserters, specifically exempts a wife, whereas sections 212 
and 216 dealing with harbouring offenders, excuses both husbands and wives. Intraspousal conspiracy is 
possible, s120A Penal Code does not exempt married couples.  
81
 State (DPP) v Walsh and Conneely [1981] IR 412 (SC) declared that the marital coercion doctrine was 
unconstitutional, being violative of equality rights. 
82
 The Isle of Man makes no exemption and gives no immunity to a wife from any crime Criminal Code 1872, 
Isle of Man. 
83
 In R v Wambogo (1924) 10 KLR 3 the Supreme Court of Kenya had to decide whether a native woman, 
married according to native law and custom, acted under the coercion of her husband. At that time the Indian 
Penal Code applied to the Colony of Kenya and the East Africa Court of Appeal held there was no room for the 
common law presumption of marital coercion. But in 1955 Worley VP, delivering the judgment of the court held 
that Wambogo must now be read in the light of s20 Penal Code (Kenya) which has put in effect a statutory 
enactment of the common law presumption: “We are not aware of any reported decision of any court in East 
Africa on the application of this section to a woman married according to native custom”: Lenson Ambindwile 
s/o Mafubila v Reginam [1955] 22 EACA 448 (Nihill P, Worley V P, Briggs JA) s20 of the Penal Code (Kenya) 
provided: “A married woman is not free from criminal responsibility for doing or omitting to do any act merely 
because the act or omission takes place in the presence of her husband; but on a charge against a wife for any 
offence other than treason or murder, it shall be a good defence to prove that the offence was committed in the 
presence of, and under the coercion of the husband”. 
84
 s19 Penal Code Cap 67 (Revised Edition 1977) [Kiribati] provides compulsion by husband “A married 
woman is not free from criminal responsibility for doing or omitting to do an act because the act or omission 
takes place in the presence of her husband; but on a charge against a wife any offence other than treason or 
murder, it shall be a good defence to prove that the offence was committed in the presence of, and under the 
coercion of the husband”. 
85
 s407A Crimes Act 1900 (as amended) (1924) [NSW]. 
86
 Criminal Code  Act 1893 [NZ], now s24(3) Crimes Act 1961 [NZ].  Intraspousal conspiracy is possible: s67 
Crimes Act 1961 [NZ]. Accessorial immunity still exists: s71(2) Crimes Act 1961 [NZ]. 
87
 In the Criminal Code Act Cap.77, ‘Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990’ the Schedule to the Act sets out 
the Code of Criminal Law and Part I ch 1 defines “Christian marriage” as meaning “a marriage which is 
recognised by the law of the place where it is contracted as the voluntary union for life of one man and one 
woman to the exclusion of all others”. Ch 2 s10 provides for the crime of an accessory after the fact and then 
adds an exemption in these terms: “A wife does not become an accessory after the fact to an offence of which 
her husband is guilty by receiving or, assisting him in order to enable him to escape punishment; nor by 
receiving or assisting, in her husband’s presence and by his authority, another person who is guilty of an offence 
in the commission of which her husband has taken part, in order to enable that other person to escape 
punishment; nor does a husband become accessory after the fact to an offence of which his wife is guilty by 
receiving or assisting her in order to enable her to escape punishment”. The section expressly states that the term 
“wife” and “husband” mean respectively the wife and husband of a Christian marriage. In Part I ch 4 clause 33 it 
states: “A married woman is not free from criminal responsibility for doing or omitting to do an act merely 
because the act or omission takes place in the presence of her husband. But a wife of a Christian marriage is not 
criminally responsible for doing or omitting to do an act which she is actually compelled by her husband to do or 
omit to do, and which is done or omitted to be done in his presence, except in the case of an act or omission 
which would constitute an offence punishable with death, or an offence of which grievous harm to the person of 
another, or an intention to cause such harm, is an element, in which case the presence of her husband is 
immaterial”. It can be noted that this legislation uniquely deals with criminal acts by omission. Ch 4 clause 34 
finally provides: “A husband and wife of Christian marriage are not criminally responsible for a conspiracy 
between themselves alone”. This country which embraces both Christianity and the Muslim religions also 
recognises the defence of marital unity to the crime of conspiracy. See Robert Yorke Hedges, ‘Introduction to 
the Criminal Law of Nigeria’ (1983) Sweet & Maxwell, London, p174. Section 34 of the Criminal Code of 
Nigeria expressly restricts the concept to a “Christian marriage” thereby excluding polygamy. It seems 
unarguably clear that a Christian marriage is intended to be a monogamous one. ANE Amissah, ‘Criminal 
Procedure in Ghana’ (1982) Sedco Publishing Ltd, Accra at p200: “Under the old [Criminal Procedure] Code 
(Cap 10) there was discrimination between the spouse married under the Marriage Ordinance and his or her 
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counterpart married according to custom or Mohammedan law over the question of privilege from giving 
evidence in the criminal case against the other spouse. Both types of spouses were competent witnesses for the 
prosecution. But this spouse married under the Ordinance was not compellable while “one married to another 
person otherwise than by a Christian marriage” was compellable”. There can be no intraspousal conspiracy in 
Nigeria. This country which embraces both Christianity and the Muslim religions also recognises the defence of 
marital unity to the crime of conspiracy. See Robert Yorke Hedges, ‘Introduction to the Criminal Law of 
Nigeria’ (1903) Sweet & Maxwell, London, p174. Section 34 of the Criminal Code of Nigeria expressly restricts 
the concept to a “Christian marriage” thereby excluding polygamy. It seems unarguably clear that a Christian 
marriage is intended to be a monogamous one. Ch 4 clause 34 Criminal Code Act, Cap 77, Laws of the 
Federation of Nigeria, 1990 finally provides: “A husband and wife of Christian marriage are not criminally 
responsible for a conspiracy between themselves alone”. The Nigerian Criminal Code based on the Griffith 
code, was enacted in 1904 and was essentially adopted in Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika and Nyasaland and 
became ‘the foundation of the criminal law in much of Anglophonic Africa. Robin S O’Regan, ‘New Essays on 
the Australian Criminal Codes’ (1988) The Law Book Company Ltd, Sydney p107 discusses its formation. 
Drafted by Gollan CJ of the British Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia (later Sir Henry Gollan, Chief Justice of 
Hong Kong), it principally follows the Griffith model. Note that it differentiates between Christian and non-
Christian marriages: see P J Pace ‘Impeding Arrest” – A Wife’s Right as a Spouse?’ [1978] Crim LR 82. In 
Idiong v The King (1950-1951) 13 WACA 30 a conviction for murder was quashed where the prosecution had 
relied upon the evidence of a woman married to the first appellant, without ascertaining whether that marriage 
was monogamous. As it had not been proved affirmatively that she was the wife of a polygamous marriage it 
was held to be a material irregularity as she would not otherwise be a competent witness.   
88
 s238 Niue Act 1966 [NZ] provides “Common Law Defences – all rules and principles of the Common Law 
which render any circumstance a justification or excuse for any act or omission, or a defence to any charge, shall 
remain in force with respect to all offences constituted by this or any other enactment, except so far as 
inconsistent with this or any other enactment”. 
89
 State v Owen unreported Supreme Court of North Carolina, No COA 98-413, 15 June 1999; affirming the 
existence of the marital coercion defence there. 
90
 s37 Criminal Justice Act 1945 [NI] abolishes the presumption of coercion and is in the identical form to s47 
Criminal Justice Act 1925 [UK]. 
91
 The Northern Territory see s40 (duress) and s41 (coercion) Criminal Code Act 1983 (NT) abolished the entire 
defence but reformulated the general defence of duress in wider terms than those appearing in other Australian 
jurisdictions. The test imposed by s40 Criminal Code Act 1983 [NT] ensures a proportionate relationship 
between the harm caused by the offence and the intensity of the external pressure brought to bear on the 
defendant. Intraspousal conspiracies are possible: s291 Criminal Code Act 1983 [NT].  
92
 s33(2) Criminal Code Act 1974 [PNG] a wife  is “not criminally responsible for doing or omitting to do an act 
that (a) she is actually compelled by her husband to do or omit to do and (b) is done or omitted to be done in his 
presence”. There can be no intraspousal conspiracy in Papua New Guinea: s34 Criminal Code Act 1974 [PNG]. 
93
 s32 Criminal Code Act 1899 [Qld] (repealed in 1977). The intraspousal conspiracy exemption was abrogated 
by s120 Criminal Law Amendment Act (No.3 of 1997) [Qld].  
94
 By ss24 and 97 Crimes Ordinance 1961 [Samoa] marriage is not a defence to the charge of conspiracy, as 
under coercion: see Mark Findlay, ‘Criminal Laws of the South Pacific’ (2000) 2 ed, Institute of Justice and 
Applied Legal Studies, p96.  
95
 s63 Criminal Code of St Lucia. The 1992 revision of the criminal law of St Lucia passed in the House of 
Assembly 3 April 1992 and in the Senate on 7 April 1992. An earlier version of which had been expressly noted 
by the Avory Committee, exactly replicates s47 Criminal Justice Act 1925 [UK]. No exemption though is made 
from an intra-spousal conspiracy. Section 99 ibid. “63. No presumption shall be made that a married woman 
committing an offence does so under compulsion because she commits it in the presence of her husband, but on 
a charge against a wife for any offence other than treason or murder it shall be a good defence to prove that the 
offence was committed in the presence of, and under the coercion of, the husband.”  “99. If two or more persons 
agree to act together with a common purpose in committing or abetting a crime, whether with or without any 
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previous concert or deliberation, each of them is guilty of conspiracy to commit or abet that crime, as the case 
may be.”  
96
 Has never recognised any part of the marital coercion defence: Archibald Alison, Principles of the Criminal 
Law of Scotland (1832) William Blackwood, Edinburgh p668. 
97
 s19 Penal Code Cap26 (Revised Edition 1996) [Solomon Is] “Compulsion by Spouse “a married person is not 
free from criminal responsibility for doing or omitting to do an act merely because the act or omission takes 
place in the presence of that person’s spouse; from a charge against a married person for any offence other than 
treason or murder, it shall be a good defence to prove that the offence was committed in the presence of and 
under the coercion of that person’s spouse”. This section was amended by s2 of Act 5 of 1989 [SI] to extend 
marital coercion to spouses rather than confine it to a wife. This is a unique formulation of the old law. The 
explanation for this equality is that it “was in line with the provisions of the Constitution on discrimination on 
the basis of gender”: Mark Findlay, ‘Criminal Laws of the South Pacific’ (2000) 2 ed, Institute of Justice for 
Applied Legal Studies, p191. See s15(4), Chapter II, The Constitution of Solomon Islands, SI 1978 No 83 
[Solomon Is]. 
98
 R v Mtetwa 1921 TPD 227 where Wessels JP concluded that Roman-Dutch law did not recognise the common 
law defence of marital coercion, although prior to then South African common law had. 
99
 s12 Criminal Law Consolidation Amendment Act 1940 [SA]. 
100
 Tasmania, not only abolished the presumption, but also the entire defence, on the basis of incompatibility 
with female emancipation; s20(2) Criminal Code Act 1924 [Tas]. 
101
 Tokelau Crimes Regulations 1975 1975/1929 made on 1 December 1975 applied the provisions of Part v, vi, 
vii of the Niue Act 1966 to Tokelau subject to the provisions of the regulations. 
102
 s22 Criminal Offences Act Cap 18 [Tonga] provides in Part III “Exemptions from Criminal Responsibility 
and Responsibility for Acts of Involuntary Agents”. Section 22 provides “A married woman committing an 
offence in the presence of her husband shall not be presumed to have committed it under his compulsion.” 
103
 Trinidad and Tobago has the identical English model for marital coercion. s7 Criminal Law Act 1936 Laws of 
Trinadad and Tobago, ‘Criminal Law’ c.10:04. 
104
 s19 Penal Code Cap 8 (Revised Edition) [Tuvalu] provides “A married woman is not free from criminal 
responsibility for doing or omitting to do an act merely because the act or omission takes place in the presence of 
her husband; but on a charge against a wife for any offence other than treason or murder, it shall be a good 
defence to prove that the offence was committed in the presence of, and under the coercion of, the husband”. 
Section 19 is found in Part IV called “General Rules as to Criminal Responsibility”. 
105
 Intraspousal conspiracy is an offence: United States v Dege (1960) 364 US 51. 
106
 s26 Penal Code [Vanuatu] Laws of the Republic of Vanuatu Revised, edition 1988, chapter 135, Penal Code. 
“26(1) Criminal responsibility shall be diminished in the case of an offence committed by a person acting – (a) 
under actual compulsion or threats, not otherwise avoidable, of death or grievous harm; (b) under the coercion of 
a parent, spouse, employer or other person having actual or moral authority over such persons”. Sub-section 2 
criminal responsibilities shall not be diminished under sub-section 1 if the person acting has voluntarily exposed 
himself to the risk of such compulsion, threats or coercion. There is no provision for a conspiracy between 
spouses. Vanuatu Penal Code Cap 135 (Revised Edition 1988).  Section 29(2) Penal Code provides “there can 
be no conspiracy between husband and wife”. In addition, it has a unique formulation of coercion which extends 
well beyond a married woman, to include her spouse, an employer or “other person having actual or moral 
authority” over another. There can be no intraspousal conspiracy in Vanuatu: Penal Code Cap 135 (Revised 
Edition 1988). Section 29(2) provides: “there can be no conspiracy between husband and wife”. “A husband and 
wife alone cannot be found guilty of conspiracy because they are, in law, one person.” The Penal Code (1988) 
by ss28-29: “Only criminal offences can be the subject of criminal charges, and the offence must state that 
conspiracy to commit that offence is an offence in itself. There is no provision for a conspiracy between a 
husband and wife in Vanuatu.” Mark Findlay, ‘Criminal Laws of the South Pacific’ (2000) 2 ed, Institute of 
Justice and Applied Legal Studies, p96.     
107
 s336 (1) Crimes Act 1958 [Vic], inserted in 1977: there can be no intraspousal conspiracy or incitement in 
Victoria: s339(2) Crimes Act 1958 [Vic] which by ss(1) exempts “conspiracy to commit treason or murder”. 
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108
 s32 Criminal Code Act 1902 [WA] repealed s118(2) Acts Amendment (Equality of Status) Act 2003 [WA]. 
Intraspousal conspiracy has been possible since 14 March 1988: s6 Criminal Code Amendment Act (No 2) 1987 
[WA].  
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